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
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
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ROBERT EDWARD LEE

*From a daguerreotype probably made when he
was colonel of cavalry, U. S. A., now in possession
of the Virginia Historical Society, Richmond.*

*From the portrait as commander-in-chief,
C. S. A., painted by J. A. Elder, now in the
Corcoran Gallery, Washington.*

THE HISTORY OF NORTH AMERICA
VOLUME FOURTEEN *THE CIVIL WAR*
FROM A SOUTHERN STANDPOINT

BY THE LATE

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EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

THE war between the States gave rise to an enormous literature which is each year increasing in bulk. The majority of the items of this vast accumulation of historical contribution is absolutely partisan, and of the rest we do not find half a dozen that are unbiased and at the same time virile. Neutrality seems attainable by emasculation alone. Reflection will show the cause for this state of affairs; reason will demonstrate that when sentiment causes and maintains a conflict, no relation of the struggle that does not reflect the sentiment is a faithful presentation of the consequent war. Historians have found it easy to reflect one side or the other, but not to give both. Believing that the reason for this was sound, THE HISTORY OF NORTH AMERICA did not seek to present in one volume the views of the North and the South. The editor held it important that the story of the North should be told by a man of the North, while that of the South should be related by a native of that section, and that both sides should be presented by men identified with the great internecine strife.

The editor was confirmed in this opinion by the fact that of all the general histories not one so presented the narrative of the Civil War, and it seemed most fitting that in this, the first history of North America, the initiative should be taken in recording the opposing views of sections whose struggle made the years from 1860 to 1865 the most vital in the history of the United States.

After consultation with certain of the surviving leaders of the Lost Cause, notably General Stephen D. Lee and General John B. Gordon, the work of preparing the volume giving the Southern side of the history of the Civil War was assigned to the distinguished scholar, William Robertson Garrett, of Nashville, whose work in the field of Confederate history, and notably his contributions to the military history of the Civil War, had given him a prominent place among Southern historians. Dr. Garrett had completed the text of almost half of the volume and had made copious notes for the remainder when he died suddenly of angina pectoris in the city of his residence. He had so far anticipated the fatal result of his physical weakness, which continually interrupted his labors, that some two weeks before his death he wrote to the general editor of *THE HISTORY OF NORTH AMERICA* naming as his literary executor Dr. Halley, in whose knowledge and ability, as well as Southern sympathies, Dr. Garrett had perfect confidence.

The history of the Civil War from the Southern standpoint is, then, the work of two men, both thoroughly qualified for their task. The late Dr. Garrett was essentially of the old school, that to which Jefferson Davis belonged; Dr. Halley is, while in direct touch and hearty accord with the South of ante-bellum days, nevertheless a representative of what the late Henry Grady called the New South. No happier combination of authorship could have been made, for while the present volume is essentially Southern, while it is true to the traditions of the past, it is keenly alive to the necessities of the present and to the interests of the future.

This volume will come as a surprise to those who look for a bitter and biased work. It will also be a disappointment to those who expect to find in it the petty scandal that is always the aftermath of struggle—be that struggle political, military, or other. On the contrary, the present work is a calm and dispassionate presentation of the war as seen by men of judicial mind. This presentation has, naturally, two sides. One of these is the philosophy of the

history of the Civil War. It is concerned with causes and conclusions. The author analyzes the movement of events by which the conflict became inevitable. He sets forth the reasons by which the South considered itself justified in seceding and by which its independent government made its appeal not only to the people of the Southern States but to the world at large. His conclusions, based upon these causes, are well set forth. And his expression of the philosophy of the war is distinctly representative of the opinion of those Southerners who to-day hold in their hands the destinies of their section—not only as such, but as an integral part of the United States.

The volume is, however, essentially a military history. As such it must stand or fall. To the editor it justifies its right to be, not only by its differences with histories written by men of the North, but by the fact that it is a clear and accurate statement of the war from the viewpoint of a Southerner whose eyes are not blinded to Northern prowess and achievement. Messrs. Garrett and Halley are not only just, but generous. They bring forward their side of the story of the conflict, but never seek glory for the Confederate cause where that glory is not its by right. They have, in fact, demonstrated the truth of that claim so long made by the people of the South that a history of the Civil War could be written in which justice might be done to the North without traducing the South.

GUY CARLETON LEE.

Johns Hopkins University.

AUTHORS' PREFACE

WHEN men and nations have differed on great questions and have in any accepted mode of arbitrament pursued that difference to a logical conclusion, it is not for the victor in the contest to write the story of the defeated, or to pass upon the views and motives that controlled their action. With particular force does this apply to the civil war in America of 1861-1865. Had the North and the South regarded in anything like a similar light the long chain of events that preceded and led up to the war between the States, the war would never have been fought. Radical differences had grown up between the sections, and from the Northern point of view the circumstances and surroundings influencing the South were not clearly seen—or, if seen, were ignored. Either being true, how can the Northern writer tell the story impartially? History must have the truth set down.

Generations of teaching by the fathers of the government, who had formed and administered the supreme law, had imbued the people of the South with firmly fixed views that were not to be shaken by newly grown theories of a section which by intrinsic changes had become hostile to much of what had been taught by the framers of the original constitution of the United States. The leaders of the Southern people represented the strength of the beliefs handed down by the fathers of the government, and they could not see

unmoved the changes sought to be engrafted upon a constitution they had so long held sacred. The high principles that actuated them, the sincerity of their beliefs, and their unfaltering devotion to the Constitution as they understood it—and they did understand it—were neither known nor appreciated by those who so bitterly opposed them. It is for this reason that the time has not yet come when a history of the war between the States can be written from the victor's viewpoint that will be just, or that can show the motives by which the people of the South were dominated.

A new generation has grown up since the war was ended and to all of this new generation whose fathers or grandfathers bore a part in that series of conflicts unparalleled in the history of the world it may be said by all candid men that to neither side was there shame, to neither all the glory of brave deeds done. The meeting of Greek with Greek was but a diminutive type of the clash between the free men of America—the heroes on both sides who fought with a courage and a valor never known before in the story of the world's wars. To decry the part taken by the South in that war is but to utterly shame the North. That the South, without resources and with inferior numbers, with hopeless odds against her from the beginning, for four years resisted armies that had the wealth of the world and the men of all nations to draw from, is its own commentary on the valor of the men who wore the gray and on the spirit that animated them. The passing of the years has much softened the animosities engendered by the conflict, but not yet has the time come when the South's entrance into that conflict may be understood or understandingly set down save by her own people. There are men like Robert E. Lee, "Stonewall" Jackson, Albert Sidney Johnston, and Nathan Bedford Forrest, whose fame has brightened as the years went by, and the North concedes their brilliant military genius. The motives and deeds of Jefferson Davis have become better understood and have been appreciated even by many of Northern sympathies. But upon the war

as a whole the Southern light must be thrown if the historian of the future is to know the truth.

Passions ran high when in the North there was not a hamlet without the knowledge that some of its best men were buried in unmarked graves on the bloody battlefields of four years past. It was then that much was written that must be forgotten now, but which is still quoted and used by the Northern historian. The loyalty of the South to the restored Union was shown in the war with Spain, and then, as always before, she sent her bravest to the front. The day of national brotherhood has dawned again, and it is in the spirit of exact justice that the authors of this volume have set forth the motives and causes that impelled the South to resistance in the bygone days. There is no bitterness, but the truth should in all things be set down.

All that is possible in a single volume—and what has been attempted by the authors of this volume—has been to state the Southern view of the war and of its origin, the plans of campaign adopted by the North and the general movements by which these plans were carried out, as well as the manner in which they were viewed at the South. Even a cursory mention of much that is interesting has been of necessity omitted. As far as possible, the original sources of information have been consulted, and some events are here correctly narrated for the first time. The endeavor has been to present a brief, yet sufficiently truthful and comprehensive narrative of the four years of battles. It is the great central movements affecting the final result that it has been sought to outline, as showing the manner in which the subjugation of the South proceeded and the determined opposition that was offered.

The unfortunate death of Captain William Robertson Garrett, who outlined the plan on which the work was to be written and completed the equivalent of about eight chapters, left the work to be completed by another. One of his last acts was to urge me to complete this volume, in which he was intensely interested. After he consulted with the

editor, I agreed, on the night before Captain Garrett's death, that I would complete it. The warm friendship and close relations existing between the two authors, and Captain Garrett's full explanation of his plans for the remainder of the volume, were such as to insure unity of design in the completion of the work, which follows closely the line originally planned.

ROBERT AMBROSE HALLEY.

Nashville.

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CHAPTER I

SECESSION AND ITS CAUSES

A HISTORY dealing with a period in a nation's life that is marked with some great disagreement or conflict, whether national or international, must be viewed from a standpoint of prejudice. This prejudice may be great—and usually is when the historian is either entirely or nearly contemporary with the times of which he writes—or it may be slight and hardly perceptible: but no matter to what degree it exists in the work, it always exists. This volume is no exception to the general rule, and, like all its fellow volumes upon the late War between the States, it is biased. According to its title, it is a history of the Civil War from a Southern standpoint. It is a history of the Civil War, inasmuch as it is a truthful narrative of the more important events of the War between the States. It is “from a Southern standpoint” to the extent that it is a portrayal of the sentiments of the Southern people which prevailed—and still prevail—in regard to the Civil War. It is also a study of the motives that impelled the Southern States to secede from the United States, that prompted them to resist the invasion of their soil by armed men hostile to their welfare and interests, that moved them to exhaust every effort in their power to establish independently the Confederate States of America, and that, finally, brought them to surrender in good faith, abiding the issues of the War, cherishing the memory of their heroes, and demanding for themselves a true verdict

from posterity. The words "from a Southern standpoint" are not meant to indicate that this is a partisan book, or a work conceived in a spirit of hostility to other sections; they only mean that the War is viewed as the South has viewed and always will view it—as it was seen by those brave men of the South who were wounded for the transgressions not of the South, but of the whole nation; as the South confidently believes it will be viewed by future generations.

When the people of a great nation, who have lived together in amity, who have been happy and prosperous under the operation of beneficent institutions which they cherish with the warmest sentiments of love and pride—when such a people, enlightened, generous, ardent lovers of liberty, become estranged from one another, alienated in affection, divided into geographical sections by the conflict of geographical interests, it becomes them to consider seriously, but none the less frankly, whether it is better for the sections to separate in peace or to be held together by the sacrifice of the institutions of one section for the aggrandizement of the other. This question of preserving her institutions, to which she had every right, or of sacrificing them and becoming subservient to the prosperity of the North, came to the people of the Southern States in 1860. If it appeared in a different aspect to the people of the North, it was not the first time in the history of the world that men, arrayed on opposite sides of a great political conflict, were animated respectively by the most exalted motives that can influence human action.

Before entering upon the narrative of the greatest internal struggle which history records, let us briefly trace the long conflict between the centripetal and centrifugal forces of the Union, in order that we may the more clearly comprehend the spirit which animated those who took part in that stupendous contest. The great centripetal force has always been the spirit of American brotherhood and faith in American institutions. It was engendered by the

Revolution. It gained strength with the establishment of a general government, and the many blessings which that government brought. It grew into a conviction of the excellence of American institutions and inspired the most enlightened patriotism. This sentiment is deeprooted in the heart of every American of every State and every section. The great centrifugal force has always been the contest between the geographical sections for the balance of power. The dread of losing this balance of power delayed the completion of the Confederation through nearly the whole period of the Revolution, and nearly proved fatal to the adoption of the Constitution.

Previous to the War between the States the operation of these two forces had produced constant political strife. Sometimes these conflicts were bitter, but they always ended in conciliation and compromise. Thus, the whole framework of the Constitution and the laws of the United States was a series of compromises. All our institutions had been founded in conciliation. During the first fourteen years under the Constitution there were some causes of irritation between the geographical sections, some alternations of geographical influence, some friction of partisan politics. There had been, however, an acquiescence in the results which had agitated Washington's Cabinet. The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, never intended to be more than a protest, or party platform, had accomplished their purpose and brought about a change of administration.

If the United States had remained within the original limits there would have been no fear by any section that it would be tyrannized over by any other section; and the centripetal and centrifugal forces would have settled into equilibrium, disturbed only by the friction of conflicting interests.

With the acquisition of foreign territory in 1803 came prolific cause of sectional strife and serious apprehensions for the permanent disturbance of the balance of power between the sections. The violent opposition of New

England need not be recited. The speeches of New England senators in 1803, the subsequent famous speech of Josiah Quincy, the opposition to the measures of Jefferson and Madison, the Hartford Convention: all bear testimony to the dissatisfaction of New England at her temporary loss of power. Yet New England had nothing to fear. None of her institutions were threatened. No hardship was put upon her. She had no grievance except that the balance of power was lost and she had not a dominating voice in the affairs of the Union.

The West, just emerged from the period of the Spanish intrigues, became reconciled as New England became dissatisfied. The fortunate conclusion of the War of 1812 brought to an end the movement for secession in New England, and the thoughts of her statesmen were directed to finding new combinations to recover the lost balance of power. As the policy of acquiring foreign territory,¹ which had been forced by the South had been the means of disturbing this balance; so the assimilation of this territory and its organization into States must be the means of restoring it. Then began the contest for the settlement of the Territories, which led to the slavery agitation.

The slavery agitation was injected into politics as a means of curbing the ascendancy the South had so long maintained in the affairs of the government. It began with the unjust opposition of the North to the admission of Missouri as a State, it was temporarily allayed by the Missouri Compromise, but it laid the foundation of a partisan policy which was relentlessly pursued for many years, assuming various phases, and finally gaining such strength as to threaten and ultimately accomplish the destruction of the peculiar institution of the South.

At first the political leaders of the North disclaimed the intention of interfering with slavery in the States where it existed, but demanded the right to prevent its extension. This led to a contest over the government of the Territories, and the admission of States. It is needless to rehearse

the arguments so vehemently urged as the contest proceeded, or to develop the various phases which it assumed. The incidents of the struggle are matters of history, though often unfairly treated by dishonest historians, and distorted by partisan coloring.

The political agitation, which did not arouse serious apprehensions, gradually developed the growth of a fanatical element, small at first, and condemned even at the North, which demanded the abolition of slavery in the United States by act of the general government. This abolition element proposed to override the Constitution, and appealing to a "higher law," pursued its purpose with the zeal and tenacity characteristic of fanatics.

The political truth that the Constitution of the United States reserved to each State the control of its own domestic institutions was so plain that the great mass of the people, North and South, conceded that the general government had no power to abolish slavery in any State. Gradually, however, a strong feeling of hostility to slavery grew in the North; yet, restrained by respect for the Constitution, the majority of the people of the North did not, prior to the Civil War, contemplate forcible abolition. The political contests over the limitations of slavery in the Territories, and the admission of new States, constantly tended to array parties on the geographical division of "Mason and Dixon's Line," and its western equivalent, the thirty-six degrees thirty minutes' line. This agitation fanned the flame of Northern hostility to slavery, while increasing Southern resentment and distrust.

From the date of the amendment of James Tallmadge, of New York, which passed the House of Representatives February 16, 1819, and which refused admission to Missouri as a slave State, the history of American politics is one of aggression on the part of the Northern section and defence on the part of the South. In this contest, the South was aided for many years by strong Northern allies who believed her position constitutional and just, but farseeing Southern

leaders could not fail to read the future and to note that whenever agitation was temporarily allayed it was always by means of Southern sacrifice. The Missouri Compromise was followed by the contest for the settlement of the Territories. Yet so great was the confidence of the great bulk of the Southern people in the bulwark of the Constitution, that they felt no serious alarm for the permanency of slavery, and the maintenance of their political status.

1 upst. of Mo. Comp. The Territory of Louisiana was in the shape of a triangle with its apex to the south and a broad base to the north. There was but little territory south of the line of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes that was available for the formation of new States. This limited area was lessened by the appropriation of the Indian Territory to purposes which precluded it from becoming a State. Thus, only Arkansas was left, and, outside of Louisiana, the South had no material for a new State, except Florida. North of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes was a vast stretch of territory acquired by Southern policy, but now a menace to the South. Before the prophetic vision of Calhoun, there were expanded Wyoming, Colorado, Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Michigan, the two Dakotas, Montana, Idaho, Oregon, Washington—all soon to be applicants for statehood. What would become of the balance of power? What protection would the Constitution afford when all the machinery of the Federal government should come into the hands of a party hostile to the institution of slavery?

Calhoun was an ardent lover of the Union, and sought to avert its disruption. He proposed two remedies. In the first he was defeated by Andrew Jackson, and in the second by James K. Polk. His first expedient was to make use of the tariff excitement to establish the precedent of nullification as an accepted construction of the Constitution, which would serve as a bulwark to protect the South when the lost balance of power in the Union should threaten her. When Andrew Jackson gave the toast "Our Federal Union: it must and shall be preserved," the Southern line of defence

was broken, and Calhoun was forced to yield to those who, according to their convictions, were no less honest or patriotic than himself. Calhoun regarded the maintenance of the balance of power between the North and the South as essential to the preservation of the Union. When he was appointed secretary of state by President Tyler in 1843, his efforts were directed at once to preserving that balance of power. This could be done only by the acquisition of new territory in the Southwest. It was impossible for the South to compete in the settlement of the Northwestern country. Her sparse population and the limitations thrown around the introduction of slavery into the Territories precluded a large immigration from the South into these areas. Meanwhile, the fanatical elements at the North had entered zealously and systematically into the work of colonization. Migration aid societies were established. Abolition agents scoured the Northern States and Europe. Emigrants imbued with sentiments hostile to the South, and favoring forcible emancipation, were poured into the Territories preparing for statehood. The balance of power must inevitably be lost to the South, and the time was near at hand.

Texas afforded the opportunity for Calhoun's second expedient. His plan was to admit Texas, divide it into five or six States, and thus offset the new States which were rapidly preparing for admission as allies of the Northern section. He strongly opposed the Mexican War, because he foresaw that it would result in the acquisition of Mexican territory north of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes, which would more than offset all that he hoped for from the acquisition of Texas. The admission of Texas was accomplished, as the last act of Tyler's administration. Calhoun earnestly desired a position in Polk's Cabinet that he might complete his Texan policy, but Andrew Jackson was still living, and his voice was still powerful, despite his retirement at the Hermitage. Calhoun could hold no post of power under Jackson's friend. Texas entered as a single State. It brought to the Southern cause only two senators

instead of ten or twelve. President Polk adopted the policy of war with Mexico. The Mexican acquisitions added a vast area of territory north of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes to bring strength to the enemies of the Southern States. Gold was discovered in California, and the settlement of the Mexican acquisitions hastened the crisis. The Senate was lost to the South, and with it was lost the last hold on the balance of power. Calhoun now despaired of saving the Union, and in 1850, for the first time, he uttered disunion sentiments. The rapidly approaching position of impotence of the South in the Federal government stared her people in the face. The tone of the Northern press, the growth of abolition sentiment, the nullification of the Fugitive Slave Law by Northern States, seriously alarmed them. The wonderful popularity of *Uncle Tom's Cabin* made it an exponent of Northern sentiment,—hostile, unjust, and insulting to the South. John Brown's raid aroused a storm of indignation. The danger which Calhoun had so long foreseen was now at hand, and the Southern people had at length come to realize it.

Notwithstanding the growth of hostile sentiments, North and South, the day had not yet arrived for secession, though it was apparent to the most casual observer that in a short time the whole machinery of government—executive, legislative, and judicial—must be in the hands of the free States, and the slave States would be as impotent in constitutional power as New England had been in 1814; yet with one important difference. In 1814, no domestic institution of New England was threatened. She suffered some temporary injury to her commerce, as did all the States, but these restraints on her trade and injury to her commerce were incidents of the war in which the country was engaged, and should have been borne with patriotic patience. Yet, at that time, New England had threatened to secede, and even took steps looking to that end, and no one disputed her constitutional right to secede. Now, the South, approaching a more disastrous condition of impotence in the government

naturally turned to the same measure of redress, but the time was not yet ripe. The South felt in 1859 the same restraining influence which had controlled New England in 1814—the innate love for the Union, and confidence in American institutions.

One hope still remained. Slavery had followed the geographical line; but with this the demarcation between political parties had not coincided. Although the balance of power was coming inevitably into the hands of the free States, yet there was a strong party in the North which held to the Southern view in construing the Constitution. The South had looked to these allies to unite with the Southern people in protecting her threatened domestic institution, and in preserving the Constitution, but she soon came to a point where she was forced to question the probability of assistance from this source. With sentiments of distrust and apprehension the two sections entered upon the memorable political campaign of 1860. The result dissipated the last hope of the South for an equal standing in the national legislature. It showed that political parties were at length arrayed on the same geographical line which divided the free States from the slave States. This conviction was confirmed at the November election, when one hundred and eighty presidential electors pledged to Lincoln were elected, all from the free States, while those opposed to him were but one hundred and twenty-three. The total electoral vote from the free States was one hundred and eighty-three, from the slave States one hundred and twenty. In the legislative branch the Senate stood: senators from free States, thirty-six; from slave States, thirty. The House stood: representatives from free States, one hundred and forty-seven; from slave States, ninety. The slave States were powerless to protect themselves in the Union, while their Northern allies were either alienated or powerless.

The argument of the rights of the Southern States under the Constitution was unanswered and unanswerable, but argument could no longer protect them. The situation is

thus described in the *Confederate Military History*: "The alternative was presented of secession from the Union or a precarious dependence on the justice and forbearance of the hostile party about to assume the reins of government with every prospect of permanent control. In such a crisis what people of Anglo-Saxon-Norman blood have ever hesitated? The South chose the alternative of secession. Then came the great American tragedy—secession—coercion—war—emancipation—reconstruction."

The secession movement was begun by South Carolina, but not without assurances of aid from other States. Six States passed ordinances of secession in rapid sequence: South Carolina, December 20, 1860; Mississippi, January 9, 1861; Florida, January 10th; Alabama, January 19th; Louisiana, January 26th. Their organization into a general government speedily followed.

While the Southern States were preparing for withdrawing from the Union, their representatives in both Houses remained very properly in the Houses to which they were accredited. With the passage of secession ordinances, however, each Congressman, upon the official notification from his own State of the adoption of measures that would separate it from the Union, bade farewell to the national legislative halls and repaired to his own State. Some few, though not many, delivered addresses in which they bitterly condemned the North for what she had forced the South to do. In most instances the farewells were free from bitterness, though seldom free from emotion. With two isolated exceptions the senators from Alabama, Georgia, Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi made farewell speeches. This series of withdrawals from Congress extended over almost two weeks, beginning January 21st and ending on the 4th of February.

Accredited delegates from the seceded States met in convention at Montgomery, in the State Capitol of Alabama, February 4, 1861, and organized the provisional government of the "Confederate States of America." The assembly

was solemn and the occasion was momentous. These men represented the sentiments of their several States. They firmly believed that they were laying the foundations of a great confederated republic, and they earnestly desired to found the republic in peace. As became patriots and statesmen, they attempted no experiments in government. As Americans thoroughly imbued with American sentiments, they sought only to perpetuate American institutions. They took for their guide that grand American chart of government which they and their people had always loved and revered, and to which they had ever looked as the palladium of their rights. They adopted the Constitution of the United States, almost word for word, amending it only so far as to engraft upon it the constructions for which the South had so long contended.

Where sentiment was so unanimous, and with such a model before them, the work was easy. It was accomplished in four days, and on February 8, 1861, the Provisional Constitution of the "Confederate States of America" was adopted, to continue in operation for one year, or until a permanent organization should be effected.

The next day, February 9th, Jefferson Davis, of Mississippi, was elected president, and Alexander H. Stephens, of Georgia, vice-president. Mr. Davis was inducted into the office of President of the Confederate States on February 18th. He took the oath of office and delivered his inaugural address on the steps of the State Capitol of Alabama, in the presence of an immense concourse of people. A few extracts from this inaugural address may serve to set forth the views of President Davis, in which he portrayed the sentiments of the Southern people:

"I enter upon the duties of the office to which I have been chosen with the hope that the beginning of our career as a Confederacy may not be obstructed by hostile opposition to our enjoyment of the separate existence and independence we have asserted, and which, with the blessing of Providence, we intend to maintain.

“Our present political position has been achieved in a manner unprecedented in the history of nations. It illustrates the American idea that governments rest on the consent of the governed, and that it is the right of the people to alter or abolish them at will whenever they become destructive of the ends for which they were established. . . . The impartial and enlightened verdict of mankind will vindicate the rectitude of our conduct, and He who knows the hearts of men will judge of the sincerity with which we have labored to preserve the government of our fathers in its spirit.

“An agricultural people, whose chief interest is the export of commodities required in every manufacturing country, our true policy is peace, and the freest trade which our necessities will permit.

“Through many years of controversy with our late associates of the Northern States, we have vainly endeavored to secure tranquillity and obtain respect for the rights to which we are entitled. As a necessity, not from choice, we have resorted to the remedy of separation, and henceforth our energies must be directed to the conduct of our own affairs and the perpetuity of the Confederacy which we have formed. If a just perception of mutual interest shall permit us to pursue our separate political career, my most earnest desire will have been fulfilled. But if this be denied to us, and the integrity of our territory and jurisdiction be assailed, it will but remain for us with firm resolve to appeal to arms and invoke the blessing of Providence on a just cause. . . . Should reason guide the action of the government from which we have separated, a policy so detrimental to the civilized world, the Northern States included, could not be dictated by even the strongest desire to inflict injury upon us; but, if the contrary should prove true, a terrible responsibility will rest upon it, and the suffering millions will bear testimony to the folly and wickedness of our aggressors. . . . We have changed the constituent parts, but not the system of government. The Constitution framed

by our fathers is that of these Confederate States. In their exposition of it, and in the judicial construction it has received, we have a light which reveals its meaning."

Before the delivery of the inaugural address, which was everywhere accepted as an official announcement of the policy of the Confederacy, the Hon. Howell Cobb, of Georgia, president of the Convention, had expressed similar sentiments. Upon taking the chair, he said that we must "maintain with our late confederates in the Union friendly relations, political and commercial." Every expression on the Confederate side, official and unofficial, breathed the desire for peace and amity. Every act of the Confederate government was taken with due regard to the promotion of peace, until convinced that war was inevitable.

Texas seceded on February 22, 1861, and joined the Confederacy on March 2d. All the extreme Southern States were now in league. The representatives of the Southern States organized for business. "The Constitution of the Confederate States of America" was "adopted unanimously by the Congress of the Confederate States of South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, sitting in convention at the capitol, in the city of Montgomery, Alabama, on the Eleventh day of March, in the year Eighteen Hundred and Sixty-one." Howell Cobb was President of the Congress.

The members signing the Constitution were: R. Barnwell Rhett, South Carolina; Robert W. Barnwell, South Carolina; Richard W. Walker, Alabama; Lawrence M. Keitt, South Carolina; Jackson Morton, Florida; William Porcher Miles, South Carolina; William W. Boyce, South Carolina; Augustus R. Wright, Georgia; Augustus H. Kenan, Georgia; Williamson S. Oldham, Texas; Charles M. Conrad, Louisiana; Stephen F. Hale, Alabama; Brigadier-general John Gregg, Texas; Robert H. Smith, Alabama; James B. Owens, Florida; Louis T. Wigfall, Texas; William P. Chilton, Alabama; W. S. Wilson, Mississippi; Walter Brooke, Mississippi; J. J. Hooper, Alabama

(secretary); J. A. P. Campbell, Mississippi; David P. Lewis, Alabama; John Gill Shorter, Alabama; Major-general J. P. Anderson, Florida; John Perkins, Jr., Louisiana; Jabez L. M. Curry, Alabama; Henry Marshall, Louisiana; W. P. Harris, Mississippi; Alexander de Clouet, Louisiana; Thomas Fearn, M.D., Alabama; Colin J. McRae, Alabama; Duncan F. Kenner, Louisiana; John Hemphill, Texas; William S. Barry, Mississippi; W. B. Ochiltree, Texas; Alexander M. Clayton, Mississippi; Brigadier-general Thomas R. R. Cobb, Georgia; Christopher G. Memminger, South Carolina; Robert Toombs, Georgia; Thomas N. Waul, Texas; Alexander H. Stephens, Georgia; John H. Reagan, Texas; Benjamin H. Hill, Georgia; James T. Harrison, Mississippi; E. A. Nisbet, Georgia; Major-general Howell Cobb, Georgia (president); Thomas J. Withers, South Carolina; Edward Sparrow, Louisiana; Francis S. Bartow, Georgia; James Chesnut, Jr., of South Carolina; Martin J. Crawford, Georgia.

In adopting as the basis for their own constitution the Constitution of the United States the Confederate States found it necessary to make some pronounced changes in the instrument which they had honored and respected as much as the States of the North. These changes were vital, and concerned those things upon which the unity of the States had beaten and finally broken. First in the preamble came a by no means indistinct declaration of States Rights. The Constitution that had been accepted by the States in 1787 stated that "We, the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquillity, provide for the common Defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America." The Constitution of the Confederate States differed radically inasmuch as it declared in the preamble that "We, the people of the Confederate States, each State acting in its sovereign and independent

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Ordinance of secession of South Carolina. From a facsimile in the
Library of Congress, Washington.

character, in order to form a permanent federal government, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity—invoking the favor and guidance of Almighty God—do ordain and establish this Constitution for the Confederate States of America.” In article I, section 8, in which are specified the powers of Congress, it is stated: “The Congress shall have power—(1) To lay and collect taxes, imposts, and excises, for revenue necessary to pay the debts, provide for the common defence, and carry on the government of the Confederate States; but [this is the significant passage] no bounties shall be granted from the treasury; nor shall any duties or taxes on importations from foreign nations be laid to promote or foster any branch of industry.” Finally, the question of slavery was dealt with in a manner that characterized the attitude of the South throughout the years preceding the movement toward secession. Article IV contains the following declarations: Section 2, (1) “The citizens of each State shall have the right of transit and sojourn in any State of this Confederacy, with their slaves and other property; and the right of property in said slaves shall not be thereby impaired.” (3) “No slave escaping or lawfully carried into another, [State] shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor; but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such slave belongs.” Section 3, (3) “The Confederate States may acquire new territory. In all such territory, the institution of negro slavery, as it now exists in the Confederate States shall be recognized and protected by Congress and by the territorial government.”

The first Cabinet consisted of Robert Toombs, of Georgia, secretary of state; Christopher G. Memminger, of South Carolina, secretary of the treasury; Leroy Pope Walker, of Alabama, secretary of war; Stephen R. Mallory, of Florida, secretary of the navy; Judah P. Benjamin, of Louisiana, attorney-general; John H. Reagan, of Texas, postmaster-general.

Nothing more clearly illustrates the devotion of the people of the Confederate States to the institutions of their fathers as well as their sincere desire for peace, than the early acts of the Confederate Congress, and of the several State legislatures. The Provisional Constitution, article 6, section 2, ordains that: "The government hereby instituted shall take immediate steps for the settlement of all matters between the States forming it and their late confederates of the United States, in relation to the public property and public debt at the time of their withdrawal from them; these States hereby declaring it to be their wish and earnest desire to adjust everything pertaining to the common property, common liabilities, and common obligations of that Union upon the principles of right, justice, equity, and good faith."

The day after the adoption of the Provisional Constitution, or February 9th, the Confederate Congress declared: "That all laws of the United States of America in force and in use in the Confederate States of America on the first day of November last, and not inconsistent with the Constitution of the Confederate States, be and the same are hereby continued in force until altered or repealed by the Congress."

The Confederate Congress, on February 15th, adopted the following resolution: "That it is the sense of this Congress that a commission of three persons be appointed by the president-elect, as early as may be convenient after his inauguration, and sent to the government of the United States of America, for the purpose of negotiating friendly relations between that government and the Confederate States of America, and for the settlement of all questions of disagreement between the two governments upon principles of right, justice, equity, and good faith."

The Mississippi River, in its approach to the Gulf, would pass for a considerable distance through Confederate territory. In order to quiet in advance any apprehensions that might be felt by Northern States as to annoying restrictions which might be placed on its navigation, the Confederate

Congress, without waiting for remonstrances or petitions or treaties with the United States, passed an act February 25, 1861, declaring the navigation of that river free to the citizens of all States upon its borders, or upon the borders of its navigable tributaries. These and similar laws met with the cordial approval of the chief executive and obtained his faithful support. He said: "These acts and all other indications manifest the well-known wish of the people of the Confederacy to preserve peace and encourage the most unrestricted commerce with all nations, surely not least with their late associates, the Northern States."

In pursuance of the act of Congress of February 15th, President Davis appointed as commissioners to confer with the United States three distinguished citizens of the Confederate States: Mr. Andrew Bienvenu Roman, of Louisiana, a life-time Whig, who had supported Bell and Everett; Mr. Martin J. Crawford, of Georgia, a States Rights Democrat, who had supported Breckinridge, and Mr. John Forsyth, of Alabama, a Democrat, who had supported Douglas. Concerning these men and their mission, the president said: "Their commissions authorized and empowered them 'in the name of the Confederate States, to meet and confer with any person or persons duly authorized by the government of the United States, being furnished with like power and authority, and with him or them to agree, treat, consult, and negotiate,' concerning all matters in which the parties are both interested. No secret instructions were given them, for there was nothing to conceal." Although these earnest efforts were made for peace, yet attention was given to the organization of the war and navy departments, and to the preparations for defence, in order to be ready if the authorities of the United States should decide on coercion and invasion.

Let us now examine the condition and attitude of the individual Southern States. The seven seceded States showed no change of laws or institutions. They had transferred their allegiance from the United States to the

Confederate States. They had changed a few words in their laws to adapt them to the transfer. That was all. There was no speculative legislation. The institutions which they derived from their fathers were unchanged: there they stood, beloved and revered as of old. Law and order were unimpaired. There was some activity in the military organizations for defence, but the people were hopeful of peace. In domestic relations no change was visible. Even in Federal relations everything followed the old routine. The Congress had enacted that the laws of the United States should continue in force until repealed, and that the civil officers of the United States should continue the performance of their duties in the service of the Confederate States until April 1st. The navigation of the Mississippi had been made free, and the Confederate Congress had likewise made the coast trade free. All was calm, tranquil, and orderly. Commerce pursued its accustomed channels. The Confederacy, in its Federal and State governments, furnished to the world a conspicuous example of American adaptability to self-government.

Let us turn next to the Southern States which had not yet joined the Confederacy. Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Arkansas, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri clung to the hope of adjustment without secession. Ardently attached to the institutions which their fathers had been instrumental in establishing and defending, they hesitated to use the remedy of leaving the Union, although they did not doubt their right to exercise it; they were fully alive to the injustice which had already been perpetrated by the nullification of the Fugitive Slave Law by fourteen Northern States, and were keenly aware of the dangers which impended when the hostile Republican party should come into power under the leadership of a president who had declared that the Union could not exist "half slave and half free."

These States informally united their influence to provide some remedy or compromise which would relieve the situation, and secure to the Southern States protection under

the Constitution. The hope was vain. The Confederate States had already taken the only step consistent with their situation. They had determined that if the Constitution of the United States was to be violated, if their rights as States and as citizens were to be overridden, it must be done only by force of arms, as an act of aggression and tyranny, after every resource of resistance was exhausted.

In the North the sentiment was very much divided. While a strong and growing sentiment demanded coercion, yet a sentiment equally strong opposed it in the beginning. It seemed impossible that the North could unite on a policy so manifestly unconstitutional and unjust. Among the leaders of the Republican party, Horace Greeley, Charles Sumner, Salmon P. Chase, and William H. Seward were opposed to coercion. The Northern Democrats for the most part were opposed to it, as well as a large element of Republicans. It became a common expression: "Let the erring sisters depart in peace."

At an immense meeting held in New York, January 31, 1861, resolutions were adopted opposing coercion and urging peace. This meeting was addressed by James S. Thayer, Horatio Seymour, ex-chancellor Reuben H. Walworth, and other distinguished citizens who enjoyed the public confidence. They all advocated the sentiment expressed by Mr. Thayer: "The Union must be preserved. But if that cannot be, what then? Peaceable separation." "It would be as brutal, in my opinion," said Mr. Walworth, "to send men to butcher our own brothers of the Southern States as it would be to massacre them in the Northern States." The *New York Tribune*, the exponent of conservative Republican sentiment, said: "The right to secede may be a revolutionary right, but it exists nevertheless; . . . whenever a considerable section of our Union shall deliberately resolve to go out, we shall resist all coercive measures to keep her in. We hope never to live in a republic whereof one section is pinned to the other by bayonets." Many other leading Northern journals

expressed similar views; among them were the *New York Herald*; the *Detroit Free Press*; the *Union*, of Bangor, Maine; and the *Albany Argus*. The radical element at the North, however, held very different views. The public mind had undergone an important change since the days in which the Constitution was adopted.

The framers of the Constitution had lived a large part of their lives at a time when there was no Constitution. They owed allegiance to Virginia, or Massachusetts, or South Carolina, or to some one of the original thirteen States when these States were colonies of Great Britain, with no political ties except mutual dependence upon the mother country. After the Declaration of Independence, they became bound to the other colonies by ties of affinity and the bond of mutual interests and dangers. They were so cautious about forming a Union that they went nearly through the struggle of the Revolution against the greatest power in the world without establishing a general government.

When, in March, 1781, a few months before the close of the Revolution, the last State ratified the Articles of Confederation, over which they had hesitated and squabbled for five years, the Union was begun. Yet this Union was but a league, having no adequate powers and but little trace of nationality; so fearful were our fathers of compromising the sovereignty of their respective States.

When they became aware of the inadequacy of the Confederation for national purposes, they very cautiously and reluctantly entered into a new compact with each other establishing the agency of the general government with enlarged powers and national functions, but carefully guarding the rights of the several States, and limiting the powers of the general government in the instrument of compact which they named the Constitution. They regarded this general government as an experiment, and felt their allegiance due in the highest sense to their respective States, and due to this new general government only through their respective States. They, the makers, looked on the United States in its true

and logical light as the creature of the States, and their agent for limited and specified purposes.

After the great compromises in the Constitutional Convention had been agreed upon, in which compromises the Southern States made the greatest sacrifices, the compact came before the several States for ratification. It met with much opposition. In Virginia, Patrick Henry assailed it with his matchless eloquence, and would have defeated its confirmation but for the overpowering influence of Washington, and the impression prevailing in the Virginia convention that Washington would be the first president and would guard the rights of States and people. Nevertheless, the opposition of Patrick Henry produced significant effects, the most important of which was that Virginia inserted in its ordinance of ratification a clause reserving to the State the right to secede.

Patrick Henry pointed out very clearly some of the defects of the Constitution. Perhaps the most serious of these is what is vulgarly styled "the dodging of issues." More correctly speaking, let us say "the ignoring of important matters." For instance, the Constitution contains no provision for the secession of a State. Objection to this omission was met, when the Constitution was discussed in the convention of 1783, by the argument that no such provision was necessary, as each State possessed the inherent right to withdraw from the compact, and this right would never be questioned.

Again, Patrick Henry insisted that the Constitution should contain a provision that the United States shall have no power to abolish slavery in any State, and other provisions to protect slavery. In arguing this point he electrified the convention by one of those outbursts for which he was famous. No man could use the English language with greater purity, precision, and fervor than Patrick Henry. He could soar in sublime flights which no other American orator has equalled, and when it suited his purpose he could drop from the sublime to the ridiculous with the grace

of an eagle swooping to the earth, and with an elegance of tone and manner that redeemed slang. In one of his most eloquent passages, while pointing out the importance of a clause in the Constitution protecting slavery in the States, and painting vividly the changes of opinion and sentiment and interest which come over men and nations in the lapse of time, he unexpectedly paused. Assuming a warning attitude and affecting a stage whisper, he said: "They will free your niggers!" The effect is described as striking. It not only provoked the laughter of his hearers, but it aroused their serious apprehensions. It was answered that no such clause was needed, because the United States could not exercise any powers not specifically granted by the Constitution, and no power to abolish or control slavery in the States had been granted. Yet the words of Patrick Henry were prophetic. The change of opinion and sentiment occurred as he predicted, and new generations came to look upon the Constitution with eyes very different from those of its greatest founders.

After a prolonged contest, the Virginia Convention voted by a small majority to ratify the Constitution, but inserted in the ordinance the distinct claim to the right of secession, as follows: "The delegates do, in the name and in behalf of the people of Virginia, declare and make known that the powers granted under the Constitution being derived from the people of the United States, may be resumed by them whensoever the same shall be perverted to their injury or oppression, and that every power not granted thereby remains with them and at their will." New York declared that "the powers of government may be reassumed by the people whenever it shall become necessary to their happiness." North Carolina and Rhode Island refused to ratify the Constitution and remained independent until after the inauguration of Washington. These two States occupied the anomalous attitude of being the remainder of the old United States under the Articles of Confederation, while the other eleven States had seceded and formed a new United States

under the Constitution. North Carolina ratified the Constitution on November 21, 1789, and Rhode Island followed on May 29, 1790, but the latter took care to insert in its ordinance of ratification a distinct reservation of the right of secession as follows: "the powers of government may be reassumed by the people whenever it shall become necessary to their happiness." These were the exact words that New York had used. Rhode Island had at first rejected it by an overwhelming majority when submitted to a popular vote, and when it did adopt it after it had been fifteen months in operation it was "in full confidence" that certain amendments would be adopted, the first of which was thus stated: "That Congress shall guarantee to each State its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Constitution expressly delegated to the United States." Many of the States inserted in their ordinances of ratification clauses similar to that of New York: "that every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not, by the said Constitution, clearly delegated to the Congress of the United States, or the departments of the government thereof, remains to the people of the several States, or to their respective State governments, to whom they may have granted the same."

The Constitution was established by the ratification of the States. It thus appears that three States, Virginia, New York, and Rhode Island, were accepted as States upon the distinct condition and compact of the right to secede at the will of the State. By every rule of construction this secured the right to all the other States, for although only three States had taken the precaution to specify the right of secession in their ordinances of ratification, yet it was claimed as a right by all, and was universally conceded.

For many years after it went into operation, the Federal government was regarded as an experiment, and was jealously watched. Each section in turn manifested dissatisfaction. The most marked dissatisfaction was shown by New England at the time of the second war with Great

Britain, and threats of secession were freely expressed. The right to secede was conceded to exist by every publicist of the time. But as years passed on, the experimental stages passed with them. The excellence of the Constitution and the beneficence of the Federal government inspired confidence. The Constitution came to be regarded with sentiments of love and veneration. It was held as the safeguard of liberty and the guarantee of human rights. Especially at the South was this reverence of the Constitution felt; yet it was revered as the agent of the States and the guardian of States Rights.

With the death of the founders of the Constitution and the admission of twenty new States came a gradual change of sentiment in the North and Northwest, which was not fully revealed until 1861. In the minds of many, the love and reverence which their fathers had felt for the Constitution was now transferred to the Federal government. The original thirteen States had witnessed the creation of the Federal government. The twenty new States were creations of that government. After serving apprenticeship as Territories, under the paternal care of Congress, they received statehood as a gift, and looked upon the United States as the creator and the source of power. Their admission as States placed them logically in the same relation to the United States and to the other States as the original States. The new Southwestern States, instructed in the Southern school of politics, understood their own true position. The new Northwestern States, settled largely under the auspices of abolition and emigration aid societies, had not imbibed the American idea. They could not understand that they had been admitted to the ranks of the creators of the Federal government; they did know that the Federal government had but recently created them. They could not comprehend the logical, historical view of the Federal government as an agency created by compact between the States and limited in powers by the Constitution. To their vision, the Federal government loomed up above the Constitution—the creator,

the sovereign. Allegiance was due primarily to the United States, and was due to the State only as a subordinate part of the United States. This sentiment was a growth. It was not founded in logic or history, and therefore could not be reached by logic or history. Its advocates could not defend it by argument, and did not attempt argument; yet they none the less honestly adhered to it.

When the crusade against slavery began, the Abolition party appealed to this sentiment and used every means to propagate it, through the medium of their slavery agitation and through their emigration aid societies. The radical and fanatical elements of the North and Northwest embraced it as the only means to accomplish their ends. Blended with the hostility to slavery, it was ready to overleap Constitutional barriers. The South, witnessing the rapid growth of this sentiment, now began to realize the truth of Patrick Henry's prophecy. Such was the condition of public sentiment in 1860, when the triumph of the Republican party in the presidential election, following on the nullification of the Fugitive Slave Law by fourteen States, and the John Brown raid, convinced the Southern States that it was time to act before their hands were tied by a hostile Federal administration.

The period from the organization of the Confederate government until the attack on Fort Sumter has been styled the "period of hesitation." The Confederacy was quiet, engaged in completing the organization of its government, civil and military, but carefully avoiding anything that had the appearance of aggression, and even submitting to the occupation by the United States of the forts and arsenals within its territories, and reiterating its desire for peace. The Border States were devoting attention to measures of peaceable adjustment. In these measures the State of Virginia took the lead. On January 19, 1861, its legislature adopted a series of resolutions calling a conference of all the States. The first of these resolutions was:

"That on behalf of the Commonwealth of Virginia an invitation is hereby extended to all such States, whether

slaveholding or non-slaveholding, as are willing to unite with Virginia in an earnest effort to adjust the present unhappy controversies in the spirit in which the Constitution was originally formed and consistently with its principles, so as to afford to the people of the slaveholding States adequate guarantees for the security of their rights, to appoint commissioners to meet on the fourth day of February next, in the City of Washington, similar commissioners appointed by Virginia, to consider, and if practicable agree, upon some suitable adjustment." Another resolution expressed the opinion of Virginia as favoring "the propositions embraced in the resolutions presented to the Senate of the United States by Hon. John J. Crittenden" with certain modifications.

The venerable John J. Crittenden, devoted to the Union, the "Nestor of the Bell-Everett party," had served fully twenty years in the United States Senate at different times, had been attorney-general under Harrison and under Fillmore, and was to give place on March 4th to John C. Breckinridge, who had been chosen because of the greater confidence of the Kentucky Democracy in his attitude on the question of slavery. Mr. Crittenden presented in the Senate, in the closing days of December, a joint resolution that became widely known as "the Crittenden resolutions." Reciting the existence of "serious and alarming dissensions" between the Northern and the Southern States concerning the rights and security of the slaveholding States, and especially their rights in the common territory of the United States, which dissensions threatened the very existence of the Union, and that they "should be permanently quieted and settled by constitutional provisions which shall do equal justice to all sections," the resolution then proposes six amendments to the Constitution. The first amendment is intended to confirm the prohibition of the extension of slavery into the territory of the United States north of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes, but provides that States thereafter formed from such territory according to law shall be "with or without slavery, as the constitution of such new State may

provide." In all territory south of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes slavery is recognized as existing and shall not be interfered with by Congress, but shall be protected as property by all departments of the Territorial government during its continuance. The second amendment provides that "Congress shall have no power to abolish slavery in places under its exclusive jurisdiction and situate within the limits of States that permit the holding of slaves." The third amendment denies Congress the power to abolish slavery within the District of Columbia so long as it exists in Maryland and Virginia or in either, nor without the consent of the inhabitants, nor without just compensation to the owners who consent to such abolishment; nor shall Congress forbid Federal officers bringing into the District their slaves and holding them during such time as their duties require them to remain there, and afterward taking them from the District. The fourth amendment denies Congress the power to hinder or prevent transportation of slaves from one State to another or to a Territory in which by law slaves are permitted to be held. The fifth amendment makes it the duty of Congress to pay full value to the owner of any fugitive slave in cases where the officer whose duty it was to arrest the fugitive was prevented by violence or where the slave was rescued after arrest, and that the United States shall recover the amount from the county where the offence took place and the county may recover by law from the parties found guilty. The sixth amendment provided that no future amendment shall affect the five preceding amendments, nor the third paragraph of the second section of the first article of the Constitution, nor the third paragraph of the second section of the fourth article of the Constitution, and that no amendment shall be made to the Constitution giving Congress any power to abolish or interfere with slavery in any State by whose laws it is or may be permitted.

As a part of the foregoing, and appended to it, a preamble recites the desire of Congress to remove all just cause for

popular discontent and agitation, and offers four resolutions. These declare the faithful execution of the Fugitive Slave laws mandatory, and that they ought not to be repealed or modified so as to hinder or defeat their execution; declare null and void all State laws in conflict with the Fugitive Slave laws, or which hindered or impeded their execution, and recommend the repeal of such State laws; recommend the amendment of the Fugitive Slave law of September 18, 1850, so as to provide for its greater efficiency; and lastly, declare that the laws for the suppression of the African Slave Trade and the prohibition of the importation of slaves into the United States ought to be promptly made effectual and thoroughly executed.

On the appointed day, the commission that resulted from the action of Virginia, and which was popularly styled the "Peace Congress," met at Willard's Hall in Washington. The venerable ex-president John Tyler was elected its permanent president. Delegates attended from the following States: Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, Missouri, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas. Of these twenty-one States assembled in solemn conference, fourteen were free States and seven were slave States. The six States which had seceded at that time were not members of the United States and took no part. Of the twenty-seven States remaining in the Union, twenty were present by their delegates duly commissioned. Seven were unrepresented. Kansas, though not as yet formally admitted into the Union, was present by duly accredited representatives, making twenty-one States present. Of the seven States unrepresented five were free States from the Northwest, viz.: Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Oregon, and California, and two were slave States, Arkansas and Texas. The deliberations were calm, conciliatory, and able. The conservative elements, North and South, looked upon the congress with more respect than

faith. Such a body as this might have adjusted the controversy upon just and equitable principles if it had possessed the power to enforce its decision, but this it did not have. The commission did agree upon a compromise which commended itself to patriots and thoughtful men, but the contempt with which it was treated by Congress illustrated the truth of the words of Salmon P. Chase, of Ohio, a member of the peace commission. In the course of the discussion he said: "Whatever our actions may be here, every proposition to amend the Constitution must come before the people. They will discuss it and must adopt it before it can become a part of the fundamental law. Dismiss, then, the idea that all that is necessary to secure amendments acceptable to a particular interest or section is to secure for them the sanction of a majority in this hall. Chief among these principles is the restriction of slavery within State limits; not war upon slavery within those limits, but beyond them. Mr. Lincoln was the candidate of the people opposed to the extension of slavery. We have elected him. After many years of earnest advocacy and sincere trial we have achieved the triumph of that principle. By fair and unquestioned majority we have secured that triumph. Do you think we who represent this majority will throw it away? Do you think the people would sustain us if we undertook to throw it away? I therefore tell you explicitly that if we of the North and West would consent to throw away all that has been gained in the recent triumph of our principles, the people would not sustain us, and so the consent would avail you nothing." The patriots of the Peace Congress found this to be true. The consent of the convention was given to a series of resolutions proposing amendments to the Constitution, but that consent availed nothing.

Commenting on this respectable body, with evident sincerity, ex-President Tyler said: "In the whole course of a public life, much longer than usually falls to the lot of man, I have been associated with many bodies of my fellow citizens, convened for legislative and other purposes, but I here

declare that it has never been my good fortune to meet an association of more intelligent, thoughtful, or patriotic men than that over which I have been called to preside." The action of the late Peace Congress was, after its adjournment, officially and promptly certified to Congress, accompanied by the request of the commissioners that the amendments proposed to the Constitution should be submitted to the States for ratification in the proper form. These amendments were similar to those of Crittenden then pending in Congress, but less favorable to the South. The day after the adjournment of the Peace Congress, the proposed amendments came before the Senate for action, and were contemptuously rejected by a vote of seven in their favor to twenty-eight against them. On the same day, the House refused to suspend the rules in order to consider them. A little later, the amendments proposed by Crittenden were likewise rejected. The debates were acrimonious, and plainly demonstrated that the Republicans did not intend to "throw away" their recent political victory for the purpose of averting war and bloodshed, but agreed with Chandler in favor of "a little blood-letting." Thus ended the last effort to avert disunion.

The question was still to be decided as to whether the incoming administration would resort to coercion. Few except the most sanguine now doubted the issue. Although Lincoln had made many inconsistent expressions of his opinion, yet it remained to conjecture how he would act under the new condition of affairs. In his speech of January 12, 1848, on the floor of the House of Representatives, as reported in the *Congressional Globe*, Lincoln said: "Any people anywhere, being inclined and having the power, have the right to rise up and shake off the existing government, and form a new one that suits them better. This is a most valuable, a sacred right—a right which we hope and believe is to liberate the world. Nor is this right confined to cases in which the whole people of an existing government may choose to exercise it. Any portion of such people that can,



Beriah Magoffin, governor of Kentucky.



Judah Philip Benjamin, secretary of state, C. S. A.

may revolutionize, and make their own of so much of the territory as they inhabit.”

Could language be stronger? Did any secessionist ever claim more? The remarkably clear style of Lincoln made his meaning unmistakable. How could a man with such views deny the right of secession, even, if this right could not be logically derived from the Constitution? But to make the case stronger. Lincoln had declared that the Union cannot long endure half slave and half free. Taken in the light of his utterance in Congress, what could this mean? There could be but three hypotheses. The Union must be all slave, all free, or there must be a separation. Surely, Lincoln would not consent to its being all slave. He declared that he did not contemplate the abolition of slavery by any act of the United States. So emphatic is he in this position that in his inaugural address he summed up his expressions on this subject, as follows:

“It is found in nearly all the published speeches of him who now addresses you. I do but quote from one of these speeches when I declare that ‘I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it now exists. I believe that I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so.’”

Surely, then, he did not expect that the Union would be all free. But it could not endure “half slave and half free.” What, then, was the logical consequence, according to his own theories? Separation. There could be nothing else. Here was separation ready at his hands. Seven States had seceded, and formed a government of their own, Texas having joined the Confederacy two days before this address was delivered. Their commissioners were in Washington awaiting an audience, ready to propose terms of peaceable adjustment. Would he deny the right which he had declared to be a sacred right? Would he give peace, or would he resort to coercion, invasion and war? The country was not long to be in doubt. The end of President Buchanan’s term was near at hand. The sentiments of the president now in

office were well known. They were such as became a wise and good man, and were in accord with the views which he had always entertained and often expressed during a long life of public service. They were expressed in his fourth annual message, December 3, 1860, and are summed up in his special message, January 8, 1861. He expresses sympathy with the grievances of the South, but he denies the right of secession. He urges the preservation of the Union, but believes that the executive has no power of coercion, or war. If this power is possessed by the government at all it can be exercised only by Congress. He believes that the Union can be preserved by peaceful means, and urges peace. The following extract from his special message of January 8, 1861, gives his opinion in brief:

“I certainly had no right to make aggressive war upon any State, and I am perfectly satisfied that the Constitution has wisely withheld that power even from Congress. But the right and duty to use military force defensively against those who resist the Federal officers in the execution of their legal functions and against those who assail the property of the Federal government is clear and undeniable.

“But the dangerous and hostile attitude of the States toward each other has already far transcended and cast in the shade the ordinary executive duties already provided for by law, and has assumed such vast and alarming proportions as to place the subject entirely above and beyond executive control. The fact can not be disguised that we are in the midst of a great revolution. In all of its various bearings, therefore, I commend the question to Congress as the only human tribunal under Providence possessing the power to meet the existing emergency. To them exclusively belongs the power to declare war or to authorize the employment of military force in all cases contemplated by the Constitution, and they alone possess the power to remove grievances which might lead to war and to secure peace and union to this distracted country. On them, and on them alone, rests the responsibility.”

It has been the custom of a certain class of speakers and writers to ridicule Buchanan as "weak and vacillating." If there be anything weak in the opinion that the President of the United States had no power to use coercion against a State, that weakness is in the Constitution and not in Buchanan. The arguments upon which he based his opinion may be seen by the reader in his fourth annual message. They were in accord with the opinions of the chief justice of the United States. These arguments have been sneered at, but have never been answered. He would not violate the Constitution. Those who subsequently used coercion did not scruple to violate the Constitution, for which they justified themselves by specious pleas which will not bear the analysis of logic. Buchanan believed that the sober second thought would bring about a compromise or adjustment of the pending difficulty, and with this conviction he opposed anything calculated to precipitate a crisis. He was not alone in this opinion. It was the almost unanimous belief in the Border States that a settlement of all differences could be made. There seemed some reason for this belief in a nation created by compromise, which throughout its national existence had cured all its quarrels by compromise.

The only question which seemed to threaten a disturbance of peace during the remainder of Buchanan's administration was the question of Fort Sumter. This question, however, by mutual forbearance, was delayed for the present, and came up for settlement in the next administration. President Buchanan closed his administration in peace. As a measure of precaution he accumulated a large military force in Washington, to guard the inauguration of his successor.

CHAPTER II

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

ABRAHAM LINCOLN was inaugurated president of the United States on March 4, 1861. He delivered his famous inaugural address in the presence of an immense assemblage of people. The telegraph flashed it over the country, and the next day it was read by nearly every citizen in the United States. No other address ever engaged the anxious attention of such a vast audience.

President Lincoln began with the subject of slavery, making the distinct pledge that he would not interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it existed. This portion of the address has been quoted above. He next gave attention to the Constitutional provision with reference to fugitive slaves and favored its enforcement. He then took up the secession of the States and announced two general principles:

First, "I hold that in contemplation of universal law and of the Constitution the union of these States is perpetual."

Secondly, "If the United States be not a government proper, but an association of States by contract merely, can it, as a contract, be peaceably unmade by less than all the parties who made it? One party to a contract may violate it—break it so to speak—but does it not require all to lawfully rescind it?"

He then enters upon an argument to prove that these views are confirmed by history as follows:

“Descending from these general principles, we find the proposition that in legal contemplation the Union is perpetual confirmed by the history of the Union itself. The Union is much older than the Constitution. It was formed, in fact, by the Articles of Association in 1774. It was matured and continued by the Declaration of Independence in 1776. It was further matured, and the faith of all the thirteen then States expressly plighted and engaged that it should be perpetual by the Articles of Confederation in 1778. And, finally, in 1787, one of the declared objects for ordaining and declaring the Constitution was ‘to form a more perfect Union.’

“But if destruction of the Union by one or by part only of the States be lawfully possible, the Union is less perfect than before the Constitution, having lost the vital element of perpetuity.

“It follows from these views that no State upon its own mere motion can legally get out of the Union; that *resolves* and *ordinances* to that effect are legally void, and that acts of violence within any State or States against the authority of the United States are insurrectionary or revolutionary, according to circumstances.

“I therefore consider that in view of the Constitution and the laws the Union is unbroken, and to the extent of my ability I shall take care, as the Constitution itself expressly enjoins upon me, that the laws of the Union be faithfully executed in all the States. Doing this I deem to be only a simple duty on my part, and I shall perform it unless my rightful masters, the American people, shall withhold the requisite means, or shall in some authoritative manner direct the contrary. I trust this will not be regarded as a menace, but only as the declared purpose of the Union that it *will* constitutionally defend and maintain itself.

“In doing this, there need be no bloodshed or violence, and there shall be none unless it be forced upon the national authority. The power confided to me will be used to hold,

occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the government, and to collect the duties and imposts; but beyond what may be necessary for these objects, there will be no invasion, no using of force among the people anywhere."

The above extracts are sufficient to recall to mind the opinions and purposes announced by the President of the United States in entering upon office. It is unnecessary to quote in full this well-known address. The remainder is an elucidation of the matters above quoted and a fervent appeal to the love of the Union which the speaker well knew was strong in the heart of every true American. A portion of the peroration, however, is given below, being the only words addressed especially to the seceded States as a parting salutation, although the author had said in the first part of his address with regard to those "who seek to destroy the Union"—"I need address no word to them."

"In *your* hands, my dissatisfied fellow countrymen, and not in *mine*, is the momentous issue of civil war. The government will not assail *you*. You can have no conflict without yourselves being the aggressors. *You* have no oath registered in heaven to destroy the government, while I have the most solemn one to 'preserve, protect, and defend it.'

"I am loath to close. We are not enemies, but friends. We must not be enemies. Though passion may have strained, it must not break our bond of affection. The mystic chords of memory, stretching from every battlefield and patriot grave to every living heart and hearthstone all over this broad land will yet swell the chorus of the Union, when again touched, as surely they will be, by the better angels of our nature."

This address was an appeal to the Northern States and to those Southern States which had not yet seceded. It was a serving of notice on the "Confederate States." It was very differently received by the different sections. The North was electrified by it and Northern sentiment was unified. The reference to the perpetuity of the Union, incorrect as

it was in historical statement, illogical as it was in deduction from false premises, was yet epigrammatical and rhetorical. It struck the Northern mind just as its conservative elements were ready to yield to the wave of what they considered the patriotic purpose of preserving the Union. The president's address came like a toast to the Union, and like a brilliant toast, it banished reflection and hesitation. It had the same effect as Andrew Jackson's magnetic toast: "The Federal Union: It must and shall be preserved."

The Confederate States received it with indignation and defiance. It meant coercion and invasion. It could mean nothing else. They were not deceived by the peroration, nor by any statement of forbearance. It pronounced their acts and ordinances void. It expressed the purpose to execute the laws in *all* the States. It expressly said: "The power confided in me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the government, and to collect the duties and imposts." Could the Confederate government permit the United States to "hold, occupy, and possess" their forts, arsenals, or any other property, or to collect duties and imposts within the limits of the Confederacy? How could they permit this without an absolute surrender of all the rights which they asserted? Claiming to be a government foreign to the United States, they had sent commissioners to Washington to sue for peace and the peaceable adjustment of all questions of property or claim. This commission had been ignored by Buchanan, and President Lincoln now announced his purpose to hold, occupy, and possess the property in dispute and to collect the customs and taxes in their territory. They were using every means to maintain peace. No one doubted or could doubt their sincere desire for peace. What, then, could the president mean by saying: "In *your* hands, my dissatisfied countrymen, and not in mine, is the momentous issue of civil war?" It meant: "There is no way for you to avoid civil war except by submission." They were in no temper for submission. Every consideration of manhood forbade

it, and they were bound by a bond similar to that set forth in the president's pathetic averment of the oath which he had "registered in heaven to preserve, protect, and defend" the government of the United States, for every officer of the Confederacy likewise had an oath registered in heaven to preserve, protect, and defend the Confederate government.

The Border States received the address with sorrow and anxiety. It extinguished the last hope that they had entertained of compromise or peace. They must now choose on which side to array themselves in the conflict. The action of Virginia, North Carolina, Arkansas, and Tennessee could not be doubted. Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri were much divided in sentiment, and their location exposed them to peculiar restraints. The Southern sentiment with regard to them is exquisitely portrayed in the beautiful song *Maryland! my Maryland!* which was written a little later. Kentucky was allied by blood, sympathy, and common interest with the slaveholding States. Missouri had been the occasion of the first agitation of the slavery question. The South had rallied to her support, and secured her admission as a State. Her citizens ought to understand States Rights, and ought to remember the battles which the South had waged for their State. There is no doubt that it was the purpose of the Border States to act together.

As to the constitutional arguments of the president's address, the Border States, except Missouri and Kentucky, utterly neglected them. On these latter States some effect was produced. The people of all the other Border States read them closely and analyzed them thoroughly. They readily detected the historical errors, and the sophisms in argument. They saw the ambiguity in the use of the word "Union." In the sense of friendly relations, the Union was older than the States, and was instituted by the colonies. In the sense of an established government the Union was older than the Constitution, but not *much* older, as the president stated. It was not so old as the States, which created it. If there was any Union, in the sense of an

established government, created by the Declaration of Independence, the people and States of 1776 were not aware of it; because they devoted much time and effort to create a Union, or Federal government, and took five years to do it.

Virginia knew that its convention which met at Williamsburg, May 5, 1776, passed a resolution, May 15th, as follows:

“Resolved, unanimously, That the delegates appointed to represent this colony in General Congress be instructed to propose to that respectable body to declare the United Colonies free and independent States, absolved from all allegiance to, or dependence upon the crown or Parliament of Great Britain, and that they give the assent of this colony to such declaration and to whatever measures may be thought proper and necessary by Congress, for forming foreign alliances, and a confederation of the colonies, at such time and in the manner as to them shall seem best; Provided, that the power of forming Government for, and the regulation of the internal concerns of each colony be left to the respective colonial legislatures.”

It further knew that in obedience to these instructions, Richard Henry Lee offered the following resolutions in Congress, June 7, 1776:

“That these United Colonies are and of right ought to be, free and independent States; that they are absolved from all allegiance to the British crown, and all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved.

“That it is expedient forthwith to take the most effectual measures for forming foreign alliances.

“That a plan of confederation be prepared and transmitted to the respective colonies for their consideration.”

Virginia further knew that the motion of its delegates was adopted July 2, 1776. Thus, preparations were begun for confederation on the same day that independence was decided on. It further knew that on account of jealousies and disagreements the Articles of Confederation were not

adopted by Congress until November 15, 1777, and were then referred to the States for ratification or rejection, not to go into effect until ratified by all the States. The delegates of all the States had on July 9, 1778, signed in ratification, except New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland. Maryland could testify that it instructed its delegates to vote against all the propositions of Virginia, and to seek reconciliation with Great Britain. It could further testify that after it consented to independence it still refused for nearly five years to consent to confederation, and did not ratify the articles until March 1, 1781, on which day the Union of these States was begun, going into effect with the ratification of the last State, Maryland.

President Lincoln was, therefore, mistaken when he said that the faith of all the thirteen States was plighted to the confederation in 1778. His argument seemed to be that the Union was perpetual because it was older than the Constitution, or the Articles of Confederation. Suppose it was older, how did that prove that it was perpetual? He did not attempt to show, and could not show. He simply aimed to throw it back beyond the debatable period. He then attempted to show that the Articles of Confederation declared it perpetual in 1778. It is true that the Articles of Confederation did declare it perpetual in 1781, when that instrument was completed by the ratification of all the States. It is equally true that this instrument was annulled and superseded by the Constitution in which the word "perpetual" is conspicuously absent. On this point North Carolina could testify, and could call in the testimony of Rhode Island. The Constitutional Convention provided that the Constitution should go into effect when ratified by nine States. It actually went into effect with eleven States. North Carolina and Rhode Island were left "outside." With this action of eleven States forming themselves into another government, exit the "perpetuity" of the Union under the agreement which provided that: "the Articles of this Confederation shall be inviolably observed by every

State, and the union shall be perpetual; nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter be made in any of them unless such alteration be agreed to in a congress of the united States, and be afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every State." Yet here stand North Carolina and Rhode Island testifying that it was broken without their consent, and a new government formed without their consent, and which they refused to join—Rhode Island for two years.

President Lincoln argued that when an association of States is made by contract merely, it cannot be unmade by less than all the parties who made it, but the history of the instrument which he cites to support his arguments shows that the contract of the Confederation was unmade by less than all the parties who made it. But he says that one of the declared objects for ordaining and establishing the Constitution in 1787 was "to form a more perfect Union."

Congresses and conventions do not *make* constitutions. They can only propose them. Constitutions are not valid until ratified by every State that accedes to them. Such was the case in 1781 and in 1787–1790. For the validity of the instrument we must look, then, to the ratifications of the States. Here Virginia is ready to testify, and to call in the testimony of New York and Rhode Island. These three States, in ratifying the Constitution, expressly reserved the right to secede. Their ordinances have been quoted in the previous chapter.

Such were the criticisms on the president's address in the Border States. Its fallacies and its historical errors weakened their faith in the entire address. With such sentiments they were now watching the diplomatic movements of the leaders on both sides, each striving to gain a political advantage. It was certain that the Confederate leaders sincerely desired peace, and the Federal leaders intended war, but desired temporary delay, partly for preparations and partly for political effect, and were striving to force the Confederates to begin the conflict.

So far, attention has been devoted to portraying the sentiments of the several sections, and especially of the South, and the motives which impelled the actors in the stupendous drama upon which they were about to enter. Partisan writers on both sides represent their adversaries as led on by ambitious men who dragged the people unwillingly into war. This view is untrue. The American people are not so easily led. Jefferson Davis was the exponent of Southern feeling, as Abraham Lincoln was the exponent of Northern feeling. In the South, there was a minority which did not favor secession; and in the North, there was a minority which opposed coercion. In both sections the great body of these minorities yielded to the tide of public sentiment, and, as events progressed, became identified with the sentiments of their respective sections. A few in each section held to their original views, and endured the hardships always visited upon those who array themselves against public opinion.

The reader who looks with enlightened human sympathy into the motives and actions of men will not require them to conform either their opinions or their conduct to his own preconceived standards, but will judge them more justly and wisely, and will recognize that men whose theories and actions are divergent and antagonistic may yet be honest men and patriots. If the sentiments, theories, and motives of the actors have been already correctly portrayed, we may enter on the recital of the events which now followed in rapid succession, pausing only in brief review to bring up the narrative to the period of President Lincoln's inaugural address.

Soon after the secession of South Carolina, as we have seen, the State made demand on President Buchanan for possession of the forts in Charleston harbor, which demand was refused, but assurances were given that the garrison would not be reinforced. Negotiations were carried on without result. There were three forts in the harbor, and a custom house and an arsenal in the city. The total garrison consisted of two hundred and forty-seven officers and

men, of whom one hundred and sixty-two men, belonging to the engineer corps, were engaged in working on repairs. Of these three forts, Castle Pinckney was the smallest, situated in the bay, one mile from the city. Fort Moultrie, situated on Sullivan's Island, about four miles from the city, was occupied by the major part of the garrison. It was subject to land attack, against which it was considered weak. Fort Sumter was the largest and strongest. It was situated in the bay, and could not be approached except by boats.

Major Robert Anderson, at that time in command of the United States forces in the harbor, on December 26, 1860, evacuated the other forts and concentrated the garrison in Fort Sumter. This fort, if supplied with provisions, could be held against any ordinary attack. South Carolina sent a commission which protested to the United States government against Major Anderson's act as a violation of the *status quo* while negotiations were pending, but Anderson was sustained; and the commissioners of South Carolina returned home. The letter of protest which had been sent to the president was returned with the following endorsement: "This paper, just presented to the President, is of such character that he declines to receive it."

Matters wore, for a few days, a threatening aspect. The authorities of South Carolina promptly concentrated State troops at Charleston and took possession of the abandoned forts, the custom house, and the arsenal. The State also erected forts commanding the harbor and nearly surrounding Fort Sumter, supplied them with artillery and mortars, and manned them with strong forces. Governor F. W. Pickens, of South Carolina, threatened that he would attack Fort Sumter unless assured that no attempt would be made to reinforce it. He was restrained, however, by the desire to preserve peace, and matters resumed the *status quo ante*, but with suspicion on both sides.

The affairs of Fort Sumter had given rise to many discussions and much difference of opinion in Buchanan's Cabinet. When the president refused to reinforce Fort

Sumter, Lewis Cass, the secretary of state, resigned, December 13th. When Buchanan refused to order Anderson to evacuate the fort, General John B. Floyd, secretary of war, determined to withdraw from the Cabinet and resigned on December 31st. At length it was decided by the new Cabinet, and approved by the president, to reinforce Fort Sumter, and a secret expedition was attempted. A merchant steamer, the *Star of the West*, was loaded with supplies and two hundred and fifty soldiers who were to serve as reinforcements. This ship left New York, January 5, 1861, and appeared before Charleston harbor on the morning of January 9th. She bore no flag, or warlike appearance, the recruits being hidden from sight. But the South Carolina authorities had notice of her coming. As soon as she came within range a shot was fired across her bows as a signal to "heave to." The only notice taken of this was to raise the American flag. Fire was then opened upon her from the batteries. The steamer, though struck by several shots, was not disabled. She hastily changed her course, and put to sea.

Heretofore, it had been thought that the strong desire of President Buchanan to preserve peace would deter him from any movement to disturb the *status quo*. It was now evident that he intended to reinforce Major Anderson, and the secret means to which he resorted intensified Southern indignation. Governor Pickens now made a formal demand on Major Anderson for the surrender of the fort. Major Anderson refused to comply with the demand, but suggested that the demand be referred to the United States authorities at Washington, and offered to send one of his officers to accompany the messenger of Governor Pickens to the national capital. The demand of Governor Pickens for the surrender upon condition "that the valuation of such property will be accounted for by the State upon the adjustment of its relations with the United States," was borne to President Buchanan by Colonel I. W. Hayne, attorney-general of South Carolina. Before his arrival, however,

the matter had become complicated with new events of great importance. Mississippi, Florida, and Alabama had seceded, and no doubt was entertained of the speedy secession of Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas. Florida and Alabama had questions to settle similar to the question presented by Fort Sumter. Fort Taylor at Key West and Fort Jefferson on Tortugas Island were still held by the United States. Lieutenant Adam J. Slemmer, commanding in the harbor of Pensacola, had surrendered the Pensacola Navy Yard and had abandoned Forts Barrancas and McRae, and on January 10th had concentrated his garrison of forty-six soldiers and thirty seamen in Fort Pickens, a strong and defensible fort, located on Santa Rosa Island, commanding the entrance to the harbor. It thus became necessary for Governor Pickens to act in concert with the other seceded States.

On January 22d, General Joseph Holt, secretary of war *ad interim*, gave to Messrs. Benjamin Kirkpatrick, Stephen R. Mallory, and John Slidell, a committee who were acting for the seceded States, a qualified assurance, with which they were compelled to rest content. In this communication, the committee is informed that there is no present intention of reinforcing Major Anderson, and that the happiest results will be attained if both parties remain on their present amicable footing, neither being bound by any obligations except the high Christian duty to keep the peace and avoid all causes of mutual irritation. The Fort Pickens situation was relieved on January 29th, not by agreement, but by the issuance of orders that Fort Pickens should not be reinforced unless attacked, or unless evidences were given of the intention to attack. On February 6th, Colonel Hayne received from the president a formal refusal to sell or surrender Fort Sumter.

Such was the condition of affairs when the seceded States, as heretofore related, assembled at Montgomery on February 4th to organize the "Confederate States of America." All negotiations with reference to Fort Sumter, Fort Pickens,

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and other disputed property now passed into the hands of the Confederate government, and were referred to the commission of which we have already made mention.

It seemed needless for the Confederate commissioners to approach President Lincoln, for they had been already answered in his inaugural address. Nevertheless, on the 12th of March they addressed a note to Secretary of State Seward requesting an interview with the president for the purpose of presenting their credentials. To this they received no written reply for twenty-seven days, and then only an unsigned memorandum. This "memorandum," as it was termed by Secretary Seward himself, was prepared on March 15th, three days after the interview had been requested. It recites a denial of the request for an unofficial interview with him "upon exclusively public consideration," and the receipt by him, on March 13th, of a sealed communication from Messrs. Crawford and Forsyth setting forth their desire for a speedy adjustment of all questions growing out of the separation for the future welfare of the two "supposed" nations (the quotation marks are the author's and not Mr. Seward's), asking for a peaceful solution of these questions, and assuring all parties concerned "that it is neither their intention nor their wish to make any demand which is not founded in strictest justice, nor to do any act to injure their late confederates." The memorandum sets forth the request of the commissioners for a day to be set when they may present to the president of the United States their credentials and the objects of their mission. The secretary then sets down his own views of recent events, which he says he understands very differently from Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford. "He sees in them not a rightful and accomplished revolution and an independent nation with an established government, but rather a perversion of a temporary and partisan excitement to the inconsiderate purposes of an unjustifiable and unconstitutional aggression upon the rights and the authority vested in the Federal government and hitherto benignly exercised.

The secretary of state therefore avows to Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford that he looks patiently but confidently "for other means of adjustment than intimated by them. "It is, however, the purpose of the secretary of state on this occasion not to invite or engage in any discussion of these subjects, but simply to set forth his reasons for declining to comply with the request of Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford." The "reasons" briefly stated are that President Lincoln's inaugural message had set forth principles that prevented the secretary from admitting that the Confederate States constituted a foreign power with whom diplomatic relations ought to be established; that the secretary had no authority, nor was he at liberty to recognize them as diplomatic agents, or hold correspondence or other communication with them; that he had submitted this paper to the president and that the president "coincides generally in the views it expresses, and sanctions the secretary's decision declining official intercourse with Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford." This memorandum was never signed, and lay in the department of state until the 8th of April, when it was delivered to the secretary of the commissioners, J. T. Pickett. On April 9th the commissioners, who had now been joined by Mr. Roman, sent a reply vindicating their position, but to this the only answer was the formal acknowledgment of its receipt.

While this unsigned and undelivered "memorandum," however, had been reposing in the secretary of state's desk, the commissioners, who in their strong desire to avoid war, if possible, waived all questions of form, received an oral answer through Judge John A. Campbell, of the Federal Supreme Court. The unofficial negotiations thus commenced became complicated with the vacillation of Cabinet councils, and subjected Seward to the charge of duplicity and deliberate falsehood. President Jefferson Davis, in his *Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government*, makes this charge, and certainly proves the inconsistency and self-contradiction of Seward by incontestable evidence. John

G. Nicolay private secretary to President Lincoln, in his work, *The Outbreak of the Rebellion*, defends Seward, and attributes his contradictory statements, which cannot be denied, to the fact that Seward made them, not as pledges to be transmitted to the Confederate authorities, but as confidential expressions of his own opinions, in conference with Judge Campbell, an official of the United States, and that Judge Campbell, in violation of confidence, and without authority, conveyed them to the Confederate authorities, as pledges from Seward.

This position of Nicolay is not sustained by the evidence. Judge John A. Campbell was appointed by Seward to act in concert with Judge Samuel Nelson, of the Supreme Court of the United States, as intermediaries of communication with the Confederate commissioners. It was eminently proper that these two high officers of the United States, who exercised, however, no executive functions, and whose exalted characters placed them above suspicion of being influenced by any considerations but those of the purest patriotism, should be the medium of aiding Seward in his patriotic policy of peace. The active work was done by Judge Campbell, though he was in frequent conference with Judge Nelson and Seward. The evidence shows that he was authorized by Seward to notify President Davis as well as the commissioners, though unofficially, that Fort Sumter would be evacuated within ten days.

Later, as no indications of evacuation appeared, the Confederate authorities became anxious over the situation, and demanded an explanation. The assurances were repeated by Judge Campbell with Seward's knowledge. Finally, on April 7th, Seward replied in writing to Judge Campbell: "Faith as to Sumter fully kept. Wait and see." After the capture of Fort Sumter, Judge Campbell, feeling that he had been placed in an embarrassing position, addressed a letter to Seward, reviewing all the transactions, and reciting the steps that had been taken by himself with the knowledge and approval of Seward. He requested a reply.

Receiving none, he addressed a second communication, April 20th, urgently demanding a reply, as due to himself. He received none. It is charitable to construe Seward's statements and pledges as due to the honest and patriotic purpose of promoting peace, and caused by an overestimate of his own personal influence in controlling the policy of the administration, yet it is certain that he made reiterated and positive pledges which his government violated, both by secret practices and open breach, as we shall hereinafter show.

There can be no doubt that Lincoln, upon entering into office, intended to retain both Fort Sumter and Fort Pickens, and to reinforce and relieve both speedily. He met with unexpected obstacles. At a Cabinet meeting, held the day after his inauguration, he learned by letters from Major Anderson that, in the opinion of himself and his officers, Fort Sumter was so completely invested that it could not be relieved by a less force than twenty thousand men, supported by a strong naval expedition. General Winfield Scott, commander-in-chief, recommended the immediate evacuation, on the ground that the fort could neither be relieved nor reinforced. Seward favored immediate evacuation for military and political reasons. He was sustained by more than two-thirds of the Cabinet. In the United States Senate, then in executive session, many senators of strong Union sentiments favored the evacuation of the Southern forts. Prominent among these was Stephen A. Douglas, while many other advisers of the president urged the same policy.

Lincoln showed some outward signs of a wavering policy, but it is probable that he never really changed his purpose. While he held the matter undecided, there was much vacillation in his Cabinet councils. While he was weighing means to accomplish his purpose, a proposition was made to him which he at once embraced. Captain A. B. Fox, of the United States navy, proposed a plan for conveying provisions and reinforcements to the garrison, which the president and a portion of the Cabinet approved. Seward

disapproved the plan. At a Cabinet meeting held March 29th, it was decided to fit out expeditions for the relief of Forts Sumter and Pickens. Notice of this change of purpose was not promptly communicated to the Confederate government, as ought to have been done in honor and good faith, for President Lincoln and Secretary Seward well knew that the Confederate authorities were relying on the pledges previously given. The two expeditions were organized as secretly as possible. The chartered steamers *Atlantic* and *Illinois*, it was announced, were going to the Gulf. They left New York on the 7th and 8th of April respectively, the *Powhatan*, their convoy, having left the harbor in the afternoon of April 6th. These went to Fort Pickens, and successfully reinforced that garrison to 858 men, landing provisions for six months. Fort Pickens was thus relieved. The Charleston expedition, which had been scheduled to leave first, was delayed by unforeseen difficulties, and sailed after the other expedition. The steam cutter *Harriet Lane* left about ten o'clock in the morning of April 8th, and the *Baltic*, well laden with provisions, followed her early in the morning of April 9th. The frigates *Pawnee* and *Pocahontas*, a part of the Charleston expedition, left Norfolk in the evening of April 9th and the morning of April 10th respectively. These had sealed orders to rendezvous before Charleston at daylight on the morning of April 11th, but owing to the delays in sailing, failed to do so.

These preparations were conducted while the Confederate authorities were resting secure under the assurances from the secretary of state that "The government will not undertake to supply Fort Sumter without giving notice to Governor Pickens," and "Faith as to Sumter fully kept. Wait and see."

On April 8th notice was served on Governor Pickens and General Pierre G. T. Beauregard, in Charleston, by Mr. Chew, an attaché of the State Department at Washington, "that the government intended to provision Fort Sumter, peaceably if they can, forcibly if they must."

General Beauregard, the Confederate commander at Charleston, communicated this notice to his government at Montgomery by telegraph on the day of its receipt, and received, on April 10th, orders to demand the evacuation of Fort Sumter, and in the event of refusal to reduce the fort. He replied the same day: "The demand will be made to-morrow at twelve o'clock."

While events now inevitably tended to war, let us glance at the sentiments of Major Anderson. They are expressed in the letter that he wrote to his government on April 8th on receiving notice of the movement to reinforce him:

"I had the honor to receive by yesterday's mail the letter of the Honorable Secretary of War, dated April 4th, and confess that what he there states surprises me very greatly—following, as it does, and contradicting so positively the assurance Mr. Crawford telegraphed he was 'authorized' to make. I trust this matter will be at once put in a correct light, as a movement made now, when the South has been erroneously informed that none such would be attempted would produce most disastrous results throughout our country. It is, of course, now too late for me to give any advice in reference to the proposed scheme of Captain Fox. I fear that its results cannot fail to be disastrous to all concerned. . . . We shall strive to do our duty, though I frankly say that my heart is not in this war, which I see is to be thus commenced. That God will still avert it, and cause us to resort to pacific means to maintain our rights, is my ardent prayer.

"I am, Colonel, very respectfully,

"Your obedient servant,

"ROBERT ANDERSON,

"*Major 1st Artillery, Commanding.*"

In obedience to the instructions of his government, General Beauregard, the day after he had sent the telegram above quoted, made formal demand on Major Anderson for

the evacuation of the fort, and sent the communication by his aides-de-camp, Colonel James Chesnut, Jr., and Captain Stephen D. Lee. The letter demanding the evacuation of Fort Sumter concluded as follows: "All proper facilities will be afforded for the removal of yourself and command, together with company arms and property, and all private property, to any post in the United States you may elect. The flag you have upheld so long and with so much fortitude, under the most trying circumstances, may be saluted by you on taking it down." To this demand Major Anderson returned a courteous reply, declining to evacuate the fort.

Anxious to avoid bloodshed, General Beauregard, under the instructions of his government, sent a second communication to Major Anderson, dated eleven o'clock P. M., April 11, 1861. This communication was delivered about midnight by Colonel Chesnut and Captain Lee. The reply to this letter is dated 2.30 A. M., April 12, 1861. The reply of General Beauregard's aides is dated 3.20 A. M., April 12, 1861. Under their instructions, they prepared it in the fort, after spending the night in the vain endeavor to dissuade Major Anderson from undergoing the terrible ordeal to which they knew he would be exposed.

As these concluding communications between Major Anderson and General Beauregard are especially important, they are quoted below in full, accompanied by the comments of Jefferson Davis, who better than anyone else knew the motives which controlled the action of the Confederate government:

"HEADQUARTERS PROVISIONAL ARMY, C. S. A.,

"CHARLESTON, April 11, 1861, 11 P. M.

MAJOR: In consequence of the verbal observations made by you to my aides, Messrs. Chesnut and Lee, in relation to the condition of your supplies, and that you would in a few days be starved out if our guns did not batter you to pieces—or words to that effect—and desiring no useless effusion of blood, I communicated both the verbal observations and your written answer to my Government.

"If you will state the time at which you will evacuate Fort Sumter and agree that in the meantime you will not use your guns against us unless ours shall be employed against Fort Sumter, we will abstain from opening fire upon you. Colonel Chesnut and Captain Lee are authorized by me to enter into such an agreement with you. You are therefore requested to communicate to them an open answer.

"I remain, Major, very respectfully,

"Your obedient servant,

"G. T. BEAUREGARD,

"*Brigadier-general, Commanding.*

"MAJOR ROBERT ANDERSON,

"*Commanding at Fort Sumter, Charleston Harbor, S. C.*"

"HEADQUARTERS FORT SUMTER, S. C.,

"April 12, 1861, 2.30 A. M.

"GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your second communication of the 11th instant, by Colonel Chesnut, and to state in reply that cordially uniting with you in the desire to save the useless effusion of blood, I will, if provided with the proper and necessary means of transportation, evacuate Fort Sumter by noon on the 15th instant, should I not receive, prior to that time, controlling instructions from my Government, or additional supplies; and that I will not in the meantime open my fire on your forces unless compelled to do so by some hostile act against this fort, or the flag of my Government, by the forces under your command, or by some portion of them, or by the perpetration of some act showing a hostile intention against this fort or the flag it bears.

"I have the honor to be, General,

"Your obedient servant,

"ROBERT ANDERSON,

"*Major U. S. Army, Commanding.*

"*To Brigadier-general G. T. Beauregard,*

"*Commanding Provisional Army C. S. A.*"

"FORT SUMTER, S. C.,

"April 12, 1861, 3.20 A. M.

"SIR: By authority of Brigadier-general Beauregard, commanding the provisional army of the Confederate States, we have the honor to notify you that he will open the fire of his batteries on Fort Sumter in one hour from this time.

"We have the honor to be, very respectfully,

"Your obedient servants,

"JAMES CHESNUT, JR.,

"*Aide-de-camp,*

"STEPHEN D. LEE,

"*Captain C. S. Army, and Aide-de-camp.*

"MAJOR ROBERT ANDERSON,

"*United States Army, Commanding Fort Sumter.*"

The following comment on this correspondence is made by President Jefferson Davis:

"It is essential to a right understanding of the last two letters to give more than superficial attention to that of Major Anderson, bearing in mind certain important facts not referred to in the correspondence. Major Anderson had been requested to state the time at which he would evacuate the fort, if unmolested, agreeing in the meantime not to use his guns against the city and the troops defending it unless Fort Sumter should be first attacked by them. On these conditions General Beauregard offered to refrain from opening fire upon him. In his reply Major Anderson promises to evacuate the fort on the 15th of April, *provided* he should not, before that time, receive 'controlling instructions' or 'additional supplies' from his government. He furthermore offers to pledge himself not to open fire upon the Confederates, unless in the meantime compelled to do so by some hostile act against the fort, *or the flag of his Government.*"

Inasmuch as it was known to the Confederate commander that the "controlling instructions" were already issued and that the "additional supplies" were momentarily expected; inasmuch also, as any attempt to introduce the supplies

would compel the opening of fire upon the vessels bearing them under the flag of the United States—thereby releasing Major Anderson from his pledge—it is evident that his conditions could not be accepted. It would have been merely, after the avowal of a hostile determination by the government of the United States, to await an inevitable conflict with the guns of Fort Sumter and the naval forces of the United States in combination, with no possible hope of averting it, unless in the improbable event of a delay of the expected fleet for nearly four days longer. (In point of fact, it arrived off the harbor on the same day, but was hindered by a gale of wind from entering it.) There was obviously no other course to be pursued than that announced in the answer given by General Beauregard, and in accordance therewith, after allowing ten minutes to elapse beyond the appointed time, the first gun was fired upon Fort Sumter at 4.30 A. M.

As this fateful cannon illumined with its flash the picturesque harbor on which day was just beginning to dawn, the eyes of watchful thousands turned to trace the graceful curve of the missile as it arose from the mortar's mouth and sped on its fiery path to its destination. Then their ears were saluted with the thundering sound which filled the harbor, and with but slight figure of speech, be it said, reverberated through the world! The bombardment was then determinedly begun with the fire of a columbiad, discharged by Edmund Ruffin, of the Palmetto Guard, to which company the duty of opening fire was assigned by General Beauregard, and Ruffin, as its oldest member, was elected by his comrades to lead the firing. The details of the assault lose interest in the stupendous fact of that first gun. The result was easily foreseen. The Confederate guns opened in chorus. From Cummings Point, from Fort Moultrie, from James's Island they concentrated their fire on Fort Sumter, now surrounded by a circle of flame. No reply was made for three hours. Then Major Anderson began a furious cannonade. The firing continued

through the day, with but little intermission and but little apparent effect; yet Anderson, owing to the smallness of his garrison, the concentration of the cannonade, especially of the mortar fire, and the fatigue of the men in watching so many points at once and in extinguishing the flames which were constantly breaking out in the buildings inside the fort, was compelled to slacken his fire. The first day, however, passed without any decisive event.

On the second day the buildings were again on fire from the hot shot poured into them by the Confederate mortars. By noon the flames were beyond control, and the garrison was subjected to almost insufferable discomfort, and to the danger of the explosion of the magazine and was compelled to cease firing. The cannon of the Confederates became more active. The flagstaff of Fort Sumter was shot away. The Confederates, seeing the flames and noting the disappearance of the flag and the cessation of any form of resistance, supposed that Major Anderson had surrendered.

At this juncture, ex-Senator Louis T. Wigfall, of Texas, struck with admiration of the gallant defence made by Major Anderson, and with sympathy for the distressing situation to which he was now reduced, went of his own accord and without authority in an open boat to Fort Sumter and urged him to surrender. Major Anderson replied that he would now accept the terms tendered by General Beauregard's note of the 11th instant. Senator Wigfall became responsible that these terms would be conceded. Hardly had he departed when staff officers from General Beauregard arrived with the offer to assist Major Anderson in extinguishing the flames and to treat for surrender. The misunderstanding was easily remedied. The staff officers agreed to a truce until General Beauregard should be heard from. There was no difficulty in conceding the terms. General Beauregard promptly ratified the irregular agreement which Senator Wigfall had made. In doing so he executed officially the sentiment of every Southern man. The same terms which were offered to Major Anderson in advance were now

granted to him in his extremity, and would have been yielded at any stage of the proceedings. Accordingly, Major Anderson, on the next day, April 14th, after the ceremonies of saluting and lowering his flag, evacuated Fort Sumter. His gallantry brought him the admiration of "friend and foe." He soon received the thanks of the Congress of the United States and rapid promotion in the army.

The expedition of Captain Fox, intended to relieve Fort Sumter, arrived off Charleston harbor at three o'clock A. M. April 12th, an hour and a half before the first gun was fired. Captain Fox's fleet knew that the bombardment was going on, yet remained outside the harbor inactive during its entire progress. This expedition accomplished no purpose except to arouse the storm of war.

In the great excitement over Fort Sumter, the public lost sight of Fort Pickens, which presented for solution questions similar to those presented by Fort Sumter. It will be remembered that the expedition to relieve Fort Pickens was fitted out in New York simultaneously with the Fort Sumter expedition. It was successful, as previously mentioned. The reinforcements were landed on the night of April 12th, without opposition, and the expedition was not known to the Confederates until its purpose was accomplished. The success of the expedition was duly reported to Washington by Captain H. A. Adams and Colonel Harvey Brown. The great interest which centres around Fort Sumter is in the fact that it was the beginning of the most stupendous fratricidal struggle in the history of the world. Many things, temperate and intemperate, just and unjust, true and untrue, have been said or written, to throw on one side, or the other, the odium of bringing on the war.

Passing by the lesser political manœuvres to gain advantage by forcing the other side into apparent aggression, these prominent facts, which cannot be refuted, stand out as witnesses:

First, The South desired peace; had all to lose, and nothing to gain by war; the South sued for peace, and took

no warlike measure until it was plain that peace was impossible.

Secondly, The North announced the purpose of coercion through the inaugural address of the president, the mouth-piece of the dominant Republican party, all of whose electoral votes were from Northern States. The aggressive policy of this party could not be carried out without coercion, and coercion meant war.

The effect produced by the fall of Fort Sumter on public opinion, North and South, and especially in the Border States, was now the subject of anxious speculation. Public meetings were held, leaders harangued, and editors wielded the pen so soon to be superseded by the sword. But the time for argument was passed: now must come the verdict.

Fort Sumter was surrendered on April 13th; on the 15th President Lincoln issued the following proclamation:

“By the President of the United States—A Proclamation.

“WHEREAS, The laws of the United States have been for some time past and now are opposed, and the execution thereof obstructed in the States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the marshals by law:

“Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, in virtue of the power in me vested by the Constitution and the laws, have thought fit to call forth, and hereby do call forth the militia of the several States of the Union, to the aggregate number of seventy-five thousand, in order to suppress such combinations and to cause the laws to be duly executed.

“The details for this object will be immediately communicated to the State authorities through the War Department.

“I appeal to all loyal citizens to favor, facilitate, and aid this effort to maintain the honor, the integrity, and existence of our National Union, and the perpetuity of popular

government, and to redress wrongs already long endured. I deem it proper to say that the first services assigned to the forces hereby called forth will probably be to repossess the forts, places, and property which have been seized from the Union; and in every event the utmost care will be observed, consistently with the objects aforesaid, to avoid any devastation, any destruction of, or interference with property, or any disturbance of peaceful citizens in any part of the country; and I hereby command the persons composing the combinations aforesaid to disperse and retire peaceably to their respective abodes within twenty days from this date.

“Deeming that the present condition of public affairs presents an extraordinary occasion, I do hereby, in virtue of the power in me vested by the Constitution, convene both Houses of Congress. Senators and Representatives are therefore summoned to assemble at their respective chambers at twelve o’clock noon on Thursday, the fourth day of July next, then and there to consider and determine such measures as, in their wisdom, the public safety and interest may seem to demand.

“In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

“Done at the City of Washington, this fifteenth day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-one, and of the independence of the United States the eighty-fifth.

“ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

“By the President:

“WILLIAM H. SEWARD, *Secretary of State.*”

As the news of Fort Sumter came like the lightning stroke, so this proclamation followed like the accompanying thunderclap. There was no hesitation now, no faltering. War had at last come, and it demanded that the people choose sides. Such was the spirit with which the great mass of the American people greeted this proclamation.

What side did they choose? With few exceptions, each chose the side of his own people, his kindred, his friends, his State. This was even more true of the North than of the South. In the North, loyalty to the State and to the Union impelled in the same direction. In the South, they pulled in different directions. Some individuals, and some communities, as in East Tennessee and western Virginia, were Union in sentiment and had long been estranged from the other sections of their respective States; but the people of these sections went together. President Lincoln made his first call not upon the so-called "American people," not upon the people *en masse*, but upon the States. The first act of Northern unanimity was the unanimity of States. This unanimity of States represented indeed the overwhelming Northern sentiment, yet it was necessary in order to make that overwhelming sentiment unanimous and effective. The governor of every Northern State made prompt and cordial response, tendering the president whatever troops might be needed and whatever support was possible. All the great leaders of Northern sentiment came into line with their people, for they now regarded the impending conflict as a war of their own States and section.

The governors of all the Border States except Maryland returned indignant replies to the demand for troops "to suppress the insurrection." From Maryland, Governor T. H. Hicks declined with the apology that he did not think it prudent. Virginia was the first State to act. Its people loved the Union, and were proud of the United States, but they loved the Constitution above the Union. The earnest efforts of the State had been given to preserve the Constitution first and then the Union. In the judgment of its people both were now broken. Early in the struggle this State had declared its attitude, in the following resolution adopted January 21, 1861:

"*Resolved*, by the General Assembly of Virginia, that if all efforts to reconcile the unhappy differences existing between the two sections of the country shall prove to be

abortive, then, in the opinion of the General Assembly, every consideration of honor and interest demands that Virginia shall unite her destiny with the slaveholding States of the South."

Virginia's convention was in session when the proclamation of President Lincoln, calling for troops, was issued. It only remained for the State to carry out its declared intention. It based its right of secession upon the express reservation of the right, as a condition made in its ordinance ratifying the Constitution in 1788, and as a part of that instrument. It declared its position as follows:

"AN ORDINANCE to repeal the ratification of the Constitution of the United States of America by the State of Virginia, and to resume all the rights and powers granted under said Constitution.

"The people of Virginia in their ratification of the Constitution of the United States of America, adopted by them in convention on the twenty-fifth day of June, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and eighty-eight, having declared that the powers granted under said Constitution were derived from the people of the United States and might be resumed whensoever the same should be perverted to their injury and oppression, and the Federal Government having perverted said powers not only to the injury of the people of Virginia, but to the oppression of the Southern slaveholding States:

"Now, therefore, we, the people of Virginia, do declare and ordain, That the ordinance adopted by the people of this State in convention on the twenty-fifth day of June, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and eighty-eight, whereby the Constitution of the United States of America was ratified, and all acts of the General Assembly of this State ratifying and adopting amendments to said Constitution, are hereby repealed and abrogated; that the Union between the State of Virginia and the other States under the Constitution aforesaid is hereby dissolved, and



Alexander Hamilton Stephens.

Vice-president, C. S. A.



Robert Toombs.

Secretary of state, C. S. A.



John Henninger Reagan.

Postmaster-general, C. S. A.

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that the State of Virginia is in full possession and exercise of all the rights of sovereignty which belong and appertain to a free and independent State.

“And they do further declare, That said Constitution of the United States is no longer binding on any of the citizens of this State.

“This ordinance shall take effect and be an act of this day, when ratified by a majority of the votes of the people of this State cast at a poll to be taken thereon on the fourth Thursday in May next, in pursuance of a schedule hereafter to be enacted.

“Adopted by the convention of Virginia, April 17, 1861.

“JOHN JANNEY, *President*,

“JOHN J. EUBANK, *Secretary*.”

Immediately after its secession and in anticipation of the affirmative vote of its people, Virginia entered into communication with the Confederate authorities and organized measures of defence. Its illustrious citizen, Colonel Robert Edward Lee, was appointed commander-in-chief of the State troops, and on May 10th was placed in command of all Confederate troops serving in Virginia.

The secession of Virginia was speedily followed by the secession of Arkansas, May 6th; North Carolina, May 2d, and Tennessee, June 8th. Virginia, the first border State to secede, and Tennessee, the last, had especial and similar causes for solicitude and hesitation. Each had within its own bosom a dissatisfied section. Each of these dissatisfied sections embraced a considerable area of its State, and had previously manifested restlessness and the desire for separate statehood. Each of these sections sympathized with the Union side of the controversy, and opposed secession. As was feared, the secession of their States furnished the pretext and opportunity to western Virginia and to East Tennessee to begin the movement for separation. It is well known that the effort of western Virginia was successful, but it is not so well known that East

Tennessee attempted a similar movement; in fact, it was the first to move.

As these two States, Virginia and Tennessee, were destined to become the northern frontier of the Confederacy, and to bear the brunt of invasion, it may be well to sketch in advance their peculiar conditions. Their territory stretched from the Atlantic to the Mississippi, forming a barrier which must be passed by any invading army moving directly from the North. If the barrier should be passed, their territory must be subjugated and held for the remainder of the war, as the pathway of invasion. In any event, after the refusal of Kentucky and Maryland to secede, they must meet the first shock and bear the brunt of war. The disaffection of western Virginia and East Tennessee left two gaps in the frontier line and exposed both sides to peculiar dangers. In order that these conditions may appear more clearly, the East Tennessee movement will now be discussed, and a discussion of the western Virginia movement will follow.

In Tennessee the majority of the people loved the Union, and did not wish to secede. The legislature met on January 7, 1861, and ordered an election at which the people should, at the same time, vote upon the question of holding a convention, and elect delegates to serve in case the convention should be held. The election took place on February 9th, and showed the sentiment in Tennessee,—for the convention, 57,798; against the convention, 69,675; for delegates who favored secession, 24,749; for delegates who favored the Union, 88,803. The first gun of the Confederate War was fired on Fort Sumter, April 12, 1861. April 15th, President Lincoln issued a proclamation, calling for seventy-five thousand troops, and followed this with a series of proclamations, declaring the ports of the seceded States in a state of blockade and all vessels acting under the authority of the blockaded States guilty of piracy. The announcement of the purpose of the Federal government to resort to coercion produced a revolution of sentiment in Tennessee. The legislature convened in extra session,

April 25th to May 1st. By its resolutions were adopted, authorizing the governor to enter into a military league with the Confederate States. The commissioners, Gustavus A. Henry, A. W. O. Totten, and Washington Barrow, concluded "the League" on May 7th. One day before the conclusion of this league, the legislature passed the Ordinance of Secession, and submitted it for ratification to a vote of the people in an election to be held on June 8th. The election was held at the appointed time, and the ordinance was adopted by a vote of 104,913 in its favor to 47,238 against it.

Acts were passed by the legislature to raise and equip an army of fifty-five thousand men and to appropriate five million dollars for the defence of the State. General Gideon J. Pillow established headquarters at Memphis and speedily organized the Provisional Army of Tennessee, equal to about one hundred and eight regiments of all arms. Factories were established in Tennessee for the manufacture of powder, percussion caps, guns, quartermaster and commissary stores. Nashville and Memphis became depots of supply, not only for Tennessee, but for the entire South. On July 31, 1861, the Provisional Army of Tennessee, with all its equipments and stores, was transferred to the Confederate States, and became part of the army of Major-general Leonidas Polk, commanding Department No. 1 of the Confederate States, with headquarters at Memphis.

Meanwhile, a strong Union sentiment developed in East Tennessee. Leading statesmen of both parties, among whom were Andrew Johnson, William G. Brownlow, Thomas A. R. Nelson, and Horace Maynard, espoused the cause of the Union. A convention of East Tennessee counties was called and assembled at Knoxville on May 30, 1861. The delegates present numbered four hundred and sixty-nine, representing twenty-six counties, and resident proxies represented two other counties, these twenty-eight counties constituting nearly the whole of East Tennessee. The convention was in session two days, and adjourned to

meet at Greeneville, June 17th, after the adoption of resolutions protesting against the military league and the recent acts of the General Assembly, favoring the policy of neutrality which had been recently adopted by Kentucky, and appealing to the people of the State, at the approaching election, to vote down the proposed Ordinance of Secession "while it is yet in their power to come up in the majesty of their strength, and restore Tennessee to her true position." At the election, held about a week later, as we have seen, the State gave a majority of fifty-seven thousand six hundred and seventy-five in favor of secession, but East Tennessee recorded a majority of about twenty thousand against it.

The delegates to the Union convention of East Tennessee reassembled at Greeneville at the appointed time, June 17th. Their ardor for maintaining the Union was not daunted by the overwhelming vote of the State in favor of secession. They adopted a "Declaration of Grievances," and appointed a committee consisting of Oliver P. Temple, John Netherland, and James P. McDowell to petition the General Assembly for the formation of a new State, to be composed of East Tennessee and such adjoining counties of Middle Tennessee as might vote to be included. If this petition should be granted, it was proposed to establish an independent State and to raise an army, with John Baxter as general. The new State was never formed, but many of the East Tennessee Unionists at once joined the Federal army. Others followed later.

With the way open through Kentucky, it can readily be seen that East Tennessee offered the opportunity to break the Confederate line of defence, and its people were ready and anxious to aid in a movement to have East Tennessee occupied by Federal forces. If western Virginia should be similarly occupied and with it the short intervening space through Virginia, a strong Union wedge would be thus inserted through the barrier of the Border States, and a way opened for invasions to reach the heart of the Confederacy. This plan was urged by East Tennesseans, but the Federal

generals commanding in the West preferred to operate along Mississippi River. While engaged in his western Virginia campaign, General George B. McClellan proposed to General Winfield Scott to move into East Tennessee by way of Wytheville, Virginia. He writes, June 7, 1861: "If the Government will give me ten thousand arms for distribution in East Tennessee, I think I can break the backbone of secession." General Scott at that time had other plans in view, and East Tennessee was left to the possession of the Confederates.

President Lincoln's first call was for seventy-five thousand men for three months. Either he did not comprehend the magnitude of the war in which he was about to engage, or else he intended this call to be but a preliminary step. General Scott informed the political authorities that seventy-five thousand three months' men would be totally insufficient for the invasion of the Confederate States. He therefore advised that the present forces be employed for the purposes of guarding Washington, securing Fortress Monroe and other Federal forts in the South, and in subjugating the Border States Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, and in erecting western Virginia into a separate State friendly to the Union. This policy was pursued.

Although the idea was early entertained of surrounding the entire Confederacy like a besieged town, yet neither the army nor the navy was as yet adequate to the purpose. Naval operations were begun along the coast, and as early as April 19th President Lincoln announced by proclamation the blockade of the ports of South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, and in a proclamation of April 27th extended the blockade to the ports of Virginia and North Carolina. It was not until a later period, however, that it was effectually maintained upon the immense scale which it finally attained. Although the battle of Bull Run was fought July 21, 1861, yet it was not so much a part of the subsequent great plan of invasion as of the first preliminary campaigns planned and limited

to the purposes mentioned above. The whole matter can, therefore, be more clearly presented by treating these preliminary detached campaigns separately, following in order the operations in the defence of Washington, the repression or subjugation of Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, and the invasion of Virginia for the purpose of securing western Virginia to the Union, and, finally, the suddenly formed expedition to capture by a dash the Confederate capital, which the Confederate authorities, by defiantly locating their seat of government at Richmond, had brought supposedly within reach of the Union army.

CHAPTER III

SUBJUGATION OF THE BORDER STATES

THE term "Border States" was condemned by President Lincoln, but has been popularly used. Its application, however, is ambiguous. Early in the conflict it was generally applied to the eight most northern slave States, viz: Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, and Kentucky, which, stretching from Delaware Bay to the Mississippi, formed the northern frontier, North Carolina and Tennessee, further south, extending in a parallel line from east to west, and together formed a double row covering the northern slave border, with Missouri and Arkansas as a similar double barrier west of the Mississippi. It was perhaps originally given to these States on account of their geographical position as intervening between the two hostile sections. The Confederacy ardently desired to maintain this line of defence, but when it was broken the term "Border States" was restricted to the four States that seceded, or more strictly to Virginia and Tennessee, which became the Southern Border States. The term "Northern Border States" was sometimes applied to Missouri, West Virginia, and Kentucky.

After the secession of Virginia, North Carolina, Arkansas, and Tennessee, the political efforts of both governments were directed to the States of Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, which still remained in the Union. Delaware was not expected to secede. Each of these States had a large element of foreign population, and of immigrants from the

free States, amounting in Delaware to fifty-four per cent of the white population, in Maryland to fifty-six, in Kentucky to twenty-eight, and in Missouri to eighty-three per cent. The peace movements gave these two classes time to unite their strength. Hence, to the surprise of political leaders, the Union sentiment in these States grew stronger as the time for decision arrived, and these classes coalesced to form a strong Union force. Though a minority in Kentucky, this element was strong, and active aid from the United States government and adroit management stimulated its development. The United States was thus enabled to throttle the contemplated movement in Maryland and Missouri and to take advantage of the conditions in Kentucky, and finally to invade and subjugate these States.

The following tables are compiled from the census of 1870 because that of 1860 does not give all the information needed; for instance, separate statistics for Virginia and West Virginia. For our purposes the ratios given below differ but little from those of 1860. The reader may pursue the narrative of events in each of the States above named with the lesson from the census to suggest that one cause of the apparent hesitation in these States was that their populations were not homogeneous. The especial condition of each State, however, will be considered in its order.

The large percentage of foreign population in Louisiana and Texas as shown in Table III is easily explained. The great body of the foreign element in Louisiana is of French descent, and in Texas of Mexican and Spanish descent, and almost wholly favored slavery and had become thoroughly assimilated in thought and sympathy with the Southern people. It may further be noted, that in all the States which seceded the number of persons therein who were born in the free States, and of their descendants, is small; and the foreign element except in Louisiana and Texas is comparatively insignificant and certainly not large enough to exert any appreciable influence.

TABLE II

Population of Foreign Birth or Foreign Parentage Living in the Slaveholding States.

SLAVERYHOLDING STATES.	Total Population.	FOREIGN LINEAGE			Approximate per cent of Foreign Lineage on Total Population.
		Foreign Born.	Having one or both Parents Foreign.	Total.	
Alabama	996,992	9,962	21,844	31,806	3
Arkansas	484,471	5,026	10,617	15,643	3
Delaware	185,025	9,136	20,361	29,497	16
Florida	187,748	4,967	9,295	14,262	7
Georgia	1,184,109	11,227	23,814	34,941	3
Kentucky	1,321,011	63,398	142,720	206,118	16
Louisiana	726,025	61,827	132,012	193,839	26
Maryland	780,894	83,412	182,362	265,774	34
Mississippi	827,922	11,191	18,756	29,947	4
Missouri	1,721,295	22,267	464,125	686,392	40
North Carolina	1,071,361	3,029	6,464	9,493	9
South Carolina	705,606	8,074	16,449	24,523	3
Tennessee	1,258,520	19,316	36,326	55,642	4
Texas	818,579	62,411	107,327	169,738	21
Virginia	1,225,163	13,754	30,794	44,548	4
West Virginia	447,014	17,091	46,204	63,295	14

The percentages of the two preceding tables have been based on the total population. The table that follows is based on the white population, and also takes into the account another important element, omitted in the statistics of the census. As the colored population before the war had no voice or influence in politics, it is proper to base our calculations on the white population. Again, an examination of the statistics shows that the foreign immigrant population is more closely analyzed in the census than the native immigrant population. It shows in each State the population of foreign birth and also the population of foreign parentage. In every State the population of foreign parentage is two or three times as great as that of foreign birth.

TABLE III

Population of the Slaveholding States; Showing the Number of Persons of Foreign Birth or Parentage, and of Free State Birth or Parentage Living in the Slaveholding States, and the Approximate Percentage of these Two Classes on the White Population.

SLAVEHOLDING STATES.	Total White Population.	FOREIGN ELEMENT.			FREE STATE ELEMENT.				Total of the Two Classes.	Per cent on White Population.	Per cent of Southern born on White Population.
		Foreign Born.	Having one or both Parents Foreign.	Total Foreign.	Born in Free States.	Having one or both Parents Born in Free States (estimated).	Free State Birth or Parentage.				
Alabama	191,384	9,696	21,844	31,540	9,179	5,179	20,358	48,151	25	8	25
Arkansas	367,115	5,006	10,617	15,623	12,045	16,045	36,090	47,733	13	73	73
Delaware	108,891	9,136	20,361	29,497	12,836	12,836	23,672	55,166	51	54	46
Florida	96,057	4,967	9,295	14,262	3,086	3,086	9,179	80,434	84	11	72
Georgia	618,926	11,127	23,814	34,941	6,298	6,298	12,596	47,537	7	7	23
Kentucky	1,098,628	63,396	143,720	207,116	49,372	49,372	98,744	304,742	28	28	73
Louisiana	362,065	61,827	122,011	183,838	10,747	10,747	21,494	81,338	22	68	41
Maryland	605,497	83,412	181,368	264,780	35,773	35,773	71,546	336,326	55	55	44
Massachusetts	382,866	21,191	18,756	39,947	6,063	6,063	12,126	42,073	11	17	17
Missouri	1,603,146	222,267	465,125	687,392	226,398	226,398	658,796	1,342,188	84	84	84
North Carolina	678,470	3,029	6,464	9,493	2,861	2,861	5,722	15,215	2	2	90
South Carolina	860,667	8,074	16,440	24,514	2,372	2,372	4,744	29,258	3	10	90
Tennessee	930,119	19,316	36,326	55,642	18,030	18,030	36,060	91,702	10	20	20
Texas	564,700	62,411	107,397	169,808	19,028	19,028	38,056	807,814	143	37	33
Virginia	712,089	13,754	30,754	44,508	24,683	24,683	49,366	73,914	10	20	90
West Virginia	424,033	17,091	46,804	63,895	31,564	31,564	63,128	126,483	30	30	70

We have been able, nevertheless, to prepare this last table with sufficient accuracy, for the census gives the number of those living in each State who were born in another State, with the State of nativity. We thus learn that the number of persons of foreign birth living in Maryland in 1870 was 83,412, and the number of those living in Maryland one or both of whose parents were born in foreign countries was 181,362. We also learn that the number of those living in Maryland who were born in the free States of the Union was 35,773; but the census does not show the number living in Maryland one or both of whose parents were born in the free States. This information has not been gathered in actual statistics, but it seems safe to estimate it. We cannot study the influence which a particular character of immigration has exercised in a State without following it through at least one descent.

The most convenient rule would be to assume that the law of descent from native immigrant parents would be the same as that of the descent from foreign immigrant parents. That rule has been given above. Invariably the number of the descendants in one degree is two or three times that of the immigrants. The attempt to follow this rule, however, leads in some cases to surprising results. There may be some unsuspected causes which would make this rule unsafe. To be entirely safe, we have assumed that the number of those living in Maryland one or both of whose parents were born in the free States was certainly at least equal to the number living in the State who were born in the free States. This rule is adopted in the preparation of Table III, which is compiled from the census except the one column marked "estimated." With this addition to the official figures a clear view of the conditions is presented.

Let us now examine in succession the course of each of the four "Northern Border States." All these States contained a large foreign and free State element. In fact these two classes constituted the majority of the population

of each of them, except Kentucky, and held the balance of power in that State.

Of Delaware little need be said. No struggle or event of importance occurred within its limits during the period of hesitation. It showed sympathy with the other slave States and gave cordial support to the "Peace Congress," and to all movements for peace and compromise. When President Lincoln issued the call for troops it acquiesced in the war and took its place among the Union States. There is nothing more to record. The explanation of its course may be studied in the analysis of its population as given in the preceding tables. The census further shows that the interest of Delaware in the question of slavery was very small. In 1860, there were only 1,798 slaves in the State, while there were at the same time 19,829 free negroes, making a total of 21,627. In 1870, the colored population, then all free, had increased to 22,794. Politically, Delaware had been allied to the South, and had united with the South in fighting the battles of slavery. Geographically, it was classed with the Middle States and was united to them by social ties and mercantile interests. Many of the leaders of political opinion turned with sympathy to their old allies of the South. In *Official Records*, Series IV, Vol. I, page 22, is found the following communication :

"WASHINGTON, January 5, 1861.

"GOVERNOR PETTUS, JACKSON, MISS.:

"The Governor, Officers of State, and six-sevenths of the people of Delaware are cordially with Mississippi in the Southern cause. The present Legislature opposed to immediate secession. The people will demand a convention and Delaware will coöperate with Mississippi.

"HENRY DICKINSON,

"ALEX. R. WOOTTEN.

"Mr. Wootten is Attorney-general of the State of Delaware.

"DICKINSON."

Similar documents may be found in the volume above cited, among them the reports of the Hon. D. C. Campbell, commissioner from Georgia, and the Hon. David Clopton, commissioner from Alabama, setting forth to their respective legislatures the results of their missions to Delaware. Both testify to the cordial reception extended to them, and to the kind sentiments of the people of Delaware, and express the belief that the State would ultimately secede, but was then waiting on Maryland and Virginia. If these gentlemen had been impressed with the characteristics of the population and had studied the census, they would not have been so sanguine.

Maryland was the first State invaded. It had shown so much sympathy with the South that it was thought necessary to arrest members of its legislature and to subjugate its citizens. A reference to the tables will show that only forty-six per cent of its people were of Southern birth, yet these were the ruling element. The majority of its citizens had long been political allies of the South. It was a slave State and had fought the battles of slavery. It was one of the original States. It was a factor and a witness of the formation of the Confederation and the Constitution. Its people understood both instruments, and had taught their principles to its immigrants; yet its population was not homogeneous. The majority of the people of Maryland sympathized with the South. They did not wish to secede, and united with Virginia in the effort to preserve the Constitution and the Union. The conditions in Maryland are clearly described in the report of the Hon. A. R. Wright, commissioner from Georgia, sent to announce to Maryland the secession of his State and to invite the coöperation of Maryland. Mr. Wright's visit was made about the middle of February, 1861. His report of his trip is of interest. His statements are so accurate and candid that they present a graphic picture of the case, and afford perhaps the most authentic form in which to lay the condition of affairs at this date before the reader:

“SAVANNAH, March 13, 1861.

“HON. G. W. CRAWFORD, *President, etc.*

“SIR: Under your appointment of myself as Commissioner to Maryland, I visited that State on the 15th ultimo and found in session on that day in the city of Baltimore a convention of her people assembled to take advisory action upon the condition of the country.

“This convention, I learned, was not a legally constituted body, authorized to take definite and binding action, but was a voluntary assemblage of the people which had no power to commit the State to any line of policy. I did not, therefore, feel authorized, under the ordinance of your body prescribing the duties of your Commissioner, to lay before them the action of our State, or to hold any intercourse with them of an official character. I visited the convention unofficially and, being invited to a seat on their floor, attended the meetings of the same during the two days of their session. I found the members of that convention, comprising as it did a number of the best and highest talent of the State, while they thought the cotton States had acted with undue haste and precipitancy, almost unanimously for resistance to Black Republican rule, and determined to co-operate with the seceding States in the event that Virginia should determine to withdraw from the Federal Government. The situation of Maryland geographically is such that, however mortifying it may be to her gallant sons, she is compelled to direct her action in concert with Virginia, that State and North Carolina lying immediately between her and the cotton States.

“The convention, after a session of two days, adjourned to reassemble on the 12th instant unless in the interval Virginia should take decided action, in which event they were to immediately reassemble for binding and definite action. Before adjourning, however, that body passed the following resolutions:

“ ‘WHEREAS, It is the opinion of this meeting that in the present alarming crisis in the history of our country it is

desirable that the State of Maryland should be represented by judicious, intelligent, and patriotic agents, fully authorized to confer and act with sister States of the South, and particularly with the State of Virginia;

“ ‘ AND, WHEREAS, Such authority can be conferred solely by a convention of the people of the State;

“ ‘ AND, WHEREAS, In the opinion of the meeting, the Legislature not being in session, a full and fair expression of the popular will is most likely to be heard by a convention called by recommendation of the Executive;

“ ‘ AND, WHEREAS, It is alleged that the Governor now has it in contemplation to recommend by proclamation a movement in the event of a failure by the Peace Conference and Congress to effect any satisfactory solution of the vexed question now agitating the country. Be it therefore

“ ‘ *Resolved*, That we shall approve such a proceeding on the part of the Governor, and add the voice of this convention to urge the voters of this State to regard such proclamation. And with a view to allow time for the action of the Governor in the matter, the convention will adjourn until the 12th day of March, next, unless intermediately the State of Virginia should by her sovereign convention secede from the Union; in which event, and in case the Governor of the State should not have then called a sovereign convention of the people of this State this convention shall at once assemble at the call of the president, with a view of recommending to the people of this State the election of delegates to such a sovereign convention.

“ ‘ *Resolved, further*, As the sense of this convention, that the secession of the several slave-holding States from the Federal Union was induced by the aggression of the non-slave-holding States, in violation of the Constitution of the United States.

“ ‘ *Resolved, further*, That the moral and material interest and the geographical position of the State demand that it should act with Virginia in this crisis, coöperating with that State in all honorable efforts to maintain and defend the

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Robert Mercer Taliaferro Hunter.
 Secretary of state, C. S. A., and peace commissioner
 in February, 1862.



Stephen Russell Mallory.
 Secretary of the navy, C. S. A.

Constitutional rights of its citizens in the Union, and failing in that, to associate with her in confederation with our sister States of the Union.

“*Resolved, further,* That the honor of this State requires that it should not permit its soil to be made a highway for Federal troops sent to make war upon our sister States of the South, and it is the opinion of this convention that an attempt on the part of the Federal Government to coerce the States which have seceded would necessarily result in civil war and the destruction of the Government itself.’

“On the 25th of February,” continues Mr. Wright, “I visited for the third time Annapolis, the seat of government (having failed while there on a former visit on the 21st to meet the Executive), and waited upon Governor Hicks, and after a personal interview and pretty free interchange of opinion with His Excellency, I handed to him the ordinances of secession with which I was entrusted, and also a written communication in which I endeavored to justify and explain the action of the State of Georgia; and attempted to show that the material interests of Maryland would be greatly promoted and advanced by her coöperation with the seceding States. To this communication (copy of which is hereto attached) I have received no reply, although upon a suggestion of Governor Hicks that he would favor me with a reply at his earliest convenience, I waited for two days to receive such communication as he should be pleased to make to your body.

“In absence of any written reply to my note of the 25th ultimo I can only give to your honorable body the result of the personal interview I had with the Governor, and I regret to say that I found him not only opposed to the secession of Maryland from the Federal Union, but that if she should withdraw from the Union he advised and would urge her to confederate with the Middle States in the formation of a central confederacy . . . He thought our action hasty, ill-advised, and not justified by the action of which we complained and that we were attempting to coerce Maryland to

follow our example; that he had great confidence in the Peace Conference then in session in Washington, and had assurance that that body would agree upon a plan of adjustment that would be entirely acceptable to Maryland; that the proposition before the Conference known as the Guthrie plan was a fair and proper basis of compromise and settlement. He also informed me in the course of our interview, and in answer to a direct inquiry from me on that point, that in the event of the Federal Government's attempting to coerce the seceding States he would interpose no objection to the marching or transporting of troops through his State and their embarkation at Baltimore by the Federal Government for that purpose; that as Chief Magistrate of the State he had no power to prevent it, as it would not be an invasion of his State, and that he would not convene the Legislature under such circumstances that they might take action in the premises.

"These opinions and views of the Governor I have reason to believe are not entertained by a majority of the people of Maryland. Indeed, I have no doubt that the people there would spontaneously rise *en masse* and resist the invaders, though it encrimsoned their soil with the best blood of the State. The people, then, in my humble judgment, are true to the memories of the past. They are a gallant, patriotic, and brave people, whose feelings and sympathies are warmly enlisted in our cause, and although some of them do entertain the opinion that we have, perhaps, acted precipitately, they acknowledge that our action is fully justified by the events of the past, and declare their determination to assist us, if need be, in sustaining our independence.

"It is greatly to be regretted that such a gallant people should be prevented by their own officials, however high they may be, from giving an authoritative expression of their convictions and of taking such action as in their judgment the affairs of the country demand. Without the consent of Governor Hicks neither the Legislature nor an authorized convention can be assembled, and I have no hesitation in

stating that he will never convene either. If Virginia shall withdraw from the Union the people of Maryland will, in the shortest possible period of time, assume the responsibility, assemble in spontaneous convention, and unite their destinies with the Confederate States of the South.

“In conclusion I would respectfully add that the communication would have been made at an earlier day, but that I waited, hoping to receive an answer from Governor Hicks before I laid before your body the result of my mission.

“I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

“A. R. WRIGHT.”

With this picture of Maryland sentiment before us, the course of events may be briefly narrated. Governor Hicks pursued his insidious policy, not openly opposing the wishes of the people, but availing himself of the movements in favor of peace and compromise to throw obstacles and delays in the way of any action by the State. As Mr. Wright predicted, he never did call a convention. He did not dare to tender troops from Maryland in response to the president's call, but declined with an apology “for the present.” He thus thwarted action until the forces of the United States took possession of the State, and the freedom of action was throttled.

On April 19th the Sixth Massachusetts Regiment, the first troops to respond to the president's call, were assaulted by an uprising of citizens while passing through the streets of Baltimore on the way to Washington. Colonel Edward F. Jones, commanding the regiment, in his report gives a list of three soldiers killed and thirty-nine wounded. Nine citizens were killed and a number wounded. This affair has been styled “the first blood of the war.” The authorities of Baltimore and the police force of the city came to the rescue of the soldiers, the main body of whom were embarked on the train and pursued their way to Washington. Intense excitement was caused by this incident, not only in Baltimore

but over all the country. It led to interviews and correspondence between the president and the officials of Baltimore and Maryland, the result of which was that the passage of troops through Baltimore was temporarily suspended.

Now followed the military occupation of Maryland and its complete subjugation. Those who believed that coercion ought to be used to hold in the Union States that had already seceded, would not, of course, hesitate to use coercion to prevent the anticipated secession of other States. Accordingly, on the same day on which the Baltimore riot occurred a military department was formed, including Delaware, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and the District of Columbia. General Robert Patterson was assigned to the command of this department. On April 27th a new military department was organized, to be known as the Department of Annapolis, to the command of which Brigadier-general Benjamin F. Butler was assigned. The following communication shows the purpose of this latter department:

“WASHINGTON, April 26, 1861.

“BRIGADIER-GENERAL B. F. BUTLER:

“The undersigned, General in chief of the Army, has received from the President of the United States the following instructions respecting the legislature of Maryland, now about to assemble at Annapolis, viz: It is ‘left to the commanding general to watch and await their action, which, if it shall be to arm their people against the United States, he is to adopt the most prompt and efficient means to counteract, even if necessary to the bombardment of their cities, and in the extremest necessity suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus*.’

“In the absence of the undersigned the foregoing instructions are turned over to Brigadier-general B. F. Butler, of the Massachusetts Volunteers or other officer commanding at Annapolis, who will carry them out in the right spirit; that is, with moderation and firmness. In the case of arrested individuals notorious for their hostility to the

United States the prisoners will be safely kept and duly cared for, but not surrendered except on the order of the commander aforesaid.

“WINFIELD SCOTT.”

Here is another order:

“WASHINGTON, April 27, 1861.

“TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

“Thomas A. Scott has been appointed to take charge of the railways and telegraphs between Washington City and Annapolis. Parties in charge thereof will place Mr. Scott in possession, and in future conform to his instructions in all matters pertaining to their management.”

Governor Hicks had been deaf to the demands of the people, and to the solicitations of the Southern States to summon a meeting of the legislature of the State to enable the people to take free action. Now, when the United States had fastened its military hold upon the State, he was more compliant. He had previously called a special session of the legislature to convene at Annapolis on the 26th of April. Now, on the pretended plea of the presence of United States troops at the capital, he called the meeting for a later date and changed the place of its convening to Frederick. He then requested General Robert Patterson to station troops at Frederick, and made requisition for the same in his official capacity, June 9, 1861. A little later he threw off the mask, expressed his approval of the system of arrests for political reasons, and wrote letters opposing the release of political prisoners who were obnoxious to him.

Meanwhile, the subjugation of Maryland proceeded apace. General Butler, on May 13th, placed Baltimore under military rule. The State was occupied by Federal troops. The writ of *habeas corpus* was suspended. Citizens were arrested, and held in confinement in defiance of the mandates of the Chief Justice of the United States. In the case of John Merryman, Chief Justice Taney replied

to the refusal of General Cadwalader to release the prisoner upon a writ from the Supreme Court in an unanswerable argument, which he closed with the following protest:

“And these great and fundamental laws which Congress itself could not suspend have been disregarded and suspended like the writ of *habeas corpus* by a military order supported by force of arms. Such is the case now before me; and I can only say that if the authority which the Constitution has confided to the judiciary department and judicial officers may upon any pretext or under any circumstances be usurped by the military power at its discretion the people of the United States are no longer living under a government of laws, but every citizen holds life, liberty, and property at the will and pleasure of the army officer in whose military district he may happen to be found.

“In such a case my duty was too plain to be mistaken. I have exercised all the power which the Constitution and laws confer on me, but that power has been resisted by a force too strong for me to overcome. It is possible that the officer who had incurred this grave responsibility may have misunderstood his instructions and exceeded the authority intended to be given him. I shall therefore order all the proceedings in this case with my opinion to be filed and recorded in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Maryland and direct the clerk to transmit a copy under seal to the President of the United States. It will then remain for that high officer in fulfilment of his Constitutional obligation to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully executed’ to determine what measures he will take to cause the civil process of the United States to be respected and enforced.

“R. B. TANEY,

“*Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.*”

The protest of the chief justice was treated with no respect. Arrests by military officers continued, the writ

of *habeas corpus* remained suspended. Arbitrary and oppressive measures were enforced with increasing severity. An adjourned session of the legislature was to meet at Frederick, September 17, 1861. A canvass of the Senate was secretly made and reported to Secretary Seward with a list of names showing that there were twenty-two members in the Senate, of whom fourteen favored secession and eight the Union. Information was also conveyed to the effect that apprehensions were entertained that some movement would be made in the legislature in favor of secession. The following letters explain themselves:

“WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON,

“September 11, 1861.

“MAJOR-GENERAL N. P. BANKS,

“*Commanding near Darnestown, Md.*

“GENERAL: The passage of any act of secession by the Legislature of Maryland must be prevented. If necessary all or any part of the members must be arrested. Exercise your own judgment as to the time and manner, but do your work effectively.

“Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

“SIMON CAMERON, *Secretary of War.*”

“HEADQUARTERS, CAMP NEAR DARNESTOWN,

“September 20, 1861.

“COLONEL R. B. MARCY, *Chief of Staff, etc.*

“SIR: I have the honor to report in obedience to the order of the Secretary of War and the general commanding the Army of the Potomac transmitted to me by letter of the 12th instant that all the members of the Maryland Legislature assembled at Frederick City on the 17th instant known or suspected to be disloyal in their relations to the Government have been arrested. . . .

“I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,

“N. P. BANKS,

“*Major-general commanding Division.*”

The details of the "Repression of Maryland" have been given mainly by quoting the words and citing the acts of those who controlled affairs. Many persons have been persuaded into the belief that Maryland remained in the Union of its own free will, and from the loyalty of its people. The fact is that this was the first State subjected to coercion and subjugation, as is clearly established by the testimony above adduced.

But although nearly all the people of Maryland sympathized with the South, they were much divided on the question of secession. Many of them, perhaps a majority of them, favored secession, but a large element opposed it, and Governor Hicks was sustained by a strong following. This Union sentiment can be readily accounted for when we study the tables giving the analysis of the population. Having been misled by its governor, Maryland failed to organize its powers of resistance, and was caught defenceless. It was thus subjected in 1861, in a modified form, to the same process of "Reconstruction" which was applied to the other Southern States four years later, when, after exhausting their powers of resistance, they likewise became defenceless.

The result was that the State remained in the Union and obeyed the calls of the president for troops. Out of the total quotas of 70,965 troops which Maryland was called on to fill for the United States, it furnished 46,638, of which 8,718 were negroes. Many of the best citizens joined the Confederate Army. Of the exact number no authoritative statement can be made, but reliable estimates place this State's contribution to the Confederate Army at not less than twenty thousand.

The case of Kentucky was different. Its location made it less accessible to invasion, and the State was better organized in the beginning. For a short time it was unmolested. Then it was subjected to an insidious occupation, which ended in invasion. The evidence is convincing that if a constitutional convention had been called about the time

of the president's call for troops, a majority would have favored secession. But the opportunity for action was lost. Governor B. Magoffin, who was known to favor secession, replied to the call for troops: "Kentucky will furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of subduing her sister Southern States." This sentiment was applauded by all parties in the State. A request was made on April 22d by the Confederate government to furnish one regiment for the Confederate service. This request was declined by Governor Magoffin, and his refusal was approved by the people. The effect of the movement in the Border States to avert war had matured into a peculiar sentiment in Kentucky. The majority of the people thought that the Southern States were precipitate in seceding, and that the North was wrong in using coercion. They believed that Kentucky could still carry out alone the purposes which the Border States had attempted, but had now abandoned. There was another strong feeling in Kentucky, a desire to keep its people in harmony, and to find some policy on which all could unite. These sentiments finally crystallized into the doctrine of "armed neutrality." A conference of leading men, representing all political parties, among whom were Governor Magoffin, John J. Crittenden, and John C. Breckinridge, recommended a plan. Governor Magoffin called a special session of the legislature to convene on May 2, 1861. A majority of the members of the legislature were opposed to secession, and refused to call a "sovereignty convention," by which term was meant a convention that should have original and absolute jurisdiction in speaking for the State, in forming a new constitution and in contracting alliances. Had this convention been called, Kentucky would have gone with the Confederate States. The new plan recommended by the conference, which was the famous "armed neutrality," was unanimously adopted on May 24th as a compromise to unite all factions. Both parties hoped to gain by this compromise: one party aiming to prevent the secession of the State, and the other, to protect the State

from Federal invasion and to make it a barrier to the invasion of the South. Perhaps both parties believed that the neutrality would be respected, and the Southern party believed that if violated by the United States it would excite the indignation of the people and arouse the State to action. The event proved that its speedy violation by the United States aroused no indignation among the Union citizens. Thus the State, in endeavoring to avoid secession, fell into nullification; for "armed neutrality" is nullification.

It soon became evident that the Union sentiment had grown in the State and was now in the majority. The election of ten Congressmen resulted in the choice of nine Union men and one Secessionist. In the election of members of the State legislature, in August, one hundred and three Union members were elected and only thirty-five Secessionists. So far there had been no coercion and armed neutrality was the choice of a large majority of the people. To carry out this policy, the legislature authorized the enlistment of State troops and appropriated one million dollars for arms, ammunition, etc. These troops were not to be employed "against the United States, nor the Confederate States, unless in protecting from unlawful invasion."

The State troops were speedily organized into two classes. The "State Guards," of which there were fifty-four companies, were ordered into active service and were put in camp. The State Guards and their officers were generally understood to be Southern in sympathy. The "Home Guards" constituted the "reserves," and were, as well as their officers, nearly all Union men. Although nominally "held in reserve," the Home Guards became the agents of active organization. With the knowledge and by the connivance of the Union leaders, President Lincoln sent arms and ammunition into the State to be distributed among Union organizations. The munitions of war were given into the care of Lieutenant (afterward General) William Nelson, and were cunningly placed. This practice began in May and was at first conducted as secretly as possible. A little

later the organizations that had received arms were gathered together and Camp Dick Robinson was formed in Garrard County, near the centre of the State, commanded by General Nelson. The mask was thrown off. Camp Dick Robinson became a regular Union recruiting station. This was the first violation of Kentucky neutrality. On August 19th, Governor Magoffin sent a protest to President Lincoln accompanied by the request to remove these forces from the State, and on August 24th sent a communication by special commissioner to the Confederate Capital with a request that the Confederate government would continue to respect the neutrality of Kentucky. The following replies were received:

“WASHINGTON, August 24, 1861.

“TO HIS EXCELLENCY, B. MAGOFFIN,

“*Governor of the State of Kentucky.*

“SIR: Your letter of the 19th instant in which you ‘urge the removal from the limits of Kentucky of the military now organized and in camp within that State,’ is received.

“I may not possess full and precisely accurate knowledge upon this subject, but I believe it is true that there is a military force in camp within Kentucky, acting by authority of the United States, which force is not very large, and is not now being augmented.

“I also believe that some arms have been furnished to this force by the United States.

“I also believe this force consists exclusively of Kentuckians, having this camp in the immediate vicinity of their own homes, and not assailing or menacing any of the good people of Kentucky.

“In all I have done in the premises, I have acted upon the urgent solicitation of many Kentuckians and in accordance with what I believed and still believe to be the wish of a majority of all the Union-loving people of Kentucky.

“While I have conversed on this subject with many of the eminent men of Kentucky, including a large majority of her members of Congress, I do not remember that any

one of them, or any other person except your Excellency and the bearers of your Excellency's letter, has urged me to remove the military force from Kentucky or to disband it. One very wealthy citizen of Kentucky did solicit me to have the augmenting of the forces suspended for a time.

"Taking all the means within my reach to form a judgment, I do not believe it is the popular wish of Kentucky that this force shall be removed beyond her limits; and with this impression I must respectfully decline to remove it.

"I most cordially sympathize with your Excellency in the wish to preserve the peace of my own native State, Kentucky. It is with regret I search for and cannot find, in your not very short letter, any declaration or intimation that you entertain any desire for the preservation of the Federal Union.

"Your obedient servant,

"A. LINCOLN."

"RICHMOND, August 28, 1861.

"TO HON. B. MAGOFFIN, *Governor of Kentucky*, etc.

"SIR: I have received your letter informing me that 'since the unhappy difficulties pending in the country the people of Kentucky have indicated a steadfast desire to maintain a position of strict neutrality between the belligerent parties.' In the same communication you express your desire to elicit 'an authoritative assurance that the government of the Confederate States will continue to respect and observe the neutral position of Kentucky.'

"In reply to this request I lose no time in assuring you that the government of the Confederate States neither desires nor intends to disturb the neutrality of Kentucky. The assemblage of troops in Tennessee, to which you refer, had no other object than to repel the lawless invasion of that State by the forces of the United States, should their government seek to approach it through Kentucky, without respect for its position of neutrality. That such apprehensions were not groundless has been proven by the course

of that Government in the States of Maryland and Missouri, and more recently in Kentucky itself, as you inform me 'a military force has been enlisted and quartered by the United States authorities.'

'The Government of the Confederate States has not only respected most scrupulously the neutrality of Kentucky, but has continued to maintain the friendly relations of trade and intercourse which it has suspended with the United States generally.

"In view of the history of the past, it can scarcely be necessary to assure your Excellency that the Government of the Confederate States will continue to respect the neutrality of Kentucky so long as her people will maintain it themselves.

"But neutrality to be entitled to respect must be strictly maintained between both parties; or, if the door be opened on the one side for the aggressions of one of the belligerents, upon the other it ought not to be shut to the assailed when they seek to enter it for purposes of self-defense.

"I do not, however, for a moment believe that your gallant State will suffer its soil to be used for the purpose of giving an advantage to those who violate its neutrality and disregard its rights, over others who respect both.

"In conclusion, I tender to your Excellency the assurance of my high consideration and regard, and am, sir, very respectfully,

"Yours, etc.,

"JEFFERSON DAVIS."

These letters are characteristic of their respective authors. The reader cannot fail to note the shrewdness of the one and the dignity of the other. It was idle to speculate as to the course of the United States. The president in his special message to Congress, July 4, 1861, had denounced "armed neutrality" in the severest language, and had plainly indicated his intention not to respect it. The invasion of the State now openly began. The doctrine of neutrality had

proven the means to prevent secession, and to turn the State over to Federal control. Instead of serving the purpose of uniting the different political factions of the State, it served to separate them in implacable hatred. The Unionists gained control of the State government, and the Secessionists formed a provisional Government.

As early as May 7, 1861, Major Robert Anderson, the "hero of Fort Sumter," promoted to the rank of brigadier-general, had been placed in command of a recruiting camp at Cincinnati, for the purpose of enlisting recruits from Kentucky. The Department of the Cumberland, consisting of Kentucky and Tennessee, was formed on August 15th, and General Anderson was assigned to the command, with headquarters at Louisville. Early in September, Generals W. T. Sherman and George H. Thomas reported to General Anderson for duty. General Sherman succeeded, on October 7th, General Anderson, who resigned, and on November 9th, General Sherman was removed to Missouri, and General Don Carlos Buell was appointed to the command of the Department of the Ohio. The portion of Kentucky west of Cumberland River was attached to the Department of Missouri. The Federal forces were assembled along Ohio River, and a fleet of ironclad gunboats, under Flag-officer Andrew H. Foote, was being assembled. On September 4th, General Leonidas Polk, commanding the Confederate forces, took possession of Columbus and Hickman on Mississippi River; on September 10th, General Albert Sidney Johnston was assigned to the command of the Department of the West, and at once moved the Confederate army into Kentucky and established the "Line of the Cumberland" across the State.

The legislature passed several acts which showed that the State government sympathized with the Union, and considered neutrality at an end. One of these acts instructed the governor to demand that all Confederate forces should withdraw from the State; another declared enlistment in the Confederate army to be a misdemeanor and

invasion of the State by Confederate troops a felony; still another act, passed September 25th, directed the governor to call out forty thousand men "to repel the invasion by armed forces from the Confederate States." The troops of Kentucky were transferred to the United States.

As long as any hope remained of the preservation of neutrality the Southern sympathizers respected it and no Confederate recruiting camp was formed in the State. Many ardent Southern men, however, left the State and joined the Confederate army. When the United States authorities by general orders created the Department of the Cumberland and assigned General Anderson to the command, the legislature of Kentucky, September 18th, invited him to take command of the State troops and expel the Confederates. When such acts were passed by the legislature as those related above, and when finally the military authorities began arresting prominent citizens who had committed no act amenable to law and against whom no charge could even be invented except Southern sympathy, the Southern men abandoned all hope of peace or neutrality and took steps for their own safety. Many of them fled to Camp Boone near the Kentucky line in Tennessee. There they organized the Kentucky recruits for the Confederate army, and subsequently accompanied the Confederate army in its advance into Kentucky. Ex-Vice-president John C. Breckinridge, evading a party of soldiers sent to arrest him, General S. B. Buckner, and other prominent leaders, left the State. Both the gentlemen above named were appointed to high command in the Confederate army.

During all this time there had been no serious fighting. Light skirmishes had taken place at Lucas Bend, September 26th; Hillsboro, October 4th; Upton Hill, October 12th; Wild Cat, October 21st; West Liberty, October 23d; Hedgeville, October 23d; Saratoga, October 26th; Woodbury, October 29th; Piketown, November 9th, and Cypress Bridge, November 17th. The battle of Belmont

had been fought November 7, 1861, on the Missouri side of Mississippi River.

When the State Convention of Southern sympathizers assembled at Russellville November 18, 1861, to form a provisional government, the military situation was as follows: The two armies confronted each other in lines extending across the State. The portion of the Federal army from the eastern boundary to Cumberland River was embraced in the Department of the Ohio, including also Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, and Tennessee, commanded by General Buell, with a force of 49,586 men as reported on December 10, 1861. The portion west of Cumberland River was embraced in the Department of Missouri, under command of General John C. Frémont, the portion in Kentucky being under the immediate command of General U. S. Grant, with a force of about 26,000 men. The exact figures do not appear in the official records. This line extended along Ohio River, with forces assembled at Louisville, Paducah, Cairo, and other points and advance posts thrown forward far into the State. A powerful fleet of gunboats on Ohio and Mississippi Rivers was under command of Flag Officer Andrew H. Foote.

The Confederate line extended across the State from Cumberland Gap to Columbus on the Mississippi, under General Albert Sidney Johnston, commanding the Department of the West. This line passed through Bowling Green, which was made the headquarters of the Central Army of Kentucky, commanded by General William Joseph Hardee. The strength of this force was 33,816 men, of whom 22,272 were present for duty. In addition were the forces of Generals George B. Crittenden and Felix K. Zollicoffer, covering Cumberland Gap with 8,451 men, of whom 5,836 were present for duty, making a total of 42,267, of whom 28,108 were present for duty, as reported on December 31, 1861. West of Cumberland River, General Grant faced General Polk and his force of 28,531 men.



Hall of Representatives in the Capitol at Montgomery, Alabama, in which the Constitution of the Confederate States of America was signed.

Such was the military situation when the State convention of Southern sympathizers met at Russellville on November 18, 1861. There were present over two hundred delegates, representing sixty-five counties. This convention adopted a provisional government and elected George W. Johnson as governor, and chose other State officers. The body then passed an ordinance of secession from the United States and an ordinance of union with the Confederate States. This action was reported to the Confederate authorities. Upon the recommendation of President Davis, the Confederate Congress received Kentucky as a member of the Confederacy on December 10, 1861. The senators and representatives elected by this convention were admitted to seats in the Confederate Congress, and the provisional government was recognized.

Under all the circumstances it is difficult to see what else the Southern element could have done. Their acts were revolutionary toward their State, but were necessary to their own defence. They had been deceived and overreached. In the endeavor to preserve peace they had avoided secession, but they had adopted nullification, which is less defensible than secession. They had done all this to escape making war upon their sister States of the South. They now found themselves involved in war, subjected to imprisonment and to draft into the Federal army. They must fight on one side or the other. If the Confederacy had succeeded, their acts would have been recognized. They had more claims to justice than the acts of West Virginia.

Having followed Kentucky through the period of its hesitation, we must turn our attention in other directions. A glance at the preceding statistical tables will show that the foreign and free State elements of its population, which constituted twenty-eight per cent, had skilfully taken advantage of the balance of power which they held, and, uniting with a minority of the Southern population, by cunning manipulations and the aid of the Federal government, had gained control of the State.

The people were now hopelessly divided. All the men of martial spirit sought the army of their choice. The official records show that the total quotas of troops from Kentucky called for by the United States amounted to 100,782. The State furnished 75,760, of whom 23,703 were negro troops. It is not possible to give with absolute accuracy the number of Kentuckians who volunteered in the Confederate army. The most reliable estimates place the number at 25,000.

CHAPTER IV

REPRESSION AND INVASION

IN the repression of Missouri the measures of the United States were less diplomatic and more radical than in the case of Kentucky. In fact direct resort to force was used from the beginning. President Lincoln seemed to have learned the lesson of the statistics and to comprehend that he was dealing with a population of which eighty-three per cent was of foreign and Northern birth or parentage, while only seventeen per cent was of Southern birth or parentage.

The larger element of the population of Kentucky was Southern. Its members loved the South and revolted at the thought of making war on the South. The bridle could not be put upon them until after they had been blindfolded. No such measures were necessary with Missouri. A large number of the people were Northern in sympathy; but the peculiar circumstances of Missouri's history had made it the political ally of the South, and the Southern element of the people added to political alliance social sympathy and love. This Southern element had from pioneer times furnished its leaders in politics. As new elements had been added to the population they fell in with the current of sentiment, but they were born of stubborn and steadfast parents and never entirely outgrew their early prejudices.

The pioneers and their descendants had not forgotten the bitter and unjust warfare made by the North against Missouri's admission as a State. They remembered with

gratitude how the South stood by them and felt that they owed statehood itself to Southern support. They had united with the South in the long-fought battle in defence of slavery and States Rights. Their newer immigrant population had united with them in the fight. Even as recently as 1860 the vote of Missouri stood in the presidential election as follows: For the Douglas electors, 58,801; for the Bell electors, 58,373; for the Breckinridge electors, 31,317; for the Lincoln electors, 17,165.

The newly elected governor, Hon. Claiborne F. Jackson, was a Democrat, of Virginia descent and a native of Kentucky. The lieutenant-governor, Hon. Thomas C. Reynolds, was a native of South Carolina, and was likewise of Virginia descent. The legislature was strongly Democratic and Southern. The following analysis of its membership is given by Colonel John C. Moore:

“The General Assembly of Missouri met at Jefferson City on the 2d day of January, 1861, and the Southern element organized both Houses with scarcely a show of opposition. There was but one Republican in the Senate, and in the House there were eighty-three Democrats, thirty-seven Bell men, and twelve Republicans. It was conceded that the Secessionists controlled the legislative branch of the government. All that was required to put the State in line with the other Southern States was prompt and decisive action. The people of the State expected such action would be taken and were prepared to uphold the legislature in taking it.”

The retiring governor, Robert M. Stewart, was a Northerner, a native of New York, and a fair type of the Northern Democrat. In his message, transmitted to the two Houses on January 3d, he urged the legislature to adhere to the Union and closed as follows:

“I would here, in my last official act as governor of Missouri, record my solemn protest against such unwise or hasty action, and my unalterable devotion to the Union so long as it can be made the protector of equal rights.”

The inaugural address of the incoming governor, Hon. Claiborne F. Jackson, was widely different in tone, as is indicated by the following extract:

“Missouri will, in my opinion, best consult her own interests and the interests of the whole country by a declaration of her determination to stand by her sister slaveholding States, in whose wrongs she participates and with whose institutions and people she sympathizes.”

Governor Jackson recommended that the militia of the State be organized, and a Constitutional Convention be called. Accordingly, a bill was introduced for organizing the militia; it passed the Senate, but was not acted upon in the House. An act was passed to call a Constitutional Convention, the delegates to be elected February 18th, and the Convention to meet February 28th. The legislature also adopted a resolution which seemed to pledge the State to secession. It was offered by Mr. George G. Vest. It declared the position of Missouri in the following clause:

“We regard with the utmost abhorrence the doctrine of coercion as indicated by the action of the States aforesaid [New York and others], believing that the same would end in civil war and forever destroy the hope of reconstructing the Federal Union. So believing, we deem it our duty to declare that if there is any invasion of the slaveholding States for the purpose of carrying such doctrine into effect, it is the opinion of this General Assembly that the people of Missouri will instantly rally on the side of their Southern brethren to resist the invader at all hazards and to the last extremity.”

The General Assembly and State officers had been elected before the secession of South Carolina, and at a time when attention was directed to protecting the interests of the slaveholding States by the ballot. Thus far the eighty-three per cent of the foreign and Northern elements of the population had cheerfully coöperated. Now the question of secession and war was presented, and the inherited prejudices of birth and the social ties of nativity began to

assert themselves, and the scene changes. The election for delegates to the Convention was the first test. "When the Convention met," states Colonel John C. Moore, "the most remarkable thing about it was that there was not an avowed Secessionist among its members." The majority against secession was eighty thousand. The Secessionists were greatly surprised at this result, and attributed it to fraud, violence, and to all causes but the true one. The census explains it.

Another remarkable thing about this Convention, which soon gave proof of its devotion to the Union, was the fact that the Union voters, still retaining their old habit of placing the Southern men in political lead, had selected as delegates, for the most part, Union Southern men, of whom there were a few in the State. Curiously enough, eighty-two of the ninety-nine delegates were natives of Northern States, three were Germans, and one was an Irishman. The Convention met on the appointed day, February 28, 1861, at Jefferson City, and adjourned to meet in St. Louis, March 4th. Ex-Governor Sterling Price, soon to become conspicuous as the Commander of the Missouri militia, and subsequently a Confederate general, but then elected as a Conditional Union man, was made president.

The political situation had developed three parties in the State: the Secessionists, the Conditional Unionists, and the Unconditional Unionists. In the convention the Secessionists had no representative. The Unconditional Unionists were the controlling faction. This may be seen from the following action. The Committee on Federal Relations submitted a series of resolutions, accompanied by a report from which the following extract is quoted:

"The position of Missouri in relation to the adjacent States which would continue in the Union would necessarily expose her, if she became a member of a new Confederacy, to utter destruction whenever any rupture might take place between the different republics. In a military aspect, secession and connection with a Southern confederacy is annihilation for Missouri. The true position for her to assume

is that of a State whose interests are bound up in the maintenance of the Union and whose kind feelings and strong sympathies are with the people of the Southern States with whom they are connected by ties of friendship and blood." A strong effort was made to supplement the resolutions by "a declaration that if the Northern States refused to accept the Crittenden Compromise and the other border slaveholding States should thereupon secede, Missouri would not hesitate to go with them." Only twenty-three members of the convention voted for this motion. One after another the convention voted down all amendments or modifications of the report of the committee, and after a short discussion adopted it as a whole. It then adjourned, subject to the call of a committee which was appointed to decide where another meeting should be held. This was evidently done to await the development of the policy of President Lincoln and to be ready to thwart any movement of the State government, a work which this convention a little later performed.

It must be borne in mind that all this occurred before any invasion of the State and before any coercion was used. The action of this convention clearly reflected the sentiment of a large majority of the people of the State. It was a surprise and humiliation to the Southern element. They saw that the crisis was approaching when they would be compelled to engage in war with their kindred of the South unless something could be done to avert the calamity. They did not intend to become invaders of Southern soil, and they were men that were not accustomed to yield. The Secession party now turned to the State government. Governor Jackson, all the State officers, and the legislature still warmly sympathized with the South. Early in March, as before mentioned, the House refused to pass the bill for the organization of the militia, which had passed the Senate, but an act was passed for the relief of St. Louis. By this act the power was taken out of the hands of the Republican mayor and placed in the hands of a Board of Police Commissioners appointed by the governor. About this time an

election was held in St. Louis for mayor, and Daniel G. Taylor, a Democrat, was elected.

Simultaneously with the events that have been narrated, a matter of great importance was pending. The United States arsenal at St. Louis, containing a considerable supply of arms, ammunition, and equipments, was very weakly defended. Another small arsenal, at Liberty, was in a similar condition. It was urged upon Governor Jackson to seize these arsenals. Before the inauguration of President Lincoln, the attention of both parties was directed to the importance of possessing these arsenals. Francis P. Blair, the leader of the Union men, was instrumental in establishing a political organization popularly known as the "Wide Awakes," which was soon converted into a military organization called "The Home Guards," of which Blair became the dominating power. Basil W. Duke, subsequently a general of the Confederate army, was active in forming an antagonistic organization of Southern sentiment, styled "Minute Men," of which he was made commander. The State had, moreover, a small militia force under General D. M. Frost. This was the military condition of the State when the governor commissioned General Frost to plan for the seizure of the arsenals.

On January 24th, General Frost had an interview with Major W. B. Bell, of the Federal army, commanding the arsenal at St. Louis. General Frost reported that Major Bell was willing to surrender the arsenal to the custody of the State, on condition that the State would protect it from mobs which threatened to assail it. While matters were in this condition, Major Bell was relieved from command of the arsenal through the agency of Blair. Major Francis P. Hagner was placed in command, and reinforcements of United States troops to the number of five hundred men were sent to its defence. Soon after this, President Lincoln was inaugurated, and Blair became powerful in the Federal counsels. Captain Nathaniel Lyon was placed in command of the arsenal, and matters assumed a new phase. Lyon

was not content to remain on the defensive. Aggressive by nature, he speedily became the assailant, and thus began the invasion of Missouri. The capture of Fort Sumter and President Lincoln's call for troops brought matters to a crisis. Governor Jackson made the following reply to the call:

“EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT,

“JEFFERSON CITY, Mo., April 17, 1861.

“HON. SIMON CAMERON, *Secretary of War*.

“SIR: Your dispatch of 15th instant making a call on Missouri for four regiments of men for immediate service has been received. There can be, I apprehend, no doubt but the men are intended to form a part of the President's army to make war on the seceded States.

“Your requisition, in my judgment, is illegal, unconstitutional, and revolutionary in its object, inhuman and diabolical, and can not be complied with. Not one man will Missouri furnish to carry on any such unholy crusade.

“C. F. JACKSON, *Governor of Missouri*.”

The secession element hoped that the call for troops and the governor's indignant reply would stir the people to action. It did, indeed, fire the Southern element, but it touched no responsive chord in the hearts of the foreign and Northern elements. The governor called the legislature to meet in extra session, May 2, 1861. At the appointed time the legislature met, now thoroughly aroused to action. The bill for organizing the militia was speedily passed. Certain moneys in the treasury were appropriated to create a military fund, which was to be increased by the issuance of State bonds and authorized loans, amounting to two million dollars. While the legislature was in session, an event occurred which aroused indignation among the Southern element, and stimulated the legislature to its decisive action.

Through the active exertions of Blair, the Home Guards, reinforced by United States troops, now mustered a force in

St. Louis amounting to ten thousand men, with Brigadier-general Nathaniel Lyon in command of the Home Guards, and Blair as colonel of the First Regiment. This force was armed and equipped from the United States arsenal at St. Louis. General Frost, commanding the State Guards, was encamped near St. Louis, at Camp Jackson, with a force of seven hundred men. This force was indifferently armed, but had received from the Confederate States four cannons and a supply of ammunition which was secretly conveyed to the camp, May 8th.

On May 10th, General Lyon surrounded Camp Jackson with an overwhelming force, and demanded its immediate and unconditional surrender. Being unable to offer any effectual resistance, General Frost surrendered. Lyon then returned to the city, taking with him Frost's command as prisoners of war. On the return, a number of citizens gathered to witness the pageant. It has been said that the crowd jeered the Federal troops, and that one pistol shot was fired into their ranks without effect. The provocation was slight, but the Federal troops, mostly Germans, opened a murderous fire on the crowd, killing twenty-eight persons, of whom three were prisoners. This incident in the streets of St. Louis produced more excitement than the capture of Camp Jackson, not only in Missouri but throughout the United States. This was the second occasion of bloodshed, and followed three weeks after the Baltimore riot. So far, not a drop of blood had been shed in battle. Fort Sumter had been bombarded and taken, Camp Jackson had been captured, Harper's Ferry and numerous Federal forts, arsenals, dockyards, custom houses, etc., had been seized, but without loss of life. Strange to say, up to this date the only blood that had been shed had been spilled in riots in the streets of cities in the Border States. In Baltimore, the Federal troops were assaulted before firing on the mob. In St. Louis, it was a brutal, unprovoked outrage.

The legislature adjourned May 15th, after conferring on Governor Jackson almost dictatorial powers. The governor

promptly entered on the task of organizing the "Missouri State Guard." He appointed Sterling Price to be major-general and commander. He divided the State into military districts, and appointed eight brigadier-generals, one for each district. General Price had served with distinction in the Mexican War with the rank of colonel. He had heretofore acted with the "Conditional Union" party, and had hoped that war might be averted, but now the Southern blood which flowed in his veins from Virginia ancestors was thoroughly aroused. He accepted the proffered appointment, as did all the eight brigadier-generals. These officers worked with energy to enlist and prepare their commands for active service.

Meanwhile Lyon, Blair, and their associates were not idle. They contemplated the immediate occupation of the most important and strategic points before the State Guard could be organized and equipped. They had already a strong force, and the United States troops from Iowa, Kansas, and Illinois were on the border awaiting the signal to invade the State. Their operations were, for the time, delayed by the arrival of General William S. Harney, of the United States army, who had been temporarily absent. General Harney entered into an agreement with General Price to "restore peace and good order." The character of this agreement is shown in the following quotation from the paper signed May 21, 1861, by the two generals:

"General Price, having by commission full authority over the militia of the State of Missouri, undertakes, with the sanction of the Governor of the State, already declared, to direct the whole power of the State officers to maintain order within the State among the people thereof; and General Harney publicly declares that this object being thus assured he can have no occasion, as he has no wish, to make military movements which might otherwise create excitements and jealousies, which he most earnestly desires to avoid."

This truce lasted until May 30th, when General Harney was relieved from command of the Department of the

West, and Nathaniel Lyon, now promoted to brigadier-general in the United States army, was placed in command in Missouri. Governor Jackson and General Price held an interview on June 11th with General Lyon and Colonel Blair. The result of this conference is given below in the language of the governor. The following day, June 12th, Governor Jackson issued a proclamation calling the militia of the State, to the number of fifty thousand, into active service for the purpose of repelling the threatened Federal invasion, and for the protection of the lives, liberties, and property of the citizens of this State. In this proclamation the governor gives a sketch of the progress of events up to the date of his proclamation. Of the conference above mentioned he says :

“We had an interview on the 11th instant with General Lyon and Colonel F. P. Blair, Jr., at which I submitted to them this proposition: ‘That I would disband the State Guard and break up its organization; that I would disarm all the companies which have been armed by the State; that I would pledge myself not to attempt to organize the militia under the military bill; that no arms or munitions of war should be brought into the State; that I would protect all citizens equally in all their rights, regardless of their political opinions; that I would suppress all insurrectionary movements within the State; that I would repel all attempts to invade it, from whatever quarter and by whomsoever made, and that I would thus maintain a strict neutrality in the present unhappy contest and preserve the peace of the State. And I further proposed that I would, if necessary, invoke the assistance of the United States troops to carry out these pledges. All this I proposed to do upon condition that the Federal government would undertake to disarm the Home Guards which it had illegally organized and armed throughout the State, and pledge itself not to occupy with troops any localities in the State not occupied by them at this time.’

“Nothing but the most earnest desire to avert the horrors of civil war from our beloved State could have tempted me

to propose these humiliating terms. They were rejected by the Federal officers. They demanded not only the disorganization of the State militia and the nullification of the military bill, but they refused to disarm their own Home Guards and insisted that the Federal government should enjoy unrestricted right to move and station its troops throughout the State, whenever and wherever that might, in the opinion of the officers, be necessary, either for the protection of the 'loyal subjects' of the Federal government or for the repelling of invasion, and they plainly announced that it was the intention of the administration to make military occupation under these pretexts of the whole State, and to reduce it, as avowed by General Lyon himself, to the exact condition of Maryland.

"The acceptance by me of these degrading terms would not only have sullied the honor of Missouri, but would have aroused the indignation of every brave citizen, and precipitated the very conflict which it has been my aim to prevent. We refused to accede to them, and the conference was broken up."

General Lyon determined to prevent the organization of the State Guard by aggressive action. He rapidly prepared an expedition to take possession of the country along Missouri River, which runs about midway across the State from St. Louis to Kansas City. Anticipating this movement and not being strong enough to defeat it, Governor Jackson removed the State government from the capital, Jefferson City, and established it at Booneville. General Lyon occupied Jefferson City on June 15th, with all the force which he had gathered at St. Louis except a small guard which he left at the latter city. The next day he pushed on to attack Booneville. General Lyon had divided his force, sending General Thomas W. Sweeney to move toward Springfield for the purpose of intercepting the expected retreat of Governor Jackson and his troops toward Arkansas. He moved with the remainder of his force, about two thousand men under his immediate command, to attack Booneville. After

a skirmish, in which about twenty-five were killed on each side, Governor Jackson abandoned Booneville and retreated south. General Price was at Lexington, in immediate command of a recruiting camp.

General Lyon now moved against Price at this point. In conjunction with a force of three thousand men from Kansas, who operated down Missouri River, while Lyon moved up, Lyon hoped to enclose the small army of Price between the two forces. Meantime, General Price had gone to Arkansas to solicit aid from that State. General James S. Rains, who had been left in command at Lexington, saved his army by a rapid retreat and moved south to unite with Governor Jackson's small force of about three hundred men.

Meanwhile, a Kansas force commanded by Colonel John Cook, sent to intercept Governor Jackson's retreat, was defeated by a force of the Missouri State Guard, under Colonel W. S. O'Kane. This engagement occurred at Cold Camp. Colonel O'Kane, with a loss of about thirty men, captured the entire Kansas force, with about four hundred muskets and a supply of ammunition. He thus opened the way for the junction of the scattered divisions of the Missouri army, and increased its numbers by the addition of his own regiment of three hundred and fifty men. This junction took place at Montevallo, near the Arkansas line. The army thus united had an effective force of about three thousand men, over which Governor Jackson assumed command in person. Several small engagements now followed, in which the Missourians were successful. At Carthage, July 5th, Governor Jackson defeated General Franz Sigel. Colonel T. J. Churchill captured a Federal force at Neosha on July 6th, taking one hundred and thirty-seven prisoners and one hundred and fifty stand of arms. Though now driven back to the southwest corner of the State, these victories greatly encouraged the Confederates.

General Price had been successful in his mission to Arkansas. He had gathered on his journey a force of one thousand two hundred men under his own command,

three thousand two hundred under General Benjamin McCulloch, and two thousand five hundred under General N. B. Pearce. Advancing to the relief of Governor Jackson, they found him a victor. General Price then rested to reorganize his army. On July 25th, the combined force concentrated at Cassville with eleven thousand armed and two thousand unarmed men.

This force moved forward on July 27th to attack Lyon at Springfield. Lyon had a force of about eight thousand men, finely drilled and equipped. After some delay, caused by disputes between Price and McCulloch, the important battle of Wilson's Creek was fought August 10, 1861. The Southern troops gained a complete victory. Lyon was killed, and his command retreated in a demoralized condition. General Price was anxious to pursue, but Generals McCulloch and Pearce declined, and the next day started on their return for Arkansas, leaving the Missourians to fight their future battles alone.

The losses were almost equal; Phisterer's record places the Union loss at one thousand two hundred and thirty-five, the Confederate loss at one thousand and ninety-five, which accords with the report of General McCulloch, and of the Union commander as found in Series I, volume iii, of the *Official Records*. But the great advantage was with the Southern side. It opened the opportunity to regain all the territory they had lost. If their people should now rally to them, they would regain the State, at least as far north as Missouri River.

While General Price rested at Springfield to organize and drill his army, and gather supplies for the northward march an important political event occurred. It will be remembered that the State Constitutional Convention, on February 28th, had after a short session, in which it had declared itself unequivocally on the side of the Union, adjourned subject to the call of a select committee. This convention reassembled upon the call of its committee, at Jefferson City, July 22d. It was the only legal agency

of the State favorable to the Union. It was therefore kept alive to be used for the purpose of giving legal sanction to the Federal invasion of Missouri. Its president, General Sterling Price, was absent, and also some of its members, but a full quorum was present. The convention passed ordinances declaring all State offices vacant, annulling various acts of the legislature as "treasonable," and providing for State elections, and then established a provisional government to be in force until elections could be held. The Hon. Hamilton R. Gamble was made provisional governor, and entered at once upon office. The United States recognized this provisional government, but it was repudiated by Governor Jackson and his legislature and by the Confederate States. This convention continued to meet from year to year. Its action in reference to the abolition of slavery will be discussed later, in its regular order.

General Price, after organizing and recruiting his army, left Springfield early in September, and moved northward, with less than five thousand men, for the purpose of recovering possession of the Missouri River country. After defeating a force of Kansas troops under Colonel J. H. Lane at Dry Wood, September 2d, he marched to invest Lexington, before which place he appeared on September 12th. Colonel James A. Mulligan, commanding the Federal garrison, after an obstinate resistance, surrendered on the 20th. The results are given in the following extract from the report of General Price, made to Governor Jackson, September 21st:

"Our entire loss in this series of engagements amounts to twenty-five killed and seventy-two wounded. The visible fruits of this almost bloodless victory are very great—about three thousand five hundred prisoners, among whom are Colonels Mulligan, Marshall, Peabody, White, and Grover, Major Van Horn, and one hundred and eighteen other commissioned officers; five pieces of artillery and two mortars; over three thousand stands of infantry arms, a large number of sabers, about seven hundred and fifty

horses, many sets of cavalry equipments, wagons, teams, and ammunition, more than one hundred thousand dollars' worth of commissary stores, and a large amount of other property. In addition to all this, I obtained the restoration of the great seal of the State and the public records, which had been stolen from their proper custodian, and about nine hundred thousand dollars in money, of which the bank at this place had been robbed, and which I have caused to be returned to it."

Phisterer's *Statistical Record* states the respective losses to be: Confederate, one hundred; Federal, one thousand seven hundred and seventy-four. It is perhaps needless to state to the investigator that the reports of these operations may be found in the *Official Records*.

General Price had recovered nearly all the territory which had been lost, and held it as far north as Missouri River, but it became evident that he could not retain it. His success in battle had been brilliant, but he could not understand why the people did not now flock to his standard. If they would only do this, Missouri was won. He appealed to the Confederate government, to the Confederate officers in Arkansas, and to the people of Missouri, but all in vain. Federal troops were poured into the State from every side. General John C. Frémont, with forty thousand men, was approaching from the southeast. A large force from Kansas was approaching from the west. Other strong bodies of troops were crossing Missouri River to intercept Price's retreat. He lingered at Lexington till the last moment of safety, and on September 27th reluctantly began his march to the south. He accomplished the difficult movement successfully and without incident. Crossing Osage River, he halted at Neosha, in the southwestern corner of the State, to afford protection to the legislature, then in session.

Much indignation was felt among the Northern partisans against what they considered the imbecility of the Federal commanders in permitting the success of General Price.

General Frémont was made the scapegoat. Adjutant-general Lorenzo Thomas was sent to investigate. He reached St. Louis on October 11th, and travelled over a large portion of the State, making a thorough investigation. On the 21st, the day of his return to Washington, he submitted his report, severely censuring General Frémont, who was relieved from command of the Department of the West by General Order No. 18, issued October 24th, and General David Hunter was appointed in his place. General Frémont received the order on November 2d, and turned over the command to General Hunter.

The report of Adjutant-general Thomas estimates the forces under the control of General Frémont and shows the tremendous odds against which General Price was contending. The following extract is therefore quoted: "Before Price got to Lexington the forces to resist him were as follows: at Jefferson City, 5,500; at Rolla 4,000; along the Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad, about 5,000; western line of Missouri under Lane down near Fort Scott, 2,300; Mulligan's force at Lexington, 2,700; a large force in Illinois, along the Mississippi River, and on the Iowa line; outside of St. Louis, some 17,000; in St. Louis, 18,000, but say 10,000." This makes a force of 46,500 within the State; or, if the force at St. Louis be counted as 18,000, the total force would be 54,000. In addition to this was the "large force in Illinois along the Mississippi River and on the Iowa line." Before this report was made, however, General Price was out of danger.

Pressed back into a corner of the State, denounced and legislated out of office, the legally elected governor and legislature of Missouri witnessed their State overrun by armed forces of the United States, held under martial law, which had been in force since General Frémont's proclamation of August 30th, and themselves in danger of being driven from the State at any time that the commanding Federal general should move against them. Under these circumstances they determined to take a step which they hoped would

bring to their aid the Confederate forces lying idle in Arkansas.

On October 31st, the legislature passed an ordinance of secession from the United States and also an act ratifying the constitution of the Confederate States and applying for admission to the Confederacy as a State. Both measures were approved by Governor Jackson on the day of their passage.

On the same day a convention between the Confederate States and the State of Missouri was entered into by duly accredited commissioners,—R. M. T. Hunter on the part of the Confederate States and E. C. Cabell and Thomas L. Snead on the part of Missouri. This convention was a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, preparatory to the admission of the State.

Governor Jackson transmitted these acts to President Davis on November 5th, and urgently requested that arrangements should be made to turn over the Missouri troops to the Confederate service, and that reinforcements should be sent sufficient to recover possession of the State. President Davis, in a special message, presented the matter to Congress on November 25th, and the following action was taken:

“The Congress of the Confederate States of America do enact, That the State of Missouri be, and is hereby admitted as a member of the Confederate States of America, upon an equal footing with the other States of the Confederacy, under the Constitution of the Provisional Government of the same. Approved November 28, 1861.”

General Price now moved his camp to Osceola and began the transfer of the Missouri troops to the Confederate service. Early in February, 1862, Federal forces too strong to be withstood moved southward to drive Price from the State. About the middle of February the Confederates retreated into Arkansas and the entire State was in the possession of the United States except the southeast corner, where the Confederates held Belmont. The Confederate

government now recognized Governor Jackson and his legislature as the legal government of the State, while the United States recognized Governor Gamble and his provisional government. The issue could be decided only by war.

The history of Missouri has been followed to the point of its final action on the question of secession and its complete subjugation by the United States. Later military movements in the State will be treated in chronological order. During the war, President Lincoln called upon Missouri for 122,496 troops, of which the State furnished 109,111. The State's contribution to the Confederate army cannot be stated from statistics, but is reliably estimated at about 36,000.

The invasions of Maryland and Virginia were necessary parts of the defence of Washington. The invasion of Maryland has been discussed first because it was chronologically the first invasion, and although part of the general plan projected by General Scott, was yet a detached campaign. The immediate subjugation of Maryland was essential to the safety of the capital city. Its geographical position made it the natural highway for the passage of troops from the North, and Washington could never be safe with Maryland in possession of a hostile army. Political considerations united with military reasons to draw upon Maryland the first invasion. The peculiar condition of sentiment in the State called for immediate and drastic action if the State was to be held in the Union. Similar considerations called for the invasion of Kentucky and Missouri, although the military reasons were not so pressing in these States.

We come now to consider the operations in Virginia, which had three objects in view, and really constituted four separate campaigns. The first object was the occupation of western Virginia, with the purpose of erecting it into a separate State in accordance with the urgent petitions of its leading citizens. The second was the defence

of Washington by interposing a strong army between the city and the Confederate forces which were gathering in Virginia. The third object was to invade and subjugate Virginia. The attention of General Scott was primarily directed to the first two objects, and it was not his intention to press the general invasion of Virginia until western Virginia was overrun and larger forces could be accumulated.

An important movement of the Confederates caused modifications in this plan. The Confederate Congress, in session in Montgomery, voted on May 21, 1861, to remove the capital from the Alabama city to Richmond, Virginia, and the third session of Congress met in Richmond on July 20th. This aggressive action of the Confederate States challenged the United States. The rapid concentration of Confederate forces on the direct road between Washington and Richmond was construed to threaten an attack upon Washington and an invasion of Maryland. These movements demanded the strengthening of the Federal army in northern Virginia, and aroused throughout the North the popular cry: "On to Richmond!"

Virginia had learned a lesson from Forts Sumter and Pickens. Consequently, Governor John Letcher, on the day of Virginia's secession, April 17th, without waiting for the formal confirmation of the ordinance by vote of the people, authorized the occupation of all public property by the State troops. Confirmation of the ordinance was certain, but could not be accomplished until May 3d, and as there was no time to be lost in formalities, the Virginia authorities acted in all matters as if the secession of the State had been completed. A force of Virginia troops was ordered to proceed to Harper's Ferry and to seize the United States arsenal at that place, which was held by a garrison of sixty men. Learning of the approach of the Virginia troops, the garrison set fire to the armory and retreated into Maryland. The Virginia troops arrived on April 18th, close upon the heels of the retreating garrison and succeeded in extinguishing the flames and in saving

much valuable machinery which was afterward useful to the Confederacy. Virginia promptly established at this place a camp of five hundred men.

General William B. Taliaferro was ordered to take possession of Gosport Navy Yard, near Norfolk. This was one of the most important naval stations in the United States. The machinery and naval equipments and stores were very valuable. At the time a few ships were in the dock. The Virginians prevented the escape of these by sinking obstructions in Elizabeth River. Anticipating the attack, the Federal garrison set fire to the buildings, sunk the ships, which had been burned to the water's edge, and evacuated the place. The Virginians immediately took possession, April 20th, extinguished the flames, and saved much valuable property, among which was the *Merrimac*, afterward converted into the first of "ironclads," the *Virginia*.

In these operations no blood was shed. The most important of the Federal possessions in Virginia, however, could not be taken without bloodshed, if it could be taken at all. Fortress Monroe was situated on a tongue of land which formed the eastern extremity of the "Peninsula," and extended between Chesapeake Bay and Hampton Roads. Except along this narrow strip it was not approachable by land, and this approach could be defended against an army by a very small force. The United States therefore determined to reinforce the garrison and hold the fort as a base for future operations.

On May 24, 1861, a Federal force of eight regiments of infantry accompanied by cavalry and artillery crossed the Potomac from Washington and occupied Arlington Heights and Alexandria. This movement was not opposed, and with the exception of the death of two men there were no casualties. Colonel E. E. Ellsworth, commander of the regiment which occupied Alexandria, noticed a Confederate flag floating over the Marshall House, the leading hotel in Alexandria. Taking with him a few soldiers, he entered

the house, hauled down the flag, and was descending with it in glee, when Jackson, the proprietor of the hotel, shot and killed him. The defender of his country's honor, Jackson, was set upon by Colonel Ellsworth's companions and brutally slain on the spot. A trifling skirmish occurred, on June 1st, at Fairfax Court House, but otherwise the Federal army was not disturbed in the quiet possession of this portion of northern Virginia contiguous to Potomac River and south of Washington.

No indications were shown of an immediate advance, for General Scott was planning to invade Virginia from a different direction. His plan was skilful from a political as well as from a military point of view. The United States had not, at that time, accumulated a force sufficient for the invasion of the Confederate States, although it was sufficient for repressing and subjugating the Border States which had not seceded, and in each of which the United States was aided by a strong Union element of the people of the State. In the three northern Border States—Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri—the result has been narrated.

In the States of Tennessee and Virginia a peculiar case was presented. A large and influential section in each State desired to secede from the parent State, establish a separate State government and join the Union. In the case of East Tennessee, as we have seen, the United States found it inexpedient to give aid, and left the people of that section to their own resources, and therefore the movement failed. In the case of western Virginia, the United States gave aid, and the separate State of West Virginia was created. It was with a view to assisting this movement in western Virginia that General Scott was content to limit himself to defensive operations in eastern Virginia, merely taking measures to protect Washington, while he threw all the forces that could be spared into the active invasion of the western part of the State.

Before entering into an account of the military operations, let us briefly review the political situation of the section of the

State which was soon to become West Virginia. About forty of the northwestern counties of Virginia were cut off from the rest of the State by the Appalachian Mountains. These counties belonged geographically to "the West." Their streams ran to Mississippi River. Trade and social intercourse followed the direction of the streams. They formed the portion of the State that was last settled by the pioneers. Separated from the rest of the State by the great barrier of the Appalachian Mountains, their settlers did not come directly by routes from the east, but mainly by those from the north. This western part of the State thus had a larger element of Northern population than is shown by the census, which traces the parentage back through only one generation.

The same mountain barrier which excluded immigration from the eastern part of the State also retarded the assimilation of the people of the western section with those of eastern Virginia. The early settlement of Virginia having been in the eastern portion of the State, its centre of government was located in the east. Richmond, the capital, was not far from the Atlantic coast. The people of the western counties complained of the location of the capital, the appropriation of the taxes to improvements in the eastern portion of the State, and the general absorption by the east of all the resources and interests of the State. Some of their orators represented that the trans-Alleghany territory was treated like a tributary province. Such sentiments had been felt and expressed long before 1861.

Let us recur to the lesson of the census. In Virginia, the elements of foreign and Northern birth or parentage were ten per cent of the white population; in West Virginia, they were thirty per cent, being three times as great as in Virginia. In reality, the percentage of Northern lineage in West Virginia was greater than that shown in the census, as previously explained. Let us now take another lesson from the census. In Virginia the colored population was forty-two per cent of the total, while in

West Virginia the colored population was only four per cent of the total.

The facts above stated prepare us for the course which was pursued by the people of western Virginia. When the ordinance of secession was adopted by the Virginia convention, April 17, 1861, there were eighty-eight votes in favor and fifty-five in opposition. Forty-six of the negative votes were from the western counties, and of these thirty-two were from the counties which afterward formed West Virginia. Only nine of the negative votes were from delegates representing the eastern portion of the State. When the ordinance was submitted to the vote of the people for ratification, May 23, 1861, a majority of ninety-four thousand votes was given in its favor, but the western counties voted against it almost unanimously.

From the day of the adoption of the ordinance by the convention, the leaders of the western counties began to put into execution the measures which they had previously planned. Public meetings were held, and a general convention was called to meet in Wheeling on May 13th. Communications were at once opened with Washington, and the aid of the United States was invoked. Assistance was also solicited from Ohio and Pennsylvania, which States had already accumulated large bodies of militia.

On the appointed day the convention met at Wheeling, with delegates from twenty-five counties in attendance, and adopted resolutions repudiating the Virginia ordinance of secession, and providing for an election of delegates to a convention to be held on June 11th for the purpose of taking steps to establish a separate State, to be named "Kanawha." The election was to be held on May 23d, the same day which Virginia had appointed for the popular vote on the ratification of the ordinance of secession.

The second convention met at Wheeling on the appointed day. Delegates were present representing about forty counties. The members were all Union in sentiment and began business by taking an oath of allegiance to the United

States. The convention declared all offices in the State vacant, ordained a provisional government for the State of Virginia, elected Francis H. Pierpont provisional governor, filled all other State offices whose occupants had "abdicated by treason," and assumed to be the paramount authority in the State. The ordinance of secession and all acts of the "Rebel legislature falsely claiming to be the legislature of Virginia," were declared void. The counties represented in this convention were declared independent of Virginia. The "legislature of Virginia" was "reconstructed" by this convention—"restored" they called it. The legislature of Virginia was summoned to meet at Wheeling July 21st. Those members who failed to obey the summons or who refused to take the oath of allegiance to the United States were to be expelled for treason and the remnant to be declared the legislature of Virginia. The anomalous body assembled at the appointed time and place. It consisted of the members from the "independent counties." This rump assemblage was held by the Unionists to be the legislature of Virginia, under the pretence that all the other counties had lost the right of participating in the State government by engaging in rebellion.

The legislature proceeded to exercise the double function of legislating for the State of Virginia and for the independent counties, now increased to forty-eight in number. As the legislature of Virginia, this body elected two senators, John S. Carlile and Waitman T. Willey, to represent the State in the United States Senate. Acting for the independent counties, this same legislature called a "Constitutional Convention" to assemble at Wheeling November 26, 1861, for the purpose of framing a State constitution and taking steps to secure the admission of the new State into the Union. This Constitutional Convention met on the day appointed and framed a constitution for the State of West Virginia, which was submitted for ratification to the voters of the forty-eight independent counties on May 3, 1862. At the same election, these counties

elected Francis H. Pierpont governor of Virginia to fill the unexpired term of John Letcher, whose office the seceders declared vacant on account of Letcher's engaging in rebellion against the United States. In the capacity of the "legislature of Virginia" this double-headed legislature complacently gave the consent of Virginia to the admission of the new State, and Congress admitted the State December 31, 1862, upon West Virginia's compliance with certain conditions. The following proclamation proves that this dual legislature was an ideal organization to comply with "conditions":

"WHEREAS, by the act of Congress approved the thirty-first of December last the State of West Virginia was declared to be one of the United States of America, and was admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the original States in all respects whatever, upon the condition that certain changes should be duly made in the proposed constitution for that State;

"And, whereas, proof of a compliance with that condition as required by the second section of the act aforesaid has been submitted to me;

"Now, therefore, Be it known that I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, do hereby, in pursuance of the act of Congress aforesaid, declare and proclaim that the said act shall take effect and be in force from and after sixty days from the date hereof.

"In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

"Done at the City of Washington this twentieth day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and of the Independence of the United States the eighty-seventh.

[L. S.]

"ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

"By the President.

"WILLIAM H. SEWARD,

"*Secretary of State.*"

If West Virginia had justified itself on the ground of the right of revolution, and honestly announced that it took advantage of this opportunity to secure independence, its action would have been entitled to respect. If the Congress of the United States had adopted as a preamble to its act of admission the statement attributed to Thaddeus Stevens "We know it is not constitutional, but it is necessary," we might even attribute its blindness to the Constitution to the fervor of patriotism. But when the people of West Virginia essay the double rôle of being Virginia and West Virginia at the same time, and the Congress of the United States pretends to be acting in accordance with the Constitution, and both together attempt to pass this fiction on the world as the truth, logic sickens at the sophism, and commonsense revolts at the imposture.

The narrative of political events has been pursued beyond its chronological order, for the purpose of showing the reasons which induced President Lincoln and General Scott to adopt the plan for the invasion of Virginia which might otherwise seem unskilful. Even before President Lincoln's first call, the two northern neighbors of western Virginia had begun the organization of troops. Each had accumulated forces at points convenient for the purpose of invading the western section of Virginia. Meanwhile, Governor Letcher had called upon the people of western Virginia for volunteers. At this juncture, General Robert E. Lee had been appointed to command the forces of Virginia. For a moment let us pause to consider the striking figure of this chief of the Virginia forces.

General Lee was a man of high character and personal worth. His intellectual force was of a high order, and his moral quality imparted to his judgment a stability that was maintained in all exigencies; to these were added great physical vigor and unusual self-control. His career before the war had been marked by brilliant exploits in the field and highly successful services in raising the standard of efficiency of the national army. General Lee was three

times brevetted for conspicuous service during the Mexican War, and for three years, 1852–1855, was in command of the West Point Military Academy. On the outbreak of the Civil War, General Lee could not long hesitate as to his course. Though sincerely devoted to the Union, his sense of duty impelled him to resign his commission in the United States army, which he did three days after Virginia had adopted its ordinance of secession. In a letter written at this time to his sister, the wife of an officer in the Federal army, we get a glimpse of General Lee's mingled feelings and realize his submission to the call of duty. He writes: "though I recognize no necessity for this state of things and would have forborne and pleaded to the end for redress of grievances, real or supposed, yet in my own person I had to meet the question whether I should take part against my native State. With all my devotion to the Union, and the feeling of loyalty and duty of an American citizen, I have not been able to make up my mind to raise my hand against my relatives, my children, my home. I have therefore resigned my commission in the army, and save in defence of my native State—with the sincere hope that my poor services may never be needed—I hope I may never be called upon to draw my sword." Better qualifications for the leadership of the Confederate forces no man could have possessed. Calm and self-confident, moved by a strict sense of duty, without selfish ambition, skilful in the art and practice of war, General Lee as the leader of the State and Confederate forces, as our narrative will demonstrate, justified the wisdom and confidence of the people and the army of the Confederacy. He brought to their service the record of a brilliant military past, and in the face of impossible conditions, that record lost none of its brightness. But we will not anticipate our narrative.

General Lee, finding that the enlistments in the western part of Virginia amounted to almost nothing, instituted active measures to increase them and was greatly surprised at the inadequate results. When he was forced to the reluctant

conclusion that a sufficient number of troops could not be raised west of the mountains to defend that section from invasion, he sent a small force to Grafton and other points to be under the command of Colonel George Porterfield.

Upon the urgent appeal of leading Union citizens the United States now determined to occupy western Virginia. General George B. McClellan with his Ohio troops crossed the river May 26, 1861, in two columns and moved upon Grafton. Thus began the invasion of western Virginia.

CHAPTER V

THE EARLY VIRGINIA CAMPAIGNS

It will be remembered that the plan of General Scott contemplated four detached campaigns in Virginia, two in the east and two in the west. The two in the east were to be mainly defensive; the two in the west were to be active, and primarily directed to effect the partition of Virginia. We have seen that on May 24th an army was stationed in Fairfax County, protecting Washington and threatening Richmond. The Department of Northeastern Virginia was created and placed under the command of General Irvin McDowell with headquarters at Arlington Heights. It remained for a time inactive.

Fortress Monroe, which commanded the naval approach to Richmond and the Peninsula route, was now made the base of a movement which threatened the capital of the Confederacy. Brigadier-general Butler had been relieved from command of the Department of Annapolis on May 18th, and ordered to take command of the post at Fortress Monroe, relieving Colonel Justin Dimick. This order, issued by General Scott, gave offence to General Butler, who, on the same day, addressed the secretary of war a letter from which the following extracts are made:

“I have just received an order from General Scott transferring the command of the Department of Annapolis to General Cadwalader and ordering me to Fortress Monroe. What does this mean? Is it a censure on my action? Is

it because I have caused Winans to be arrested? Is it because of my proving successful in bringing Baltimore to subjugation and quiet? . . . If my services are no longer desired by the Department, I am quite willing to be relieved altogether, but I will not be disgraced. . . . To be relieved of command of a Department and sent to command a fort, without a word of comment, is something unusual at least, and I am so poor a soldier as not to understand it otherwise than in the light of a reproof."

General Butler was pacified by the organization of a department styled the Department of Virginia, of which he was placed in command. It does not appear that this department, however, extended beyond southeastern Virginia. No aggressive movements seem, at this time, to have been contemplated from Fortress Monroe. Colonel John B. Magruder arrived on the Peninsula about the same time as General Butler and took command of the Confederate forces there, under orders from General Lee, dated May 21st. General Butler reported that on his arrival on May 24th the effective force was 3,375 men, and on June 6th he reports his effective force to be 6,750. General Butler also had a naval force in coöperation with his army. A few days after this second report of General Butler, Colonel Magruder reported his effective force to be 5,550 men.

With the exception of one or two light skirmishes, and expeditions for reconnoissance, no engagement of importance occurred between the two opposing forces until June 10th. General Butler extended his lines along the Hampton Roads and occupied Newport News on May 27th. In the meantime, Colonel Magruder extended his lines across the Peninsula from York to James Rivers, strongly fortifying Yorktown on York River, at which point his left flank rested. His right flank rested on Mulberry Island, a narrow peninsula which extends between Warwick and James Rivers. He availed himself of the topography of the country, which was peculiarly fitted for defensive operations, to fortify points along his whole line. Feeling secure against

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STANDARD LEADERS



Claiborne Fox Jackson.
Governor of Missouri.



John Cabell Breckinridge.
Secretary of war, C. S. A.



Martin Jenkins Crawford.
Peace commissioner.

any movement by land, he maintained his line, varying from twenty-five to twenty miles from Fortress Monroe, fortified a strong line in his rear near Williamsburg and threw forward advanced posts.

One of these advanced posts was established near Bethel Church, generally known as "Big Bethel." General Butler determined to attack this post. His report to General Scott shows that the attack on this place was not intended to be the precursor of a general advance, nor the inauguration of an active campaign. General E. W. Pierce, in obedience to the orders of General Butler, attacked the Confederate post at Big Bethel on June 10th with a force of seven regiments, accompanied by artillery, and was defeated after a severe action lasting about two hours and a half. This post was defended by a Confederate force under the command of Colonel D. H. Hill. On the arrival of Colonel Magruder on the 8th, he assumed command. Reinforcements also arrived on the 9th, making the total force one thousand two hundred men.

The purposes of General Butler in sending out the expedition are shown in the following extracts from his report:

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF VIRGINIA,
"FORTRESS MONROE, JUNE 10, 1861.

"GENERAL: Having learned that the enemy had established an outpost of some strength at a place called Little Bethel, a small church about eight miles from Newport News, and the same distance from Hampton, from whence they were accustomed nightly to advance both on the Newport News and the picket guards of Hampton, to annoy them . . . I had determined to send up a force to drive them back and destroy their camp, the headquarters of which was this small church.

"I had also learned that at a place a short distance farther on, on the road to Yorktown, was an outwork of the rebels on the Hampton side of a place called Big Bethel, a large church near the head of the north branch of Black River;

that here was a considerable rendezvous, with works of more or less strength in process of erection, and from this point the whole country was laid under contribution. Accordingly, I ordered General Pierce, who is in command of Camp Hamilton, at Hampton, to send,"

The above report was written on the day of the engagement. It was followed on the 16th by a second report, in which was enclosed the following statement:

*Casualties in the United States Forces at Big Bethel,
June 10, 1861.*

COMMANDE.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Aggregate.	REMARKS.
Staff	1			1	Major Theodore Winthrop.
Infantry:					
Fourth Massachusetts . .	1			1	
First New York	2	1		3	
Second New York	1	2	1	4	
Third New York	2	27	1	30	
Fifth New York	6	13		19	
Seventh New York	3	7	2	12	
First Vermont	2	3	1	6	
Second U. S. Artillery . .	1			1	Lieutenant John T. Greble.
Total	18	53	5	76	

The report of Colonel Hill shows that on June 6th he established the Confederate camp at Bethel Church with his own regiment, the First North Carolina Infantry, and four pieces of Colonel George W. Randolph's battery; that he immediately began the construction of earthworks to entrench the position; that he was reinforced by detachments from Virginia regiments, commanded respectively by Lieutenant-colonel James E. B. Stuart and Major E. B. Montague, and that the total amount of the force was one thousand two hundred men and that Colonel Magruder assumed command in person. Colonel Magruder made three reports of the battle, describing its incidents, the retreat of the Federals, and the pursuit of their forces. He reports the Confederate

loss to be one killed and seven wounded, the total Confederate force to be one thousand two hundred men, and estimates the Federal force at more than three thousand five hundred. Colonel Hill gives an account of two light skirmishes which took place between his advanced forces and the Federals previous to the battle. Several light skirmishes subsequently occurred on the Peninsula, one near Newport News on July 5th, and another near the same place on the 12th. There were other minor movements, but this portion of the Federal army was inactive during the remainder of the campaign of 1861.

Let us now devote attention to the two active campaigns, both of which had in view the winning of western Virginia: the invasion from Ohio commanded by General McClellan, and the invasion from Pennsylvania commanded by General Patterson. General McClellan was in command of a large force of Ohio troops, thoroughly equipped, and which had been drilled and organized under his direct supervision. He had for some time been awaiting orders to cross Ohio River for the invasion of western Virginia. To meet this formidable movement the State of Virginia and the Confederate government had made no adequate preparation. President Davis, General Lee, Governor Letcher, and all the State authorities labored under an erroneous impression. They believed that Virginians would rally to the defence of Virginia, and they could not be brought to understand the sentiment in western Virginia until too late. They relied upon the people of western Virginia to furnish troops for their own defence and felt that they had performed their duty when active and systematic steps had been taken to raise and organize the western Virginia recruits. Major A. Loring was sent to Wheeling on April 29th to organize the volunteers from the "Pan Handle" counties; Major F. M. Boykin on the 30th to Weston; Lieutenant-colonel John McCausland on the 29th to the Kanawha valley. Colonel C. Q. Tompkins was appointed to command and organize the troops to be raised in the Kanawha valley. All these officers

wrote that their efforts to enlist troops in the Confederate service were unavailing, but the authorities at Richmond could not entertain the idea that any portion of the Virginia population was not loyal to Virginia, and still continued to issue orders to the imaginary troops of western Virginia. The following order and report will serve as a specimen. In this order, General Lee directs important movements to be executed, based on the expectation of five regiments to be raised in western Virginia, and relies on them so confidently that he provides no other means for the execution of these important orders:

“HEADQUARTERS, VIRGINIA FORCES,

“RICHMOND, VA., May 4, 1861.

“COL. GEORGE A. PORTERFIELD, *Harper's Ferry, Va.*

“COLONEL: You are directed to repair to Grafton, Taylor County, Virginia, and select a position for the troops called into the service of the State for the protection and defence of that part of the country. It is desired to hold both branches of the railroad to the Ohio River to prevent its being used to the injury of the State. . . . It is not known what number of companies will offer their services, but it is supposed that a regiment, composed of infantry, riflemen, and artillery, may be obtained for the Parkersburg branch, a similar force for the main road near Moundsville, and three regiments for the reserve, near Grafton; and you are authorized to receive into the service of the State that amount of force. You will report the number of companies mustered into the service, their condition, arms, &c.

“Very respectfully, etc.,

“R. E. LEE,

“*Major-general, Commanding.*”

Colonel Porterfield reports on May 14th that he had duly arrived at Grafton for the purpose of assuming command, but found nothing there to command. He says: “The officers directed to report to me are not present; nor is

there any volunteer or other force here. . . . There is great disaffection in this, and the adjoining counties, and opposition to the lawful action of the State authorities is certainly contemplated." He adds that he will proceed at once to endeavor to collect a force of volunteers, but requests that two hundred and fifty men be sent as a nucleus. He writes again on the 16th, and reports that he has found three companies in the territory assigned to his command, and has ordered them to report to Grafton. He has heard of two or three other companies. He repeats his warning of the inimical disposition of the people, and urges that troops be sent.

Colonel Porterfield gathered from the country a force of about five hundred and fifty men at Grafton. He was not allowed time to organize them. Meanwhile, two regiments of western Virginians had been recruited for the United States' service at Wheeling, and companies were recruited for the same service all over the western counties. Receiving information that overwhelming forces were accumulating along Ohio River, and were preparing to move on Grafton, Colonel Porterfield destroyed two bridges on the branch of the Baltimore and Ohio Road which led to Wheeling, and one on the branch which led to Parkersburg, in order to delay the Federal advance. On May 26th, the forces of General McClellan, commanding the Department of the Ohio, crossed the river in two columns, one at Wheeling and one at Parkersburg. The column from Wheeling consisted of the First and Second Virginia (United States) regiments and an Ohio regiment, and was commanded by Colonel B. F. Kelley of the First Virginia. The column from Parkersburg consisted of two Ohio regiments. These two columns moved upon Grafton.

Colonel Porterfield evacuated Grafton on May 28th, and retreated to Philippi, a town on Tygart River, fifteen miles south of Grafton. Here he was joined by a few recruits, raising his force to about one thousand men. He intended to make a stand at this point, and be in position

to assail the railroads, if the enemy should move forward. The column of Colonel Kelley, having repaired the burned bridges, occupied Grafton on May 30th, and was promptly joined by the Parkersburg column. Reinforcements soon arrived, among which was an Indiana Brigade under Brigadier-general Thomas A. Morris. Upon his arrival, General Morris assumed command. Colonel Kelley proposed a plan for capturing the Confederate force at Philippi. This plan received the sanction of General Morris, and Colonel Kelley was ordered to carry it out. The attacking force consisted of about three thousand men, and was divided into two columns. In order to disguise the movement, it was given out that the Federal force was about to advance to Harper's Ferry. Colonel Kelley's division embarked on the cars, and after going about six miles, disembarked at a small station and marched to Philippi. Colonel Ebenezer Dumont made a similar movement westward, disembarking from the train at Webster. The two columns marched so as to approach Philippi from opposite directions at day-break. The attack occurred on June 3d. The Confederate camp was completely surprised. No pickets gave alarm; the first notice the Confederates received was the fire of Colonel Dumont's artillery. Thus suddenly aroused, they behaved with coolness. Colonel Porterfield extricated his men with skill, and retreated on the road to Beverly. The Federals had no cavalry, and were too much exhausted by the long night march to follow in pursuit. The casualties were remarkably slight. On the Federal side, Colonel Kelley was severely wounded, but there was no loss of life. On the Confederate side, the loss was variously estimated at from two to six.

Colonel Porterfield retreated to Beverly, from which place he wrote to General Lee on June 9th, and received a letter in reply, informing him that General Robert S. Garnett had been appointed "to take command in the Northwest, with such a force as was disposable." Colonel Porterfield thereupon demanded a court of inquiry into his conduct. The

court convened at Beverly, June 20th, with Colonel William B. Taliaferro as president. After a thorough investigation, the court found that Colonel Porterfield was in command at Philippi with one thousand men, sufficiently supplied with ammunition; that his camp was completely surprised, and no alarm was given by the pickets; that Colonel Porterfield had given the orders for the placing of pickets sufficient for ordinary occasions; that the pickets had failed of their duties, that Colonel Porterfield, having reason to suspect an attempt of the enemy to surprise him, ought to have increased his guards, and placed pickets further from the camp; that he ought to have retreated from Philippi the day before, and should not have permitted the rain to prevent him; and that he showed great coolness and skill in extricating his command after the surprise. General Lee approved the findings of the court, and dismissed the matter from further consideration. General Garnett assumed command on June 14th, at Huttonsville, to which place Colonel Porterfield had fallen back. About the same time, General McClellan arrived in person and took command of the forces in western Virginia. Both generals received reinforcements, and decided to advance toward each other.

The reinforcements of General Garnett consisted of militia raised in Pendleton, Bath, and Highland counties on the eastern side of the Alleghany Mountains, and from Barbour, Randolph, and Pocahontas counties on the western side. Colonel J. M. Heck brought with him one battery of four guns, a company of cavalry, and three infantry companies from eastern Virginia. Colonel Porterfield also had collected recruits from western Virginia. The recruits from all sources were organized into two regiments: the Twenty-fifth Virginia under Colonel Heck, and the Thirty-first Virginia under Colonel H. R. Jackson. General Garnett was the first to advance. After examining the topography of the country, he formed a plan which he decided to put into execution before he should be anticipated by General McClellan.

The turnpike from Staunton to Beverly was the great highway across the mountains, and the only practicable route. It was thought to be General McClellan's intention to move on Staunton. It was, therefore, necessary to block the way. Upon reaching Beverly, the turnpike diverges, one branch going to Buckhannon through a pass over Rich Mountain descended on the western side about seven miles from Beverly; the other, going to Philippi through a pass over Laurel Hill descended the mountain about seventeen miles further north. Rich Mountain and Laurel Hill form one continuous, long, narrow range, the most western of the Appalachian chain, and running parallel with the general trend of the system. The most eastern branch of Tygart River breaks through this range a few miles northwest of Beverly. North of the gorge of this river, the range is called Laurel Hill, and south of it, Rich Mountain.

General Garnett conceived the idea that defensive works constructed on the western side of Rich Mountain and Laurel Hill, at the points where the turnpikes from Philippi and Buckhannon, respectively, began the ascent of the passes over the mountains, would debar McClellan's further advance, and exclude him from the Cheat River valley. In his report to General Lee, written June 25th, he says: "I regard these two passes as the gates to the northwestern country, and, had they been occupied by the enemy, my command would have been effectually paralyzed, or shut up in the Cheat River Valley."

Having received assurances from General Lee that reinforcements were on the way, Garnett determined to move without waiting for them. The following extract from his report to General Lee, written from the camp on Laurel Hill, explains the movement: "I deemed it of such importance to possess myself of the two turnpike passes over the Rich and Laurel Mountains, before they should be seized by the enemy, that I left Huttonsville on the evening of the 15th with these two regiments and Captain Rice's battery, and by marching them the greater portion of the

night, reached the two passes early in the afternoon of the following day, Colonel Heck's regiment and a section of artillery occupying the Buckhannon pass, and Colonel Jackson with the remaining section, taking up their position here. I have made Beverly for the present my principal depot."

Soon after this advance, General Lee sent the following reinforcements: the Twentieth Virginia under Colonel John Pegram, the Thirty-seventh Virginia under Colonel J. V. Fulkerson, and the First Georgia under Colonel J. N. Ramsey. These forces Garnett distributed to strengthen his position. Colonel Pegram took command of the Buckhannon Pass, which had been named Camp Garnett, while General Garnett in person assumed command of the other camp. The Confederates remained undisturbed in their advanced position for about three weeks, during which they fortified the camps, and strengthened their entrenchments. General Garnett reported that he was confident of being able to hold his position. His total effective force, July 8, 1861, is shown in the following table, which may be found in the *Official Records*:

Abstract from return of Confederate States Troops in Northwest Virginia, Brigadier-general R. S. Garnett commanding, July 8, 1861:

TROOPS.	PRESENT FOR DUTY.						TOTAL PRESENT.	
	Infantry		Cavalry.		Artillery		Officers.	Men.
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.		
Command at Laurel Hill	178	2,666	6	131	4	92	209	3,351
Command at Rich Mountain	38	694	3	52	5	85	49	859
Command at Beverly	20	312	2	58	34	375
Total	236	3,672	11	241	9	177	292	4,585

The additions in the above table are incorrect. If corrected, the number of men present would be reduced to 4,089, and the officers to 256.

The reinforcements of General McClellan cannot be stated with accuracy, nor his total force in western Virginia. The *Official Records* make the following note: "The imperfect returns of the Department of the Ohio for July, 1861, do not indicate the Union strength in West Virginia." These records show, however, that the aggregate forces in the Department of the Ohio on June 30, 1861, amounted to 54,313. General McClellan commanded this department, and had it in his power to order to western Virginia whatever force he deemed necessary. It is estimated that he had on the scene of action about 12,000 troops, thoroughly armed and equipped.

McClellan now determined to make a simultaneous attack upon the two camps and upon Beverly. He sent General Morris with about 3,500 men to feign an attack on the entrenched camp on Laurel Hill where Garnett commanded in person. He himself moved against the more southerly camp located on Rich Mountain, and on July 9th occupied a position on Roaring Creek, about two miles from the Confederate camp, with a force of about 6,000 men. Here was the real point of attack. It was the weaker point of defence and was only seven miles from Beverly. If successful, it would carry McClellan much nearer to Garnett's depot at Beverly than Garnett himself would be. A rapid advance would capture Beverly, cut off Garnett's line of retreat and place him in a precarious position.

Notwithstanding these dangerous demonstrations, Garnett held his position, expecting the immediate arrival of reinforcements. The Forty-fourth Virginia under Colonel W. C. Scott, the Second Georgia under Colonel Edward Johnson, and a North Carolina regiment under Colonel Stephen D. Lee were on the way. They did not, however, arrive in time. Meanwhile, General Morris continued his feint, assailing Garnett's pickets on the 8th at Belington, and occupying a position within less than two miles of the Confederate entrenchments.

At five o'clock on the morning of July 11th, General William S. Rosecrans, with a force of 1,917 men, moved for the real attack on Rich Mountain. Marching by a southward detour, he ascended Rich Mountain to its top, gained the rear of Colonel Pegram's entrenchments, and moved to attack the camp. Suspecting such a movement, Colonel Pegram had sent Captain Julius A. De Lagnel to take position at Hart's farm on the summit of the mountain and guard the rear. Captain De Lagnel, with two six-pounders supported by a small force, took position as ordered, and was subsequently reinforced, after which his total command amounted to three hundred and ten men. About three o'clock P. M. he was attacked by General Rosecrans. After a gallant resistance, in which he repulsed the attack, he fell back to a second position, in which he again repulsed the enemy. He was finally broken and driven from the field and retreated down the mountain to Beverly. This was the only fighting on Rich Mountain. General Rosecrans bivouacked on the field for the night and early the next morning advanced to Camp Garnett, which he found abandoned, and occupied the place without resistance. Here he captured sixty-nine men, two brass six-pounders, and working tools, equipments, etc.

Major Nat Taylor, commanding reinforcements on the way to aid De Lagnel, learning of his disaster, retreated to Beverly. The remaining troops began the retreat from Camp Garnett at one o'clock on the night of July 11th. In the absence of guides familiar with the country, Engineer Jed Hotchkiss was placed in front with orders to lead the column through the trackless mountain forests to the camp of General Garnett on Laurel Hill. Upon reaching the extremity of Rich Mountain about sunrise, Hotchkiss found that only fifty men had followed him, the main body of the column having taken a different direction by mistake in orders. This party guided by Hotchkiss went to Beverly, which it reached about eleven o'clock, and found the town evacuated. The troops supplied themselves bountifully

from the abandoned stores and then continued their retreat to Huttonsville, on which route Major Tyler had preceded them.

Colonel Pegram, in command of the main column, reached the Tygart River valley, near Leedsville, about 7 P. M. on July 12th. Hearing that General Garnett had retreated and was pursued northward on the Leeding Creek road by a large force and that Beverly had that afternoon been occupied by General McClellan, Colonel Pegram bivouacked his men and sent a letter of surrender to General McClellan. The next morning the reply of General McClellan was received and the command surrendered. The number included in this surrender is stated by Colonel Pegram to have been 30 officers and 525 men, and by General McClellan to have been 33 officers and 560 men.

The scattered remnants from Rich Mountain and Beverly retreated to Huttonsville, where they reported to Colonel Scott. Thence, the retreat was continued across Cheat Mountain to Greenbrier River, where the retreating force united with Colonel Johnson's regiment. The combined forces retreated to the top of the Alleghany Mountains, and General Jackson, assuming command, gathered the scattered forces on July 14th, at Monterey in Highland County.

General Garnett, to go back a little, retreated from his entrenched camp on Laurel Hill, about midnight, July 11th, and marched on the road to Beverly. Upon reaching Leedsville, he received information that Beverly had been occupied by McClellan. He then changed the line of his retreat to the northeast, aiming to cross Cheat River, and march to Red House in Maryland. The retreat was conducted without serious incident until he reached Carrick's Ford, Cheat River. Here his rear was attacked, and an engagement occurred, in which Garnett lost about twenty-eight men and a portion of his baggage. About half a mile further on, it was necessary to cross another ford over the last of the Cheat River branches. In crossing this, his rear was again assailed, and a skirmish ensued in which General Garnett was

killed. Here the pursuit ended. The retreat was continued to Red House, thence across the Alleghany Mountains and to General Jackson's headquarters at Monterey.

Thus ended McClellan's western Virginia campaign. The Confederates were driven across the Alleghany Mountains, and none were left in western Virginia north of the Kanawha. McClellan states his own losses in the Rich Mountain fight as 12 killed and 59 wounded. He reports the Confederate loss as 135 killed and 800 or 900 wounded and prisoners. McClellan gives this as an estimate. It is known to be too great, but an exact estimate is not obtainable.

At the conclusion of the campaign, General McClellan issued an address, July 16th, to "The Soldiers of the Army of the West," which resembled the famous address of Napoleon to the soldiers of the Army of Italy. General McClellan's western Virginia campaign was vigorous and rapid, and proved him to be an able general. It was important in its results, and the most brilliant of the preliminary detached campaigns directed by General Scott. It won western Virginia for the Union so completely that the Confederates were never able to recover the lost ground. Yet in all his movements he encountered almost no opposition. At Grafton he simply moved promptly, and took possession of an abandoned post. At Philippi he made an abortive attempt to capture the forces of Porterfield, and practically failed. Porterfield retreated with a loss of from two to six men. The place was untenable, and Porterfield had intended to evacuate it the day before it was attacked, and was only prevented by a severe rainstorm. McClellan reaped no especial military advantage by the surprise. Up to this point, the total force opposed to him was only about one thousand men, and this force could make no effectual resistance.

In his subsequent movements against Garnett, the Confederate troops had been reinforced, but McClellan still had an overwhelming force. General Garnett was a brave and

trained soldier. He died for his countrymen, but he committed a fatal mistake in separating his inadequate force and awaiting attack in two entrenched camps ten or twelve miles apart and with difficult and hazardous communications between them, and especially in holding the main body of his force in a position where it could be so easily flanked and thrown *hors de combat*. General McClellan, with the eye of genius, saw and seized the advantage. He held Garnett's attention by feigning to attack, as the Confederate general expected him to do. Perhaps McClellan knew that General Garnett had reported the camps on Rich Mountain and Laurel Hill as the "gates to the northwestern country"; and so they were gates to the highway of travel, but the rear could be reached without going through the gates. McClellan flanked the pass on Rich Mountain, which was much nearer to Beverly—the base of supply and retreat. Thus the fate of the campaign rested on the three hundred and ten men who fought heroically to defend the rear against a brigade. When they were overborne by numbers, the rest of the Confederate forces were helpless, and the main body, twelve miles away on Laurel Hill, was unable to strike a blow. The whole command was entrapped; the only thought was how to escape, for there was no way to fight.

Thus the only battle of this much lauded campaign was the battle fought by the three hundred and ten under command of Captain De Lagnel in the rear of Colonel Pegram's camp on Rich Mountain. The skirmishes at Carrick's Ford and the other fords were mere incidents of the pursuit. General McClellan managed this campaign with a master hand. He did what was to be done. Perhaps if there had been a greater obstacle to overcome or adequate forces to oppose, he might still have been successful; but, taking the campaign as it was, neither proclamations, nor adulation, can raise it to the rank of Napoleon's Italian campaign.

A few days later General McClellan was called to Washington, where he was assigned to duties of a much wider sphere. He proved himself to be the best organizer of

troops in either army. He gave evidence of his military genius by organizing and perfecting the plan of invasion upon which the war was subsequently fought, and which all his successors adopted. In the comprehensiveness of his plans he had no equal in the Federal army. In executing movements in the field he did not seem so successful as in planning them. In fact, there were contradictions in his character. He was scientific and bold in thought, but slow and deliberate in action. It would seem that he was cautious by nature, and from reading acquired an admiration for Napoleon and became a student of his campaigns and methods. In his western Virginia campaign he acted with rapidity and vigor. In his subsequent career and greater sphere he planned like Napoleon and executed like Fabius.

While the events above related were in progress in the north part of western Virginia, a campaign was begun by the invasion of the southwestern section along the line of Kanawha River. General McClellan, being engrossed with the operations in the northern part of the State, committed the more southern campaign to Brigadier-general J. D. Cox. The inauguration and objects of this campaign cannot be more clearly and succinctly stated than by quoting General McClellan's order, as follows:

“HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,

“BUCKHANNON, VA., July 2, 1861.

“BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. D. COX, *Camp Dennison, Ohio.*

“GENERAL: On receipt of this you will at once assume command of the First and Second Kentucky Regiments and the Twelfth Ohio. Call upon Governor Dennison to supply you with one company of cavalry and six guns. Captain Kingsbury probably has State guns enough to give you.

“You will expedite the equipment of those regiments and move them at once to Gallipolis, via Hamden and Portland, hiring teams for the supplies of the troops between Portland and Gallipolis, sending to the quartermaster in advance to have teams ready. With the regiment first

ready to move proceed to Gallipolis and assume command of the Twenty-first. Cross the river and occupy Point Pleasant. With the regiment that next arrives occupy Letart's Falls, and then move the two regiments to the mouth of Ten-mile Creek, or the point near there where the road from Letart's Falls intersects the Kanawha River. Place the last regiment in reserve at Point Pleasant, or any proper point in the rear of your line of defence. Intrench two guns at Letart's and four at your advanced position on the Kanawha. Remain on the defensive, and endeavor to keep the rebels near Charleston until I can cut off their retreat by movement from Beverly. Should you receive certain intelligence that I am hard pressed seek to relieve me by a rapid advance on Charleston, but place no credit in rumors, for I shall be successful. Use your cavalry as pickets, not exposing them. Punish Ripley, if you can. Repress any outbreaks that may occur at Guyandotte or Barboursville.


"Remember, my plan is to cut them off, and do all you can to assist that object. Always keep two or three boats on hand. Call on Captain J. Kountz, at Marietta or Ripley, to supply boats from his fleet. If the two companies of Seventeenth Ohio are still at Ravenswood when you reach Gallipolis, order them to rejoin their regiment, via Parkersburg or Webster. Communicate frequently. A telegraph line follows me out.

"Very respectfully, yours,


"GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
"Major-general, Commanding."

Such was the original plan—an inactive campaign to await the results of movements from the north.

On the Confederate side, some preparation had been made to meet invasion. General Henry A. Wise had been appointed, June 6, 1861, to command in the Kanawha Valley. He brought with him a small force, and was instructed to "rally the people of that valley and the adjoining counties to resist and repel the invading army." He



Plan of the battlefield at Bull Run, July 21, 1861. *From the print in the Library of Congress.*



had gathered together a force which is shown in the following table, and was stationed at Charleston, on Kanawha River.

Abstract from the Report of the Confederate and State Forces Commanded by Brigadier-general Henry A. Wise, Confederate States Army, at Charleston, Virginia, dated July 8, 1861:

TROOPS.	PRESENT FOR DUTY.				Total Present.	Aggregate Present.
	Infantry.		Cavalry.			
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.		
General Staff	• • •	• • • • •	• • •	• • •	12	12
First and Second Kanawha Regiments	68	1,332	• • •	• • •	1,422	1,483
Kanawha Battalion	26	427	• • •	• • •	453	459
Independent Companies (seven) . . .	27	425	• • •	• • •	508	535
Mounted Rangers, etc. (3 companies) .	• • •	• • • • •	11	170	204	216
Total	121	2,184	11	170	2,599	2,705

Some of the additions in the above table are incorrect. They are sufficiently accurate, however, to show General Wise's strength. General Wise was notified that Brigadier-general John B. Floyd was at Abingdon, raising a force to protect the Virginia and Tennessee railroads; that it was desired that he should act in coöperation with Floyd, and that if they should be thrown together, Floyd would be entitled to command.

The first Kanawha campaign was short and neither decisive nor important. Under later orders from General McClellan, General Cox advanced to meet him. Several skirmishes took place. At the mouth of the Pocotaligo, Cox's pickets were driven back. On July 12th, a skirmish occurred at Barboursville, in which a small Confederate force was driven back. On the 16th, there was a skirmish at Ripley in which the Confederates gained the advantage, and another skirmish at Barboursville in which the Confederates retreated. The most important of these skirmishes, and the only one which at all approached the proportions of a battle, was at Scarey Creek on July 17th.

General Cox adopted an unusual plan of advance, moving his men up Kanawha River in a column of boats with flanking parties thrown out on each side. When this column approached the mouth of Scarey Creek, Colonel William W. Lowe was sent forward with the Twelfth Ohio and two companies of the Twenty-first to dislodge a Confederate force of eight hundred men under Colonel W. T. Patton. A protracted engagement ensued. In reporting its results, General McClellan says: "Cox checked on the Kanawha. He has fought something between a victory and a defeat. . . . Have orders for him to remain where he is and will start as soon as possible to cut Wise's rear and relieve our credit."

General Wise reports: "Since mine of yesterday, I have the proud satisfaction to report to you a glorious repulse of the enemy, if not a decided victory." He gives a detailed account of the action, and reports the capture of Colonels Jesse S. Norton, William E. Woodruff, and Charles A. De Villiers, Lieutenant-colonel G. W. Neff, and Captains Austin and Ward, "and some ten or twenty privates, and the killing of about thirty. Our loss one killed and two wounded." The Federal force crossed the river and retreated to their entrenched camp at Pocotaligo.

In obedience to the orders of General McClellan, General Cox now suspended his advance. After the dispersion of Garnett's forces, McClellan took possession of the passes over Cheat Mountain. It was in his power to advance toward Staunton in the Valley of Virginia, or to move against Wise's rear, for the purpose of driving the Confederates from the Kanawha Valley, and entirely out of western Virginia. We now know from his official correspondence that he intended to move southward to occupy the Kanawha Valley.

It being at that time uncertain which direction General McClellan would take, General Wise was ordered to occupy a position where his forces could be used for either emergency. At the same time, General Floyd was ordered to move northward to the same line. The forces in McClellan's

front were strengthened, and General W. W. Loring was assigned to command them. General Wise, in obedience to orders, marched up Kanawha River and occupied Lewisburg, in Greenbrier County, near the Alleghany Mountains, reaching that position on August 1st. This was the only Confederate force now in western Virginia. Thus closed the first Kanawha campaign, to be renewed later when the result of the battle of Bull Run left the Confederates free to attempt the recovery of western Virginia.

The second campaign for the invasion of Virginia organized by General Scott was the "Shenandoah Valley Campaign," under General Patterson. This was one of the series of detached campaigns undertaken for twofold purposes: the first, political, and the second, military. The political reasons were not so clearly announced in the correspondence which has been preserved, but they may easily be gathered when we remember that in planning to establish the new State of West Virginia it was desirable, for reasons political, to include in its limits the Valley of Virginia; while for reasons military it was important, if not necessary, to press a companion campaign to that of McClellan.

It was believed in Washington that the Union sentiment in Virginia was more widespread than it really was. It was thought that the same means which were so successful in the northern Border States and in trans-Alleghany Virginia would likewise be successful in the valley. And so they might have been, had the people of the valley given to the invasion of their soil the same support and sympathy which were given by the other invaded sections. But the Federal authorities were mistaken in supposing that the Southern sentiment was confined to the eastern portion of the State. This sentiment was as strong in the valley as it was anywhere in Virginia, except in the few counties contiguous to the eastern slope of the Alleghany Mountains, which became parts of West Virginia.

The portion of Virginia lying between the Alleghany and Blue Ridge Mountains, extending diagonally across the State

from northeast to southwest, is known as the Valley of Virginia, and is one of the most desirable sections in the State. Rising in Augusta County, near the centre of the State, Shenandoah River flows northward along the western base of the Blue Ridge Mountains and empties into the Potomac near Harper's Ferry. The valley of this river is famed for its beauty and fertility. While the Shenandoah Valley proper is but a part of the great Valley of Virginia, the name is often applied to the entire valley. It is commonly so applied by military writers.

It was the purpose to overrun this valley and win it as a part of West Virginia, and thus extend that State west to the Blue Ridge Mountains and use it as a base for invasion. To effect this object, General Scott designed to press actively the "Shenandoah Campaign." Circumstances rendered this campaign abortive. It was the only one of General Scott's campaigns of repression that did fail. Maryland, Kentucky, Missouri, and western Virginia were all reduced to Federal possession by detached invasions, but the effort against this fine valley was repulsed largely by the efforts of its own people, as all the other invasions might have been had their citizens not been repressed by the iron hand of the Federal military in advance of the invasion.

As previously narrated, Harper's Ferry, located on the Potomac near the mouth of Shenandoah River, was seized by the Confederates the day after the secession of Virginia. It was occupied by a force of Virginia militia, about one thousand three hundred strong, which body was increased by volunteers from the Valley who hastened to enlist. Colonel Thomas J. Jackson took command on April 30th. He at once entered on the process of organization and drill. Here were enrolled the first Confederate troops who enlisted "for the war." Here was formed a portion of the famous "Stonewall Brigade." Here were organized the cavalry commands of J. E. B. Stuart and Turner Ashby. Colonel Jackson continued the work of drilling his troops, daily receiving recruits from the adjacent country, and at the

same time strengthened his position by constructing additional fortifications on both sides of the Potomac.

General Joseph E. Johnston relieved Colonel Jackson of the command at Harper's Ferry on May 23d, and continued the work which the latter had begun. After an examination of the position, he became convinced that Harper's Ferry was defensible on the front, but that the position was easily turned and was untenable against a strong attack from the rear. He wrote General Lee on May 26th, stating his force to be five thousand two hundred men, and enclosing a memorandum of his objections to the policy of standing a siege at Harper's Ferry. He says: "The only way in which this force can be made useful, I think, is by rendering it movable and employing it to prevent or retard the enemy's passage of the Potomac, and, should he effect the crossing, in opposing his advance into the country." He follows this communication by a series of letters, all expressing similar views. He seemed particularly to fear a combined movement by Patterson in his front and McClellan in his rear, and especially to apprehend danger from McClellan. In a communication on June 6th he says: "It is likely to be cut off by the troops from Ohio, who, you know, are commanded by a man of great ability. The operations of these troops and those from Pennsylvania will no doubt be combined. . . . You say that 'the abandonment of Harper's Ferry would be depressing to the cause of the South.' Would not the loss of five or six thousand men be more so? And, if they remain here, they must be captured or destroyed very soon after McClellan's arrival in the valley."

General Johnston constantly complained that he was not kept informed of McClellan's movements in northwestern Virginia, and wrote letters making eager inquiries. He looked at the matter from a military point of view, and clearly saw that the march of McClellan either on Staunton or Winchester would be the proper military movement. He did not seem to understand the political reasons which

impelled General Scott to keep McClellan's campaign detached and to devote his army to the occupation of the trans-Alleghany region. The correspondence between Generals Scott and McClellan throws some light on the matter. General McClellan, after occupying Grafton, voluntarily left the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and moved on the Staunton turnpike. After the road to Staunton was opened by the dispersion of Garnett's forces, he declined to cross the Alleghany Mountains and contented himself with fortifying Cheat Mountain, giving notice to General Cox of his intention to move to the attack of Wise's rear and to occupy the Kanawha valley. As early as July 7, 1861, while planning the attack on Garnett, McClellan, in anticipation of success, wrote to General Scott a letter which shows the direction of his thoughts. From this letter the following remarkable expression is quoted: "With these means at my disposal, and such resources as I can command in Virginia, if the government will give me ten thousand arms for distribution in East Tennessee I think I can break the backbone of secession. Please instruct me whether to move on Staunton or on to Wytheville."

If the suggestion of General McClellan had been adopted, the character of the war would have been materially changed. If, at the same time, a successful campaign had secured to the Union the valley of Virginia between the Blue Ridge and Alleghany Mountains, all the purposes of General Scott's plan would have been successfully accomplished. East Tennessee would, perhaps, have become a separate State, and all the disaffected communities of the South would have been brought within the Federal lines—*lines of protection* the Unionists styled them.

At this time, however, General Scott was beginning to yield to the popular clamor which demanded a different policy, and which brought him disaster. He returned a cold reply to McClellan's suggestion, not positively refusing it, but fearing "your line will be too long without intermediate supports." McClellan did not press the matter for

the present, but after his victory at Rich Mountain, he prepared for a campaign in the Kanawha valley, which would be the first step, and perhaps nursed the mental reservation to renew the project of the East Tennessee campaign if he should be successful in the preliminary movements. Events now followed so rapidly that all plans were changed. General Scott telegraphed to McClellan on July 21st: "McDowell has been checked. Come down to the Shenandoah valley with such troops as can be spared from western Virginia, and make head against the enemy in that quarter." On July 22d, McClellan replied with the offer to join Patterson with fifteen thousand troops and push the Shenandoah valley campaign. On the same day, General Scott informed McClellan of McDowell's disaster, and ordered him to remain in western Virginia.

General Patterson, at Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, was organizing an army for the Shenandoah campaign. The first object was the investment of General Johnston, then at Harper's Ferry. Patterson's force, as shown by his returns of June 28, 1861, was 14,344 men. He subsequently received large reinforcements. General Johnston had 6,500 men on June 15th, and subsequently received reinforcements which increased his army to 10,654, as shown by the returns of June 30, 1861.

General Johnston received information on June 13th that two thousand Federal troops, supposed to be the advance of McClellan's army, had taken possession of Romney, about forty-three miles west of Winchester. The information proved to be incorrect, but it decided Johnston's course. He sent Colonel A. P. Hill to oppose the force at Romney, and made arrangements to evacuate Harper's Ferry. After sending to Winchester such baggage and materials as could be moved, he abandoned the place on June 15th, resting for the night near Charleston. Meanwhile, Colonel Hill found, upon arriving at Romney, that, instead of being the advance of McClellan's army, the troops which had occupied the place were a detachment, about five

hundred strong, from Patterson's army under Colonel Lew Wallace, who had attacked a small Confederate force, and driven it from the town. Before the arrival of Colonel Hill, the Federals had retreated. Colonel Hill retaliated by sending an expedition under Colonel J. C. Vaughn to capture the garrison at New Creek Bridge. The garrison escaped, but Vaughn took two pieces of artillery, and burned the bridge.

On June 16th General Patterson crossed the Potomac to Virginia, and seemed to be disconcerted at the evacuation of Harper's Ferry. General Johnston advanced to Bunker Hill to intercept any attempted movement against Winchester. General Patterson became impressed with the belief that Johnston had a greatly superior force, and was laying a "decoy." He made a rapid retreat and recrossed the Potomac into Maryland. Johnston then fell back to Winchester, and went into camp. While awaiting the further movement of Patterson, he constructed defences. These were manned by the militia of Frederick and the adjoining counties. The employment of these troops, some twenty-five hundred strong, under the command of General Carson, left the army free for active service. Having received additional reinforcements and orders from Washington, General Patterson again crossed the Potomac on July 2d, and advanced toward Winchester. Colonel Jackson met the advance at Falling Waters where an engagement occurred with the Federal vanguard under General Thomas. Jackson fell back, after inflicting a sharp loss on the enemy, and bringing off forty-nine prisoners. Colonel Jackson reported that the Federal loss in killed and wounded must have been heavy, and that the Confederate loss was twelve wounded and eleven missing. Among those reported "missing," the general believed several were killed.

The Confederate army advanced to Darkestville, to which place Jackson had fallen back, and remained there four days, offering battle. Patterson, however, halted at Martinsburg, six miles north of Darkestville, and Johnston retired to Winchester. General Patterson, though largely superior

in force, and pressed to take the aggressive, could not be persuaded to attack Winchester, seeming to be impressed with the idea that Johnston outnumbered him. He moved to Bunker Hill, as if to attack Winchester, and remained there on the 16th. The movements which closed the campaign are given below, in the language of General Johnston's report:

"On the 17th, he [Patterson] moved by his left flank to Smithfield. This created the impression that he intended to attack us on the south, or was merely holding us in check while General Beauregard should be attacked at Manassas by General Scott. About one o'clock on the morning of July 18th, I received from the Government a telegraphic dispatch informing me that the Northern Army was advancing upon Manassas, then held by General Beauregard, and directing me, if practicable, to go to that officer's assistance, after sending my sick to Culpepper Court-House. In the exercise of the discretion conferred on me by the terms of the order, I at once determined to march to join General Beauregard. The best service which the Army of the Shenandoah could render was to prevent the defeat of that of the Potomac. To be able to do this it was necessary, in the first instance, to defeat General Patterson, or to elude him. The latter course was the most speedy and certain, and was therefore adopted. Our sick, nearly seven-hundred in number, were provided for in Winchester. For the defence of that place the militia of Generals Carson and Meen seemed ample, for I thought it certain that General Patterson would follow my movement as soon as he discovered it. Evading him by the dispositions made of the advance-guard, under Colonel Stuart, the army moved through Ashby's Gap to Piedmont, a station of the Manassas Gap Railroad. Thence, the infantry were to be transported by the railway, while the cavalry and artillery were ordered to continue their march."

General Patterson remained in camp inactive. On July 18th, the day that Johnston began his march to Manassas, Patterson telegraphed in some indignation to inquiries from

Washington: "The enemy has stolen no march on me." On July 19th he telegraphed: "The enemy, from last information, are still at Winchester and being reinforced every night." At that time a portion of Johnston's force had reached Manassas and the remainder was nearing that place. Patterson did not learn of Johnston's movement until July 20th, and even then he did not understand it. He telegraphed on that day: "With a portion of his force Johnston left Winchester by the road to Millwood on the afternoon of the 18th. His whole force was about thirty-five thousand two hundred." The fact was, Johnston's force, which did not exceed nine thousand, reached Manassas on the 20th, and Johnston assumed command of the Army of the Potomac. On July 21st, while Johnston was fighting in the battle of Bull Run, Patterson telegraphed: "Johnston left for Millwood to operate on McDowell's right and to turn through Loudoun on me. I could not follow."

The three months' men formed a large part of Patterson's army. The expiration of their term of service was now approaching and this fact seemed to alarm Patterson. He fell back to Harper's Ferry on July 21st, and two days later telegraphed General Scott: "I will go to join you with all my available force unless I hear from you by immediate return dispatch." General Scott replied the same day: "Your force is not wanted here. It is expected you will hold Harper's Ferry unless threatened by a force well ascertained to be competent to expel you." In the meantime, the incompetency of Patterson had become so apparent that the authorities had determined to get rid of him by discharging him from the service along with the three months' men of his command. On July 19th, General Order No. 46 of the War Department directed as follows:

"Major-general Robert Patterson, of the Pennsylvania Volunteers, will be honorably discharged from the service when his tour of duty will expire. . . . Major-general Banks will proceed to the Valley of Virginia and assume command of the army now under General Patterson, when

that department will be called the Department of the Shenandoah, headquarters in the field." General Patterson issued his farewell address to the army on July 25th, and General Banks assumed command. Thus ended the first campaign in the Valley of Virginia, generally called the Shenandoah campaign.

The fourth campaign in Virginia, which ended in the rout of the Federal army at Bull Run, grew out of a plan by General Scott to assume a defensive attitude. That commander planned to occupy with a strong force an entrenched position on the south side of Potomac River opposite Washington, for the defence of the capital. General Scott contemplated no aggressive movements from this entrenched camp except such demonstrations as would compel the enemy to keep a force in its front.

General Order No. 26 from the adjutant-general's office, issued May 27, 1861, contained the following:

"All that part of Virginia east of the Alleghany Mountains and north of James River except Fort Monroe and sixty miles around the same, will for the present constitute a new military geographical department, under the command of Brigadier-general Irvin McDowell, U. S. A., whose headquarters will be movable according to circumstances."

General McDowell assumed command of the Department of Northeastern Virginia May 29th. His correspondence with General Scott shows that neither officer's attention was directed to any enterprise beyond coöperation with Patterson and demonstrations against Manassas, until about June 24th. In a letter of that date General McDowell, alluding to a previous conversation, proposes to General Scott the details of a plan for the expedition which led to the battle of Bull Run. He estimates the Confederate force at Manassas and within reach at 25,000 and calls for a force of 30,000, with a reserve of 10,000, making a total of 40,000 men.

Mr. Nicolay, who as private secretary of President Lincoln had access to the private councils, says: "The project was elaborately discussed, and finally agreed upon, at a

council of war at the Executive Mansion on June 29th, in which President Lincoln, his cabinet, and the principal military officers took part. As already mentioned, General Scott was opposed to the undertaking; but after it was once resolved upon, he joined with hearty good will in every effort to make it a success." Thus General Scott was compelled to modify his military plans in obedience to political clamors and the popular cry of "On to Richmond!"

General McDowell began his forward movement on July 16, 1861. The following table shows the organization and strength of his army:

Abstract from the Returns of the Department of Northeastern Virginia, commanded by Brigadier-general McDowell, United States Army, for July 16 and 17, 1861.

COMMANDS.	PRESENT.			
	For Duty.		Total.	Aggregate.
	Officers.	Men.		
General Staff	19	21
First [Tyler's] Division*	569	12,226	9,494	9,936
Second [Hunter's] Division	121	2,364	2,525	2,648
Third [Heintzelman's] Division	382	8,680	9,385	9,777
Fourth [Runyon's] Division	247	5,201	5,502	5,752
Fifth [Miles's] Division	289	5,884	5,917	6,207
Twenty-first New York Volunteers	37	684	707	745
Twenty-fifth New York Militia	39	519	534	573
Second United States Cavalry (Company E.) . . .	4	56	63	73
Total	1,707	35,614	34,127	35,732

* The total and aggregate present in the Fourth Brigade of this division is not carried out in the original return. Hence the anomaly of a smaller total and aggregate "Present" than "Present for Duty" in this division.

It will be seen from the above table and note that the aggregate of 35,732 does not fully represent McDowell's force. The total "present for duty" in the First Division is reported 569 officers and 12,226 men, making the total present for duty 12,795, while the aggregate present is carried out as 9,936. This error and its cause are pointed out

in the note at the foot of the table. Thus the aggregate "present" is given as 2,859 less than the total "present for duty." This number added to the aggregate as reported gives 38,691. To this, also, should be added the excess of the "aggregate present" over the "total for duty" in the Fourth Brigade. There is no means of ascertaining this with accuracy. The aggregate strength of McDowell's army may therefore be stated from the Federal returns to be nearly 39,000 men. Confederate estimates place his entire strength at 54,140. With this force were 49 pieces of artillery.

The Confederate troops against which General McDowell moved consisted of 19,569 infantry, 1,468 cavalry, 826 artillery, making an aggregate present of 21,833 men, as shown by the field returns, July 21, 1861. This force, known as the Army of the Potomac, was commanded by General Beauregard, and was stationed around Manassas Junction, thirty-five miles from Washington. This army defended important railroad connections and barred the way to Richmond. Its advanced posts extended north toward Washington and covered the lines of approach toward Manassas.

As McDowell advanced, the Confederates fell back toward Manassas, as their point of concentration. On July 18th, McDowell's advance reached Centerville, about seven miles north of Manassas. About midway between Centerville and Manassas flows Bull Run Creek, a tributary of Occoquan River, which flows into the Potomac. The main body of the Confederates had retired behind Bull Run Creek and were guarding the fords across that stream. This creek, running in a southeasterly direction, is fordable at many points. The Confederates stretched a line about eight miles long at right angles to the road from Centerville to Manassas, their right resting at Union Mills Ford on the southeast, and their left extending to the Stone Bridge on the Warrenton turnpike to the northwest of Manassas, with strong guards at the intermediate fords,—McLean's, Blackburn's, Mitchell's, Ball's, and Lewis's,—thus barring the direct road and protecting both flanks.

When McDowell's advance arrived at Centerville, July 18th, commanded by General Daniel Tyler, an attack was made upon Blackburn's Ford on the direct road from Centerville to Manassas. This attack was repulsed after a sharp fight and the Federals withdrew toward Centerville. The Federal loss was 19 killed, 38 wounded, 26 missing; total, 83. The Confederate loss was 15 killed, 53 wounded; total, 68.

General McDowell having developed the position of the Confederate line, spent the next two days in inspecting the nature of the ground and concentrating his troops for the attack. He had become convinced that a direct attack would expose his troops to heavy loss, if not disaster, in assailing the defensive works which guarded the fords. It had been his original plan to turn the Confederate right flank. After thorough examination he determined to turn the Confederate left, which lay to the north. All his plans were perfected, and the attack began on the morning of July 21st.

Meanwhile, a movement of the greatest importance had taken place on the Confederate side, of which McDowell was ignorant. General Johnston had eluded Patterson and reached Manassas on July 20th with the advance of the Army of the Shenandoah, and General T. H. Holmes had also arrived with a small force. The Confederate Army thus augmented had a total force, shown in General Beauregard's report as follows:

	Aggregate.	Guns.
Army of the Potomac	21,833	29
Army of the Shenandoah	8,334	20
Hill's Virginia Regiment	550	6
Holmes's Brigade	1,355	
Total	32,072	55

The apparent hesitation of McDowell in delaying the attack for more than two days led Generals Johnston and Beauregard to suspect that he had discovered the movement of Johnston and was awaiting the arrival of Patterson.

They therefore determined to attack the Federal army at Centerville on the morning of July 21st, so as to prevent the anticipated junction with Patterson. In this conjecture they were mistaken. Operating in an enemy's country, McDowell did not possess the means of gaining speedy knowledge of the movements of his adversary, while the able and skilful Stuart could gather and report at once accurate tidings of every movement of the Federals. Patterson had, on the 19th, reported Johnston to be still at Winchester.

Expecting to encounter only the army of Beauregard, McDowell crossed Bull Run Creek at Sudley's Ford, two miles beyond the most northern defence of the Confederates, and moved south to roll back the Confederate line, thus gaining the rear successively of the several fords, with their defences, opening the way for fresh troops to cross the stream and swell the attack. The flanking force which crossed Sudley's Ford without opposition about nine o'clock A. M., and marched south, consisted of Hunter's and Heintzelman's Divisions, amounting to 12,425 men according to the field returns. At the same time Tyler's Division with 12,795 "total present for duty" appeared in front of the extreme right of the Confederate line at Stone Bridge and threatened an attack.

At this point Colonel N. George Evans was in command of the Confederate defences, with one regiment and a half, and four guns. He was thus assailed by 25,220 of the enemy. When he learned that the enemy had crossed at Sudley's Ford, three miles above him, and was moving to his flank and rear, and at the same time became convinced that no immediate assault was intended on his front, he threw eleven companies with two guns in the pathway of Hunter and Heintzelman, leaving four companies and two guns to deceive the enemy as a guard at the bridge. This little force under Colonel Evans met the first shock of the battle of Bull Run and delayed the advance of Hunter and Heintzelman long enough for reinforcements to come to their rescue. The Confederate generals, finding their

intended aggressive movement anticipated by the enemy, now hurried reinforcements to the point of attack. About eleven o'clock General Bernard E. Bee formed on Evans's right with four regiments, and two companies and four guns. The position was held until noon against all assaults. General Johnston says:

"Here the joint force, little exceeding five regiments, with six field pieces held the ground against about fifteen thousand United States troops for an hour, until, finding themselves outflanked by the continually arriving troops of the enemy, they fell back to General Bee's first position, upon the line of which Jackson, just arriving, formed his brigade and Stanard's battery."

Upon this line the main battle was fought, but first came the lull of preparations for the assault. The retreat of Evans and Bee necessarily involved the withdrawal of the four companies and two guns from the defence of Stone Bridge. Tyler now crossed Bull Run Creek with his 12,795 men, and joined the flanking column. Pressing down on the small force which had been hastily gathered to protect the Confederate flank, came the united divisions of Hunter and Heintzelman and Tyler, numbering 25,220 men by their own returns, but 35,000 men by the Confederate estimates.

Meanwhile, Johnston and Beauregard had been watching anxiously for the movement of General R. S. Ewell from the Confederate right to strike General D. S. Miles at Centerville. In this attack Ewell was to be followed by Generals D. R. Jones and James Longstreet, and was expected to drive Miles from Centerville and intercept the Federal line of retreat. About noon it was learned that the order had failed to reach Ewell. Thus it happened that the entire right wing of the Confederate army remained inactive during all the morning of this eventful day. Ewell, Longstreet, and Jones were ordered to hold their positions, to guard the fords on the right, and to make demonstrations against Centerville, while all the other available forces

were hurried to the left to join in the battle. Later, Ewell was ordered to the left, but he did not reach there until the battle was over.

The new Confederate line was formed for a final stand in the angle made by the intersection of the Warrenton and Sudley roads, on the crest of the hill which rises south of the Young's Branch valley along the semicircular edge of the wood which presents its concave side to the famous Robinson and Henry houses. This line extended from near Young's Branch on the right across the Sudley road on the left. Here the Confederate troops were formed under the personal supervision of Johnston and Beauregard. When General Johnston retired to the commanding hill at the Lewis house, where he could overlook the entire country, and assume general direction of the whole army, General Beauregard remained in immediate command of the left wing. General Johnston says: "We had nine regiments and two companies of infantry, two hundred and fifty cavalry and five field batteries (twenty guns) of the Army of the Shenandoah, and twenty-seven companies of infantry, six companies of cavalry, and six pieces of artillery of that of the Potomac." This force amounted to about six thousand five hundred men. Here was Jackson standing like a *stone wall*. Here were Evans and Bee and Bartow, who had borne the brunt of the morning fight. Here was Hampton with his legion, who had so effectually protected the retreat. Here was Stuart with his cavalry. Here were the Forty-ninth Virginia and the Eighth Virginia regiments, which had just come upon the field, "eager for the fray." This line must hold the enemy until the reinforcements, hastening to their support, should have time to arrive.

A little after two o'clock the Federals advanced to the charge. A series of fierce conflicts ensued, which are thus described in General Johnston's report:

"Yet this admirable artillery and brave infantry lost no foot of ground. For nearly three hours they maintained their position, repelling five successive assaults by the heavy

masses of the enemy, whose numbers enabled them continually to bring up fresh troops as their preceding columns were driven back. Colonel Stuart contributed to one of these repulses by a well-timed and vigorous charge on the enemy's right flank with two companies of his cavalry. . . .

"The expected reinforcements appeared soon after. Colonel Cocke was then desired to lead his brigade into action to support the right of the troops engaged, which he did with alacrity and effect. Within a half hour the two regiments of General M. L. Bonham's brigade (Cash's and Kershaw's) came up, and were directed against the enemy's right, which he seemed to be strengthening. Fisher's North Carolina regiment was soon sent in the same direction. About three o'clock, while the enemy seemed to be striving to outflank and drive back our left, and thus separate us from Manassas, General E. Kirby Smith arrived with three regiments of Elzey's brigade. He was instructed to attack the right of the enemy, now exposed to us. Before the movement was completed he fell, severely wounded. Colonel Arnold Elzey at once took command and executed it with great promptness and vigor. General Beauregard rapidly seized the opportunity thus afforded him, and threw forward his whole line. The enemy was driven from the long contested hill, and victory was no longer doubtful.

"He made yet another attempt to retrieve the day. He again extended his right with a still wider sweep to turn our left. Just as he re-formed to renew the battle, Colonel Early's three regiments came upon the field. The enemy's new formation exposed his right flank more even than the previous one. Colonel Early was therefore ordered to throw himself directly upon it, supported by Colonel Stuart's cavalry and Beckham's battery. He executed this attack bravely and well, while a simultaneous charge was made by General Beauregard in front. The enemy was broken by this combined attack. He lost all the artillery he had advanced to the scene of conflict. He had no more fresh troops with which to attempt a rally, and a general rout ensued."

This rout was complete and final. The Federal army fled in dismay and wild disorder. No efforts of their officers could rally them. The Confederate leaders issued orders for pursuit, but the pursuit was feeble and inadequate, and was checked at nightfall by order of the commanding officers. Neither General Johnston nor General Beauregard realized the utter demoralization of the Federal army. Viewing it from a military point of view, they could see no reason for it. The Federal army had been defeated and driven from the field, but there was no reason for its dissolution as an army. Apprehending an attack on their right flank, General Beauregard, taking the brigades of Ewell and Holmes, marched toward Manassas to protect that point. When the mistake was discovered it was too late in the night for pursuit, and the Confederates rested on their laurels.

The Federal returns show the total loss in men and officers as follows: Killed, 481; wounded, 1,011; missing, 1,216. Other evidence shows that 1,460 prisoners were captured. The total loss may therefore be stated at 2,952. The Confederate loss as stated by General Johnston was: Killed, 378; wounded, 1,489; missing, 30; total, 1,897.

The Confederate generals have been criticised for failing to follow up the victory, even to the point of taking possession of Washington. General Johnston and General Beauregard have both assigned military reasons why the pursuit was not pressed, and why it was impossible to occupy Washington. Upon a careful examination their reasons do not seem sufficient. There is strong testimony to show that Washington could have been taken by a prompt and vigorous attack. It is stated by the biographers of Stonewall Jackson that he favored such a movement. Colonel Henderson says: "For three days Jackson impatiently awaited the order to advance, and his men were held ready with three days' cooked rations in their haversacks."

But there is stronger testimony from men who witnessed the dissolution of McDowell's army and the consternation

in Washington. As late as July 26th Secretary of War Stanton wrote: "The capture of Washington seems now to be inevitable; during the whole of Monday and Tuesday it might have been taken without resistance. The rout, overthrow, and demoralization of the whole army were complete."

Here is still stronger testimony given by Mr. Hotchkiss:

"When McClellan, summoned in hot haste from northwestern Virginia to avert further disaster, reached Washington on the 26th of July, he rode around the city inspecting the existing conditions. Of these he wrote: 'I found no preparations for defence, not even to the extent of putting the troops in military positions. Not a regiment was properly encamped, not a single avenue of approach guarded. All was chaos, and the streets, hotels, and bar rooms were filled with drunken officers and men, absent from their regiments without leave,—a perfect pandemonium. Many had even gone to their homes, their flight from Bull Run terminating in New York or even in New Hampshire and Maine. There was nothing to prevent a small cavalry force from riding into the city. A determined attack would doubtless have carried Arlington Heights and placed the city at the mercy of a battery of rifled guns. If the Secessionists attached any value to the possession of Washington, they committed their greatest error in not following up the victory of Bull Run.' "

CHAPTER VI

CAMPAIGNS OF 1861

GENERAL SCOTT continued in chief command a few months after the battle of Bull Run. The remainder of his service was devoted to the continuation of the campaigns which he had originally planned, and to the organization of the troops now rapidly assembling; but no new enterprise was undertaken. His policy had been successful in subduing the border States Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, and in acquiring northwestern Virginia. It had signally failed in the campaign of the Shenandoah Valley. Disaster, too, had followed where his policy had been overruled in the Bull Run campaign. His former reputation, his eminent wisdom, and his venerable character did not save him from public censure and clamor. The remaining operations under his command may be briefly recounted. In Maryland and Kentucky there were no incidents of importance beyond what have already been described.

In Missouri there were a few skirmishes, and the battle of Belmont was fought. This battle, though occurring on the Missouri side of Mississippi River, was a part of the Kentucky campaign. Belmont was an outpost of the Confederate line which extended across Kentucky. It was opposite the fortified post of Columbus, and was entrenched for the purpose of defending Mississippi River against navigation by Federal gunboats. Belmont was attacked by General Grant on November 7, 1861, with a force of 3,114 men accompanied by two gunboats. General Polk, commanding the Confederate forces on the opposite side

of the river, sent General G. J. Pillow, and subsequently General B. F. Cheatham with reinforcements. Grant, after gaining some advantages, was driven back, retreated to his gunboats, and retired to Cairo.

The only activity of this period was in western Virginia, and along the Potomac. No decisive results, however, were accomplished in either direction. After the expulsion of the Confederates from northwestern Virginia, the scattered forces were collected at Monterey under General Jackson. General Loring was assigned to the command on July 24th, and reinforcements were sent for the purpose of recovering western Virginia. In the latter part of July, General Lee assumed command of the forces in western Virginia and repaired in person to Huntersville. After a thorough reconnoissance, he planned an attack on the positions of Elkwater in the Tygart valley, where General Joseph J. Reynolds commanded with about 5,000 men, and the strong pass of Cheat Mountain which was held by Colonel Nathan Kimball with about 2,000 men. The movement was delayed by a heavy downpour of rain, which lasted through the month of August and rendered the roads impassable. By September 9th the roads were again usable though in very bad condition, and General Lee ordered the advance.

Colonel Albert Rust with 1,500 men moved on September 11th, and marching through the forest reached the rear of the Cheat Mountain Pass before daylight on the 12th. General Jackson with the remainder of the command appeared at the same time in front of the Pass. General Loring with his command arrived simultaneously at his assigned position to attack Elkwater. All the other auxiliary detachments were in their places at the appointed time. The Confederate army was thus thrust between the two Federal posts of Elkwater and Cheat Mountain, which were about seven miles apart, and had reached their several positions without the knowledge of the enemy.

General Lee contemplated giving the enemy a complete surprise and now awaited the appointed signal. That was

to be Colonel Rust's attack upon Cheat Mountain. But the signal was not given. Colonel Rust, after overcoming the greatest difficulties in his march and reaching the rear of the Pass at the determined time, suffered himself to be overawed at the impregnable aspect of the fortifications, was deceived by a false report of the strength of the garrison, and decided to make no attack. Thus the surprise was lost. General Lee nevertheless retained his position until the 14th, when he learned that Rust had retreated without making an attack. He then withdrew his troops. In the meantime some slight skirmishing occurred between the hostile armies thus brought so close to each other. This skirmishing was unimportant and the losses were trifling. The Federal leaders being much in need of a victory about this time attempted to magnify the matter into a repulse, and published congratulatory despatches and orders. There was a miscarriage of the Confederate plans, but there was no victory or defeat because there was no battle and neither army attacked the other.

In the Kanawha valley in western Virginia there had been some fighting with indecisive results. Rosecrans, in pursuance of the plans previously made by McClellan had moved with a large force to coöperate with Cox against Floyd and Wise, and in addition to various manœuvres and skirmishes, the battle of Carnifex Ferry on the Kanawha had been fought. General Rosecrans attacked Floyd at that point on September 10th. The reports of this battle are vague and conflicting. Both sides claimed a victory. Floyd from his entrenched position repulsed five assaults of the enemy and retired during the night, crossing Gauley River and occupying a stronger position. The Confederate force has been estimated at 4,200 men and the Federal force at 12,000. The Confederate loss was 20 wounded; the Federal loss was 17 killed and 141 wounded.

Upon his return to camp from the Cheat Mountain campaign, General Lee had found letters from General Floyd informing him of the battle of Carnifex Ferry. There were

also other communications informing him that the rivalry between Floyd and Wise prevented their coöperation. Lee considered his presence necessary to the portion of his command in the Kanawha valley, and immediately proceeded there, reaching Floyd's camp September 21st. Very soon after his arrival he issued orders to Loring to send the main part of his command to reinforce Floyd. The Confederate forces in northwestern Virginia, being thus reduced, remained on the defensive. General Reynolds, on October 3d, with a Federal force of about 5,000 men attacked General Jackson commanding the Confederate force of about 1,800 men at Camp Bartow. This camp was on Beverly turnpike where it crossed Greenbrier River. The Federals were defeated in an engagement which lasted seven hours and were driven from the field in disorder. The Federal loss was forty-three killed and wounded. The Confederate loss was thirty-nine killed and wounded and thirteen prisoners. There were frequent skirmishes but no serious engagements in northwestern Virginia previous to November 1st, the date of General Scott's retirement from command.

After the arrival of General Lee he concentrated the Confederate force at Little Sewell Mountain, facing Rosecrans at Big Sewell Mountain, and awaiting an attack. The two armies were about equal in strength, each consisting of about 8,000 or 9,000 men. Rosecrans retreated on October 6th and occupied the river from Kanawha Falls to the Hawk's Nest. General Floyd followed and skirmishes ensued. Such was the condition on the Kanawha when General Scott retired from command.

Along the Potomac all was quiet and idle for three months after the battle of Bull Run. The Confederate forces were advanced by successive stages to Potomac River, except in front of Washington and Alexandria. On the Federal side, General Banks commanded the right, extending in a defensive line from the neighborhood of Washington to Harper's Ferry along the north bank of the Potomac.

On August 17th the following order was issued by General Scott:

“The Departments of Washington and Northeastern Virginia will be united into one, to which will be annexed the Valley of the Shenandoah, the whole of Maryland and of Delaware, to be denominated the Department of the Potomac, under Major-general McClellan—headquarters Washington—who will proceed to organize the troops under him into divisions and independent brigades.”

On August 20th, General McClellan issued his “General Orders No. 1,” assuming command. His presence was soon felt. The defences of Washington were rapidly completed, and order and system replaced the confusion which had existed since McDowell’s retreat. The Federal army was rapidly and skilfully organized as the new recruits came in, but there was a lull in aggressive movements. Where the Confederate left faced Banks across the Potomac, necessarily there were collisions and skirmishes; but there were no general aggressive movements, and no engagements which could take rank as battles, except the battle of Leesburg on October 20th and 21st.

The Federals made several attempts to get a foothold on the southern side of the Potomac, which led to light engagements and skirmishes. Among the most important of these skirmishes were the affairs at Edwards’s Ferry, July 29th; Lovettsville, August 8th; Pohick Church, August 18th; Potomac Creek, August 23d; Bell’s Cross Roads, August 27th; Bailey’s Corner, August 28th; Munson’s, August 31st; Lewinsville, September 10th and 11th. These skirmishes and minor actions continued through the year 1861, and up to the time of the retreat of the Confederate army from the Potomac. They brought great reputation to Colonel Stuart for the gallantry and skill which he displayed, and gained him the popular title of “the eyes and ears of the army” and promotion to the rank of brigadier-general.

On October 20th and 21st, an important action, assuming the proportions of a battle, but producing no important

results except upon the morale of the armies, occurred near Leesburg, and is variously called "Ball's Bluff," "Harrison's Island," "Conrad's Ferry," and "Leesburg." It really consisted of two connected battles, one at Ball's Bluff and one at Edwards's Ferry, in a combined Federal movement against the Confederates at Leesburg.

General McClellan ordered a reconnoissance to be made on October 20th along the entire Confederate line. On the morning of that day, General C. P. Stone, commanding the Federal forces opposite Leesburg, was deceived by false information that the Confederates were evacuating Leesburg. General Stone sent a force estimated at 5,000 men to cross the Potomac in two columns at Ball's Bluff and Edwards's Ferry and move upon Leesburg. The column from Ball's Bluff, under Colonel E. D. Baker, about 1,700 strong, was attacked by General Nathan G. Evans and driven upon the river. A portion of this force surrendered, and a portion escaped by recrossing the Potomac. Colonel Baker, commanding the Federal forces, was killed. The following morning, Colonel William Barksdale attacked the Federal forces which had crossed at Edwards's Ferry, and drove them to the river. Federal reinforcements arriving checked the pursuit, and Barksdale withdrew. The Federals recrossed the Potomac during the night. In these two engagements, generally included as the battle of Leesburg, the Confederate loss aggregated 155, the Federal loss, 921.

It remains to recount the operations along the coast during the period while General Scott was in command. The naval operations up to the time of the surrender of Fort Sumter and the seizure of the forts by both belligerents at the beginning of the war have been previously discussed.

The first naval encounter occurred on October 12, 1861, at the mouth of Mississippi River. It was highly creditable to the so-called "Confederate Navy." Commander A. T. Mahan, of the Federal navy, in his work *The Gulf and Inland Waters*, admits this, as follows: "The first collision

was unfortunate, and, to some extent, humiliating to the service."

The United States vessels *Richmond*, *Vincennes*, *Preble*, and *Water Witch* were anchored in Mississippi River at the head of the passes, where they were attacked by a Confederate fleet consisting of the ram *Manassas* and six other boats, none of which were war vessels, the fleet being under command of Commodore George N. Hollins. The ram *Manassas* was a privateer, temporarily commanded by Lieutenant A. F. Warley of the Confederate navy. This ram was an old Boston tug-boat, on whose hull a plating of railroad iron had been hastily constructed. She rammed the *Richmond*, sustaining in the shock more damage than she inflicted, and had much difficulty in escaping in her disabled condition. Three fire-rafts were now turned upon the Federal squadron and compelled it hastily to retreat, in doing which the vessels ran aground on the bar. As soon as they could get off, they put to sea, pursued by the Confederate vessels which, however, kept at a safe distance from their guns.

On August 20, 1861, the first Federal expedition of importance along the Atlantic coast was successfully begun against the forts on Hatteras Inlet. Seven war vessels carrying 158 guns, under command of Flag-officer Silas H. Stringham, and a fleet of transports conveying 880 men, under command of General B. F. Butler, appeared off Hatteras Inlet. The Confederate defences consisted of two forts, Hatteras and Clark, mounting together 17 smooth-bore 32-pounders and two small guns, and manned by a total force of 508 men, subsequently increased by reinforcements so as to number a total of 718 men. The Confederate naval force was commanded by Flag Officer Samuel Barron; Colonel Wm. F. Martin was in charge of the land forces, while Major W. S. G. Andrews was commandant of Forts Hatteras and Clark. The Confederate steamers present could not render direct assistance. They were useful only as transports. The forts resisted the attack

for two days. On the morning of the 29th they surrendered; 615 prisoners, 25 pieces of artillery including field-pieces, 1,000 stand of arms, and a large quantity of stores were taken. The capture of these forts, together with the subsequent taking of Roanoke Island, was of the greatest value to the Federals, not only furnishing a much needed harbor and depot of supplies, but commanding the entrance to the principal rivers of North Carolina and seriously restricting the operations of the blockade runners. It was heralded as a great victory, and brought much rejoicing at the North.

The Federals followed up their success by sending a regiment under Colonel Harvey Brown to occupy Chicamiconico, near the northern extremity of Hatteras Island. This movement resulted in the capture by the Confederates of the Federal tug *Fanny*, and the rout of the Federal regiment by Colonels Marcus J. Wright and H. M. Shaw, who moved over from Roanoke Island in Commodore William F. Lynch's Confederate fleet. In this attack, the Confederates took thirty prisoners, and the entire Federal regiment escaped capture only by a precipitate retreat.

Galveston was shelled on August 3d and 5th by two Federal vessels, but these retired without attempting to effect a landing. The Confederate schooner *Judah* was burned at the wharf in the navy yard at Pensacola, Florida, on September 14th, by a daring attack of 100 Federals in launches. A Confederate expedition of 1,063 men, transported on two armed steamers and a flotilla of barges and flatboats, made an attack upon the Federal troops on Santa Rosa Islands, near Pensacola, on October 9th. The expedition was repulsed. General Joseph R. Anderson, commanding the Confederates, reported a loss of 16 killed, 39 wounded, 30 prisoners; total, 85. His estimate of the loss of the enemy was 50 killed, 100 wounded, 20 prisoners; total, 170.

This completes the review of the condition of affairs at the end of the first period of the war, November 1, 1861,

when General Scott retired from command. On that day the war department issued the following order:

**“WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT GENERAL’S OFFICE,
“WASHINGTON, November 1, 1861.**

“GENERAL ORDERS No. 94.

“The following order from the President of the United States announcing the retirement from active command of the honored veteran Lieutenant General Winfield Scott will be read by the Army with profound regret:

**“ ‘EXECUTIVE MANSION,
“ ‘WASHINGTON, November 1, 1861.**

“ ‘On the 1st day of November, A.D. 1861, upon his own application to the President of the United States, Brevet Lieutenant General Winfield Scott is ordered to be placed upon the list of retired officers of the Army of the United States, without reduction of his current pay, subsistence, or allowances.

“ ‘The American people will hear with sadness and deep emotion that General Scott has withdrawn from the active control of the Army, while the President and a unanimous Cabinet express their own and the nation’s sympathy in his personal affliction, and their profound sense of the important public services rendered by him to his country during his long and brilliant career, among which will ever be gratefully distinguished his faithful devotion to the Constitution, the Union and the flag, when assailed by parricidal rebellion.

“ ‘ABRAHAM LINCOLN.’

“The President is pleased to direct that Major General George B. McClellan assume command of the Army of the United States. The headquarters of the Army will be established in the city of Washington. All communications intended for the Commanding General will hereafter be addressed direct to the Adjutant General. The duplicate returns, orders and other papers heretofore sent to the

Assistant Adjutant General, headquarters of the Army, will be discontinued.

“By order of the Secretary of War.

“L. THOMAS,
“*Adjutant General.*”

With the entrance of McClellan upon the command of the army began the second period of the war. Heretofore it had been directed almost exclusively to the Border States.

The Confederate States had exhibited a marvellous rapidity in development, a completeness of government, an indifference to threats of invasion, and had organized a military force which astonished those in power. It became evident that an immense and permanent army and a no less powerful navy must be created if any hope were to be entertained of success in the stupendous undertaking to which the United States was pledged.

President Lincoln and Congress acted promptly. Calls were issued for troops, steps were taken for the organization of a powerful navy, vast appropriations of money were made, and all the immense resources of the United States were exerted to their utmost capacity. Before November 1, 1861, an immense army was beginning to assemble, and a largely increased and growing navy was ready for active operations. It became necessary to formulate a general plan of campaign. To this duty General McClellan was assigned. His entrance upon the chief command thus marks the beginning of the period of the general invasion of the Confederate States. The work of preparation and organization necessarily suspended active operations. This work was going on not only in the United States, but also in the Confederate States. Thus, the Confederate forces were inactive not only because they were engaged in the similar work of preparation, but also because, being on the defensive, it was their policy to await attack. Beyond a few coast operations and minor engagements in continuation of the former campaigns, there was a general suspension of hostilities.

While the great armies destined later to engage in the most stupendous encounters of modern times were pausing to collect their energies, let us also pause in the narrative to take a brief review of the strength and resources of the belligerents.

We will first compare the two populations. By the census of 1860 the total population of the 37 States and 10 Territories which then formed the United States was 31,443,321. The following table shows the population of the eleven States which formed the Confederacy:

STATES.	No.	White.	Colored.	Total, including Indians.
Alabama	1	526,271	437,770	964,201
Arkansas	2	324,143	111,259	435,450
Florida	3	77,746	62,677	140,424
Georgia	4	591,550	465,698	1,057,286
Louisiana	5	357,456	350,373	708,002
Mississippi	6	353,899	437,404	791,305
North Carolina	7	629,942	361,522	992,622
South Carolina	8	291,300	412,320	703,708
Tennessee	9	826,722	283,019	1,109,801
Texas	10	420,891	182,921	604,215
Virginia	11	1,047,299	548,907	1,596,318
Total	11	5,447,219	3,653,870	9,103,332

There were, in addition to the white and colored population, 2,243 Indians living in the Confederate States, making the total population 9,103,332. Subtracting this number from the total population of the United States we find the population of the twenty-six States and ten Territories which remained in the Union amounted to 22,080,412. But this is not all. Of the 9,103,332 people living in the Confederacy, 3,653,870 were negroes. Subtracting this large element of Southern population from the total, it is found that its white and Indian population was only 5,449,462, arrayed against 22,080,412 Northern assailants—an immense disparity.

The same disparity is found in the area of the two sections. The total area of the United States in 1860 was 3,026,494 square miles. The area of the eleven

Confederate States was, in 1860, 774,698 square miles, while the area of the remainder of the United States was 2,251,796 square miles. This immense territory invested the Confederacy on two sides—the north and the west. The navy completed the investment on the east and the south.

In point of wealth, the Confederate States made apparently a more favorable showing, but an examination of the elements of that wealth clearly proves that it could not be converted to the uses of war except in agricultural supply. The total assessed valuation of property of all kinds in the United States in 1860 is given in the census as \$12,084,560,005. The assessed valuation of all such property in the eleven Confederate States is \$5,202,166,007. Of this nearly two billions was the valuation of the slaves. This valuation shows that the wealth and prosperity of the South was beyond that of the other sections of the country when invasion and spoliation began. The census of 1870 tells a different tale. The valuation of all property in the same States was \$2,463,516,700. Some little recuperation had begun at that date. Making allowance for this, it appears that invasion, reconstruction, carpetbagging, and robbery had destroyed much more than half the resources of the South.

We will now consider the two important departments of agriculture and manufactures:

In point of agriculture, impelled by the genius and tastes of its people, the South was the acknowledged leader of the sections. No statistics showing the value of farm products or the capital invested are contained in the census of 1860. In 1870, the date at which such statistics were first introduced, the labor system of the South had been destroyed, its industries paralyzed, and its agricultural wealth depleted. In addition to this, the war had opened a market to the great agricultural States of the West. This vast development had so changed the relations of production that the agricultural statistics of 1870 do not represent the agricultural supremacy of the South in 1860. However, we are not left without

a witness. The statistics of "Occupations" shows that even after the development of agriculture in the West, the eleven Confederate States furnished, as late as 1870, nearly half of the persons engaged in agriculture in the United States. If to this should be added the Southern slave States of Missouri, Kentucky, Maryland, and West Virginia, these fifteen Southern States furnished fifty-four per cent of the agricultural population.

The following tables show the number of persons in the States named engaged in agriculture in 1870:

The United States	5,992,471
Alabama	291,628
Arkansas	109,310
Florida	42,492
Georgia	336,145
Louisiana	141,467
Mississippi	259,199
North Carolina	269,238
South Carolina	206,654
Tennessee	267,020
Texas	166,753
Virginia	244,550
Total	2,334,456

The agricultural population in 1870 of the other four States usually classed as Southern States was as follows:

Kentucky	261,080
Maryland	80,449
Missouri	263,918
West Virginia	73,960
Total	679,407

The agricultural wealth indicated by these figures was a valuable resource in war, but was greatly impaired by the lack of transportation facilities, and by invasion and devastation.

In the important line of manufactures the South was sadly deficient, not from lack of mechanical genius among her people, as has been abundantly proved since the war, but their genius and tastes had long been directed in other channels. The South heretofore had relied upon Europe and the North for manufactured products. But now it was cut off from these sources of supply. This deficiency contributed largely to the ultimate exhaustion of the Confederacy. The following table, compiled from the census of 1860, demonstrates this fatal weakness:

1860	Capital Invested in Manufactures.	Value of Manufactured Products.
The United States	\$1,009,855,715	\$1,885,861,676
Alabama	9,098,181	10,588,571
Arkansas	1,316,610	2,880,578
Florida	1,874,125	2,447,969
Georgia	10,890,875	16,925,564
Louisiana	7,151,172	15,587,473
Mississippi	4,384,492	6,590,687
North Carolina	9,693,703	16,678,698
South Carolina	6,931,756	8,619,195
Tennessee	14,426,261	17,987,225
Texas	3,272,450	6,577,202
Virginia	26,935,560	50,652,124
Total	\$95,975,185	\$155,535,286

Thus the Confederate States had engaged in manufactures only \$95,975,185 of capital, a little more than nine per cent of the \$1,009,855,715 so employed in all the States. The manufactured products of the Confederate States amounted to only \$155,535,286, a little more than eight per cent of the total for the entire country. Yet the above table does not tell the whole tale. An examination of the statistics in detail shows that such manufacturing establishments as did exist were chiefly small private enterprises, mainly applicable to agricultural purposes, and incapable of being used for the manufacture of materials of war.

The facilities for transportation were likewise inadequate, and did not compare with the transportation facilities of the

North. The Confederate States had almost no commercial marine and engaged but little in direct foreign commerce, while the States that remained in the Union carried on a foreign trade second only to that of Great Britain.

As to its rightful share in the common property of the general government, which had been acquired by the joint resources of all the States, the Confederacy, in the beginning, sent a commission to Washington to treat for an equitable division. This commission did not obtain even a hearing. The United States held that all rights to any share in the common property had been forfeited by treason. The Confederate States, then, received nothing from the common property of the United States except such arsenals, dockyards, forts, and equipments as they seized at the beginning of the war.

Southern men serving as officers in the United States navy, impelled by a sense of honor, carried into Northern ports the ships under their command and surrendered them to the United States; then tendered their resignations, and brought only themselves into the Confederate service.

Looking to the outside world, the Confederacy had neither external resources nor foreign relations; and even if they had possessed such means, they would have been beyond reach, cut off, as they were, by the blockade.

With these comparative resources, the two belligerents were now exerting their utmost energies for the struggle, of which the first year of war had revealed only the magnitude.

Let us next examine the comparative strength of the armies, navies, and equipments which the two governments were enabled to bring into action from the resources above mentioned. The United States began the war with a regular army of 16,367 men. This force was speedily increased by the 75,000 three-months' volunteers, who were discharged at the end of the period of their enlistment, and many of them immediately joined other organizations. Under the call of President Lincoln of May 3, 1861, confirmed by Congress on August 6th, and under the Acts of Congress

of July 22d and 25th, there were enlisted 700,680 men. The strength of the Federal army on January 1, 1862, is given by the provost-marshal-general as 575,917 men.

The strength of the Confederate army at the same date cannot be accurately given. It has been variously estimated by different writers at from 200,000 to 315,000. It is probable from the best evidence that at this time it approached more nearly to equality to the Federal army than at any other period of the war. It is perhaps fair to state its strength as half that of the Federals, about 290,000.

The condition of naval affairs was so anomalous that it cannot be succinctly stated, yet a clear understanding of this branch of the service, which was the most important factor of the war, is necessary to the discussion of the Federal plan of invasion and the Confederate plan of defence.

The United States began the war with a fine navy, well equipped. It was a small navy compared with the naval armaments of Europe, but it was efficient in service, sufficient to prohibit to the Confederacy the military use of the seas, and was rapidly strengthened and increased. At the beginning of the war the ships were scattered on various foreign stations, and several months elapsed before they could be concentrated. The secretary of the navy, Gideon Welles, in a report under date of July 4, 1861, states that on March 4, 1861, the total number of vessels of all classes belonging to the navy was 90, carrying or designed to carry 2,415 guns. The available force, which does not include those unfinished, on the stocks, in use as stationary store-ships or receiving ships, or those deemed inexpedient to repair, comprised 69 vessels fitted out for 1,346 guns. Of these 42 were in commission, bearing 555 guns and having a complement of 7,600 men. The home squadron of 12 vessels was carrying 187 guns and about 2,000 men. The other vessels were in foreign ports. This navy, being rapidly recruited by the purchase of other vessels, was certainly formidable to an adversary that had no navy. In January, 1862, the United States navy consisted of 250

steamers and about 100 sailing vessels, carrying in all about 2,900 guns. The United States navy during the first year was used for two purposes: first as a blockading force; second to attack cities and posts along the coast and to make incursions and detached expeditions.

The blockade was announced by President Lincoln's proclamation of April 19th and extended from South Carolina to Texas. After the secession of Virginia and North Carolina it was extended by proclamation on April 27th to include the coasts of those States. It raised international questions, especially with Great Britain, and could be defended only by admitting the Confederate States to be belligerents. The navy was not sufficient to blockade 3,000 miles of coast. It attained, however, a certain amount of efficiency, owing to the fact that the Confederates had no means of opposing it except by blockade runners and privateers.

The second purpose of the navy, to attack the coast towns and posts, could be met by the Confederacy, in the absence of naval force, only in one way. Fortifications must be constructed at the most important and most exposed points. These defences were generally inadequate, and consequently but few points were successfully defended.

J. R. Soley, of the United States navy, in his *Blockade and the Cruisers*, writes as follows of the Confederate navy: "Except its officers the Confederate government had nothing in the shape of a navy. It had not a single ship of war. It had no abundant fleet of merchant vessels in its ports from which to draw reserves. It had no seamen, for its people were not given to seafaring pursuits. Its only shipyards were Norfolk and Pensacola. Norfolk, with its immense supplies of ordnance and equipments was indeed valuable; but though the 300 Dahlgren guns captured in the yard were a permanent acquisition, the yard itself was lost when the war was one-fourth over. The South was without any large force of skilled mechanics, and such as it had were early summoned to the army. There were only

three rolling mills in the country, two of which were in Tennessee, and the third, at Atlanta, was unfitted for heavy work. There were hardly any machine shops that were prepared to supply the best kind of workmanship, and in the beginning the only foundry capable of casting heavy guns was the Tredegar Iron Works, which, under the direction of Commander Brooke, was employed to its fullest capacity. Worst of all, there was no raw material except the timber that was standing in the forests. The cost of iron was enormous, and toward the end of the war it was hardly to be had at any price. Under these circumstances, no general plan of naval policy could be carried out, and the conflict on the Southern side became a species of partisan, desultory warfare."

Captain W. H. Parker, of the Confederate Navy, in his *Recollections of a Naval Officer*, which is really a history of the Confederate navy, in quoting this same passage from Professor Soley's work, gives it his general approval, but comments: "In spite of all these difficulties, so plainly stated by Professor Soley, we shall see that the Southern navy was nevertheless built; and incredible as it now appears, the South constructed during the war a fleet of ironclad vessels which, had they been assembled in Chesapeake Bay, could have defied the navy of any nation in Europe. They were not seagoing vessels; but in smooth water the navy of Great Britain, at that time, could not have successfully coped with them."

The remarkable statement of Captain Parker applies to a subsequent period of the war, and will be considered in its chronological order. It is here quoted to invite attention to the future developments of naval history. It pertains to the present discussion to consider the condition of naval affairs up to November 1, 1861, which closes the first period of the war, with the retirement of General Scott.

Before giving the summary of the condition of the Confederate navy at the close of this period, as supplied by Captain Parker, its historian, it is necessary to recount

briefly the steps which had been taken by the Confederate authorities to create a navy. As early as April 17, 1861, President Davis, recognizing the impossibility of constructing a navy for immediate service, issued his proclamation announcing his purpose of granting letters of marque. Under this proclamation and subsequent Acts of the Confederate Congress, a number of privateers were commissioned which did efficient service against the merchant marine of the United States. At the same time, swift vessels, known as "blockade runners," evaded the blockading ships of the United States, and carried on an extensive foreign trade. These two classes of vessels, while unable to cope with ships of war, kept the United States navy occupied.

The Confederate government gave early attention to correcting its naval weakness, and the building and fitting out of ships was rapidly pushed forward. By November, 1861, the Southern States had afloat, according to Captain Parker's summary, the *Sumter*, the *Patrick Henry*, the *Jamestown*, the *Resolute*, the *Calhoun*, the *Ivy*, the *Lady Davis*, the *Jackson*, the *Tuscarora*, the *Virginia*, the *Manassas*, in addition to some twenty privateers. There were still others, of which, however, a correct list cannot be given on account of the loss of official documents.

The act of the Confederate Congress passed April 21, 1862, made provisions for a formidable navy, and Stephen R. Mallory, the secretary of the navy, entered into many contracts for the construction of ironclads and other warships. The Committee of Congress, appointed August 27, 1862, made a favorable report on the Confederate navy. These matters also pertain to the future, and will therefore be considered in chronological order.

In one naval element the Confederacy had an abundant supply. Before June 3, 1861, 321 naval officers of the United States had resigned and offered their services to the Confederate States. Many of these were assigned to naval construction, and others to artillery duty in the army, especially in coast defence.

When President Lincoln first announced the purpose of coercion and aggression, a plan of invasion somewhat similar to the plan finally adopted was indicated. From the beginning, General Scott advised that such a plan could not be put into operation with an army of 75,000 three months' men and 16,000 regulars, and a navy in the scattered condition in which the United States navy then was. We have seen that General Scott deemed this force insufficient and that he advised that the operations of the army be confined to the defence of Washington and the subjugation of the Border States. He also advised the collection of a great army of longer term of enlistment. These objects had now been successfully accomplished. McClellan's first duty as commander-in-chief was to formulate a detailed plan for the general invasion.

The plan proposed by this able officer was conceived with unerring sagacity, and executed with relentless tenacity. It utilized the overwhelming superiority of the United States in all the resources of war, surrounded the Confederate States like a besieged town, isolated them from the world, subjected them from every side to a constant and fatal pressure which would ultimately have exhausted them if not a victory had been gained on the field of battle.

On the north, a strong base line stretched from the Atlantic ocean across the Mississippi, running with the Potomac and the Ohio along the northern boundary of the seceded and doubtful States. When Kentucky and Missouri acceded to the Union, and western Virginia was overrun, this line was pressed further south. From this line emanated at convenient points the main armies of invasion: in the East the armies that moved on Richmond; in the West, the armies that captured Nashville and took possession of the Mississippi.

On the Atlantic coast the United States navy formed the base line which maintained the blockade. From this line detached expeditions of naval and land forces assailed the coast cities, entered the rivers, and penetrated the interior.

On the south, the United States navy blockaded the coast of the Gulf of Mexico, in this manner coöperating from the south with the expeditions sent from the north to gain possession of Mississippi River.

On the west, detached expeditions overran the trans-Mississippi States, assailing them from many directions.

History furnishes, perhaps, no example of any country of such extensive territory thus surrounded and invested. There was but one break in this wonderful line of investment—the short boundary between Texas and Mexico.

The military advantage of interior lines and closer communication which remained to the South, impaired by the lack of facilities of transportation, could not compensate for the vast inferiority of numbers and resources and the ceaseless drain of watching at so many places, while the enemy was free to choose the point of attack.

There could be but one result of such an investment, maintained with the exhaustless resources of the United States and the skill of its leaders when directed against a country deficient in manufactures and dependent upon the outside world for many of the resources of war.

Subsidiary to the general plan was the purpose to acquire possession of Mississippi River, thus cutting the Confederacy in two, gaining a great highway of communication, and pressing closer the western line of investment.

It is evident from McClellan's letters that he did not contemplate immediate movements to gain the Mississippi by attack from a northward direction, but preferred a preliminary movement to acquire East Tennessee. This movement into East Tennessee and a few detached coast expeditions were the only aggressive military movements ordered by McClellan as commander-in-chief during the year 1861. He considered that the armies needed more thorough organization and equipment before entering on the stupendous task before them. His policy is summed up in the following extract from a communication which he wrote to the secretary of war February 3, 1862:

“When I was placed in command of the armies of the United States I immediately turned my attention to the whole field of operations, regarding the Army of the Potomac as only one, while the most important, of the masses under my command. I confess that I did not then appreciate the total absence of a general plan which had before existed, nor did I know that utter disorganization and want of preparation pervaded the western armies. I took it for granted that they were nearly, if not quite, in condition to move to the fulfilment of my plans. I acknowledge that I made a great mistake.

“I sent at once, with the approval of the Executive, officers I considered competent to command in Kentucky and Missouri. Their instructions looked to prompt movements. I soon found that the labor of creation and organization had to be performed there; transportation, arms, clothing, artillery, discipline, all were wanting. These things require time to procure them.

“The generals in command have done their work most creditably, but we are still delayed. I had hoped that a general advance could be made in the good weather in December. I was mistaken. My wish was to gain possession of the Eastern Tennessee Railroad as a preliminary movement, and then to follow it up immediately by an attack on Nashville and Richmond, as nearly at the same time as possible.

“I have ever regarded our true policy as that of fully preparing ourselves and then seeking for the most decisive results. I do not wish to waste life in useless battles, but prefer to strike at the heart.”

McClellan's plans for the East Tennessee movement are shown in the following extracts from his correspondence of November 7, 1861, with General Buell, commanding the Department of the Ohio:

“The military problem would be a simple one could it be entirely separated from political influences. Such is not the case. Were the population among which you are to

operate wholly or generally hostile, it is probable that Nashville should be your first and principal objective point. It so happens that a large majority of the inhabitants of Eastern Tennessee are in favor of the Union. It therefore seems proper that you should remain on the defensive on the line from Louisville to Nashville, while you throw the mass of your forces by rapid marches, by Cumberland Gap, or Walker's Gap, on Knoxville, in order to occupy the railroad at that point, and thus enable the loyal citizens of Eastern Tennessee to rise, while you at the same time cut off the railway communication between Eastern Virginia and the Mississippi."

So anxious was McClellan as to the occupation of East Tennessee, which he had early in the war desired to undertake from the direction of western Virginia, that he followed up the instructions to General Buell by a second communication, dated November 12, 1861, from which the following extract is quoted:

"The main point to which I desire to call your attention is the necessity for entering Eastern Tennessee as soon as it can be done with reasonable chances of success, and I hope that you will, with the least possible delay, organize a column for that purpose, sufficiently guarding at the same time the main avenues by which the rebels may invade Kentucky."

This expedition was not undertaken, for reasons which will be explained later. It was not intended as a substitute for the movements against Mississippi River, as is shown in the communication to the secretary of war, and which also appears in the following extract from the instructions of General McClellan, written on November 11, 1861, to General Henry W. Halleck, commanding the Department of Missouri:

"With respect to military operations, it is probable that the interests of the Government will be best served by the fortifying and holding in considerable strength Rolla, Sedalia, and other interior points, keeping strong patrols

constantly moving from the terminal stations, and concentrating the mass of the troops on or near the Mississippi, prepared for such ulterior operations as the public interest may demand."

General McClellan contemplated a simultaneous advance from all directions, the immense Federal force squeezing on the Confederate lines like the pressure of a boa constrictor. He adhered to his purpose of getting "fully prepared" throughout the remainder of the year 1861. This course did not meet the approval of President Lincoln, and still less of his Cabinet and the leading politicians. They saw a vast army and navy accumulated, supplied with abundant equipments and facilities. They had waited through the whole of 1861 with impatience, but there was no advance. Congress took the matter in hand. It appointed a joint committee on the conduct of the war. This committee held its first meeting on December 20, 1861, and was active and powerful throughout the war. It consisted of Benjamin F. Wade, Zachariah Chandler, and Andrew Johnson, on the part of the Senate, and of Daniel W. Gooch, John Covode, George W. Julian, and Moses F. Odell, on the part of the House. This committee demanded action, and speedily antagonized McClellan and his plans. This antagonism was caused partly by political considerations, as McClellan was a Democrat. Through the influence of this committee, the relations of the commanding general to the president and the Cabinet became estranged. McClellan, as far as permitted, remained reticent as to his plans. The president became censorious and urgent for action. McClellan's secret sentiments appear in the following extract from a letter which he wrote to his friend General Halleck on March 3, 1862:

"I have but few friends in Congress. The abolitionists are doing their best to displace me, and I shall be content if I can keep my head above water until I can strike the final blow. You have no idea of the undying hate with which they pursue me, but I take no notice of them, and

try to keep Warren Hastings' motto in mind, *mens æqua in arduis*. I sometimes become quite angry, but generally contrive to keep my temper."

The result of the antagonism to McClellan was that the president authorized the advances of the western armies under Grant and Buell before McClellan was ready for his general movement, and issued in his own name January 27, 1862, a general order for the advance of all armies on February 22d. Not only was the general-in-chief not consulted but the implied censure could not be mistaken, as may be seen in the order itself:

"EXECUTIVE MANSION,

"WASHINGTON, January 27, 1862.

"PRESIDENT'S GENERAL WAR ORDER NO. 1.

"*Ordered*, That the 22d day of February, 1862, be the day for the general movement of the land and naval forces of the United States against the insurgent forces. That especially the army at and about Fortress Monroe; the Army of the Potomac; the Army of Western Virginia; the army near Munfordville, Kentucky; the army and flotilla at Cairo, and a naval force in the Gulf of Mexico, be ready to move on that day.

"That all other forces, both land and naval, with their respective commanders, obey existing orders for the time, and be ready to obey additional orders when duly given.

"That the heads of departments, and especially the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, with all their subordinates, and the General-in-chief with all other commanders and subordinates of land and naval forces will severally be held to their strict and full responsibilities for prompt execution of this order.

"ABRAHAM LINCOLN."

This general order was followed January 31st by a special order directing the Army of the Potomac to move on Manassas, "before or on the 22d day of February next."

The antagonism to McClellan continued to grow, and in a short time led to his removal from the position of commander-in-chief, although his services were retained as commander of the Army of the Potomac. Previous to his removal he was forced to lay aside the reticence which he deemed it important to observe, and his plans as soon as presented to the president became subjects of discussion and revision by the president, his Cabinet and the Congressional committee. He had practically lost the functions of a commander-in-chief, when he was formally removed by the following order:

“EXECUTIVE MANSION,

“WASHINGTON, March 11, 1862.

“PRESIDENT’S WAR ORDER No. 3.

“Major General McClellan having personally taken the field at the head of the Army of the Potomac, until otherwise ordered he is relieved from the command of the other military departments, he retaining command of the Department of the Potomac.

“*Ordered, further,* That the departments now under the respective commands of Generals Halleck and Hunter, together with so much of that under General Buell as lies west of a north and south line drawn indefinitely through Knoxville, Tennessee, be consolidated and designated the Department of the Mississippi, and that, until otherwise ordered, Major General Halleck have command of said department.

“*Ordered also,* That the country west of the Department of the Potomac and east of the Department of the Mississippi be a military department to be called the Mountain Department, and that the same be commanded by Major General Frémont.

“That all the commanders of departments, after the receipt of this order by them, respectively report severally and directly to the Secretary of War, and that prompt, full and frequent reports will be expected of all and each of them.

“ABRAHAM LINCOLN.”

This order was issued without consulting General McClellan, and must have come both as a surprise and a humiliation. He manifested no resentment, however, and the next day addressed the president a letter on the subject, from which the following is an extract:

“I believe I said to you some weeks since in connection with some western matters that no feeling of self-interest or ambition should ever prevent me from devoting myself to the service. I am glad to have the opportunity to prove it, and you will find that, under present circumstances, I shall work just as cheerfully as before, and that no consideration of self will in any manner interfere with the discharge of my public duties.”

After General McClellan's removal from the chief command the general plan of procedure which he had formulated, and part of which had been put in operation under his own command, was continued in its general features, but somewhat modified in details.

The Confederate plan of defence necessarily conformed to the Federal plan of invasion and was consequently flexible. Military lines were established facing the Federal lines along the northern border. Troops were sent into the trans-Mississippi States to oppose the detached expeditions for their invasion. Strong fortifications were established to retain control of Mississippi River. During the suspension of active operations in the latter part of 1861 and the early part of 1862, President Davis and the Confederate Congress pressed every means of preparation that patriotism and wisdom could devise.

Two days after the removal of McClellan from chief command in the army of the United States, on March 13, 1862, President Davis issued the following succinct order: “General Robert E. Lee is assigned to duty at the seat of government and, under the direction of the President, is charged with the conduct of military operations in the armies of the Confederacy.”

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James A. Seddon, secretary of war, C. S. A.
From a painting in the State Library, Richmond,



George Davis, attorney-general, C. S. A.
From a painting in the Confederate Museum, Richmond,

CHAPTER VII

CAMPAIGNS OF 1862—IN THE EAST

PASSING, for the present, such minor engagements and detached expeditions as would come first in chronological order, let us give attention to the movements of the great armies of the invasion and follow their campaigns through the year 1862. The western army of invasion was the first in the field, and its campaigns were, in the main, successful. The eastern army was later in motion and sustained signal defeats.

We have seen that McClellan, upon being removed from the command of the entire Federal army, was retained in command of the Army of the Potomac, which included nearly all the forces in Virginia. Here we are greeted with a series of brilliant Confederate victories, first in chronological order being the famous "Valley Campaign" of "Stonewall" Jackson.

Thomas J. Jackson, in reward for his services at the battle of Bull Run, was commissioned major-general on October 7, 1861. On November 4th he was gratified by the assignment to command the forces of the Shenandoah Valley, of which section he was a native and to which he was ardently attached. He at once requested that all the troops guarding the mountain passes be placed under his command, but his request was not complied with. Early in December he asked permission to be supplied with a sufficient force to move against Romney. But this request was also refused by the Confederate government. His total force, January 1, 1862, including 2,000 or 3,000 militia,

amounted to less than 11,000. The Federals had not resumed active operations in the valley since its abandonment by Patterson, and Jackson remained for a time in enforced quiet at his headquarters in Winchester. He employed the time in organizing and drilling his troops. But it was not in his nature to remain inactive. Learning that General Rosecrans contemplated using the possession of Romney as a means of throwing his western Virginia forces into the valley for the purpose of occupying Winchester and establishing communication with Banks, thus reducing the valley to permanent Federal control, Jackson determined to use what troops he had to checkmate the movement.

On January 4, 1862, he drove a force of the enemy from Bath, followed their retreat to Hancock, which commanded the communications along the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and took Romney in the rear. The Federal forces evacuated Romney, January 10th, on Jackson's approach. Leaving Loring, who was second in command, to occupy Romney, and establishing communication with General Edward Johnson at Camp Alleghany, Jackson returned to Winchester, having defeated the plans of Rosecrans and Banks, and freed the entire district under his command from the presence of the enemy. The Confederate secretary of war, without consulting General Jackson or General Joseph E. Johnston, commanding the department, sent a peremptory order on January 31st to Jackson to abandon Romney and to recall Loring to Winchester. Jackson obeyed the order, but resented this intermeddling with his command. He immediately tendered his resignation. General Johnston withheld the letter, and entreated Jackson to reconsider it. Governor Letcher, of Virginia, and other influential men strongly joined in the request. Finally, Jackson acceded to their wishes and withdrew the resignation. The Federals in a few days reoccupied Romney, repaired the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and reestablished communications. Jackson now remained in enforced idleness until the movement of McClellan to the Peninsula changed the condition

of affairs and opened the way to the remarkable campaign which ranked him among the most renowned commanders of the world.

During the illness of McClellan in December, 1861, and January, 1862, President Lincoln had called to his councils other advisers, who were impatient and incompetent, and hostile to McClellan. They raised another "On to Richmond!" cry, and demanded an immediate advance. As soon as McClellan reported for duty, the president demanded his plans for the campaign. McClellan was forced to disclose that he did not favor a direct advance by the way of Manassas, but designed a movement by water to Urbana on the lower Rappahannock, thus flanking Johnston's army and defences at Manassas, and landing troops at a point nearer to Richmond than that occupied by the Confederate army. The president discussed the plan with incompetent advisers and insisted on the direct advance.

While consideration of these matters was pending, General Johnston, the Confederate commander, disconcerted all the plans of the enemy by a skilful retreat, on March 9th, behind the Rappahannock to a new position previously entrenched. This movement especially defeated any surprise by way of Urbana.

McClellan now advanced toward Manassas, and established headquarters at Fairfax Court House. Here he called a council of his officers and submitted his plan of moving upon Richmond by way of the Peninsula. A majority of the council favored the plan. Thus sustained, it was urged upon the president, who finally consented to it upon the condition that a sufficient force should be left in and around Washington to guard the city from any sudden attack. The embarkation of McClellan's troops for the Peninsular campaign began on March 17th. Supposing himself to be still in command of the defences of Washington and of northern Virginia, McClellan issued orders accordingly. By his own statement, he left 73,456 men, with 109 pieces of light artillery, for the defence of Washington, and recommended

other available troops to be ordered in, among others 4,000 from New York. These troops were stationed as follows: 18,000 as a garrison for Washington, 7,780 at Warrenton, 10,859 at Manassas, 35,467 in the Shenandoah Valley, 1,350 on the lower Potomac. McClellan soon found that he was not in command of the defences of Washington. The president was not satisfied with his disposition of troops. He detached from his command McDowell's splendid corps, 40,000 strong, and detained it for strengthening the defence of Washington. Soon afterward, the Department of the Rappahannock was formed, and McDowell was placed in command of it.

A new plan was now devised. McClellan was at Fortress Monroe with an army of more than 100,000 men, ready to move upon the Peninsula to assail Richmond with the coöperation of a powerful naval force. Banks was moving up the valley with 35,000 men, 18,000 men were at Warrenton and Manassas, McDowell was at Fredericksburg with 40,000 men, Frémont was moving to the valley from his "Mountain Department" with 16,000 men, and 8,000 men were on the way from the Kanawha.

While McClellan was moving up the Peninsula and every available Confederate soldier was engaged in opposing his advance and northern Virginia was thus denuded of defenders, the several armies above enumerated were to converge toward Richmond, driving the Confederates before them; at the same time protecting Washington and sweeping the Confederates in a closing circle. This great converging force was thus to envelop Richmond and insure its capture, if McClellan should fail to take it before their arrival.

The magnitude and brilliancy of Jackson's Valley Campaign will be seen when it is recalled that by the most consummate generalship he so used the small force under his command as to strike these several armies in detail, defeat each in turn, shatter the combination, inspire terror for the safety of Washington, and finally join Lee in the defence of Richmond.

To oppose the tremendous force arrayed against Richmond, General Lee could not muster more than 83,000 men. Of these, the main army under Joseph E. Johnston consisted of 47,306 effective men. Holmes had 2,000 at Fredericksburg. Magruder on the Peninsula had about 11,000. These troops were thrown as rapidly as possible on the Peninsula to oppose McClellan's advance, and General Benjamin Huger, who commanded about 7,000 men, was subsequently ordered there after the evacuation of Norfolk.

To oppose the great combination gathering in the valley and northern Virginia were three small bodies of troops. Jackson, in the valley, had a total force, as shown by his field returns, of 5,297 men. General Edward Johnson, on the extreme west of the Confederate line, had about 3,500 men. General Ewell, guarding the direct route from Washington to Richmond, had about 6,200 men.

The first movement was made against Jackson in the valley before McClellan's troops had embarked for the Peninsula. Banks with 38,484 men crossed the Potomac February 26th, at Harper's Ferry, and occupied a line across the valley, paying but little attention to Jackson, whom he expected to brush out of his way as soon as he was ready to advance.

Banks advanced on Winchester on March 6th, when Jackson drew up his little army for battle, but Banks withdrew. Banks again advanced on March 11th, and Jackson offered battle. That night he called his first and last council of war. Like all councils, this council opposed fighting. Jackson then evacuated Winchester, much against his will. He steadily fell back before the advance of Banks, watching for an opportunity to strike, while Turner Ashby, his gallant chief of cavalry, engaged the enemy in daily skirmishes, easily defeating its cavalry, and keeping its detached parties in constant alarm.

At length the opportunity came. Thinking the possession of the valley practically assured, the Federal authorities ordered Banks to leave sufficient forces to retain the valley,

and to move with his main force to Manassas. Shields with 9,000 men had been left at Kernstown. Hardly was the main body of Banks's army well on the way to Manassas, when Jackson attacked Shields, March 23d, bringing into action 3,377 men, of whom 290 were cavalry under Ashby. After a severe fight, in which the victory was long doubtful, Jackson was finally driven from the field with a total loss of 691 men, while the loss of the enemy was 568. He gained, however, all the results of a victory. He impressed on the enemy the belief that he had a large force. The 20,000 men from Banks's army that were moving to Manassas were hastily recalled, and 10,000 additional troops were sent to reinforce Banks. It caused the creation of the Department of the Rappahannock under McDowell, and the removal of all northern Virginia from the command of McClellan, and confirmed President Lincoln in his determination to retain McDowell's corps for the defence of Washington, in spite of the earnest protest of General McClellan.

After the battle of Kernstown, Jackson fell back to Woodstock. Banks, hastening to Winchester, concentrated his troops, and after receiving reinforcements, moved to drive Jackson from the valley. Jackson retreated before him while Ashby kept the enemy constantly annoyed, and covered the movements of the Confederate army. The retreat bore the appearance of a strategic movement to decoy the enemy, and to find an opportunity to strike a blow among the mountain passes. Banks, impressed with an exaggerated idea of Jackson's strength, which did not exceed 4,000, followed slowly and cautiously to Harrisonburg, about 100 miles from Winchester. At this point, at which he arrived on April 22d, he lost trace of Jackson. He abandoned the pursuit and returned to Winchester, telegraphing to Washington that Jackson had abandoned the valley. It was true that Jackson had left the valley, but he had not abandoned it. He had marched due east from Harrisonburg around the foot of the Massanutton

Mountain to the Blue Ridge which forms the eastern wall of the valley. Here he selected a position in Swift Run Gap which defied attack, and went into camp. He had two purposes in view. The one was to occupy a strategic position where he could rest his men secure from attack, and be ready to operate in the valley or toward Manassas as occasion might require. The other purpose was more important. He had taken measures for recruiting his army from the surrounding counties, and expected that recruits would join him in a few days. He was, therefore, unwilling at that time to move further south.

Jackson remained at Swift Run Gap about ten days, reorganizing his army, which by new enlistments and the arrival of the Tenth Virginia Regiment, was now increased to about 6,000. On April 28th, upon his urgent solicitation, he received permission from General Lee to order General Ewell from the Rapidan, and General Edward Johnson, who was retreating toward Staunton before Frémont's advance, to unite with him in a movement upon Banks. On the 29th Jackson moved. He made a demonstration against Harrisonburg, on Banks's rear. Rapidly retreating while Banks was awaiting the attack, he retraced his steps to the Blue Ridge, crossed through Brown's Gap, and marched to Meechum's station on the Virginia Central Railroad. Here he was met by trains which conveyed his army to Staunton, the artillery and wagons crossing the Blue Ridge a second time through Rockfish Gap. By this circuitous route he veiled his purpose. The movement was more completely concealed by another ingenious device. A few hours after he left his camp at Swift Run Gap, Ewell arrived with his troops and occupied it, with instructions to continue the demonstrations against Banks.

From Staunton, Jackson marched 15 miles to the camp of General Edward Johnson who was falling back before the advance of Frémont's force under Generals Robert H. Milroy and Robert C. Schenck. Upon learning of the junction of Jackson and Johnson, Milroy fell back to make

junction with Schenck. Jackson pursued with all his own and Johnson's forces, amounting to about 9,000 men, and found the enemy awaiting him at McDowell, a village about forty miles southwest of Harrisonburg. Jackson attacked and routed this force, May 8th, and pursued the flying enemy to Franklin. He had now accomplished his purpose. He had thwarted any immediate attack on Staunton, and freed General Johnston's troops to unite with his own in an attack upon Banks. So secretly had this been done that his movement was not suspected until his famous dispatch was received at Richmond: "God blessed our army with victory at McDowell yesterday."

Jackson now marched across the valley to join Ewell and attack Banks. The joint forces of Johnson, Ewell, and Jackson numbered a little more than 15,000 men. Fortune now favored Jackson. During his absence, little suspecting his errand, the president had supposed him driven from the valley, and had ordered the division of General Shields, 11,000 strong, to join General McDowell at Fredericksburg for the purpose of marching upon Richmond. Other detachments had weakened Banks's force, until it was not numerically equal to that of Jackson. Banks had fallen back to the vicinity of Winchester, with his forces distributed from Front Royal to Strasburg.

The first attack was made May 23d, on Colonel John R. Kenly's force of 1,000 men in the entrenched camp at Front Royal. Nearly the entire Federal force was included in the killed, wounded, and captured, the total loss being 904. The Confederate loss was 26. Banks fell back from Strasburg to Winchester. His retreating columns were assailed in rear and flank, and suffered severe loss.

At Winchester, Banks made a stand and offered battle. He was attacked, May 25th, was routed with severe loss, and was then pursued to Potomac River, which he crossed with an army utterly disorganized. In these operations of the 23d to the 25th of May, Jackson had driven Banks from the valley, inflicting on him a loss of more than 3,000

men, while his own loss was less than 400. In addition to this, he had captured an immense amount of arms and military stores. He now moved forward to make a demonstration as if to cross the Potomac into Maryland. He spent two days in feigning an attack on Harper's Ferry.

The defeat of Banks and his disorderly retreat across the Potomac, followed by the demonstrations against Harper's Ferry, produced consternation in Washington and throughout the North almost equal to the panic after the battle of Bull Run. The mysterious movements of Jackson, and the suddenness of the blow, made it fall like a thunderbolt. The wildest rumors prevailed as to Jackson's strength and intentions. In the absence of McClellan's army on the Peninsula, the unexpected appearance of an unknown force, reported to be indefinitely tremendous, which had come from no one knew where, and having overwhelmed Banks, was now on the march to capture Washington,—for thus "many-tongued rumor" carried the news,—aroused to frenzy the national government, and appeals were made to patriotic governors to rally to the defence of the capital. Troops were hurried to protect Washington. Reinforcements were sent to Banks. The orders which had been issued to McDowell to move with his own corps of 40,000 men and strong reinforcements to attack Richmond from the north were hastily countermanded, and his troops were retained to defend Washington. After the first panic had spent itself, more definite information was obtained, and then it was realized that Jackson's total force was only 15,000 men.

The cooler heads now conceived a plan to capture this small army which thus audaciously thrust itself unsupported within the Federal lines and had broken the Federal plans of campaign. A strong force under General Rufus Saxton was thrown into Harper's Ferry. Banks's army was rapidly reorganized and reinforced. While this force blocked Jackson's front, and was ready to assail him in retreat, McDowell was ordered to march rapidly to the valley and there to form

a junction with Frémont at Strasburg in Jackson's rear to cut off his retreat. The daring Confederate was now apparently in danger, but in reality he was reaping the fruits of his victories, and the enemy was doing exactly what he wished. The object of his campaign was to defeat McDowell and to draw him and all the Federal forces in northern Virginia into the valley in the elusive pursuit of his "Foot Cavalry," or "Web-feet," as his men now came to be called. The purpose was to divert McDowell's advance upon Richmond in aid of McClellan, and to break the concentric movement of the several columns which were coöperating to the same end. His object in making demonstrations to cross the Potomac was twofold. The first was to tempt the Federal authorities to move. They were now making ready for his capture. The second was to gain time to transport to Staunton the prisoners and vast quantity of army stores which he had captured. With the insufficient means of transportation at his command, this work was necessarily slow, but it was completely and safely accomplished.

Meanwhile, Jackson was fully and accurately informed of the movements of the enemy. Yet he delayed his march to the danger point. McDowell moved to form the junction with Frémont more rapidly than Jackson expected, and reached Front Royal, twelve miles from the point of junction at Strasburg, while Frémont was only twenty miles from the same point. It was now, indeed, time for action; yet Jackson waited for the Stonewall Brigade, then engaged in demonstrations on Harper's Ferry under the heroic General Charles S. Winder. The retreat was begun on May 31st, and the next day, about noon, the rear of Jackson's army, under Winder, marched though Strasburg, having safely passed the danger point. Jackson now suspended the retreat, called in Ashby and Ewell, who had been guarding the roads on each flank, drew up his army, with its flanks resting on the mountains south of Strasburg, ready for battle should the opportunity offer.

Jackson now tested the truth of the old proverb: *Fortuna favet fortibus*. The junction between Frémont and McDowell was not made. The heavy downpours of rain had swollen the mountain streams so as to render them impassable except by the few bridges, and these bridges, with a single exception, Jackson destroyed. The river and Massanutton Mountain, which runs north and south parallel with the river, now intervened between the two armies and prevented communication between them as they followed Jackson's retreat to Harrisonburg, at the south end of Massanutton Mountain. General James Shields, leading McDowell's column, sought in vain an opportunity to cross the river and unite with Frémont.

After remaining one day at Harrisonburg, Jackson fell back a few miles to Port Republic, leaving Ewell six miles north at Cross Keys. Almost daily skirmishes occurred between the hostile troops, Ashby and Munford leading the Confederate cavalry and inflicting blows which were sometimes severe. In one of these skirmishes Sir Percy Wyndham, an English officer attached to Frémont's army, was given command of 800 cavalry with which he boasted that he would capture Ashby. Sir Percy, however, came to grief. Ashby captured him with 63 of his men, and routed his troops.

On June 8th, an important battle was fought. Frémont, being informed that Ewell was at Cross Keys with a portion of Jackson's army, made an attack upon him at that place. After a severe fight, Frémont was repulsed and retreated in confusion with a loss of 625 men. Ewell's loss was 287 men.

While the battle of Cross Keys was going on, General S. S. Carroll with a small Federal force, by a sudden dash crossed the bridge at Port Republic, the only bridge which Jackson had left standing. He dashed into the town, captured several members of Jackson's staff, and almost secured the general himself, but he escaped by rapid flight. This bold attack was speedily repulsed and Carroll was driven back across the river with severe loss.

The next day, June 9th, Jackson crossed his army over the river on a floating bridge constructed by his engineers. With Winder leading his advance he moved to attack the advance of McDowell under Shields. Confident of a junction with Frémont in Jackson's rear, Shields had written: "I think Jackson is caught this time." He had yet to learn some lessons in the art of war. General Erastus B. Tyler, commanding the vanguard of Shields, was encountered opposite Port Republic and immediately attacked. After a gallant resistance Tyler was defeated at every point and driven from the field. At Conrad's Store Tyler met Shields coming to reinforce him. At this point Shields helped to check the pursuit and then joined in the retreat. While the battle of Port Republic was in progress, Frémont moved upon Generals Isaac R. Trimble and William B. Taliaferro, who had been left at Cross Keys to watch him. Their troops, under Jackson's orders, slowly fell back, crossed the river, and destroyed the bridges. Frémont arrived at the river bank in time to witness the retreat, but Jackson's genius had debarred his crossing to follow them. In rage the baffled general opened his artillery on the ambulances and the wounded, the only Confederates within range of his guns. He then retired from the scene to the far side of the mountain and retreated down the valley to a safe position. The Federal registers give the total losses in the battle of Port Republic as follows: "Union, 1,002; Confederate, 657."

The battle of Port Republic was the last battle of Jackson's Valley Campaign. During three months he had marched more than five hundred miles, fought five pitched battles, and almost daily minor engagements and skirmishes, drawn to the valley three armies, prevented their junction, defeated them in detail, inflicting upon them severe loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, and captured or destroyed large amounts of military stores, while his own loss was comparatively small. Beginning operations with a force of less than 5,000 men, which in the latter part of his campaign was increased by reinforcements until it reached a total

of 15,000, he had defeated more than 60,000 troops operating directly against him, and had paralyzed the movements of more than 100,000 in northern Virginia and adjacent territory. He now saw all the Federal forces in retreat for the lower valley. Shields on the eastern side and Frémont on the western side of Massanutton Mountain, were falling back to form a junction with the shattered remnant of Banks's army at a point of safety beyond the reach of Jackson. Upon receipt of information from General Lee that his services would now be more useful at Richmond, he placed his men in camp to rest and recuperate for another campaign.

General Lee wrote Jackson on June 11th that General Alexander R. Lawton with six regiments and General William H. C. Whiting with eight regiments had been ordered to report to him. General Lee then proceeds to give the following instructions:

"Leave your enfeebled troops to watch the country and guard the passes covered by your cavalry and artillery, and with your main body, including Ewell's division and Lawton's and Whiting's commands, move rapidly to Ashland by rail or otherwise, as you may find most advantageous, and sweep down between the Chickahominy and Pamunkey, cutting up the enemy's communications, etc., while this army attacks General McClellan in front. He will thus, I think, be forced to come out of his intrenchments, where he is strongly posted on the Chickahominy and apparently preparing to move by gradual approaches on Richmond." General Lee wrote an urgent letter to Jackson on June 16th to begin the movement. The next day, Jackson began the march to join General Lee, and reached Richmond on June 26th.

The movement to Richmond was skilfully disguised. The troops left to watch the valley made demonstrations to feign advance. The reinforcements sent to Jackson were displayed, heralded, and magnified. The news was set afloat that Jackson, heavily reinforced, was about to move on

Washington. This information reached the Federal lines by the returning paroled prisoners, by spies, and by rumor. So completely were the Federal authorities deceived that, two days after Jackson began his march for Richmond, Frémont telegraphed that Jackson was about to move down the valley with "30,000 men, or more." On the 23d, when Jackson had nearly reached Richmond, General John E. Wool telegraphed: "If Jackson has the number of troops reported, I think we ought to be looking after Washington." The day that Jackson arrived at Richmond, June 26th, President Lincoln issued an order forming all the forces in northern Virginia into one army to protect the national capital and overcome the rebel forces of Jackson and Ewell. Meanwhile, the telegraph lines were kept busy between the Federal commanders, inquiring: "Where is Jackson?" As late as the 28th, while Jackson was engaged in the battle of Gaines's Mill at Richmond, General Banks, replying to the inquiry of General Pope, telegraphed from Middletown: "I believe he is preparing for an attack here. All the people regard it certain."

Let us now turn to the Peninsular Campaign, which was going on simultaneously with Jackson's Valley Campaign. When McClellan moved to the Peninsula, he was promised the full coöperation of the navy, and a force of 140,000 men. The embarkation began on March 17th, and the advance reached Fortress Monroe in a few days. The remainder of the army was rapidly transported. General McClellan arrived on April 2d, and assumed command. He was deeply disappointed to find that the naval coöperation was insufficient, and that the naval commanders would not undertake to capture Yorktown. Jackson had begun his operations in the valley. The battle of Kernstown had been fought, and the president, uneasy for the safety of Washington, withheld McDowell's corps, 40,000 strong. McClellan's plans were disconcerted in the beginning. It was now necessary to modify them. He must accomplish the work with 100,000 men, instead of 140,000 as he

expected, and he must find other means of doing some things which he had expected the navy to accomplish.

Now, let us review the Confederate means of defence. The Peninsula of Virginia, as a theatre of war, presented certain unusual features of topography, which had heretofore led to peculiar results in the colonial settlement and subsequent history of the country, and were now to be important factors in the most remarkable campaign of the war.


The two great rivers, York and James, flow into Chesapeake Bay through channels which are nearly parallel for more than sixty miles from their respective mouths. Each of these rivers, in its lower or tidewater part, is from three to eight miles wide. Between them lies the tongue of land known as the Peninsula, which in width very little exceeds either river. The land is apparently level, but really descends by gentle slopes from what is known as the "backbone" to each river. This backbone runs in a long, irregular line, midway between the two rivers, and forms a watershed from which streams having their heads near together flow in opposite directions and empty respectively into York River on the north and James River on the south. These streams are short. Many of them do not exceed six miles in length. They cut deep ravines or gullies in the porous soil. Upon reaching the level of the rivers they encounter the tidewater, which at flood tide drives back the current and widens their beds. Some of these short creeks reach the river more than a mile wide. Warwick and Chickahominy Rivers are longer. All these streams along their tidewater parts are skirted by marshes which are covered with water at high tide.

The lower Peninsula is very narrow. The two great rivers are nowhere more than twelve miles apart, and at some points, as in the vicinity of Williamsburg, the distance between them does not exceed seven miles. It will be readily seen that to a land force, however strong, unaided by powerful naval coöperation, the Peninsula was the worst route to Richmond.

A chain of redoubts, two or three miles in length, from the head of a creek flowing into York River to the head of a creek flowing into James River, would debar advance along the "backbone." A dam across each of the opposite flowing creeks at the point where the current and tide-water meet, would make each creek a broad lake. The tidewater portion of the creeks, about a mile wide, with its skirting marshes, would complete the line of defence. Such a line defended by a resolute foe could be broken only by siege operations. If such a line should be forced after severe loss to the assailants and long delay, another line equally strong would be ready a few miles in the rear. It is evident, that so far as a direct advance was concerned, a small force could bar the way of a large army.

The weak point in defending the Peninsular route was the inability of the Confederates to defend the two great rivers which lay on each flank. General John B. Magruder (then colonel), who, as previously related, had been assigned to command the Department of the Peninsula May 21, 1861, had maintained his precarious position with admirable skill, and still held the lower Peninsula, confronting the Federal forces at Fortress Monroe. Fully comprehending the military features, he maintained an advanced line from the Poquosin to the Warwick, and had fortified two strong lines in his rear: one from the mouth of Warwick River on the James to Yorktown and the other from College Creek to Capitol Creek, passing east of Williamsburg. The centre of the latter line was defended by a strong earthwork named Fort Magruder.

The rivers on each side were strongly defended. In James River was the *Virginia*, constructed upon the hull of the United States frigate *Merrimac*. This first ironclad was thought to be a complete protection against any naval expedition on James River. York River was protected by the defences at Yorktown and Gloucester Point, manned by strong garrisons and mounted with powerful guns. Opposite the bluffs at Yorktown, Gloucester Point projects into the



Map of the battle of Fredericksburg, Virginia, December 13, 1862. From facsimile of original in possession of the Southern Historical Society.

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river until it reaches within one mile of the opposite shore. It was confidently believed that no naval expedition could pass between the guns of these defences.

Such were the conditions on the Peninsula of Virginia when General McClellan arrived at Fortress Monroe, April 2, 1862, to command the troops which had been transported during the previous month for the purpose of advancing by the Peninsula route to Richmond. General Magruder held the advance in check pending the arrival of the main Confederate army. General Johnston arrived April 17th, and assumed chief command of the 50,000 Confederate troops gathered for the defence of Richmond. Then began the famous campaign between the two great commanders, which is known as the Peninsula Campaign.

McClellan's advance began on April 4th. He moved in two columns. The one on the Warwick road under General Erasmus D. Keyes was ordered to follow this road beyond Warwick Court House, and thence to pass in the rear of Yorktown to the Halfway House, midway between Yorktown and Williamsburg, six miles from each. General Samuel P. Heintzelman, commanding the other column, was ordered to move direct upon Yorktown, and there to occupy a suitable position as near to the defences of the place as he could attain without serious resistance. The two corps were to keep in communication and surround Yorktown on the land side, looking to its immediate investment. This plan of attack was brought to a sudden halt. McClellan had not been informed of the peculiar topography of the Peninsula, which played so important a part in its defence, and learned too late that he had a new difficulty to encounter which he had not suspected, but which must be overcome before he could invest Yorktown. Along Warwick River were five dams, one at Wynn's Mill, one at Lee's Mill, and three constructed by General Magruder. The effect of these dams was to back up the water along the course of the river, so that for nearly three-fourths of its distance its passage was impracticable for either artillery or infantry.

Magruder was required to defend only the five dams. The river did the rest. A thin line of skirmishers, extending from one dam to the other along the whole line completed the Confederate defence. McClellan has been blamed by Federal military writers for not forcing this line, but their writings show that they do not understand the peculiar features of the topography of the Peninsula. McClellan tested the line April 5th, and was repulsed. Again, he attempted assault on the 16th at Dam No. 1, the weakest portion of Magruder's line. Here an attack was made in force, preceded by a furious cannonade. Under cover of this line, several companies of a Vermont regiment found an unguarded point, crossed the river and gained a foothold, but they were not supported by any general movement, and, after displaying brilliant courage and dash, were driven back with severe loss. This incident confirmed McClellan in the opinion that the Confederate line could not be carried by storm, and he pushed forward his siege operations.

General Johnston arrived the day after the battle of Dam No. 1, or Lee's Mills, and took chief command. He had not favored the defence of the lower Peninsula, and did not seem to value its topographical advantages. On the night of May 3d, he evacuated Yorktown and Gloucester Point and the line of the Warwick which Magruder had so skilfully selected and defended, and began his retreat to Richmond. He found it necessary to use Magruder's last line of defence to cover his retreat when surprised at Williamsburg by the Federal vanguard, but delayed at that place only long enough to repulse the enemy and give time for the removal of his trains and stores.

McClellan moved from Yorktown and Warwick River with more than his usual celerity, and began his attack at Williamsburg on the afternoon of May 4th. The main body of the Confederate army had passed through Williamsburg in retreat, only a small infantry rearguard and train of wagons being left to gather up and transport such remnants of stores as had not yet been removed. The six redoubts

on the left of Fort Magruder had been abandoned. The Federals, under General Winfield S. Hancock, at once occupied the abandoned line of redoubts on the left. The troops under General Joseph Hooker rapidly deployed in front of Fort Magruder and the line of redoubts on the right.

Every Confederate soldier at Williamsburg and in the vicinity rushed to the front, so lately the rear. General James Longstreet's corps was recalled. General Johnston rode to the field, and gave orders in person. The following incident will serve to show how complete was the surprise and how rapid the rally. The heavy guns of Fort Magruder had been removed, and there was a demand for artillery. There were but two batteries in reach, both parked in the town, about one mile from the battlefield, and both light field batteries. The battery of six pieces commanded by Lieutenant William I. Clopton was ready to move and went at once to the field, where it was placed in Fort Magruder. The other battery, Company F of the First Virginia Regiment of Artillery, was not in condition to move. This company was raised in Williamsburg and the vicinity. It was under orders to follow the retreat at the dawn of the following day. Meanwhile, the officers and men had received permission to visit their homes and take the last farewell of parents or friends upon the eve of this sudden separation. The guns were parked on the old historic Court House Green, under the guard of three men, who happened to be the only members of the company who had no family ties.

While engaged in bidding their relatives farewell, the Confederate troops were startled about two o'clock by cannonading at Fort Magruder. Officers and men sprang from the dinner table and hurried to their post. In a short space of time, the entire line from Fort Magruder to the right was ready for the attack. The redoubts on the left were more remote and exposed, and after their abandonment had been occupied by the enemy. They were never recovered, and prevented the Confederates from gaining a signal victory in the battle of the next day.

The remainder of the day was spent in cannonading and skirmishing. Longstreet's troops had come upon the field and were in position. Stuart's cavalry had arrived and was placed on the right. Generals Richard H. Anderson and Jubal A. Early reported to General Longstreet, who was in command of all the forces on the field. The battle began on the morning of May 5th. The Confederates were successful on their right, and defeated Hooker with heavy loss along this part of the line. General Stuart attributes much of this success to the artillery fire from the redoubts. He thus describes the scene:

"The firing from the woods continued obstinately for several hours without any indication of an advance, and the long range rifles of the enemy were beginning to tell upon the garrison of Fort Magruder. . . . Holding my cavalry near the two redoubts, to the right of Fort Magruder, I assumed the direction of the pieces in those redoubts during the rest of the day, and I will here pay a merited tribute to the excellence of the execution done by them, commanded by Captain W. Robertson Garrett, who, notwithstanding the hail-storm of bullets and shells, kept up an accurate and incessant fire upon the enemy's battery until it was silenced and then upon his line."

Hooker was followed and driven until darkness ended the pursuit. General D. H. Hill with his division, consisting of the brigades of Generals Early, Gabriel J. Rains, W. S. Featherston, and Robert E. Rodes had a much more difficult task to perform on the Confederate left. Hancock occupied the line of redoubts with strong advantages of position. In the assault upon his lines, the Confederates were repulsed with severe loss, but later prevented Hancock's advance and successfully met his assaults. The total Federal loss is stated in the statistical registers to be 2,228, and the total Confederate loss about 1,000. During the night General Longstreet withdrew, continuing his retreat slowly, and reaching the Burnt Ordinary, twelve miles from Williamsburg, on the night of May 6th. He had brought

off his supplies and camp equipments, moving at leisure and unmolested. The Confederate army concentrated at Barhamsville, while McClellan rested at Williamsburg.

A strong fleet of gunboats and transports left Yorktown, May 6th, for the purpose of landing troops to cut off Johnston's retreat. This force, under command of General William B. Franklin, landed at Eltham, at 3 P. M. on the same day, and was speedily followed by the troops of Generals John Sedgwick, Israel B. Richardson, and Fitz-John Porter. The next morning, this force was attacked and driven back to the cover of the gunboats, and it made no further attempt to intercept Johnston's retreat. On the 9th, the Confederate army took position on the north side of the Chickahominy, covering all approaches to Richmond. On the same day Norfolk was evacuated, and General Benjamin Huger moved his forces to Petersburg to coöperate in the defence of Richmond. McClellan advanced to Barhamsville, where he concentrated his troops on the 10th, and began a slow and cautious advance.

The theatre of war was now transferred to the upper Peninsula, the topography of which presented none of the unusual features of the lower Peninsula. The higher elevation of the land raised it above the influence of the tidewater. The soil, no longer porous, was not intersected by the deep gulleys made by streams flowing in opposite directions from a backbone watershed. The two great rivers were no longer parallel, or wide. York River terminated at West Point, about forty miles from Richmond. The James was here a narrow, ordinary current river. The Peninsula had widened so much that it really ceased to be a peninsula. The Chickahominy, with its wide swamps, curving around Richmond, bore a resemblance to the Pamunkey, which unites with the Mattaponi to form the York at West Point, but it was too far from Richmond to be used except as a distant base of supplies.

The James was open to Federal control as far as the head of tidewater navigation at City Point. Beyond City

Point, being no longer widened by action of the tides, it becomes narrow as it approaches Richmond, and flows through banks which, at many places, are high and precipitous. Among the defensible places presented by these high banks, is Drewry's Bluff, about eight miles below Richmond. This position was selected to bar the passage of Federal gunboats. It was strongly fortified, and obstructions were placed in the channel. Hardly were these defences completed before the *Galena* accompanied by a fleet of ironclads attacked Drewry's Bluff on May 15th, and, being repulsed, retreated down the river. On the same day, Johnston retreated across the Chickahominy and placed his army in the entrenchments around Richmond, his right resting at Drewry's Bluff, and his left extending to a position opposite Mechanicsville; thus presenting to the enemy a convex front.

McClellan advanced on the 15th, the day on which Johnston crossed the Chickahominy. From White House he advanced along the York River railroad, and reached the Chickahominy on the 19th. From that date to the 24th he was engaged in establishing his communications with York River, locating bases of supply, and developing his lines in front of Johnston's position. All this he was permitted to do without interruption. McClellan rapidly entrenched his line facing Johnston. A little less than half his army crossed to the south side of the Chickahominy. Hooker advanced to the bridge over a small tributary of the Chickahominy which with its impregnable swamp, known as White Oak Swamp, furnished a safe protection to rest the left flank. Extending from this point, the corps of Keyes and Heintzelman crossed on the 25th, and formed a line presenting a convex front to Johnston, and extending through Seven Pines and Fair Oaks to Chickahominy River, over which bridges were constructed for the communication between the two wings of the army. Edwin V. Sumner's, William B. Franklin's, and Porter's corps remained on the north side, and extended their lines along

Chickahominy River to Mechanicsville, about seven miles northwest of Richmond.

McClellan's aggregate force present, as shown by the returns, May 31st, was 126,083, and 280 pieces of field artillery. He was now awaiting in his entrenched position the promised movement of McDowell to fall upon Richmond from the north. McDowell was at Fredericksburg with 41,000 men, and had already begun the movement. In order to prepare the way for the junction, and to clear the country north of Richmond of the Confederate troops, General Porter was sent on an expedition with a selected command of 12,000 men. He moved rapidly northward, surprised General Lawrence O'B. Branch near Hanover Court House on May 27th, and defeated him. Branch, not suspecting such an attack, had his troops scattered, repairing the railroads. He promptly rallied his force and made a spirited resistance. He had six infantry regiments and one battery, amounting to about 4,500 men. He was driven from the field, and retreated to Ashland. The loss of Porter as stated in the official records was 355. The Confederate loss as given in the official reports was 269. There is no record of prisoners, but Porter, in a loose way, claims that he captured 730 men. These were probably picked up during his raid, and were not all soldiers. He certainly did not capture them at the battle of Hanover Court House. He returned to his position at Mechanicsville on the 29th.

General Johnston, being informed that McDowell had begun the dangerous advance from Fredericksburg determined to attack the right wing of McClellan's army on the north of the Chickahominy, and drive it back so as to prevent the threatened junction with McDowell. The movement was to be begun on the night of the 27th, and the attack was to be made on the morning of the 28th, when Johnston received information that Jackson had routed Banks at Winchester, that the North was alarmed for the safety of Washington, and that the president, panic-stricken, had ordered McDowell to the valley from Fredericksburg.

This information changed Johnston's plans. He suspended the movement by Mechanicsville and north of the Chickahominy, and decided to attack the left wing south of the Chickahominy. Preparations were immediately begun to fall upon the corps of Keyes at Seven Pines. Orders were issued on the evening of the 30th. Huger's division was to form the right wing of the attack extending to White Oak Swamp. D. H. Hill's division formed the centre and was to make the main attack, supported by Longstreet. G. W. Smith's division formed the left wing. The attack was to be made early in the morning of the 31st. That night the rain fell in torrents. General Johnston says:

"Heavy and protracted rains during the afternoon and night, by swelling the streams of the Chickahominy, increased the probability of our having to deal with other troops than those of Keyes. The same cause prevented the prompt and punctual movement of the troops. Those of Smith, Hill, and Longstreet, however, were in position early enough to be ready to commence operations by 8 A. M. Major-general Longstreet, unwilling to make a partial attack, instead of the combined movement which had been planned, waited from hour to hour for General Huger's division. At length, at 2 P. M., he determined to attack without those troops."

Longstreet's attack was completely successful and drove the enemy back for more than two miles. The attack of General Smith was delayed until four o'clock, owing to the fact that he was instructed to attack as soon as he heard the firing from Longstreet, but this firing was not heard, owing to peculiar atmospheric conditions. Notwithstanding the failure of Huger to arrive and other accidents, the Confederates gained the day. General Johnston says:

"Had Major-general Huger's division been in position and ready for action when those of Smith, Longstreet, and Hill moved, I am satisfied that Keyes' Corps would have been destroyed instead of being merely defeated."

At seven o'clock in the evening, General Johnston was severely wounded by a shell and was borne from the field. General G. W. Smith succeeded to the command. The Federals were heavily reinforced during the afternoon and night of May 31st by Sumner's corps and other troops. Early the next morning, June 1st, General Smith renewed the battle. The Confederate attack was repulsed and the Federal advance was likewise unsuccessful. The fighting had ceased, each army holding its line of the morning, when General Robert E. Lee arrived upon the field about 2 P. M. and assumed command. He devoted the rest of the day to caring for and removing the wounded and collecting the trophies of the first day's victory, which were scattered over the field. That night he withdrew the Confederate troops, and the Federals remained on the field. The first day of the battle was a Confederate victory. The second day was a drawn battle so far as fighting was concerned, but it foiled the Confederate plans and left the Federals to hold their lines. The Federal loss for the two days, as reported by General McClellan, was 5,739. The Confederate loss has not been exactly ascertained. That of General Longstreet, including all the troops of the right wing, which bore the brunt of the fight, was 4,851. The loss in Whiting's division was 1,273. This makes a total of 6,124 and includes nearly all the losses. Phisterer's *Register* states the Confederate loss at 7,997, but gives no authority.

CHAPTER VIII

CAMPAIGNS OF 1862—IN THE EAST—(Continued)

MCCLELLAN and Lee now faced each other, their armies inactive. The two generals, however, were preparing for offensive operations. McClellan's force on May 31st was 126,089, in five corps. Lee had a force of 57,000 men, which he speedily increased to 72,000 by reinforcements from the South, and was planning to bring Stonewall Jackson to Richmond with 16,000 men.

McClellan, despairing of active assistance by any movement of McDowell from Fredericksburg, and suspecting, as is shown by his letters, that Jackson would suddenly move to Richmond, had now no object in maintaining his long line on the north side of the Chickahominy. He was beginning to make arrangements to contract his lines by throwing all his troops south of that river. In order to do this it was necessary to "change his base." He sent engineers to inquire into the feasibility of a base on James River, to be reached by way of White Oak Swamp, but after consultation with trusted officers, took no active steps. Had he changed at that time he would have secured a safer base and would have avoided the ridicule which attached to the movement when he finally made it under compulsion. He kept one corps under Fitz-John Porter north of the Chickahominy, and held the other four on the south side, constantly pressing forward by slow approaches toward Richmond, until his advanced posts were about four and a half miles from the city.

Lee, as early as June 8th, wrote to Jackson suggesting that the latter should move rapidly to Richmond to unite in the attack on McClellan. On June 17th Jackson was on the way, having taken the steps previously related to deceive the enemy. He had reached Ashland on June 25th, and was moving, in accordance with General Lee's plan of attack, upon McClellan's rear.

It was on the 25th that McClellan made his first movement, which was to direct General Hooker to take a position one mile in advance on the Fair Oaks Farm, on the Williamsburg Road leading directly to Richmond. The move was a tentative one by which it was hoped to gain an advantage in one of two ways. It was thought that the movement might arouse a general resistance from the Confederates and so renew the battle of Fair Oaks, in which event, by the advantage of the bridges, the whole army could be concentrated. On the other hand, should the battle not be renewed, it would be one step gained in the march toward Richmond. The ground General Hooker was ordered to occupy was taken, lost, and retaken at a cost of four or five hundred men, Brigadier-generals C. Grover and D. E. Sickles ably supporting Hooker. During the ensuing night the news was received that General Jackson had returned from the Shenandoah Valley and was in force near Hanover Court House. Knowing that this signified the concentration of the Confederate forces, and believing that Jackson's object was to cut off Federal communications by seizing the York River railroad in their rear, Hooker was recalled from his position the following day. The advance upon Richmond had been checked.

Jackson was instructed to move upon the right flank of the Federal army, and if McDowell remained inactive in his position near Fredericksburg a general attack was to be made on McClellan's whole line. Jackson was to leave Ashland early in the morning of the 26th and turn Beaver Dam. A. P. Hill was to cross the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge as soon as Jackson's advance beyond that point

should be known, and move directly upon Mechanicsville. As soon as the Mechanicsville bridge should be uncovered, Longstreet and D. H. Hill were to cross, the latter to proceed to the support of Jackson, the former to that of A. P. Hill. These four commands were to sweep down the north side of the Chickahominy toward the York River railroad, Jackson on the left and in advance, Longstreet nearest the river, and in the rear. Huger and Magruder were to hold their positions against any assault of the enemy, to observe his movements and follow him closely in case of his retreat.

Jackson began his flanking operations at Ashland, his advance guard driving in the little Federal force posted there and pushing on to Hanover Court House. General Branch's brigade was thrown forward between Chickahominy and Pamunkey Rivers, to establish a junction with A. P. Hill. Hill did not commence his movement until three o'clock in the afternoon, when he crossed the river and advanced toward Mechanicsville. This advance was witnessed by the Federals, who knew approximately of Jackson's position and realized that serious work was at hand. Fitz-John Porter had strongly fortified Mechanicsville; and as the Confederates advanced, the artillery on both sides opened fire. The cannonade lasted half an hour, until night fell, and then the Federal guns were silent and the forces that lately manned them took refuge in the works on the left bank of Beaver Dam Creek, a mile distant. This position was one of great strength. The banks of the creek were high, almost perpendicular, and approach was by open field. There were no bridges, and trees had been felled along the bank to add to the difficulty of its passage. It was thought that the only possible method of attack was to cross the creek and swamp higher up, and it was believed Jackson would do this and try to turn the enemy's right.

D. H. Hill and Longstreet had crossed the Mechanicsville bridge as soon as it was uncovered and could be repaired. They reached the north bank of the Chickahominy late in the day. D. H. Hill's leading brigade, under Roswell S.

Ripley, advanced to the support of the troops engaged, and later joined with W. D. Pender's brigade of A. P. Hill's division in the effort to turn the enemy's left. In the darkness, Ripley had advanced his lines through the open fields and reached the road and swamp in front, when at a distance of seventy yards the enemy opened with grape and mowed down whole files of his men. The word to charge was given. The men ran forward, but were stopped by the impassable swamp and an abattis; to the right, up the rising road, cannons blazed in their faces, and the infantry poured in showers of small shot. Retreat was the only recourse, and this was effected under cover of the darkness with slight additional loss.

Along the right bank of the Chickahominy, fronting Richmond, were eight divisions of the Federal army; and before them lay the Confederate army, also in entrenched positions. Along the left bank of the river, connected by numerous bridges with the other side, were General Fitz-John Porter with two divisions and General George Sykes's regulars, against which latter force the Confederate attack was made. Two separate armies of considerable force were ready to attack McClellan, who felt his position to be critical. Should he concentrate his army on the left bank of the river, it meant abandonment of the attempt to capture Richmond, and, as he believed, risked a disastrous retreat upon White House and Yorktown with the entire Confederate army in pursuit, and where he could hope for no support. If, on the other hand, he moved to the right bank of the river, he risked the cutting off of his communications. The necessary consequence of this would be to force him to open new communications with James River and move at once in that direction, where he could receive the support of the navy, transports having shortly before been sent to James River with this very movement in view. Reinforced and aided by the navy, he thought he could operate against Richmond or Petersburg, believing that the fall of the latter place involved the fall of the former. McClellan therefore

decided upon the latter course. From Fair Oaks to James River, about seventeen miles, there was but one road over which stores and baggage could be moved, and this was exposed in front to the Confederates. The movement must therefore be performed by night and with great celerity. While General D. H. Hill was held in check at Mechanicsville, Porter's baggage was sent over to the right bank of the river and united with the long train that was to set out for James River on the evening of the 27th.

The battle had been renewed early on the morning of the 27th in expectation of Jackson's arrival on the enemy's left, and was continued with animation for about two hours. While this action was in progress Jackson was rapidly approaching to decide it. He had at last succeeded in crossing Beaver Dam Creek above the enemy's position, and as soon as the Federals realized this they abandoned their entrenchments and retreated down the river. General George Stoneman with a flying column reshipped or destroyed during the day all the stores along the railroad to White House, which was evacuated. Then, after vainly attempting to check or delay for a time the Confederate advance, he fell back on Yorktown.

The plan of the Federal troops for the 27th had been for General George A. McCall on the extreme right to fall back on the bridges thrown across the Chickahominy at Gaines's Mill, to join the other troops of Porter's corps, and to make a stand in front of the bridges until the army could execute its general movement. General Porter with this force was to cross the bridges late in the evening and then destroy them. Hardly had dawn arrived before the tremendous fire of artillery opened from both sides. No time was to be lost. General Lee had easily perceived and as quickly understood McClellan's endeavor to force Porter into an energetic resistance so as to gain time to protect his centre on the north bank in the neighborhood of Gaines's Mill near that river. The Confederates, therefore, as soon as the bridges over Beaver Dam Creek had been repaired,

resumed their march. The forces under A. P. Hill and Longstreet moved along the edge of the Chickahominy on the right while Jackson, with whom D. H. Hill had united, was still far to the left, threatening the enemy on the right as he gradually converged toward the river. General Branch's force, supporting D. H. Hill, advanced to attack McCall on the right, and at his approach McCall fell back down the stream fighting as he withdrew. The Confederates thus secured the crossing of the Chickahominy at Mechanicsville, and the order for an advance was given all along the Confederate line except the right wing under General Magruder, which was confronting McClellan on the right bank. The centre, formed of the divisions of Generals A. P. Hill, R. H. Anderson, and William H. C. Whiting moved toward Cold Harbor; Generals Jackson, D. H. Hill, and Longstreet formed the left nearer Pamunkey River.

McClellan's position at Gaines's Mill was evidently intended for a decisive field, and here was to occur an obstinate battle for Richmond. The Federals occupied a range of hills, their left on a wooded bluff rising abruptly from a deep ravine. This ravine was filled with sharpshooters whom the bluff protected. Above these, behind a breastwork of trees, a second line of infantry was stationed on the side of a hill. The crest of the hill was occupied by a third line protected by rifle trenches and by a battery of artillery. The approach was over an open plain a quarter of a mile wide, commanded by this triple line of fire and swept by the heavy batteries south of the Chickahominy. The ground was open on the centre and front of the enemy, bounded on the side of the Confederate approach by a sluggish stream that converted the soil into a deep morass.

General Lee in his headquarters at a house on Hogan's plantation quietly awaited the moment when his word would begin one of the most important battles of the war. Noon passed. The columns of Hill and Longstreet had halted to await Jackson's arrival at Cold Harbor. A courier dashed

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Major-general John Hunt Morgan and Mrs. Morgan.

up and delivered a paper to General Lee, who sat quiet and serious on a rear portico. The commander mounted his horse, and it was understood that the time for action had come.

Pressing on toward the York River railroad, A. P. Hill, who was in advance of Longstreet, had reached the vicinity of Cold Harbor about 2 P. M., and there encountered the enemy. He immediately formed his line nearly parallel to the road and soon became hotly engaged. The arrival of Jackson on the left was momentarily expected and it was supposed that his approach would cause the extension of the enemy's line in that direction. Under this impression, Longstreet was held back until this movement should commence. Hill's single division met with impetuous courage the principal part of the Federal army now on the north side of the Chickahominy. It drove the Federals back and assailed them in their strong position on the ridge. The battle raged fiercely and with varying fortune more than two hours, but the superior force of the enemy, assisted by the fire of the batteries south of the Chickahominy, which played incessantly on their columns, caused the Confederate troops to recoil. Most of the men had never been under fire until the day before, but they were rallied and in return repelled the advance. Some brigades were broken, others stubbornly maintained their positions, but it became apparent that the Federals were gradually gaining ground. Longstreet was ordered to make a diversion in Hill's favor by a feint on the Federal left. In making this demonstration the great strength of the position already described was discovered, and Longstreet perceived that to render the diversion effectual the feint must be converted into an attack. He resolved with characteristic promptness to carry the heights by assault. His column was quickly formed near the open ground, and just as he was ready for the assault Jackson arrived. Jackson's right division, that of Whiting, took position on the left of Longstreet. At the same time D. H. Hill formed on the extreme left, and

after a short but bloody conflict forced his way through the morass and obstructions and drove the enemy from the woods on the opposite side. Ewell advanced on Hill's right and engaged the enemy furiously. The line being now complete, a general advance was ordered. On the right the Confederates moved forward with steadiness, unchecked by the terrible fire from the triple lines of infantry on the hill and the cannon on both sides of the river, which burst upon them as they emerged upon the plain. The dead and wounded marked the way of the intrepid advance. The Federals were driven from the ravine to the first line of breastworks, over which the Confederate column charged up to the entrenchments on the crest. These were quickly stormed, fourteen pieces of artillery captured, and the enemy driven into the field beyond, and then into the woods on the river bank. Night put an end to the pursuit. Long lines of dead and wounded showed the location of each stand made by the Federals in their stubborn resistance, and the field was strewn with the slain. On the left the attack was no less vigorous and successful. D. H. Hill charged across the open ground in his front, one of his regiments having first bravely carried a battery whose fire enfiladed his advance. He captured several of the Federal batteries and drove their forces in confusion toward the river until darkness rendered further pursuit impossible.

On the morning of the 28th, General Stuart drove the last of the enemy to the south bank of the river and burned the railroad bridge. During the forenoon, columns of dust south of the Chickahominy showed that the Federal army was retreating. The following morning found the whole line of works deserted and large quantities of military stores of every description abandoned or destroyed. Late in the afternoon General Magruder attacked the Federals, and a severe action ensued which continued two hours, and was terminated by night. The Federals continued the retreat under cover of the darkness, after losing several hundred prisoners, and leaving their dead and wounded on the field.

At Savage Station were found about two thousand five hundred men in hospital and a large amount of property. Stores of much value had been destroyed, including the necessary medical supplies for the sick and wounded. But the time gained enabled the retreating column to cross White Oak Swamp without interruption and destroy the bridge.

Jackson reached Savage Station early on the 30th and was directed to pursue the enemy while Magruder followed Longstreet by the Darbytown road. As Jackson advanced, he captured such numbers of prisoners and collected so many arms that two regiments had to be detailed for their security. His progress was arrested at White Oak Swamp. The Federals occupied the opposite side and obstinately resisted the reconstruction of the bridge. Longstreet and A. P. Hill came upon the Federals, who were strongly posted across the Long Bridge road one mile from its intersection with the Charles City road. Huger's route led to the right of this position, Jackson's to the rear, and the arrival of their commands was awaited to begin the attack. General Theophilus H. Holmes had crossed from the south side of James River with part of his division on the 29th, and, reinforced by General Wise with a detachment of his brigade, on the 30th he moved down the river road and came upon the line of the retreating army near Malvern Hill. Here, reinforced by Longstreet and Hill, the Federals were attacked and the battle raged furiously. The Federals were driven with great slaughter from every position but one, and this they maintained until they were enabled to withdraw under cover of the darkness. The entire field remained covered with the Federal dead and wounded.

On July 1st, Jackson arrived and was directed to continue the pursuit. He found the Federals occupying a high range extending obliquely across the road in front of Malvern Hill, where they had concentrated their powerful artillery, supported by masses of infantry protected by

earthworks. Immediately in front the ground was open and from a quarter of a mile to half a mile in width, sloping from the crest so that it was easily swept by the fire of the Federal infantry and artillery. Before reaching this open ground, the Confederates had to pass through a thickly wooded country traversed by a swamp, and within the range of the batteries on the heights and the gunboats in the river, under whose incessant fire all movements had to be executed. Jackson formed his line for action. D. H. Hill pressed forward across the open field and engaged the enemy gallantly, breaking and driving back his first line, but he found himself unable to maintain the position. Jackson sent to his support his own division and that part of Ewell's which was in reserve; but, owing to the increasing darkness and to the intricacy of the forest and swamp, they did not arrive in time and Hill was compelled to abandon part of the ground he had gained. On the right, the attack was also gallantly made by Huger's and Magruder's commands. The brigades advanced bravely across the open field, raked by the fire of cannon and musketry. Some gave way, others approached close to the guns, driving back the infantry, compelling the advanced batteries to retire to escape capture, and mingling their dead with those of the enemy. Night was falling when the attack began, and it soon became difficult to distinguish friend from foe. Part of the troops were withdrawn to their original positions; others rested within a hundred yards of the batteries that had been so bravely but vainly assailed.

On July 2d it was discovered that the Federals had withdrawn during the night, and pursuit was commenced. General Stuart, with his cavalry, led the advance. A violent storm prevailed throughout the day, and the Federals succeeded in gaining the bank of James River and the protection of the gunboats. Here it was deemed inexpedient to attack; and in view of the condition of the Confederate troops, who had been marching and fighting almost incessantly for seven days, it was determined to withdraw and allow them to rest.

The army returned to the vicinity of Richmond on the 8th of July. The siege of Richmond had been raised, and the object of a campaign which had been prosecuted after months of preparation and at enormous expense was completely defeated.

The casualties during these seven days of fighting around Richmond had been, on the part of the Confederates, 3,286 killed, 15,909 wounded, and 940 missing, a total of 20,135 casualties. On the part of the Federals, the reports show 1,734 killed, 8,062 wounded, and 6,053 captured or missing, a total of 15,849. The effective force engaged on the Federal side numbered in all 105,445, divided as follows: infantry, 90,975; cavalry, 6,513; artillery, 6,446; engineers, 1,511. The strength of the Confederate forces is not officially stated, but probably ranged from 80,000 to 90,000 effectives.

These battles were fought at a time when the military strength of the Confederate States had been brought into the field and concentrated around Richmond. They were opposed by a force outnumbering them, according to the official records, by from 25,000 to 35,000 men. A great effort was made by Northern writers at the time to show that the Federal forces were outnumbered, but the official records show it to have been otherwise.

On the 5th of July, President Davis issued an address to the soldiers of the army in eastern Virginia, congratulating them on their "series of brilliant victories." On the preceding day, General McClellan had issued an address to his army congratulating it on having succeeded in changing its base of operations by a flank movement, "always regarded as the most hazardous of military operations." It had surely proved hazardous to McClellan's army. Up to the first decisive engagement in the series of battles, Cold Harbor, there were strategic designs in his backward movement. The retirement from Mechanicsville was voluntary and with the intention of concentrating his troops lower down, where he might select his own position and fight with the

advantage of numbers. Afterward he fixed the decisive field at Cold Harbor, and having been pushed from his strongholds north of the Chickahominy, an attempt was made to retrieve his disaster at Fraser's Farm. After these two principal battles there is no ground for claims of strategy in the retrograde movement. It was not a falling back to concentrate troops for action, but a retreat.

There were no more promises of a speedy ending of the war. The news of McClellan's retreat caused great excitement throughout the North and produced such a shock as had not been felt since the outbreak of the war. The clamor against McClellan was renewed in Washington. On the 7th of July he wrote a letter to President Lincoln embodying his views of warfare. In the course of this letter he says :

"I earnestly desire, in view of possible contingencies, to lay before your excellency for your private consideration my general views concerning the existing state of the rebellion, although they do not strictly relate to the situation of this army or strictly come within the scope of my official duties. These views amount to convictions and are deeply impressed upon my mind and heart. Our cause must never be abandoned; it is the cause of free institutions and self-government. The Constitution and the Union must be preserved, whatever may be the cost in time, treasure, and blood. If secession is successful, other dissolutions are clearly to be seen in the future. Let neither military disaster, political faction, nor foreign war shake your settled purpose to enforce the equal operation of the laws of the United States upon the people of every State.

"The time has come when the government must determine upon a civil and military policy covering the whole ground of our national trouble. The responsibility of determining, declaring and supporting such civil and military policy, and of directing the whole course of national affairs in regard to the rebellion must now be assumed and exercised by you, or our cause will be lost. The Constitution gives you power, even for the present terrible exigency.

This rebellion has assumed the character of a war, as such it should be regarded, and it should be conducted upon the highest principles known to Christian civilization. It should not be at all a war looking to the subjugation of the people of any State, in any event. It should not be at all a war upon population, but against armed forces and political organizations. Neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, territorial organizations of States, or forcible abolition of slavery should be contemplated for a moment. . . . Military arrests should not be tolerated, except in places where active hostilities exist; and oaths not required by amendments constitutionally made should be neither demanded nor received. Military government should be confined to the preservation of public order and the protection of political rights. Military power should not be allowed to interfere with the relations of servitude, either by supporting or impairing the authority of the master, except for repressing disorders, as in other cases. . . . A system of policy thus constitutional, and pervaded by the influences of Christianity and freedom, would receive the support of almost all truly loyal men, would deeply impress the rebel masses and all foreign nations, and it might be humbly hoped that it would commend itself to the favor of the Almighty.

“The policy of the government must be supported by concentration of military power. The national forces should not be dispersed in expeditions, posts of occupation, and numerous armies, but should be mainly collected into masses, and brought to bear upon the armies of the Confederate States. Those armies thoroughly defeated, the political structure which they support would soon cease to exist.”

Early in July, General Halleck had resigned his command of the Army of the West and July 23d assumed the duties of general-in-chief of the entire army of the United States. This was the position McClellan had held previous to his departure from Washington to conduct the Peninsular

Campaign, the secretary of war having performed its duties in the meantime, under the supervision of President Lincoln, assisted by the counsel of Major-general Ethan Allen Hitchcock, an elderly officer of the army. General Halleck favored either an advance upon Richmond or a junction of McClellan and Pope, and as McClellan finally demanded at least thirty-five thousand more men before advancing on Richmond, and as this number could not be furnished him, the transfer of McClellan's army to join that of General Pope was ordered.

The appointment of Pope to the most important command in Virginia had been the triumph of the radical element at Washington, the negative reply to McClellan's letter. From that appointment dated the system of spoliation in the Southern States. Pope at once made war upon the non-combatant population within his lines; he arrested private citizens, and when they would not take the "oath of allegiance" they were driven from their homes; if they returned to their own homes within his lines they were "considered spies, and subjected to the extreme rigor of military law." By a general order of the Federal government the military commanders in the States of South Carolina, Virginia, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas were directed to seize and use any property, real or personal, belonging to the people of the Confederate States which might be necessary or convenient, and no provision was made for any compensation to the owners. It was estimated on the floor of the House of Representatives that the invading armies by this act were authorized to plunder 5,500,000 people of property of the value of \$5,000,000,000. Slaves belonging to anyone who had ever aided the Confederacy were to be freed, and if the slaves escaped to free States they could not be molested. All private property, from silver spoons to plantations, was to be regarded as spoils. The fifth article of the Constitution was thus abrogated by legislative enactment.

One Northern paper, referring to the depravity of Pope's troops in Virginia, said that unless there were "by far more stringent safeguards against irregular and unauthorized plundering, we shall have let loose upon the country at the close of the war a torrent of unbridled and unscrupulous robbers."

To such an extent did the pillaging of private property and the insulting of women go that the Confederate government, by way of retaliation, issued an order declaring that General Pope and the commissioned officers serving under him were "not entitled to be considered as soldiers, and therefore not entitled to the benefit of cartel for the parole of future prisoners of war; that in the event of the capture of Major-general Pope or any commissioned officer serving under him, the captive so taken shall be held in close confinement so long as the orders aforesaid shall continue in force and unrepealed by the competent military authority of the United States; and that in the event of the murder of an unarmed citizen or inhabitant of the Confederacy under pretence of the order herein recited," out of the commissioned officers from among the prisoners should be hanged at once a number equal to those so murdered.

McClellan protested in vain against the withdrawal of his army from the James; he entreated that the order be rescinded. But Halleck persisted upon his return and the once proud Army of the Potomac went down to reinforce the army of Pope and to act under his command. The scene of operations was thus changed from about Richmond to northern Virginia.

To meet Pope's advance and to check the atrocities threatened against defenceless citizens, General Jackson with his own and Ewell's divisions was sent toward Gordonsville July 13th. Finding Pope's army vastly greater than his own he observed the enemy closely while awaiting the opportunity to attack. McClellan remaining inactive, and Pope's advance having reached the Rapidan, A. P. Hill with his division was ordered, July 27th, to join Jackson. At the same time D. H. Hill was directed to threaten

McClellan's communications by seizing favorable positions below Westover from which to attack the transports in the river. He selected Coggins's Point, opposite Westover, and on the night of July 31st General Samuel G. French, accompanied by General W. N. Pendleton, chief of artillery, placed forty-three guns in position within range of the Federal shipping in the river and of the camps on the north side, upon both of which fire was opened, causing consternation and inflicting serious damage. The guns were withdrawn before daybreak, and McClellan then sent a strong force to entrench itself at Coggins's Point.

While Lee was still awaiting the development of McClellan's plans, Jackson, reinforced by A. P. Hill, determined to assume the offensive against Pope. He wanted to meet his old opponent of the Shenandoah Valley again and so resolved to attack Banks's corps before the arrival of the remainder. On August 7th he moved from Gordonsville for that purpose; on the 9th he arrived within eight miles of Culpepper Court House, when the enemy was found at Cedar Run, a short distance northwest of Slaughter's Mountain. Early's brigade was thrown forward while two others took position on the western slope of the mountain and Jackson's division was placed on the left of the road. A fierce fire of artillery opened the battle, in which General Winder was killed while directing the movements of the batteries. As no demonstration was made except with the artillery, Banks sent word to Pope, seven miles away, that he hardly expected a battle that afternoon. Despite his lesson in the Shenandoah, he was again to be deceived. Hardly had his courier gone, when the flanking force of the Confederates was discovered on the mountain. In the battle that followed Banks was ingloriously defeated, and night alone saved him from pursuit. General Jackson remained in position, and the next day, feeling assured that Banks had been reinforced, buried the dead and collected the arms from the battlefield, returning at night to the vicinity of Gordonsville. The loss to his army was 223

killed and 1,060 wounded. The Federal loss was about 2,000, including 400 prisoners taken.

Pope's army was evidently being largely reinforced, and General Lee decided to advance against him as the best means of relieving Richmond from danger of attack. Pope took the alarm and promptly retreated beyond the Rappahannock. On August 25th, Jackson, with 25,000 men, went toward the headwaters of that river, and on the 26th he was between the Federal capital and Pope's great army, a position of peril, since an attack from Washington, should Pope turn and coöperate against him, meant annihilation. The Federal government thought Jackson was lost and that a certain and splendid victory awaited them. But before Pope had realized that such a force was in his rear, before he had realized that the demonstration was not a mere foray, Jackson had effectively carried out his important designs upon Pope's stores at Bristoe and Manassas. He captured eight pieces of artillery, three hundred prisoners, and a vast accumulation of supplies. He appropriated all that his army could use, and destroyed the remainder to prevent its recapture. The Federal commander at last became aware of the true situation, and turned upon Jackson with his entire army.

Jackson's force being greatly inferior to that of Pope in point of numbers, he withdrew from Manassas and took a position west of the turnpike road from Warrenton to Alexandria. Jackson, having been reinforced, attacked the Federals on the 28th on their way from Warrenton to Alexandria, and a fierce and bloody conflict, lasting until nine o'clock at night, followed. The Federals fell back. The loss on both sides was heavy, among the Confederate wounded being General Ewell and Brigadier-general Taliaferro, the condition of the former being serious.

During the night the enemy took a position to interpose his army between Alexandria and Jackson's army, and about ten o'clock on the morning of the 29th opened fire with artillery upon Jackson's right. The evident intention was

to concentrate on Jackson and overwhelm him before Longstreet arrived. Longstreet had left his position opposite Warrenton Springs on the 26th and marched to join Jackson. The next day he reached White Plains, his march being retarded by the want of cavalry to ascertain the meaning of certain movements of the Federals from the direction of Warrenton, which seemed to menace the right flank of his column. He arrived at Thoroughfare Gap on the 28th, and, finding that the Federals held the eastern extremity of the pass in large force, directed a heavy fire of artillery upon the road leading through it and upon the sides of the mountain. The Federals attacked, but were repulsed, and Generals D. R. Jones and Cadmus M. Wilcox bivouacked that night east of the mountain. On the morning of the 29th, the whole command resumed the march, the sound of cannon at Manassas announcing that Jackson was already engaged. Longstreet entered the turnpike near Gainesville; and moving down toward Groveton, the head of his column came upon the field in rear of the enemy's left, which had already opened with artillery upon Jackson's right. General Longstreet took position by the right of Jackson, John B. Hood's two brigades, supported by Evans, being deployed across the turnpike and at right angles to it.

These troops were supported on the left by three brigades under General Wilcox, and by a like force on the right under General James L. Kemper. D. R. Jones's division formed the extreme right of the line, resting on the Manassas Gap railroad. The cavalry guarded the right and left flanks, that on the right being under General Stuart in person. Little real fighting occurred until the Federals in large force assailed Jackson's left, when the battle raged with fury. Repeatedly repulsed, the Federals again and again pressed on the attack with fresh troops. They penetrated the extreme Confederate left, but were driven back with great slaughter by the Fourteenth South Carolina Regiment and the Forty-ninth Georgia, of J. R. Anderson's brigade. The contest was close and obstinate, but the Federals were forced

back two hundred yards beyond the line of battle. While the battle was raging on Jackson's left, General Longstreet ordered Hood and Evans to advance; but before the order could be obeyed, Hood was himself attacked and his command at once became warmly engaged. After a severe contest the Federals fell back, closely followed by the Confederates. Darkness ended the battle, the Federals retreating to a strong position.

On the morning of the 30th the Federals again advanced, and skirmishing began along the line. The troops of Jackson and Longstreet maintained their positions of the previous day. Fitzhugh Lee, with three regiments of his cavalry, was posted on Jackson's left; and R. H. Anderson's division, which arrived during the forenoon, was held in reserve near the turnpike. The batteries of Colonel S. D. Lee engaged the enemy actively until noon, when firing ceased and all was quiet for several hours. About 3 P. M. the enemy, having massed his troops in front of General Jackson, advanced in strong force. Jackson's troops checked the advance, and a fierce and bloody struggle ensued. A second and third line of great strength moved up to support the first, but in doing so came within easy range of a position a little in advance of Longstreet's left. He immediately ordered up two batteries; and two others being thrown forward about the same time by Colonel S. D. Lee, under their well-directed and destructive fire the supporting lines were broken, and fell back in confusion. Their repeated efforts to rally were unavailing, and Jackson's troops, being thus relieved from the pressure of overwhelming numbers, began to press steadily forward, pushing the enemy before them. Longstreet, anticipating the order for a general advance, now threw his whole command against the Federal centre and left. They swept steadily on, driving the Federals with great carnage from each successive position, until 10 P. M., when darkness again ended the battle and the pursuit.

When morning came, the Federals had escaped to Centreville, about four miles beyond Bull Run. Heavy rain set

in during the night. General Longstreet remained on the battlefield to engage the attention of the enemy and cover the burial of the dead and the removal of the wounded, while Jackson proceeded toward Fairfax Court House. The Federal army fell back rapidly toward Washington. Jackson's advance column encountered them near Germantown about 5 P. M., and line of battle was at once formed. The conflict was obstinately maintained until dark, when the Federals retreated, having lost two general officers, one of whom, Major-general Philip Kearney, was left dead on the field.

The next morning it was found that the retreat had been conducted so rapidly that further pursuit was useless, and the victorious army rested on the 2d of September, near Chantilly, except the cavalry, which continued to harass the enemy until they reached their entrenchments.

The losses in this series of combats, from the Rappahannock to the Potomac, known as the second battle of Bull Run, were heavy on both sides. The Federal casualties amounted, according to the official reports, to 1,747 killed, 8,452 wounded, and 4,263 captured or missing—a total of 14,462. On the Confederate side, omitting Fitzhugh Lee's brigade, which was not reported, there were 1,553 killed, 7,812 wounded, and 109 missing—a total of 9,474. The numbers given on both sides are unquestionably too small, but are the nearest approximation that can be had from the existing records. As to the number actually present on the field of battle, official returns and reports are both imperfect and contradictory. A careful study of the armies based on the most accurate information obtainable, leads to the conclusion that the effective strength of the army under Pope's command was not less than 63,000, and that of the Confederate army close to 54,000 of all arms.

Pope had sustained a most signal defeat, to the utter surprise and consternation of the North, as a decisive victory had been promised by him. Even after the battle of the

29th he had telegraphed to Washington that he had won a great victory and was master of the field. On the night of the 30th, when the day's battle ground, torn, scarred, and bloody, was piled with heaps of dead and dying, he telegraphed from Centreville, whither he had retreated, to General Halleck in Washington: "The enemy is badly whipped, and we shall do well enough. Do not be uneasy. . . . I think the army entitled to the gratitude of the country." The North soon realized the terrible situation; the Confederates had won the crowning victory of the campaign in Virginia, and would certainly attempt a new adventure; and so greatly had they risen in the opinion of their enemies that no project was thought too extravagant, no enterprise too daring for the troops of Lee and Jackson. The fortunes of the Confederacy had changed—rapidly, decisively. The armies of Pope and McClellan had now been brought back to the point from which they had set out on the campaigns of the spring and summer, reduced in number, physically weakened, and discouraged.

Confederate victories had created a growing sentiment in Richmond in favor of transferring the war to the enemy's country. On the receipt of information to this effect, President Lincoln on August 4, 1862, had issued an order calling out an additional 300,000 men, and directing a special draft in every State failing to furnish its quota.

General Lee's army on the 3d of September marched toward Leesburg, with the design of crossing the Upper Potomac and transferring hostilities to the soil of Maryland. General Lee's own expectations were much more moderate than those of the Confederate public. He knew that the army was not properly equipped for an invasion. The surrounding difficulties were fully appreciated, yet more assistance was expected from the fears of the Washington government than from any active demonstration on the part of the people of Maryland. The Potomac was crossed on September 5th, and on the 6th Jackson's corps entered Frederick City. Here General Lee issued a proclamation

to the people of Maryland explaining that he had entered Maryland to assist the people in throwing off the Federal yoke if they so desired, intending no restraint upon their free will and no intimidation. It was for the people to decide their own destiny, and the army would respect their choice. The response to this appeal was equivocal, timid, inconsiderable. General Lee found the people content to gaze with wonder on his poorly equipped army. While there was some display of welcome, that part of Maryland was not in sympathy with the South.

General Jackson drove the enemy from Martinsburg and on the 14th of September invested Harper's Ferry on three sides. In the meantime McClellan, who, after the defeat of Pope, had been placed again at the head of the Federal armies in and around Washington, was evidently at a loss to understand Lee's movements, and was for several days inactive owing to President Lincoln's fear that Lee after drawing the army from Washington by the feint of an advance into Maryland, would turn around and capture the city. Accident at last revealed Lee's plans and the exact disposition of his forces. A copy of the order directing the movement from Frederick addressed to D. H. Hill, had been left on Hill's abandoned camp ground, near which the Twenty-seventh Indiana went into camp. A Federal soldier picked up the order, took it to Colonel, afterward General, Silas Cosgrove, and within two hours McClellan became possessed of the details of his adversary's plan of operations.

General Jackson had meantime completed the reduction of Harper's Ferry, which he attacked at dawn on the 15th of September and captured after a fast and furious battle of two hours; seventy-three pieces of artillery, thirteen thousand small arms and a large quantity of military stores were taken. General A. P. Hill was left in charge, while General Jackson with his two other divisions set out at once for Sharpsburg, ordering Generals Lafayette McLaws and William Walker to follow without delay. He arrived early



Major-general Sterling Price.

*From the painting in possession of the
Missouri Historical Society,
St. Louis.*



Major-general James Ewell Brown Stuart.

*From the painting in the
Confederate Memorial Museum,
New Orleans.*



Lieut.-gen. Thomas Jonathan Jackson.

*From the painting in the
Confederate Memorial Museum,
New Orleans.*

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on the 16th, and General Walker joined him in the afternoon, but McLaws did not reach the battlefield of Sharpsburg until after the engagement of the 17th had begun.

The commands of Longstreet and D. H. Hill on their arrival at Sharpsburg were placed in position along the range of hills between the town and the Antietam, nearly parallel with the course of that stream, Longstreet on the right of the road to Boonsboro and Hill on the left. The enemy's advance was delayed by Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry, but he crossed the Antietam beyond the reach of the batteries and menaced the Confederate left. In anticipation of this movement Hood's two brigades had been transferred from the right and posted between D. H. Hill and the Hagerstown road. General Jackson formed his line on Hood's left, his right resting on the Hagerstown road and his left extending toward the Potomac, protected by General Stuart with the cavalry and horse artillery. General Walker with his two brigades was stationed at Longstreet's right. As evening approached the artillery fire of the enemy opened more vigorously, and the Federal infantry made a heavy charge upon Hood, but the attack was repulsed. At 10 P. M. Hood's troops were relieved by the brigades of Lawton and Trimble, of Ewell's division, commanded by General A. R. Lawton.

After a short respite during the night the Federal artillery opened the battle again at dawn on the 17th. Under cover of the fire a large force of infantry attacked General Jackson, but his troops met the charge with the utmost resolution. The conflict raged for hours. The Federal lines were repeatedly broken and driven back, but fresh troops constantly replaced those who were beaten off and Jackson's men in turn were forced to fall back. General William E. Starke was killed and General Lawton wounded. Nearly all the field officers and a large proportion of the men were killed or disabled. The worn out soldiers were replaced or reinforced by others who had had less arduous work to do. Then the battle raged with great violence again. The

enemy's lines were broken anew and forced back, but reinforcements came up and again they began to gain ground. Once more they were driven back.

The Confederate centre and left were also attacked, but the enemy, driven off, retired behind the crest of a hill from which a desultory fire was maintained. By a mistake of orders, General Rodes's brigade was at this time withdrawn from its position during the temporary absence of that officer in another part of the field. The enemy passed through the gap thus left and broke General G. B. Anderson's brigade, which retired. Generals G. B. Anderson, R. H. Anderson, and A. R. Wright were all wounded and borne from the field.

The heavy masses of the enemy again moved forward. They were opposed by four pieces of artillery and a few hundred men belonging to different brigades, rallied by General D. H. Hill and other officers, and by parts of other commands. The Twenty-seventh North Carolina Regiment, of Walker's brigade, under Colonel John R. Cooke, stood boldly in line without a cartridge. The firm front presented by the little band and the well-directed fire of the few guns, checked the progress of the Federal advance, and in an hour and a half the enemy retired. Another attack further to the right was repulsed by Captain M. B. Miller's guns supported by a part of R. H. Anderson's troops. While these two attacks were in progress the Federals made repeated efforts to force the passage of the bridge over the Antietam. The bridge was defended by General Robert Toombs with two regiments of his brigade and by the batteries of General D. R. Jones. This small command repulsed five strenuous assaults and maintained its position. In the afternoon the Federal lines were extended with the apparent intention of crossing below the bridge. Toombs's regiment retired and the enemy crossed in large numbers. They immediately advanced against General Jones, who held the crest of the hill with less than 2,000 men, and after a brave resistance he was forced to retire. Thus the enemy gained the summit.

General A. P. Hill having arrived from Harper's Ferry, he was ordered to reinforce General Jones and moved against the enemy, now flushed with success. The Federals paused, the lines wavered, they made a brief resistance, and then broke and retreated toward the Antietam. They were pursued until they reached the protection of their batteries. The brave General Branch was killed in this attack while gallantly leading his brigade.

It was nearly dark. The Federals had massed a number of batteries so as to sweep the approaches to the Antietam, on the opposite side of which General Porter's corps, not heretofore engaged, now appeared. The Confederate troops were much exhausted and greatly reduced in number, so it was deemed injudicious to pursue the present advantage further in the face of fresh troops of the enemy. They were accordingly recalled and formed on the line originally held by General Jones. During the attack on the Confederate centre General Jackson had endeavored to turn the Federal right, but abandoned the attempt because he found it extending nearly to the Potomac and strongly defended with artillery. The repulse on the right ended the engagement. After a protracted and bloody conflict every effort to dislodge the Confederates had been defeated with severe loss.

On the 18th, the Confederates occupied the same position as on the preceding day, except in the centre, where the line was drawn in about two hundred yards. New troops arrived, who had not participated in the battles of the preceding days. Too weak to assume the offensive, the renewal of the attack was awaited without apprehension. The day passed with no demonstration from the enemy, who was reported to be awaiting further reinforcements. As the Confederates could look for no material increase in their number, while the enemy could be largely and rapidly augmented, it was not thought prudent to await another contest. The Confederate army accordingly retired to the south side of the Potomac, where it rested several days near

Martinsburg, while the enemy appeared to be concentrating at Harper's Ferry. President Lincoln wanted an immediate advance and an early battle with Lee's forces. McClellan hesitated. There were occasional skirmishes, but McClellan let the beautiful autumn weather pass without any demonstration of moment. Bleak November came, and on the 5th of the month McClellan received an order to resign the command of the army to General Ambrose E. Burnside and to report himself at Trenton, New Jersey.

General Burnside found a splendid army, formed into three divisions, and commanded by Generals Sumner, Hooker, and Franklin. He at once proposed to march rapidly down the left bank of the Rappahannock, cross by means of pontoons at Fredericksburg, and advance on Richmond by Hanover Court House.

General Lee knew on November 15th that the enemy was in motion, and one regiment of infantry, with a battery of light artillery, was sent to reinforce the Fredericksburg garrison. General Stuart was directed to cross the Rappahannock and observe the movements of the enemy. On the 18th he obtained information which confirmed the impression that the whole Federal army under Burnside was moving toward Fredericksburg. On the morning of the 19th, the remainder of Longstreet's corps was accordingly put in motion for that point, and arrived before any large body of the enemy appeared. Stafford Heights, on the north bank of the river, had been held by a Federal detachment for several days. It was apparent on the 21st that Burnside was concentrating his entire force on the north side of the Rappahannock. On the same day, General Sumner demanded the surrender of Fredericksburg, and in case of refusal threatened to bombard the city at nine o'clock the following morning. The bombardment did not take place, but the population left their homes with such food and clothing as they could take with them.

General Burnside began his preparations to cross the Rappahannock and advance upon Richmond. Lee's left

wing, under Jackson, was fast pushing forward. On his arrival the forces were disposed at once. The Confederate lines extended from the river, about a mile and a half above Fredericksburg, along the range of hills in the rear of the city to the Richmond Railroad. Earthworks for the artillery were thrown up on the crests of these hills. The Federals had on Stafford Heights a brilliant and magnificent array of military force. The Confederates were drawn up along the heights in the rear of Fredericksburg. These heights, receding in a semicircle from the river, embrace within their arms a plain six miles long and from two to three miles wide. The Federals were in motion before the dawn of December 11th, and the Confederate signal guns announced that fact. Soon afterward, one hundred and fifty pieces of artillery opened a furious fire upon the city. The Confederates withdrew and the enemy crossed in boats, their advance being bravely resisted until dark. The Confederates had gained the time needed for the concentration of their forces.

The plain in which the Federal army lay was still enveloped in a dense fog at nine o'clock on the morning of the 13th, so that its operations could not be discerned. The batteries on the heights began to play upon Longstreet's position, and shortly after nine o'clock the partial lifting of the mist disclosed a large force moving in line of battle against Jackson, near the centre. After a temporary check from Major John Pelham, of Stuart's Horse Artillery, the enemy's entire batteries opened upon Jackson, and their left was extended down the Port Royal road. There was no immediate response from Jackson, and the enemy confidently moved forward to seize the position held by Lieutenant-colonel James A. Walker near the right. Walker reserved his fire until they had come within eight hundred yards, when he opened with his fourteen guns with such destruction as to make the line waver, then break, and retreat.

The attack on the Confederate right began about one o'clock with a furious cannonade, under cover of which three compact lines of Federal infantry advanced. The

Confederate artillery checked the forward movement, but the column recovered and pressed forward, and when within range of the Confederate infantry, the contest at once became fierce and bloody. Generals James J. Archer and James H. Lane, who were stationed on the edge of the wood, repulsed a portion of the line, but before the gap made between these two forces could be closed the enemy had pressed through in overwhelming numbers and turned the left of Archer and the right of Lane. Archer held his line with the First Tennessee, and with three other regiments continued to struggle until reinforcements came. Thomas came to Lane's relief and aided in repulsing the column that had broken Lane's line, driving the Federals back to the railroad.

A sudden attack by a large force penetrating the wood as far as Hill's reserve threw the Confederates into confusion, and, while rallying his men, Brigadier-general Maxey Gregg fell mortally wounded. Colonel D. H. Hamilton, upon whom the command devolved, with the remaining regiments and one company of the Rifles, met and checked the enemy. The second line advanced to assist the first, and after a short and decisive contest in the wood, the Federals were routed, though largely reinforced, and pursued to the railroad embankment. Here the Confederates charged and drove them back across the plain to the shelter of the batteries. The attack on Hill's left was driven off by the artillery. The attack of the enemy on the right was not renewed, though the Federal batteries kept up an active fire at intervals. In the meantime, the Federals in formidable numbers made repeated and desperate assaults on the Confederate left, the batteries on Stafford Heights directing their fire upon the Confederate artillery, with the purpose of silencing it and covering the movements of the infantry. Without replying to the cannonade, the Confederate batteries poured their fire into the dense lines of the advancing enemy, frequently breaking their ranks and forcing them to the shelter of the houses. Six times did they rally, and pressed

on to within one hundred yards of the foot of the hill, but here they encountered the deadly fire of the Confederate infantry, and the columns broke and fled. In the third assault, the brave Brigadier-general R. R. Cobb fell at the head of his troops, and, almost at the same instant, Brigadier-general J. R. Cooke was borne from the field severely wounded. General J. B. Kershaw, who had come up to support Cobb's brigade, took command.

The last of the assaults was made shortly before dark, and met the fate of those that had preceded it. When night closed in, the shattered masses of the enemy had disappeared in the town, leaving the field covered with dead and wounded.

During the night the Confederate lines were strengthened, but two days passed with no renewal of the attack. The batteries on both sides of the river played upon the Confederate lines, and the sharpshooters skirmished along the front. The Confederate forces did not deem it wise to lose the advantages of their position and expose the troops to the fire of the inaccessible batteries beyond the river by advancing, but they were ignorant of the extent of the Federal suffering until the morning of the 16th, when it was discovered that under cover of the darkness and the storm the Federal forces had recrossed the river. The Confederates immediately reoccupied the town and resumed their position on the river bank.

The armies engaged in this battle were very disproportionate. On the 10th of December, Burnside reported that he had "present for duty equipped" or available for line of battle, 104,903 infantry; 5,884 cavalry, and 5,896 artillery, or a total of 116,683. On the same day, a similar report from Lee shows "present for duty," including all of Stuart's cavalry, 78,513 men. His effective strength in battle, not officially stated, was 58,500, Hampton's cavalry being on a raid north of the Rappahannock, and W. E. Jones's cavalry brigade serving in the Shenandoah Valley. Less than 20,000 of this force was actively engaged in the

battle. Losses on the Federal side officially reported were 1,284 killed, 9,600 wounded, and 1,769 captured or missing, a total casualty list of 12,653. On the Confederate side there were 608 killed, 4,116 wounded, and 653 captured or missing, a total of casualties of 5,377.

It was a crushing defeat for Burnside, in which every part of the Confederate army engaged had an important part. In Richmond there was but one thought—that General Lee would follow up the crippled enemy, and the North trembled lest that should be the result. One day might have decided the fate of the war. Annihilation or capitulation would have been the result. General Lee's report acknowledges while explaining his error. He did not know even the extent of the injury he had inflicted on Burnside's magnificent army until after it had escaped in the storm and darkness of the night of December 15th.

This closed the third campaign against Richmond, and no other hostile demonstration was made by either party during the year.

One feature of the notable campaigning of 1862 in Virginia was the quick and frequent work of Stuart's cavalry. In March they watched the Federal reconnoissance to Bealton Station and captured about fifty prisoners, though no fighting occurred. On the night of May 3d, they protected the rear during the retreat from Yorktown, and during the battle of Williamsburg formed General Longstreet's medium of communication with the battlefield. On the 12th, 13th, 14th, and 15th of June, Stuart prosecuted that reconnoissance to the rear of McClellan's army which is known as "The Chickahominy Raid," the object in view being to locate definitely the right wing of McClellan's army and ascertain the feasibility of the plan of moving Jackson against it. The force consisted of one thousand two hundred cavalry, and Stuart soon accomplished the purpose of the expedition. He then continued until he had made the entire circuit of McClellan's army, though the return lay through the enemy's territory and in sight of his

gunboats in the James. In recognition of Stuart's services Governor Letcher presented him with a handsome sabre. All doubt as to the location of the Federal army had been solved and the possibility demonstrated of those movements which on the 27th of June, culminated in the defeat of the Federal right wing at Cold Harbor. It was for his bravery in this raid that Fitzhugh Lee received promotion to the rank of brigadier-general.

In the seven days' fighting around Richmond, Stuart rendered the greatest service. He covered Jackson's left flank in the march from Ashland on June 26th, and covered it also on the following day. On the 28th he advanced toward White House, which he reached on the 29th, capturing a large amount of supplies and remaining during the night. On the 30th he moved his command to Long Bridge and Forge Bridge, bivouacking at the latter; early on the morning of July 1st he received orders to join Jackson. This he did on July 2d at Gatewoods, but hearing that the enemy had abandoned their position at Malvern Hill, Stuart started down the river to ascertain their location. In sight of two gunboats, the *Monitor* and the *Galena*, he drove off thirty mules and captured one hundred and fifty prisoners. Finding the enemy in force at the cross roads, he spent the rest of the day collecting prisoners toward Malvern Hill and reconnoitring toward Charles City Court House.

On July 25th Stuart was commissioned major-general, and on the 28th the cavalry was organized into two brigades under Brigadier-general Wade Hampton and Brigadier-general Fitzhugh Lee. After some skirmishing along the Rapidan and the Rappahannock, General Stuart proposed to General Lee to allow him to take his cavalry to the rear of Pope's army and endeavor to interrupt his communications by the railroad. General Lee gave his consent, and on August 22d Stuart crossed the Rappahannock with all his command except the Seventh and Third Virginia Cavalry. At night he attacked Pope's camp, captured a number of officers belonging to Pope's staff, a large sum of money, the

despatch book and other papers, together with General Pope's personal baggage and other property. The following day he returned to Warrenton Springs with over three hundred prisoners. General Pope's uniform was displayed prominently in the window of a Richmond store for many days afterward. Stuart's part in the second battle of Manassas and in the unfortunate invasion of Maryland has been referred to elsewhere.

The Chambersburg raid was one of the most remarkable occurrences of the war, in that it was in such glaring contrast with the raids made into hundreds of Southern cities and towns by the Federal troops. Eighteen hundred cavalrymen started on October 9th from Darkesville, their destination unknown, and under the most rigid orders against private plundering. No private property was seized in Maryland, which was crossed almost before the enemy knew of their presence, and the column pressed on toward Mercersburg. The Pennsylvanians could not believe the truth even when it was forced upon them. Once in Pennsylvania, the country was denuded of its horses. On the evening of the 10th Stuart reached Chambersburg, which surrendered without resistance. The stores were closed and few of them were molested. No private premises were entered, even to ask for water or food, without permission. Private property was not molested, except horses, for which receipts were given. There was no wanton destruction of property, and everything seized was taken under officers who would have restrained any inclination of the men to plunder. But there was no such inclination. Stuart's ranks were filled by men from the highest class of Southern society.

Stuart bivouacked outside Chambersburg on the 10th, and that night a heavy rain set in. The enemy was massing to oppose or intercept him, and scouts on every road were learning his movements to direct the attack upon him. If the river should rise beyond fording he could have no avenue of escape. Though assured by his guide that they

could cross the streams, the hours passed slowly while the command rested.

With dawn the head of the column started toward Gettysburg, the ordnance storehouse at Chambersburg being blown up before departure. Emmettsburg, Maryland, was reached about sunset, and there they were warmly received and well treated. They had come thirty-one and a half miles since nine o' clock. After a short rest they resumed the march southward to Frederick. Soon after dark a scout was captured with papers showing that the enemy were as yet unaware of Stuart's locality, and that two brigades of infantry were ready at the railroad crossing of the Monocacy in cars, the engines with steam up, to convey them in either direction at a moment's notice. To avoid these dangers the column was turned eastward at Rocky Ridge to strike the Woodsboro road two miles distant. Throughout the night the head of the column was kept at a trot, and entered Hyattstown by daylight of the 12th of October. Stuart had come sixty-five miles in twenty hours and had kept up his artillery. He was still twelve miles from a place of safety, and General George Stoneman, stationed at Poolesville, was guarding all the lower fords with three brigades of infantry.

In view of the enemy's signal station on Sugar Loaf Mountain, Stuart marched a little more than two miles toward Poolesville, where the road entered a large body of woods. Here he went abruptly to the west by a long disused road; he had deceived the enemy, who could no longer follow his movements. Colonel W. H. F. Lee led the way by a farm road to White's Ford, which was guarded by a large body of Federal infantry, on a precipitous bluff, separated from the ford only by the width of the canal. It seemed a hazardous undertaking to dislodge them. Colonel Lee tried strategy. A courier with a handkerchief tied to his sabre conveyed to the Federals a demand to surrender, as Stuart with his whole command was in front and would charge if they did not surrender within fifteen minutes.

When the fifteen minutes had expired the Federals were in full retreat, and Stuart's men passed over the river and on to Virginia soil once more. After a breathing spell the troops moved on to Leesburg, ten miles distant, where they bivouacked for the night. Thence by easy marches they returned to their camps west of the mountains.

This march from Chambersburg is one of the most remarkable on record. Stuart, encumbered with artillery, had traversed about ninety miles in twenty-seven hours. He had captured horses, and forced a passage of the Potomac under the very eyes of troops vastly outnumbering his own. His only casualty was one man wounded. Two who had dropped out of the line of march for some reason were captured. He had destroyed public property valued at a quarter of a million dollars, paroled two hundred and eighty sick and wounded prisoners, brought about thirty United States officials and prominent citizens to Richmond to be held as hostages for citizens of the Confederacy imprisoned by Federal authorities, and captured about twelve hundred horses. McClellan's cavalry had all been used against Stuart, and was completely exhausted and broken down.

Stuart was allowed but two day's rest for his men after this exhausting raid. At daylight on the 16th of October, two columns of the Federal army advanced, the purpose of their reconnoissance being to ascertain if General Lee's army was yet in the valley of Virginia. Stuart with Fitzhugh Lee's brigade opposed the advance of the column under General A. A. Humphreys, being afterward reinforced with Winder's brigade of infantry. General Humphreys, having ascertained Lee's whereabouts, withdrew. General McClellan's advance began on October 26th, and Stuart was in almost daily contact with the enemy thereafter until the year closed.

CHAPTER IX

CAMPAIGNS OF 1862—IN THE WEST

WE left the two armies of the west in battle array facing each other in long lines extending entirely across the State of Kentucky. The impatience and urgent appeals of General Grant had obtained him permission to move against Belmont, on the Missouri side of Mississippi River, an outpost of the Confederate left flank, and Grant had been repulsed in the attack and forced to fall back to Cairo. From that date, November 7, 1861, there was no important movement by either army until after the middle of January, 1862.

It must be remembered that while the entire Confederate army was united under the command of one general, such was not the case with the Federal forces. General D. C. Buell's command extended west to Cumberland River in its western crossing of the State. The portion of Kentucky west of this river was attached to the Department of Missouri, and was occupied by troops under the immediate command of General Grant, who was, however, under the orders of General Halleck. It was not until March 11, 1862, that the two departments were united under Halleck.

General Buell was the first to move. Under the orders of McClellan instructing him to form a column to move against Knoxville, he sent General George H. Thomas to move against the right of the Confederate line which guarded Cumberland Gap and the road to Knoxville. General Thomas, commanding a strong Federal force, marched against Beech Grove, north of Cumberland River, where

the right wing of the Confederate army, having been thrown forward from Cumberland Gap, was entrenched, under the command of General George B. Crittenden. Learning of the approach of the Federal force, General Crittenden moved forward to anticipate the attack. General Felix K. Zollicoffer, leading the advance, encountered the enemy near Fishing Creek, January 19, 1862. After a severe battle of more than three hours, in which General Zollicoffer was killed, the Confederates were defeated and driven back to Beech Grove. Finding his army unable to withstand the superior force under General Thomas, General Crittenden withdrew during the night to the south side of the Cumberland.

General Thomas reported the Federal loss as 39 killed, 207 wounded; total 246. General Crittenden reported the Confederate loss as 125 killed, 309 wounded, 99 missing; total 533. The result of this battle was the crushing of the Confederate right wing and the utter demoralization of the troops engaged. The death of General Zollicoffer cast a gloom over Tennessee. Beloved by the Confederates, he had gained the esteem of the Unionists while in command at Knoxville. He fell, an early victim of the war, before partisan passions had reached the bitter stage, and was lamented by friend and foe.

The way was now opened to carry out McClellan's favorite plan, the occupation of East Tennessee. He urged Buell in frequent letters to enter the territory at once. All things seemed to point to the East Tennessee movement. In addition to the pressing orders of the commanding general, Buell was besieged with letters from prominent East Tennesseans, among which was the following:

"We have just had interviews with the President and General McClellan, and find they fully concur with us in respect to the East Tennessee expedition. . . .

"ANDREW JOHNSON,
"HORACE MAYNARD."

The way was now opened, but the expedition was not made. Had it been made, General Braxton Bragg's subsequent invasion of Kentucky would have been impossible.

On January 27, 1862, Buell notified McClellan that the road rendered an immediate advance impossible, but expressed the purpose to carry McClellan's plans into operation as soon as practicable. In the meantime, the progress of events turned the current of affairs into a different channel. During McClellan's long illness of a month's duration, General Grant impatiently and urgently applied for permission to move on the Confederate right and centre. General Halleck favored his plans, and secured the approval of the president and his advisers. The anxiety of the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War that the Mississippi be opened was not an inconsiderable force in favor of Grant's plans.

On January 1, 1862, President Lincoln sent the following telegram to General Grant:

"General McClellan should not yet be disturbed with business. I think you better get in concert with General Halleck at once. I write you to-night. I also telegraph and write Halleck.

"A. LINCOLN."

As a result of this telegram, communications ensued between Halleck and Buell looking to a combination to break the Confederate left and centre. Buell, alluding to the East Tennessee expedition, telegraphed to the president on January 5th: "As earnestly as I desire to accomplish it, my judgment has from the first been decidedly against it, if it should render at all doubtful the success of a movement against the great power of the rebellion in the west. . . ."

The next day, McClellan wrote from his sickbed to Buell: "I was extremely sorry to learn from your telegram to the President that you had from the beginning attached little or no importance to a movement in East Tennessee.

I had not so understood your views, and it develops a radical difference between your views and my own which I deeply regret."

Buell, on January 13th, replied to this letter, explaining that he did consider the East Tennessee movement important, and had obeyed all orders in reference to it, and was still pressing all means for its accomplishment. After gaining the victory of Mill Springs, or Fishing Creek, however, he manifested no alacrity in pushing the expedition, and wrote on January 27th, as previously stated, that the condition of the roads prevented an immediate advance. Attention was now turned toward the Mississippi. The East Tennessee movement was delayed for the time, but McClellan continued to urge it.

Meanwhile, the movement of General Grant from Kentucky southward gave direction to the campaign. Fort Henry on the Tennessee and Fort Donelson on the Cumberland were twelve miles apart, protecting the navigation of the two rivers. Fort Henry was defended by a force of 2,160 men of all arms, under command of Brigadier-general L. Tilghman; Fort Donelson, with a force of about 4,000 men, was under command of Brigadier-general Bushrod Johnson. On February 4, 1862, General Grant, with a force of 17,000 men, accompanied by a fleet of seven gunboats carrying fifty-four heavy guns, began operations against Fort Henry. Finding that it was impossible to hold the fort, General Tilghman determined to save the garrison. He therefore, on the third day of the siege, February 6th, ordered Colonel A. Heiman to proceed to Fort Donelson with the main body of the troops, while he remained in person with one artillery company to engage the enemy and secure the retreat. Being immediately assaulted, the little garrison of sixty-six men maintained a gallant resistance for two hours and ten minutes, when it surrendered, after disabling two of Commodore A. H. Foote's gunboats and inflicting on his fleet a severe loss. This was the first battle of the war that was fought on Tennessee soil.

General Grant now moved across the narrow peninsula between the two rivers and invested Fort Donelson on February 12th. On the evening of that day he was reinforced by six regiments of infantry, and by Commodore Foote's fleet of gunboats. During the siege he received additional reinforcements. His total force is variously estimated. General S. B. Buckner reported it to be 50,000 men. General Buell stated it to be between 30,000 and 35,000. The Federal statistical records generally place it at 27,000. In addition to this was Commodore Foote's fleet of six gunboats. Meanwhile, the garrison at Fort Donelson had been strengthened by the troops from Fort Henry under Colonel Heiman and the arrival of reinforcements under Generals Buckner, G. H. Pillow, and John B. Floyd; General Floyd had assumed command. The total Confederate force has been variously estimated at from 11,738 to 20,000 men. No exact information is obtainable. The most reliable estimates place the total force at about 15,000. The siege lasted five days, February 12th to 16th. The first fighting was favorable to the Confederates. The gunboats were disabled and forced to retire; the besieging lines were successfully assailed and driven back, and a road was opened for the retreat of the garrison. On February 15th, the day before the surrender, the defence had been brilliant and successful. Then followed a fatal misunderstanding between the commanding officers. The road which had been opened for the retreat of the garrison was weakly abandoned. General Floyd turned over the command to General Pillow, and departed with a portion of his command. General Pillow turned over the command to General Buckner and likewise departed. General Buckner announced his intention to surrender the garrison. Colonel N. B. Forrest, after protesting against the surrender, marched out with his cavalry force and a few other soldiers. General Buckner surrendered the garrison on February 16th. It is the general opinion of military men that affairs were badly managed.

The statistical records give the Federal loss in killed and wounded as 2,331, and the Confederate loss as 15,067, including prisoners. The Confederate loss is given as an estimate, and is evidently too great. The Confederate loss in killed and wounded, from reliable estimates, was about 1,420.

The surrender of Forts Henry and Donelson was a serious blow to the Confederate cause. It broke the line of the Cumberland, destroyed all hope of holding Kentucky, and lost control of Middle and West Tennessee. Bowling Green, Kentucky, and Nashville and all points in Middle Tennessee were promptly evacuated. A portion of West Tennessee was held for a short time, in order to dispute the control of Mississippi River. General Polk, commanding the defences of the Mississippi, began the evacuation of Columbus, Kentucky, February 25th, and fell back to the Tennessee line, where he constructed defences at Island No. 10, in the Mississippi River, and along the banks of the river from New Madrid to Tiptonville. General J. P. McCown was placed in command of these defences, aided by Commodore George N. Hollins, with eight gunboats. General Pope, with a strong Federal force, assailed the Confederate works. On March 16th, Commodore Foote with his fleet of gunboats and mortar boats began the attack on Island No. 10. This was gallantly defended for more than three weeks, when the whole line of defence was abandoned, and the entire Confederate force began the retreat, which was intercepted at Tiptonville. At this place General W. W. Mackall, who had succeeded to the command, surrendered about 3,000 men on April 8th.

After the evacuation of Middle Tennessee, General Albert Sidney Johnston concentrated the Confederate army at Corinth, Mississippi, reaching there in person on March 24th. General Buell had occupied Nashville on February 24th, the day after the retreat of the rear guard under General N. B. Forrest, and no obstacle interposed to the complete occupation of Middle Tennessee. A strong Federal force was

speedily concentrated at Pittsburg Landing. General Grant arrived there March 17th and assumed command.

The importance of the positions of Pittsburg Landing and Corinth will be seen by a glance at the map. Tennessee River, running north and south, separates West Tennessee from Middle Tennessee. Its capture by the Federal forces thus cut off the Confederate troops who were holding Mississippi River from Columbus to Memphis from all communication with the rest of Tennessee. At the same time it gave the Federals a splendid highway of water transportation and communication directly south through the State. A few miles above Pittsburg Landing the river deflects to the east and was of no immediate value as a line of transportation. It would be necessary for General Grant to move southwest but a few miles and occupy Corinth in order to cut off the Confederate troops in West Tennessee from all communication and capture them in detail. In addition to this the occupation of Corinth by the Federal forces would interrupt the communication between Generals Johnston and Beauregard.

Corinth is the junction of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad with the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. Thus it will clearly be seen that its possession was necessary to the Confederates as long as an effort was maintained to hold Memphis or any part of West Tennessee. After the disaster at Fort Donelson, therefore, General Johnston, with great military sagacity, threw aside all minor considerations and anticipated the Federal movement by concentrating at Corinth all his forces and those of General Beauregard who commanded the Department of the Mississippi. Being informed that the Federal authorities were planning to accumulate an overwhelming force at Pittsburg Landing to attack Corinth, and that General Buell and others were on their way with reinforcements, he determined to make an immediate attack on General Grant before the reinforcements could arrive. The Federal army was encamped on the south side of Tennessee River, near Shiloh Church, not

far from the southern boundary of Tennessee. General Johnston began the attack on Sunday morning, April 6th, with a force variously estimated at 40,000 to 50,000 men. He himself stated it to be 40,000. The force of General Grant is likewise variously estimated from 32,722 to 41,153. On the first day, the Confederates won a brilliant victory, and had driven the Federal forces back toward the river to the protection of their gunboats, when, at about ten o'clock P. M., General Johnston was killed. Much confusion was caused by his death and by the consequent failure of orders to continue the attack. General Beauregard succeeded to the command, but considered the hour too late to renew the attack. During the night General Buell arrived with about 20,000 men, General Lew Wallace with about 6,500, and other troops amounting to about 1,400. These reinforcements of about 27,900 fresh men were sufficient to turn the tide of battle. Early the next morning, General Grant attacked with all his forces. The Confederates were driven back and retreated to Corinth. This battle was fiercely contested and the losses on both sides were heavy. The Confederate loss in killed, wounded, and missing was 10,699, about one-fourth of the army. The Federal loss as given in the official records was 13,573.

In the death of General Albert Sidney Johnston the Confederacy lost one of its ablest officers. Graduating at West Point in 1826, he entered the army as second lieutenant and became conspicuous in the Black Hawk War in 1832. Soon afterward, he resigned his commission in the army and engaged in farming. In 1836 he offered his services to the republic of Texas and was appointed adjutant-general of the army on the Coleta. In 1837 he was appointed brigadier-general in the Texas army, and succeeded General Sam Houston as commander-in-chief. In 1839 he was made secretary of war for that republic. He retired to private life in 1843 and again engaged in farming. He served with distinction in the Mexican War as commander of the First Texas Rifles, and subsequently as inspector-general. In 1849

he was appointed paymaster of the United States army, and served in that capacity until 1855, when the second regiment of cavalry was formed, of which he was appointed colonel. He commanded the Department of Texas until 1857, when he was assigned to the delicate and important duty of quelling the insurrection of the Mormons of Utah. This duty was quickly and thoroughly performed, and as a recognition of the valuable service he received the brevet rank of brigadier-general. In 1860 he was transferred to the command of the Department of the Pacific. Upon the outbreak of the war he was tendered the commission of major-general in the United States army and assured of the highest consideration of the government, but no temptation of personal gain could make such a man join in the invasion of the South where dwelt his own people. He therefore declined the overture, tendered his resignation, and offered his services to the Confederate States. He was at once appointed general in the Confederate army, being the first man appointed to that position, and thus became the ranking officer in the Confederate army. He was assigned on September 10th to command the Department of the West, which included all the territory of the Confederate States west of the Alleghany Mountains, except the Gulf coast. After the disasters of Fishing Creek and Forts Henry and Donelson, a clamor was raised against him and his removal was demanded. To this demand President Davis replied: "If Albert Sidney Johnston is not a general we have none."

A few days after the battle of Shiloh, General Halleck arrived in person at Pittsburg Landing and assumed command on April 11th of the combined forces of Grant and Buell. He ordered General John Pope, who was then engaged in besieging Fort Pillow, to leave two regiments to continue the siege and to report with the rest of the army at Pittsburg Landing. All other available troops were concentrated at this point, and in the latter part of April, Halleck, with an army exceeding 100,000 men, began the

movement to dislodge Beauregard from Corinth. Beauregard, also largely reinforced, held his position at Corinth and threw forward outposts toward the front. ' Halleck, advancing slowly and cautiously, had approached close to Corinth when General Beauregard evacuated the place on May 30th and retreated south.

Then followed the general dispersion of both armies. As they move to their new fields of action we may briefly review some of the results of the campaign which closed at Corinth. It was now impossible to hold West Tennessee. Fort Pillow was abandoned on June 1st. On June 6th, Commodore C. H. Davis, who had succeeded Commodore Foote in command of the Mississippi fleet, destroyed the Confederate flotilla which attempted to defend Memphis, and the Federals occupied the city. Then, by a strange decree of fate, Middle and West Tennessee, which were strongly Confederate in sympathy, came under the control of the Federal authorities, and East Tennessee, which was strongly Union in sympathy, remained in possession of the Confederates. While such a condition was painful to all sections, it served to demonstrate the frank and firm character of the people of Tennessee. But few instances were found of apostasy or treachery. The mass of the people on each side, resenting what they considered the oppression of their enemies, remained true to their convictions and outspoken adherents of the cause which they espoused. Confederate soldiers marched by their homes, and followed their colors on the retreat to the South, while East Tennessee Unionists abandoned home and fled to join the Federal army.

The political position in which Tennessee was now placed was interesting. On February 15, 1862, the legislature, in consequence of the fall of Fort Donelson, adjourned to Memphis, where it met on February 20th. After passing acts to authorize the State banks to remove their locations in case of invasion, and other acts to enable the governor to provide for emergencies, the legislature adjourned *sine die*

on March 20th. The regular elections had been held on August 1, 1861, previous to the evacuation of the State. Isham G. Harris was reëlected governor, with a legislature strongly Confederate in sympathy. Representatives were also elected to the Provisional Confederate Congress. Landon C. Haynes and Gustavus A. Henry were elected senators to the Confederate Senate and served to the end of the war. Regular elections were held on November 6, 1861, for representatives to the first permanent Confederate Congress, and for presidential electors. After the evacuation of the State, civil government was paralyzed, and subsequent elections were held irregularly, and for the most part by the soldiers in the Confederate camps. In 1863, Robert L. Caruthers was elected governor, but failed to qualify as such, and Isham G. Harris continued nominally in office. In the same year eleven representatives were elected to the Confederate Congress.

On February 22, 1862, General Grant issued an order suspending civil government in Tennessee and declaring martial law. On March 3d, President Lincoln appointed Andrew Johnson brigadier-general and military governor of Tennessee. Thus the whole of Tennessee was placed under military government: Middle and West Tennessee by the United States, and East Tennessee by the Confederate States. Governor Johnson arrived at Nashville and assumed command as military governor on March 12, 1862. He at once entered upon a vigorous policy, intended to crush resistance and to restore Tennessee to the Union. This policy was severe against those who persisted in sympathy with the Confederacy, and conciliatory to those who were willing to desert the Confederate cause. He required test oaths from police officers and persons of whose loyalty there was any suspicion, and fined citizens suspected of Confederate sympathy. Beginning in Nashville, he required all members of the City Council, teachers, ministers of the gospel, and influential citizens to take the test oath. Those who refused were arrested for treason. Some were

imprisoned and others sent South. A Union convention was held in the city, which passed Union resolutions and issued a public address. As a test of public sentiment, the governor ordered an election for judge of the Criminal Court. The Union nominee was defeated by the popular vote, whereupon Governor Johnson arrested and imprisoned the successful candidate.

The conditions in Tennessee afforded the opportunity for a species of warfare which was peculiarly suited to the genius of the Confederate soldier. In the fine stock-raising States of Tennessee and Kentucky, the citizens were nearly all expert horsemen and were provided with an abundant supply of the finest horses in the world. As a result, the cavalry service, or more properly the mounted infantry service, was very popular. Daring leaders like Colonel John H. Morgan and Colonel Nathan Bedford Forrest found it easy to attract recruits to their standards. The main body of the Federal troops had been concentrated under Halleck and Grant for the large operations in the South. Tennessee was held by small garrisons, stationed at a few important towns. With a brilliancy and dash which have never been surpassed, the Confederate raiders suddenly broke into Tennessee and Kentucky, captured garrisons, disconcerted the matured plans of Federal generals and of the military governor, and reanimated the drooping spirits of their Confederate friends.

Early in May, Colonel Morgan entered Middle Tennessee, and, after performing brilliant exploits at Pulaski and other points along the Nashville and Decatur Railroad, moved around the vicinity of Nashville and rested at Lebanon, where he was attacked and defeated. Moving into Kentucky, he made a successful attack at Cave City, and then retired to Chattanooga to recuperate, preparatory to his famous Kentucky raid.

After Corinth had been evacuated, May 30, 1862, the Confederate army was divided. On the 17th of June, General Bragg, at General Beauregard's request, temporarily

relieved that officer, whose health had failed. Beauregard expected to recuperate and reassume his duties within a few weeks. As soon as President Davis heard of this he telegraphed General Bragg to assume permanent command. A few days later Major-general Leonidas Polk was announced as second in command. Major-general Earl Van Dorn was transferred to command the Department of Southern Mississippi and East Louisiana, and Major-general John P. McCown assumed command of the Army of the West.

On the 10th of June Major-generals U. S. Grant, D. C. Buell, and John Pope, of the United States army, were ordered to resume command of their respective army corps. General Halleck was about the same time summoned to Washington to succeed General John Pope as commander-in-chief. The Federal government had a great programme laid out for the summer in the West, and its preparations were in keeping with the vastness of its plan. Grant's army was to move against Mississippi River and completely close it against the people of the Confederacy. The army of Pope, now well on its way through Middle Tennessee, was to follow the Confederate retreat along the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. Buell was first to occupy Chattanooga and then overrun East Tennessee. One formidable army was already operating in Arkansas and Missouri, and on the waters of the Mississippi had been placed a fleet of gunboats terrible in destructiveness and presumably impregnable in strength.

This situation of affairs left the South but little choice other than making an aggressive movement by which North Alabama and Middle and East Tennessee might be cleared of the enemy, who would be forced to fall back into Kentucky to assist General Buell. While Van Dorn was to defend the river against Grant, Price was to oppose Pope in the movement toward Mobile, and General John H. Forney was to command the district of the Gulf. Bragg was at once to move with the main army to occupy Chattanooga and oppose Buell. On June 17th, General Bragg

moved with his army from Tupelo, Mississippi, with Chattanooga as his objective point. General Buell was also moving from Corinth with the same place in view. It was a race between two great armies for Chattanooga, and Bragg won. Buell then concentrated his forces at Nashville.

Colonel Forrest, moving by a secret and rapid march from Chattanooga, with a force of 1,300 mounted men, reached Murfreesboro on the morning of July 13th about five o'clock. The town was defended by a garrison of more than 1,765 men, under command of General Crittenden. After sharp fighting the entire garrison was captured, together with four pieces of artillery, 600 horses and mules, and a large quantity of stores and supplies. A number of citizens who were held in arrest on account of their "sympathy with the rebellion," six of whom were under sentence of death, were set free. After brilliant exploits and narrow escapes, Forrest eluded General William Nelson, who attempted to encompass him with a large force. On September 3d, he joined the main body of General Bragg's army, then at Sparta, on its way to invade Kentucky.

While Forrest was engaged in Middle Tennessee Morgan was operating in Kentucky and in Tennessee north of Nashville. General Bragg was at that time preparing to move his army into Kentucky and ordered Morgan to destroy the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, so as to impede the movements of General Buell. Having returned from his brilliant raid into Kentucky, he began operations in Tennessee, captured Gallatin, with two hundred prisoners, destroyed the railroad bridge and tunnel near that place, and captured Colonel Boone. He defeated General R. W. Johnson, who had been sent against him with a force of cavalry, infantry, and artillery. General Johnson and a portion of his command surrendered as prisoners of war.

No sooner had General Bragg reached Chattanooga than he began preparations for assuming the offensive, and the invasion of Kentucky was his first aggressive act. General Smith entered Kentucky on August 16th and moved

northward. On the 30th he gained a brilliant victory at Richmond over a superior force commanded by General Mahlon D. Manson, and subsequently by General William Nelson. He then sent General Henry Heth forward to threaten Cincinnati, while he accumulated army supplies and awaited the arrival of General Bragg, to whom he reported, October 4th. General Bragg marched to Glasgow, Kentucky, which place he reached on September 13th. Munfordsville was captured on the 17th, with 4,267 prisoners, ten pieces of artillery, and a large amount of munitions of war.

So far, Bragg's movements had been brilliant and successful. Buell had been completely deceived and outflanked, and was marching on behind, having been outstripped in the race. From this point to the close of the campaign, the strategy of General Bragg has been blamed by some military critics and defended by others. After several days of manœuvring, he left the main route to Louisville and permitted General Buell to pass. General Buell, after receiving reinforcements and supplies at Louisville, marched out to offer battle. A brilliant but not decisive battle was fought at Perryville, October 8th, in which the losses of General Buell are stated in the statistical records as 4,348. The Confederate loss has been variously estimated from 2,500 to 7,000. The most reliable estimate places it at 3,212. After this battle General Bragg withdrew from Kentucky at leisure, bringing with him large stores of supplies.

During the Kentucky campaign Forrest had been employed in harassing Buell's army. A few days before the battle of Perryville he was relieved from command of his brigade and ordered to Middle Tennessee for the purpose of recruiting and organizing cavalry troops, of which he was to assume command, and to take possession of the most eligible position from which he could annoy the Federal forces at Nashville and secure a rallying point for the concentration of an army. Leaving Bardstown, Kentucky, September 27th, he reached Murfreesboro October 1st.

General James Scott Negley, with a small force, held Nashville. The Confederate Congress had recently passed the Partisan Ranger Law, which was approved by President Davis on April 21, 1862. Under this law a number of independent battalions and companies were recruited. These several independent organizations, by concert of action among their leaders, but under no general command, established camps on the various turnpikes leading out of Nashville, and effectually blockaded the city. About 1,700 of these Partisan Rangers had assembled at Lavergne, fifteen miles from Nashville. On October 7th, a few days after the arrival of General Forrest at Murfreesboro, this assemblage was attacked and nearly surrounded by a force sent by General Negley from Nashville, consisting of 411 cavalry and 2,600 infantry. Panic-stricken, the Confederates fled from the camp, making almost no resistance. A few of the number were captured. This precipitate flight received the name of the "Lavergne races." General Forrest came to the rescue, reversed the tide of battle, and pursued the Federal force to Nashville.

From their experience of the "Lavergne races" the independent Partisan Rangers had learned the value of organization. They were inspired by the advent of their natural leader. Nearly all of them enlisted in the regular service and became the bone and sinew of "Forrest's Cavalry." Thus the nucleus of an army was ready at Forrest's hands, and before November 1st a force of 3,500 cavalry was ready at Murfreesboro.

General John C. Breckinridge arrived at Murfreesboro and assumed command, October 28th, bringing with him the advance of Bragg's army, about 3,000 infantry. Forrest at once advanced to Lavergne with his cavalry force. The brigade of General Roger Hanson, consisting of 3,000 infantry and two batteries, was added to his command. Having obtained the consent of General Breckinridge, Forrest moved from Lavergne, November 6th, for the purpose

of capturing Nashville. He approached the city and had actually driven in the pickets, and formed his lines for the assault, when he received orders from General Breckinridge, under peremptory instructions from General Bragg, forbidding the attack. Deeply disappointed, Forrest withdrew his forces under protest.

The Army of Tennessee, having returned from Kentucky, was concentrated at Murfreesboro, at which place General Bragg established his headquarters, December 2, 1862. The line extended east to Triune and west to Readyville. Forrest was sent on an expedition to West Tennessee, and Morgan to Kentucky. General Joseph Wheeler was made chief of cavalry, and commanded the outpost at Lavergne. Meanwhile, General Buell had been relieved from the command of the Army of the Cumberland, and his successor, General William S. Rosecrans, concentrated the Federal forces at Nashville.

General Rosecrans advanced on December 26th from Nashville to attack Bragg at Murfreesboro. Throughout this advance from Nashville the Federal force met with the most stubborn resistance. General John J. McCook advanced on the Nolensville turnpike, skirmishing at every step, and ending the day with a brisk fight, which gave him possession of Nolensville and the nearby hills. Crittenden advanced to Lavergne, encountering heavy skirmishing on his front, and, after gaining that point, awaited McCook's arrival at Triune. This being reported to him on the following day, Crittenden resumed his advance. On Sunday the Federals rested, after having ascertained that the Confederate forces were concentrated a little northwest of Murfreesboro. The position held by the Confederate army was by no means a strong one, offering more advantage for attack than for defence, but General Bragg decided to make his stand there. Skirmishing with cavalry at every step, Rosecrans reached Stone River on the evening of December 30th and halted. Across the river lay Bragg's troops. Disposing his force with the purpose of opening the attack

with his left wing on the following morning, Rosecrans rested for the night.

The Federal right was commanded by Major-general McCook, the centre by Major-general Thomas, and the left by Major-general Crittenden. The Confederate left, directly opposite McCook, was made up of McCown's division, supported by P. R. Cleburne's division, the whole under command of Lieutenant-general William J. Hardee; the centre, opposite Thomas, was commanded by Lieutenant-general Polk, having in front the division of General Jones M. Withers with Cheatham's as support; the right, opposite Crittenden, was commanded by Major-general Breckinridge. Between the Confederate right and their centre ran Stone River.

The last day of the year, 1862, therefore found the two armies in the deadly grapple of battle. General Bragg having received reports on the previous day that the Federal right was being extended with the evident intention of flanking his left, Rosecrans's own plan for an attack by his left on Breckinridge was foiled. McCown's division was sent against McCook early in the morning. The artillery opened fire at seven o'clock, and McCown attacked vigorously. Aided by the dense fog he took the Federals by surprise and routed them; they fled leaving their breakfast unserved. Several guns were captured before they could be fired, and a very large number of prisoners taken. Despite stout resistance the Confederates continued to advance in force until the Federal line was thrown entirely back at right angles to the first alignment. A number of cannon and several thousand prisoners had been taken, and by eleven o'clock the entire Federal right had been driven from its position. Half the field had been taken and the brunt of battle transferred to Thomas in the centre. Thomas's position was a strong one. It was on the edge of a rocky hill covered with cedar brush, and was defended by artillery which swept the entire open field in front. But despite the murderous effect of this artillery and of the

infantry in the thickets, Polk's Alabama and Mississippi brigades carried the line at the point of the bayonet and the Federal centre joined the right in its retreat. The Union forces had now been driven from every point except the extreme left, where they were posted in a strong position on an elevation about one hundred yards wide between the river bluff and a deep railroad cut. This strip was covered with trees and was known as the "Round Forest," but the soldiers named it "Hell's Half Acre" after the fight. The only direct approach was from the front, and a strong force of artillery and infantry held this. Every effort to take it was repulsed with fearful slaughter, some of the attacking regiments losing half their men. Part of Breckinridge's force was brought over to reinforce the attacking party, but Rosecrans's left still held its position when night came.

To check the retreat of the soldiers of the Federal right and centre, fresh troops were brought up from their reserve, and the flight was halted. By two o'clock, the Federals had concentrated such a force as to prevent General Hardee's further progress. He therefore retired to a better position. By the union of Lieutenant-general Polk's infantry, the Confederate forces then formed a line almost perpendicular to the original line of battle. During the night the Federal lines were further withdrawn, leaving nearly the whole field with their dead and wounded, hospitals and stores, in the hands of the Confederates. The body of Brigadier-general Joshua W. Sill was found among the dead, and was sent to Murfreesboro and decently interred, despite the feeling on the Confederate side that acts of cruelty recently committed under his authority on women, children, and old men of that vicinity had forfeited his claim to such consideration.


Both armies, exhausted by a conflict of ten hours' duration—a conflict rarely surpassed in its intensity and heavy losses—sank to rest with the sun, and the night was quiet.

All day January 1st the armies lay close together, but were too tired to renew the contest. At dawn, however, the Confederate commander sent the skirmishers forward to

ascertain if there were any change in the enemy's position, but these found that the only alteration had been the withdrawal of the left flank from its advanced position. The Confederate cavalry passed to the enemy's rear and attacked the heavy trains moving toward Nashville, burning their wagons and paroling many captured prisoners. This caused the Federals to send their wagon trains under heavier guard, and the impression gained ground at the Confederate headquarters that the enemy was making a retrograde movement. Their worn-out forces were held ready to avail themselves of any promising circumstances, but it was not deemed wise to attack. Beyond these movements the day passed without any important event on either side. The Confederates occupied themselves in gleaning the battlefields, burying the dead, and replenishing ammunition.

On Friday the Confederates again gave their earliest morning efforts to ascertaining the enemy's exact position, and received reports that there had been no material change. Early in the day, however, in an attempt to get between Bragg and Murfreesboro, Federal troops crossed Stone River and occupied an eminence from which General Polk's line was both commanded and enfiladed. General Breckinridge's division was concentrated in front of the position and with ten guns and two detachments of cavalry opened the attack at four o'clock, a heavy cannonading being begun from General Polk's front in order to distract attention from the real purpose. The action was short and severe. The Federals were driven back and the eminence gained, but the movement as a whole was a failure and the position was again yielded to the enemy. Hearing that the Confederates were being forced back, General Bragg sent Brigadier-general Patton Anderson's brigade of Mississippians to Breckinridge's relief. On their arrival the retreat was checked, the enemy was driven back, and the guns not already lost were saved.

That night a heavy rain set in, and all day Saturday, January 3d, the steady downpour continued. For five days



Head-Quarters, Department of the Gulf,
New Orleans, May 15, 1862.

General Orders, No. 28.

As the Officers and Soldiers of the United States have been subject to repeated insults from the women calling themselves ladies of New Orleans, in return for the most scrupulous non-interference and courtesy on our part, it is ordered that hereafter when any Female shall, by word, gesture, or movement, insult or show contempt for any Officer or Soldier of the United States, she shall be regarded and held liable to be treated as a woman of the town plying her avocation.

By command of MAJ.-GEN. BUTLER, FR.
GEORGE C. SIKKONS,

A. A. G. Chief of Staff.

and nights the Confederate forces had been in line of battle with but little rest, having no reserves. Their baggage and tents had been loaded and the wagons were four miles off. Provisions, if cooked at all, were imperfectly prepared; the weather had been either cold or rainy; the troops' clothing was scanty, while in many places the soldiers could have no fires. Officers and men were exhausted. Stone River was rising fast, and there was great danger that it would rise too high to be forded and so cut off Bragg's supplies. From supposedly reliable papers captured from the enemy, General Bragg estimated the Federal forces at nearly, if not quite, 70,000, and he knew that reinforcements were constantly arriving. General Bragg himself had had at the beginning but 37,712 men. Sickness, loss in battle, and desertion had reduced that number by at least 10,266. He decided that common prudence and the safety of the Confederate cause demanded his withdrawal from so unequal a contest. In the night, therefore, the whole Confederate army crossed the river and fell back, Polk's corps to Shelbyville and Hardee's to Tullahoma.

Because of this retreat the Federals claimed a victory. But General Bragg had captured 6,273 prisoners by actual count, 30 pieces of artillery, 6,000 stand of small arms, and a large amount of property, besides destroying 800 of the enemy's wagons and much valuable property. General Rosecrans reported his effective force at 46,940; the number engaged in the battle 43,400, and in his first report estimated his loss at 11,578. In a subsequent revised statement he set out his loss as 9,532 killed and wounded, and 3,717 prisoners, making a total of 13,249. If General Bragg's counted list of 6,273 prisoners be correct, it would make the loss of Rosecrans 15,805, a loss of $37\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. General Bragg also claimed a victory, telegraphing to Richmond on the night of December 31st to that effect. But the South was greatly disappointed to know that the victory was fruitless and that Bragg was again falling back.

One remarkable feature of the battle was the cavalry raids of Generals Wheeler and John A. Wharton. There were four of these raids, and in one of them Wheeler passed entirely around the Federal army. He had hoped to capture the Federal ammunition train, but in this was foiled by the precautions of General (then Captain) G. P. Thruston, who was in command of the train. In disobedience of orders Thruston had changed the location of his train from Lavergne to a point six miles nearer Murfreesboro. If this train had been captured the retreat of the Federal army must have immediately followed.

CHAPTER X

CAMPAIGNS OF 1862—OPERATIONS AGAINST MISSISSIPPI RIVER

THE fall of Richmond alone excepted, the greatest disaster to the Confederacy was the loss of New Orleans. Not only was this city the most important commercial port in the Confederacy, but it was the outlet to European, Central and South American ports for the entire Mississippi valley. It had become before the war the greatest cotton market of the United States, and the Confederate government took early steps looking to its defence. By the spring of 1862 the impression of the people had grown into conviction that the attack on New Orleans would come from the North when it was made. Owing to the bar at the mouth of the Mississippi, which seldom afforded over eighteen feet of water, and to the construction of Fort Jackson and Fort St. Philip; because of the presence of a volunteer fleet of transports and of the fact that two powerful vessels were under construction, as well as the belief that any attack must come from the north, the citizens rested in supposed safety under the conviction that New Orleans was impregnable. The newspapers had so declared, regarding Forts Jackson and St. Philip, sixty or seventy miles below the city, as but the first or outer line of defences. The shores of the river were lined with batteries, and in the harbor were reported to be twelve gunboats and certain ironclad naval structures capable of dealing severely and speedily with any Federal fleet. But the Confederate fleet

was in reality made up of seventeen vessels, only eight of which were armed, while drafts on this naval force for use at Columbus and other points above New Orleans, where defences were thought to be more needed, had further weakened it materially. Still, confidence prevailed.

In order to obstruct the channel of the river a raft was constructed which should extend across the river above Forts Jackson and St. Philip. This raft was made of eleven dismasted schooners connected by six lines of heavy chains, and strongly moored to the banks. It was placed about a mile above the forts, in a most favorable position.

The Federals also had realized the importance of New Orleans, but they too had neglected their opportunities. The fleet with which Samuel F. Dupont had attacked and captured the works at Port Royal in November, 1861, could have steamed on up to New Orleans and would have been able to take the city with little difficulty. But the Federal government was slow to take any step beyond blockading, and the Confederates had used their limited resources as best they could in fortifying the river as far north as Memphis. Captain David D. Porter, on a visit to Washington, had detailed to the president, the secretary of war, and General McClellan his plan for the capture of New Orleans, and it was undertaken. Captain David Farragut was placed in command. A fleet of seven large steam war vessels, sixteen gunboats, twenty-one heavily armed mortar schooners, and a transport fleet carrying fifteen thousand men, under General Benjamin F. Butler, was sent to Farragut; and this fleet, after its arrival at the mouth of the Mississippi, moved slowly up the river as far as Forts Jackson and St. Philip. The bombardment of these forts began on April 18, 1862, and lasted without intermission for six days and nights. The forts made no sign of surrender, and Farragut determined to run by them. The fast rising river had swept away a portion of the raft across the channel, making the passage vastly easier, and the diminished ammunition supply of the Federal force made speedy action

necessary. Farragut divided the fleet into three squadrons—one to fight Fort Jackson, one to fight Fort St. Philip, and the other to make its way up the river. Sandbags were piled on the decks, and chains were hung over the sides to protect the vessels as far as possible from the Confederate fire. When the effort to pass the forts was made before daylight on the morning of April 23d, a hot fight ensued, but eleven of the little Confederate gunboats and the ram *Manassas* were disabled or destroyed, and the thirteen of the attacking fleet which remained uninjured passed up the river.

The utmost consternation prevailed in New Orleans. General K. R. Mansfield, commanding the troops, turned the city over to the municipal authorities and marched away with the Confederate forces. Cotton and provisions were destroyed. At one time the levee for miles showed an unbroken line of fire where cotton bales, sugar, and molasses fed the flames. The unfinished war vessels were launched and fired in the hope of their doing injury to the approaching enemy. Thousands of citizens left with all their portable property before Farragut, on April 25th, anchored in front of the city.

The forts were still holding out, and the mayor refused to surrender the city. A party of marines was sent ashore, and hoisted the United States flag over the Mint, but it was taken down by a young man named William B. Munford. The forts were also attacked in the rear by Porter, and on land by Butler's men. Food and ammunition were exhausted in the garrisons, and on April 28th, after the guns had been spiked, the forts were surrendered. The brave defence made by the garrisons was recognized by the Federals, who allowed the officers to retain their side arms and left the Confederate flags flying until all the Confederate forces had withdrawn. Captain John K. Mitchell, of the Confederate naval forces, decided not to surrender his flagship, the *Louisiana*, which was his only formidable vessel, but withdrew his crew and set the vessel on fire. She floated

down the river, exploded, and sank close under Fort St. Philip while negotiations were progressing for the surrender.

Meantime, Farragut and Mayor John T. Monroe were still exchanging angry letters. On the 28th, complaining of the continued display of the State flag of Louisiana on the City Hall, Farragut threatened bombardment within forty-eight hours if the flag remained, and notified Monroe to remove the women and children. The flag remained, but the bombardment did not follow. On May 1st the flag was taken down by a detachment of men sent ashore by Farragut for that especial purpose.

General Butler took possession of New Orleans; he ruled it in a manner that excited the disgust of the civilized world, and caused his outlawry by President Davis. One of his first acts was to hang, as a felon, Munford, who had pulled down the United States flag. Because of the contemptuous attitude of the women of New Orleans and because of their failure to extend courteous treatment to himself and his officers, he issued a proclamation known as "General Order No. 28," which secured for him the title "Beast Butler," by which he was ever afterward known in the South and in parts of the North. It read as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,
"NEW ORLEANS, May 15, 1862.

"GENERAL ORDER NO. 28.

"As the Officers and Soldiers of the United States have been subject to repeated insults from the women (calling themselves ladies) of New Orleans, in return for the most scrupulous non-interference and courtesy on our part, it is ordered that hereafter when any female shall, by word, gesture, or movement, insult or show contempt for any officer or soldier of the United States, she shall be regarded and held liable to be treated as a woman of the town plying her avocation.

"By command of Maj.-Gen. Butler,

"GEORGE C. STRONG,

"*A. A.-G. Chief of Staff.*"

This was the prelude to a rule of tyranny and oppression. Newspapers refusing to publish the order were suppressed. Mayor Monroe and city officials who protested against it were imprisoned for many months. A physician who jokingly intimated that a skeleton in his office was that of a Union soldier, as was claimed—for he had affixed a card bearing the inscription "Chickamauga"—was imprisoned at hard labor for two years. A lady, wife of a former member of Congress, who laughed while the funeral of a Federal officer was passing, was imprisoned at Ship Island as a felon. The houses of prominent citizens were seized and made resorts for infamous female friends of the Federal officers. Wine cellars were looted, chests and wardrobes broken open, and the clothing of whole families "confiscated." Train loads of pianos, books, family portraits, silverware, and articles of luxury or ornament were sent north to the families and friends of the officers.

People were forced to decide between starvation and oaths to bear allegiance to the invader. Aged women and helpless children, ejected from their homes and robbed of their property, were forced to live on charity, being refused permission to leave the city. "Slaves were driven from the plantations in the neighborhood of New Orleans until their owners consented to share their crops with the commanding general, his brother, and other officers," writes Mr. Davis in his *Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government*. "When such consent had been extorted, the slaves were restored to the plantations and compelled to work under the bayonets of a guard of United States soldiers. When that partnership was refused armed expeditions were sent to the plantations to rob them of everything that could be removed; and even slaves too aged and infirm for work were, in spite of their entreaties, forced from the homes provided by their owners and driven to wander helpless on the highway." Slaves were armed and then incited to insurrection, many officers being active in these crimes. It was an era of plunder and robbery in which the whole army under Butler's command

seemed to share. Such was Butler's alleged preference for silverware, so far as he was concerned, that the newspapers, both North and South, were filled with caricatures based on this preference. The deposit of silverware in a bank in New Orleans by General Butler probably had no little influence on public opinion as to this preference. This deposit is authenticated by the receipt of the Citizens' Bank, dated December 23, 1862, given to Butler for a box for safe keeping, "said to contain silverware." Not only New Orleans, but the whole Louisiana coast was devastated and robbed, and the outcry against Butler was so universal that the Federal government relieved him and placed General Banks in command of Louisiana.

After taking possession of the forts and occupying with militia the city of New Orleans, Porter withdrew part of the fleet to Ship Island for repairs. Three formidable vessels were retained at New Orleans, while seven vessels, under Captain Thomas T. Craven and the smaller craft under Captain S. Phillips Lee went up the river, the latter force as far as Vicksburg. The importance of Vicksburg to the Confederacy lay in the fact that it occupied the first high ground near the river below Memphis; also in its railroad connections with all points in the Southern States, and in the fact that a railroad starting on the side of the river opposite Vicksburg led as far west as Shreveport, Louisiana. At this time there was no other connection between the parts of the Confederacy divided by the river. The possession of Vicksburg by the Confederates absolutely prevented free navigation of the Mississippi by the Federals, despite their own possession of Cairo above and New Orleans below. All points between Vicksburg and Port Hudson were dependencies sure to fall when Vicksburg should be captured. The importance of retaining its possession had been seen by the Confederates, and after the fall of New Orleans General Mansfield Lovell had ordered a detail of his force to garrison the city and construct works of defence. At that time a steady stream of men, material,

and provisions was coming across the river through Vicksburg. Even the food for the armies came largely from Texas, Arkansas, and western Louisiana.

When Captain Lee with the advance of Farragut's squadron arrived at Vicksburg May 18th and demanded its surrender, he met with a defiant refusal. He therefore requested the removal of the women and children within twenty-four hours, reserving the right to begin bombardment at the end of that time. He merely continued the siege, however, until a few days later, when Farragut arrived with a column of troops under General Thomas Williams. Naval and military forces continued to arrive, including Porter's mortar fleet, which opened the bombardment on the night of June 26th; the fire was directed partly against the town and partly against the batteries on the heights. This was the situation at the time of the arrival of General Earl Van Dorn, who had been assigned to defend the city. It was besieged by a powerful fleet and an army, while many of the citizens had gone to the interior for safety. Van Dorn had marched in and his troops had pitched their tents in the valleys and on the hills adjacent, in convenient position to support the batteries and to strike assailants. The city itself was occupied by Breckinridge's division. Guns were brought from Mobile, Richmond, Columbus, and other points, and put in battery to contest with the enemy's fleet, which early in July was increased by the arrival of the upper Mississippi fleet, following the evacuation of Fort Pillow and the fall of Memphis. On the 12th of July this combined fleet opened fire.

While all these preparations had been under way on the Federal side, the Confederates had not been idle. Two rams, the *Arkansas* and the *Tennessee*, had been under construction at Memphis when that city was threatened by the Federals. The *Tennessee's* iron was on the Arkansas side of the river and her framework completed when, on the evening before the Federals arrived, the boat had been destroyed by fire. The *Arkansas*, however, had been removed

to Greenwood, on Yazoo River. The limited resources of the Confederacy were so strikingly shown by the difficulties attendant on the construction of this vessel that it is worth while to outline them. The contractor, Prime Emmerson, of Memphis, had to begin his work by building two saw mills capable of sawing long pine timber, which was brought a distance of one hundred and four miles by railroad. The oak timber had to be prepared in five other saw mills, which were located from ten to twenty miles away. The iron was purchased partly in Memphis, but mostly in Arkansas, and was ordinary railroad iron. The bolts and spikes had to be rolled on Cumberland River, and the first lot had been seized at Nashville and put into an iron boat under construction at that city. This forced the contractor to have another lot rolled, and with increased difficulty. The iron was picked up in fifty and hundred pound lots wherever it could be found. Few ship carpenters could be secured from New Orleans, Mobile, or elsewhere; and details of these carpenters from the army were refused, despite the solicitation of the secretary of the navy. Instead of the contract time of four months, seven months were required to complete the work. In running to Greenwood, a barge containing four hundred bars of drilled railroad iron was sunk in the Yazoo. Every bar of iron used in the *Arkansas* had to have six holes drilled through, and the steam machinery at Memphis had to be taken down, transported, and set up again before the new iron could be drilled. On May 26th, the timber from which the gun carriages were to be made was still growing in the woods. Lieutenant Isaac N. Brown, Confederate States Navy, who was to be assigned to the command of the new ship, was instructed to finish the *Arkansas*. The barge was raised and the *Arkansas* was moved to Yazoo City, one hundred and sixty miles nearer the enemy. Fourteen forges and two hundred carpenters were employed, and divided into day and night parties and set to work. Iron armor was brought by wagons from the railroad, twenty-five miles distant, and the work pushed

energetically forward. But the iron was worn and indifferent, and poorly secured to the vessel. Boiler iron was used on stem and counter, and the smokestacks were of sheet iron. But finally the ship was finished, and armed with ten guns—two eight-inch columbiads, two nine-inch Dahlgrens, four six-inch rifled and two thirty-two-pounder smoothbores. Two guns were forward, two aft, and three in each broadside.

In order to get under cover of the Confederate batteries at Vicksburg, it was necessary for Commander Brown to navigate the *Arkansas* past no less than forty of the most formidable sloops, gunboats, rams, and transports then in the service of the United States navy. Warned by two deserters from the *Arkansas*, the Federals sent an expedition up the river to meet the Confederate ship. The *Carondelet*, the *Queen of the West*, and the *Tyler*, three Federal ships, and the *Arkansas* met on the morning of July 15th, when the latter hoisted anchor and commenced to run the fearful gauntlet of the enemy's fleet. The *Carondelet* fired, and all three ships then retreated before the *Arkansas*. In half an hour the *Carondelet* was silenced, and ran in among the willows, where her consorts and the *Arkansas* left her. Fourteen shots struck the *Tyler*, eleven penetrating her. The *Queen of the West* fled ingloriously after firing three rounds. On nearing the fleet, there appeared before the *Arkansas* a long line of men-of-war on the east side of the river, a moving mass of rams and ironclads beyond; on the west side, an occasional gunboat; directly in front, a large ram, and an ironclad flying an admiral's flag. There were six ironclads, each superior to the *Arkansas*, seven rams, and ten seagoing ships of war. Passing within a cable's length of Farragut's line, the *Arkansas* received and returned the fire of the entire fleet; and as the vessels closed in astern, the Confederate guns were fired ahead, astern, port and starboard, dealing death in every direction. None of the boats could give her more than one or two broadsides before she was out of reach. The solid shot glanced off, and the shells were shattered into fragments. Two eleven-inch solid

shot went through her, killing some of her men. The iron on the port side was much loosened. A flash of fire would indicate the spot at which every shot struck, so close was the range and so terrible the concussion. The *Arkansas* put holes through the *Hartford*, the *Iroquois*, the *Richmond*, the *Benton*, and half the gunboats.

The Federal line was forced, and the *Arkansas* emerged from the volcano of flame and smoke—after an hour's horizontal hail of missiles hurled by a fleet of forty formidable vessels—badly injured but triumphant. Only when she was safe under the Confederate batteries did the enemy abandon the chase. Then the *Arkansas* slowly turned the point and was moored before Vicksburg. A subsequent attempt to destroy the vessel met with conspicuous failure, and this failure practically ended the siege of Vicksburg for the time. Five days later the Federal fleets, with the exception of the *Essex* and the *Sumter*, which, under the command of W. D. Porter, remained a short distance below the city, disappeared without having dismounted a gun in the Vicksburg fortifications. The Confederate killed and wounded numbered but twenty-two for the siege of sixty-seven days.

Vicksburg is situated on the east bank of the river at the extreme end of a long bend. General Butler had an idea that by cutting a canal across the peninsula formed by this bend, which is opposite Vicksburg and on the west bank, the river could be diverted into a shorter course, leaving Vicksburg far to the east of the stream. In an order of June 6th, he directed General Williams to send a regiment or two at once from Baton Rouge to cut this neck of land by a trench four feet deep and five feet wide. "The river itself will do the rest. A large supply of spades and shovels have been sent for this purpose." A month later the cut-off canal was in progress, as a letter of July 6th speaks of General Williams's high hopes of the canal's success. On July 11th, the general grade of the cut-off had been carried a foot and a half below the then level of the Mississippi and in twelve hours would have been ready to let in the

water, when caving suddenly began at several points, and so arrested the excavation still to be made that the rapidly falling river had left the bottom of the cut-off some feet above the river's level.

"Thus I am chagrined to report," he says, "that after the great labor of an average excavation of eighteen feet in width and thirteen feet in depth we have encountered at least a temporary failure. My purpose now is (if not interrupted by the enemy) to collect an additional force of blacks, shovels, scrapers, etc., to my present force of one thousand five hundred blacks, . . . and make a real canal, carrying it, if necessary, to the depth of the greatest fall of the river at this point, say some thirty-five to forty feet; a labor which with sufficient force . . . will take three months." But he was interrupted by the enemy and handicapped by the withdrawal of the Federal fleet, as already stated.

As soon as the Federals retreated from Vicksburg, General Van Dorn decided to strike a blow before the enemy had time to organize and mature a new plan of attack. Baton Rouge, the capital of Louisiana, forty miles below the mouth of Red River, was held by a force of three thousand five hundred Federal troops, assisted by four or five gunboats and a number of transports. To keep Red River open as high up as Vicksburg was a vital necessity. Much-needed supplies were there, and strong military reasons required that the Confederacy should hold the Mississippi at two points to facilitate communication and coöperation between Van Dorn's district and the trans-Mississippi department. To capture Baton Rouge would effect these objects, secure the navigation of Red River, and make the recapture of New Orleans practicable. With 5,000 men from Vicksburg, and the effective force of General Daniel Ruggles from Camp Moore, about 6,000 in all, General Breckinridge was sent against Baton Rouge. The *Arkansas* was fully repaired and ordered to coöperate by a simultaneous river attack. Within ten days, Breckinridge's force was reduced by epidemic disease to less than 3,000 men,

but having frequent and encouraging reports of the progress of the *Arkansas* to join with him, he attacked with his entire available force on August 5th. The Federals were forced to flee to their gunboats for protection.

Meantime, Breckinridge waited vainly to hear the guns of the *Arkansas*; for that vessel never reached the scene of conflict. Within a short distance of Baton Rouge, in ample time for the attack, her machinery suddenly became unmanageable, nor could her engineers repair it. She was moored to the shore, and on the approach of the enemy her commander, Lieutenant Stevens, landed her crew, cut her moorings, fired her, and turned her adrift in the river. Every gun was shotted and the Confederate flag flying, as with not a man on board she made her last advance upon the enemy. As the flames reached her guns they were discharged, and as the last gun fired her magazine exploded and ended her brief career. Unable to fight the enemy's gunboats without her, General Breckinridge was unable to pursue his victory and withdrew his troops. The fight was between most unequal contestants, the Federal forces being larger, better clothed, and better fed; but no troops ever behaved with greater gallantry than the ragged and emaciated Confederates.

As a result of this expedition, General Van Dorn ordered the occupation of Port Hudson, a position easily defended and admirably situated for annoying the Federal forces. Batteries were established and placed in the hands of experienced gunners, and with an adequate supporting force they could hold Baton Rouge in menace. The Federals shortly withdrew from Baton Rouge, leaving the river open from Memphis to New Orleans. The Confederates thus held two important Mississippi River points two hundred miles apart and were for a time unmolested by the enemy.

Early in September, General Grant had two divisions of the Army of the Mississippi stationed at Corinth, Rienzi, Jacinto, and Danville. At Corinth he also had Davies's division, two brigades of McArthur's, and the cavalry and

artillery constituting the left wing, with General Rosecrans in command. General E. O. C. Ord commanded the centre wing and General W. T. Sherman the right wing, which extended to Memphis, with two of his brigades back at Brownsville. All except Sherman's forces were in easy telegraphic communication. Corinth was a strongly fortified point. As a part of the plan of subjugation, preparations were being made by the enemy for an advance through Mississippi and an attack on Vicksburg by combined land and naval forces. General Bragg had moved into Kentucky, leaving General Van Dorn and General Sterling Price in command of the Confederate troops in northern Mississippi. General Grant had been constantly called on to reinforce General Buell, so that he had at this time a total force of about 42,000 men. General Price and General Van Dorn united their forces and prepared for an attack on Corinth, by the capture of which position the Federal forces could be driven from western Tennessee and northern Mississippi. This would have made Ohio River the dividing line between the belligerents west of the Alleghanies. At the east the line was already farther north than when hostilities commenced at the opening of the year.

General Bragg's instructions to Generals Price and Van Dorn had been to prevent a junction of the opposing forces with General Buell in Middle Tennessee. General Price learned that General Rosecrans was moving to cross the Tennessee and join Buell. He therefore marched from Tupelo, reached Iuka on the 13th, and on the following day took possession. Colonel R. C. Murphy, commanding the Federal forces, made no resistance, but marched his regiment out, leaving a considerable quantity of army stores and a large amount of cotton. The cotton was burned and Price settled down leisurely under the nose of General Grant, who was at Corinth, thirty miles away. Grant planned a combined attack by Rosecrans from the south and Ord from the west; Ord took position six miles from Iuka to await Rosecrans's attack. There ran two roads

from the southward to Iuka: the Fulton road, and two miles west of it the Tuscumbia road. Grant's plan had been an approach by the Fulton road, with a view to cutting off Price's escape by that way; but Rosecrans, for reasons of his own, advanced with his whole force by the Tuscumbia road, leaving the Fulton road entirely open.

On the 1st of September, General Bragg had telegraphed Price to watch Rosecrans and prevent his joining Buell in Middle Tennessee. On reaching Iuka, Price learned that Rosecrans had sent three divisions to Buell, but had remained west of Iuka with two divisions. He decided to remain, and telegraphed Van Dorn that he would turn back and coöperate with him in an attack on Corinth. Almost at the same time he had another telegram from Bragg urging him to hasten to Nashville. He did not go, though Grant, Halleck, and Rosecrans feared that he would do so, and Halleck had written Grant to "do everything in your power to prevent Price from crossing the Tennessee. A junction of Price and Bragg in Tennessee would be most disastrous. They should be fought while separate." Grant's response was that he would do everything in his power "to prevent such a catastrophe," and he at once began concentrating his forces against Price. Even after Ord's march to within six miles of Iuka, there was time for Price to hurry to Nashville, and pursuit would hardly have been made, since Grant would not dare to open West Tennessee to the advance of Van Dorn, who was waiting to enter it. Price was still hesitating when, during the night of September 18th, he learned that Van Dorn had been directed by the president to take command of the force under Price and the Army of the West. The officer bringing this information was authorized to arrange the movements by which the two armies should unite and preparations were made to inaugurate on the following morning the beginning of the movements.

At two o'clock in the afternoon of September 19th, however, Price learned that Rosecrans was advancing in force by the Jacinto road, while all his artillery and infantry

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Receipt for a chest of silver deposited for safekeeping by Major-General Benjamin F. Butler in 1862, with endorsement showing its return delivery on his order in 1867. From the original in the Confederate Memorial Collection, New Orleans, Louisiana.

were in front of Ord, by whom he expected the attack to be made. Brigadier-general Henry Little was ordered to send General Louis Hebert's brigade to the left, and it came on the instant. By this time, Hamilton's division of Rosecrans's corps was within a mile and a half of the centre of the town. In response to Price's order for another brigade General Little sent Martin's brigade quickly to the field, the fight having already begun. Little was ordered to bring up the rest of his division; he started it forward and joined General Price in the thickest of the fight. A minie ball crashed through his forehead, killing him instantly. Hamilton gave way, losing nine of his guns, and was reinforced by General D. S. Stanley's division. About the same time the rest of Little's division arrived, but darkness had put a stop to the battle. General Price resolved to renew the fight at daylight, but influenced by the apprehensions of his generals that Grant would attack in overwhelming force in the morning, he reluctantly ordered that the preparations of the preceding day for withdrawal be carried out. This was done. It was learned afterward that Grant never heard of the fight until the following day. Rosecrans entered Iuka when Price had withdrawn. Grant sent two divisions and some cavalry in pursuit and they overtook Price's rearguard in the afternoon, but being severely handled they retired. This was pronounced a severe fight by both armies, Major-general Hamilton saying: "I never saw a hotter or more destructive engagement." General Price in his official report says: "The fight began and was waged with a severity I have never seen surpassed."

Rosecrans's column was 9,000 strong, but the battle was mainly waged by Hamilton's division. The Federal loss was 141 killed, 649 wounded, and 36 missing. On the Confederate side, only two brigades of Price's army, Hebert's and John Adams's brigades of Little's division, 3,179 officers and men, were engaged. The Confederate loss was 86 killed, 408 wounded; about 200 Confederate sick were left at Iuka or on the road.

General Price on the 28th of September reached Ripley, Mississippi, with Hebert's and D. H. Maury's divisions, numbering 13,863 infantry, artillery and cavalry. At Ripley he joined General Van Dorn, who had Lovell's division there with a little over 8,000 men. They had become satisfied that instead of trying to join Buell the Federals were trying to hold the line on the Confederate left. General Grant by this time believed that the purpose of this concentration of forces was an attempt to drive the Federal forces from northern Mississippi and West Tennessee, and had prepared to meet this movement by ordering to Corinth all the forces that could be spared from Bolivar and Jackson. The strategic importance of Corinth lay in its control of movements either way over the Mobile and Ohio and the Memphis and Charleston Railroads, the one running from Columbus on the Mississippi through Jackson in Tennessee, and through Bethel, Corinth, Tupelo, and Baldwyn in Mississippi, on to Mobile, Alabama; and the other running from Memphis almost parallel with the southern border of Tennessee through Corinth to Decatur, Alabama, and thence to Stevenson, where it converged with the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad en route to Chattanooga. In all this section through which the Federal army of 50,000 was distributed, the Federals could not have existed without railroad connection. After the battle of Iuka, Grant moved his headquarters to Jackson, Tennessee. Rosecrans was left in charge of the district, assuming command September 26th. He engaged in throwing up breastworks as rapidly as possible. By the 1st of October he had increased the force in Corinth from 10,000 to 16,000 men.

Meantime, Van Dorn had decided that Corinth must be taken before anything of importance could be accomplished in West Tennessee, and he determined to make the attempt, attacking from the north and west. On October 1st he was at Pocahontas with about 22,000 men, while Rosecrans had 16,000 at Corinth, with 8,000 at outposts twelve to fifteen miles distant. His march toward Pocahontas had

been interpreted by the Federals as an intention to attack Bolivar, and the sudden turn of the army, crossing the Hatchie and the Tuscumbia, enabled the Confederates to surprise Corinth before the outposts could be called in. Crossing the Hatchie in the early morning of October 2d, the army bivouacked at Chewalla, ten miles from Corinth, resuming the march the following morning. The railroad between Corinth and Jackson was cut, and the line of battle formed after some heavy skirmishing. By ten o'clock all skirmishers were driven into the entrenchments and the two armies were in line of battle, confronting each other in force. A belt of fallen timber four hundred yards wide extending along the whole line of Union entrenchments was to be crossed.

The attack was begun on the right by General M. Lovell's division and extended gradually to the left. By half-past one o'clock, the whole line of outer works was carried and several pieces of artillery taken. The Federals obstinately resisted the advance to the second line of works, making several ineffectual efforts to hold their ground. As the last shot followed the retreating Federals into their innermost lines, the sun went down. The Confederate army, victorious so far, slept on their arms within six hundred yards of Corinth. During the night three batteries took position on the ridge overlooking the town from the west with instructions to open fire at four o'clock in the morning. The battle really opened about eight o'clock, and though General Van Dorn's well-laid plans were delayed by unavoidable causes, one brigade after another went gallantly into action, pushing forward, through direct and cross fire, over every obstacle. They reached Corinth, planted their colors on the last stronghold of the enemy and fought hand to hand in the very yard of Rosecrans's headquarters and in the streets of the town. The heavy guns were silenced and all seemed about to be ended, when fresh troops that had arrived from Iuka, Burnsville and Rienzi began to pour a heavy fire into the thinned Confederate ranks. Exhausted from loss of sleep, wearied from hard marching

and fighting, many companies and regiments without officers, the Confederates gave way, and the battle was lost.

Lovell's division was then sent to the left and fell slowly back to Indian Creek where he could prevent the Federals from turning the Confederate left. The same division brought up the rear of the whole army, which again bivouacked at Chewalla. No enemy disturbed the sleep of the wearied troops. During the night, Van Dorn had a bridge constructed over the Tuscumbia and sent Armstrong's and General W. H. Jackson's cavalry to seize Rienzi, intending to march to and hold that point, but after consultation with General Price it was decided to return by the road by which they had come and fall back toward Ripley and Oxford. Expecting that his passage across the Hatchie would be disputed, General Van Dorn pushed rapidly toward the bridge, but learned from couriers that he would be too late. He hastened on, however, determined to engage the enemy until his train and reserve artillery could be started on the road. Armstrong and Jackson were ordered back, and covered the front and flank of the trains until they crossed the Hatchie and then covered them in front until they were on the Ripley road. The Federals were then engaged beyond the Hatchie bridge by small fragments of Maury's division and were held in check sufficiently long to enable the Confederates safely to remove their impedimenta. General Ord commanded the Federal force at this point, and took his position before the travel-worn Confederates could form a line of battle, and drove them back across the bridge. They maintained their position on the hills, however, until they received orders to fall back. General John S. Bowen was left at the Tuscumbia bridge to defend it until the artillery was available. While executing this order the head of Rosecrans's army appeared, but was repulsed in a manner reflecting credit on General Bowen and his men. The Confederates were not again molested during their retreat to Holly Springs. Charges were made against General Van Dorn of neglect of duty and cruelty

and improper treatment, but a Court of Inquiry investigated them and unanimously voted them disproved.

General Price in his report of the battle says: "The history of this war contains no bloodier pages, perhaps, than that which will record this fiercely contested battle. The strongest expressions fall short of my admiration of the gallant conduct of the officers and men under my command." The Federal loss was officially reported as 355 killed, 1,841 wounded, and 324 captured or missing. The Confederate loss was 505 killed, 2,150 wounded, and 1,812 captured or missing.

Van Dorn waited further developments while resting at Holly Springs. In the meantime, General Grant had massed a heavy force, somewhat over 80,000 men, at points along the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, and moved south toward the interior of Mississippi. Holly Springs was taken November 13th, and the whole day was spent in skirmishing with the Confederate cavalry. Grant's main army camped at Water Valley, where the country was rich in breadstuffs and forage. This he seized and sent to Holly Springs, where he accumulated an immense depot of supplies, hastening every necessary preparation to continue his march southward. Jackson, Vicksburg, and the railroads were doomed unless his progress could be arrested. There was no force in front to oppose him, and the only hope was to interrupt his communications. General Van Dorn, on the night of December 15th, quietly withdrew the cavalry, about 2,500 men, from the Federal front and marched for Holly Springs. Early in the morning of the 19th he surprised and captured the garrison, a brigade of infantry and a portion of the Seventh Illinois Cavalry. The vast accumulation of supplies, valued at a million and a half dollars, was burned by Van Dorn, except the small quantity used in arming and equipping his command.

The second expedition for the capture of Vicksburg had been carefully and skilfully planned, but like the first, it resulted in failure. General Grant with an army of 30,000

men moved as far south as Grenada, Mississippi, forcing back the inferior force of General Van Dorn and following the line of the Illinois Central Railroad parallel to Mississippi River, thus threatening the rear of Vicksburg. General W. T. Sherman moved from Memphis with a force of 32,000 men, in 94 transports accompanied by the river gunboat fleet of 31 vessels mounting nearly 150 guns, commanded by Acting Rear-admiral Porter.

To oppose these two formidable armies the Confederates could bring into active duty only 22,000 men in the field under General Van Dorn, and 6,000 men in the garrison at Vicksburg under General Martin L. Smith, the whole being under the command of General John C. Pemberton. The force in the field opposing the advance of Grant was in reality a part of the garrison of Vicksburg, and necessary to the complete defence of the fortifications.

It was Sherman's purpose to keep his expedition as secret as possible, to surprise Vicksburg while thus inadequately defended and to take the place by sudden assault; or, failing in this, to besiege it by land and water, while Grant's army in coöperation pressed Van Dorn with the double purpose of preventing reinforcement of the garrison and of pushing back the Confederate forces and forming a junction with Sherman in the rear of Vicksburg.

This plan was defeated by three unexpected events. The first was the raid of General N. B. Forrest into West Tennessee, which destroyed the railroad by which Grant received his supplies and left him without communications for eleven days, and without supplies for a much longer period. The second was the destruction by General Van Dorn of the stores which Grant had accumulated at Holly Springs. His accumulated stores and his source of supplies being thus unexpectedly destroyed at the same time, Grant was compelled to retreat at the very moment when he expected to advance to coöperate with Sherman. The third event was equally unexpected. Sherman's movement was not so secretly conducted as to escape the notice of the

Confederate spies. Leaving Memphis on December 20th, he entered the mouth of Yazoo River on December 26th, and landed at Johnson's farm, near the mouth of Chickasaw Bayou. From this point General Sherman expected an easy march to the defences of Vicksburg, about twelve miles distant. At that time there were no entrenchments except the immediate defences of the city, and at Snyder's Bluff, on the Yazoo, thirteen miles from the city. Says General Stephen D. Lee: "Not a spade of dirt had been thrown up along this entire line (Vicksburg to Snyder's Bluff), and there were no entrenchments, nor covered batteries."

On December 25th, the day on which Sherman arrived at the mouth of Yazoo River, and when his intentions became evident, General Martin L. Smith, commanding at Vicksburg, determined not to await an investment of the city, but to oppose the enemy in the field. He placed General Stephen D. Lee, recently promoted to that rank, in command of all the forces that could be spared from the city fortifications, and sent him to meet Sherman.

With the quick eye of military genius, Lee chose his ground. From Vicksburg the long line of bluffs, about two hundred feet in height, which skirts the Mississippi on the east, diverges from the river, and does not again reach it to the north until Memphis is reached. The bluffs leave Mississippi River about two miles above Vicksburg, and trend northeastward in a nearly straight line, touching Yazoo River about eighteen miles from its mouth and thirteen miles from Vicksburg, at a point named Snyder's Bluff—called Haines's Bluff by the Federal officers. A triangle is thus formed, bounded by Yazoo River from its mouth to Snyder's Bluff, the line of bluffs from Snyder's Bluff to Vicksburg, and Mississippi River from Vicksburg to the mouth of the Yazoo. Snyder's Bluff was fortified, and its heavy guns commanded the navigation of the Yazoo at that point. The triangle above mentioned is low and flat, and subject to overflow. It is intersected by bayous and almost made up of lakes and swamps.

From the point where Sherman landed it was necessary, in order to reach Vicksburg, to cross this low land and then to ascend the bluffs. Lee rapidly distributed his small force along the line of battle, twelve miles in length, from Vicksburg to Snyder's Bluff, and hastily constructed defences to command the few narrow passes of dry land which afforded the only practicable routes to Vicksburg, and to strengthen the natural barrier of the bluffs. The widest crossing on dry land, and the best route to Vicksburg, was along Chickasaw Bayou, which ran from Yazoo River to the foot of the bluffs at the centre of the Confederate line of battle, about six and a half miles from the city.

Skirmishing began on the 26th and continued during the 27th, by which time General Sherman had developed his lines and had sent the gunboats to assail Snyder's Bluff. On the 28th, he pressed his line forward, and some severe fighting occurred. Having brought his guns into position, he prepared to make a vigorous assault the next day on the Confederate lines posted on the bluff. During all this time he had been held in check by a small force of 3,000 men commanded by General Lee.

On December 29th Sherman moved to the main assault his four divisions, commanded respectively by General A. J. Smith, General Morgan L. Smith, General G. W. Morgan, and General Frederick Steele. The main attack was made on the Confederate centre at Chickasaw Bayou, where General Lee was present in person, and a strong assault was also made near a place called "The Mound," about four miles from Vicksburg. The fighting began at noon and ended about four o'clock. The Federals were repulsed along the entire line, with the most severe loss in front of Chickasaw Bayou.

General Lee had received a reinforcement of two regiments on the 28th. More began coming in on the 29th and 30th. These reinforcements came from Van Dorn's army, now relieved from pressure by Grant's retreat. The entire force engaged on the Confederate side was fifteen

regiments and four batteries, not exceeding 8,000 men. A large portion of these did not arrive in time to bear the brunt of the battle. Sherman had at hand 32,000 men, with a fleet of gunboats. The strategy of the Confederates rendered the gunboats practically useless and foiled the largely superior land force. General Sherman's loss was 191 killed, 982 wounded, 756 missing; total, 1,929. The entire Confederate loss was 63 killed, 134 wounded, 10 missing; total, 207.

General Sherman remained a few days in camp. Some desultory skirmishing ensued and an expedition was planned against Snyder's Bluff, but was subsequently abandoned. On January 2, 1863, Sherman reëmbarked and steamed to the mouth of the Yazoo. There General John A. McClernand arrived and assumed command under orders from the government at Washington. Thus ended the second attack on Vicksburg. It would be difficult to cite a feat of arms more decisive and brilliant than the bloody and signal repulse of this formidable expedition.

CHAPTER XI

CAMPAIGNS OF 1862—THE TRANS-MISSISSIPPI AND THE COAST

THE Confederate trans-Mississippi campaign of 1862 was a series of mistakes; it was characterized by disorder, confusion, and demoralization. Desultory expeditions and crushing defeats destroyed the confidence of the people, and left Arkansas and Missouri in the hands of the Federals to an extent that would have been deemed impossible at the beginning of the year. There were few important movements, and they were as a rule unsuccessful. Repeated changes in commanding officers tended to the destruction of discipline among the troops, and the results were disastrous to the Confederacy. The trans-Mississippi District was organized January 10, 1862, under command of Major-general Earl Van Dorn, who assumed command on the 29th of the same month. On the 3d of February there was a call for 71,000 men from the State of Missouri for the Confederate service. On February 15th, Brigadier-general John M. Schofield assumed command of the Federal forces in the district of St. Louis, and on the 23d, Brigadier-general John Pope assumed command of the Army of the Mississippi assembling at Commerce, Missouri. Skirmishes were of almost daily occurrence throughout Missouri, but the movements were unimportant as a whole until General Van Dorn tried to beat the enemy at Pea Ridge, Arkansas, and a series of accidents and a badly disciplined army defeated his intentions.

Van Dorn moved on the morning of March 4th with the divisions of Price and McCulloch, by way of Fayetteville and Bentonville, to attack the enemy's main camp at Sugar Creek, his own force being about 16,000 men. On the 6th, he reached Bentonville just in time to see Sigel with his 7,000 men leaving the place, and too late to cut him off from the main body under General Samuel R. Curtis. By eleven o'clock the fighting had been begun near Elkhorn Tavern and Leesville. Generals Benjamin McCulloch and James McIntosh were killed and Colonel Hebert captured early in the action, throwing the troops on the right under their commands into confusion. Van Dorn, however, pressed forward with the attack. By sunset the Federal forces were retreating, and when night fell they had been driven from the field. During the night the Confederate commander found his ammunition almost exhausted and the ordnance wagons gone on to Bentonville. He awaited daylight with anxiety, and when it came he found the Federal forces in strong position offering battle. By seven o'clock the cannonading was as heavy as on the preceding day. The right wing being disorganized and the batteries retiring one after the other as their last shots were expended, Van Dorn retreated, and about 3 P. M. encamped ten miles from the field of battle. He had gone into action with less than 14,000 men, and sustained a loss of 600 killed and wounded and 200 prisoners. The opposing force was estimated at from 17,000 to 24,000 men, and their loss at 700 killed and wounded and 300 prisoners.

After the defeat at Elkhorn, the Confederate forces withdrew to Des Arc. General Van Dorn accompanied by Colonel Dabney H. Maury, went to Corinth where, after a personal conference with Generals Johnston and Beauregard, Van Dorn was directed to bring his command to Corinth to unite in the attack upon Grant at Pittsburg Landing. No sooner had General Van Dorn returned to Arkansas than the news of the proposed abandonment of Arkansas and Missouri became known and created the

most general consternation. The governors of the States protested and the troops manifested the greatest reluctance to leave their own States. Van Dorn's assurance of their return immediately after the impending battle reconciled them, but few of them ever returned, and these two States were left to their fate. Nothing was accomplished by the movement of Van Dorn, for the battle of Shiloh had been fought before the arrival of his troops, and three times as many Union troops were transferred to confront the Western men on the Tennessee. The policy of depleting the trans-Mississippi forces was continued until after the fall of Vicksburg, and contributed its share toward hastening the downfall of the Confederacy.

After the battle of Elkhorn, General Curtis went to northern Arkansas and occupied Batesville on White River, ninety miles from Little Rock, with an effective force of 12,422 men. But for the distance from St. Louis, his base of supply, he could have moved on to the capital and down the valley of the Arkansas. His movement on Little Rock was really begun, but the evacuation of Corinth and the opening of Mississippi River to Vicksburg gave him hope of water communication with St. Louis and he waited at Batesville. Brigadier-general John S. Roane had been assigned by General Van Dorn to command the Confederate forces remaining in Arkansas, but these forces consisted of only a few companies of State militia poorly armed and badly organized. There were also a few thousand Indian and mixed troops in the Indian Territory under Brigadier-general Albert Pike, but these were practically worthless as soldiers. Arkansas was thus abandoned and her people north of Arkansas River submitted to the authority of the Union and many enlisted in the Federal army. The Confederate portion of the population were panic stricken, and the governor and State officials prepared to abandon the capital of the State.

In compliance with the request of a delegation from Arkansas, General Beauregard appointed Major-general

Thomas C. Hindman to the command of the trans-Mississippi district and authorized him to raise an army for defence. General Hindman had been wounded at Shiloh, where he commanded a brigade, and had been promoted for his services in that conflict. Having procured money and army supplies, he hastened to Little Rock and went to work with his characteristic energy and administrative ability to create an army. He declared martial law, enforced the conscript law remorselessly, arrested and shot scores of deserters, collected stragglers, and sent recruiting officers throughout his district. He appropriated five Texas regiments on their way to Beauregard, established powder mills, factories for making shot, arms, and clothing, and worked faithfully until he had about 20,000 men and forty-six pieces of artillery. He saved the valley of the Arkansas to the Confederacy and forced Curtis to retreat through the swamps to Helena. Hindman sent Brigadier-general Rust to intercept the march, but Curtis got by Rust and reached Helena July 13th.

Then the Confederate government planned a vigorous war in the West and sent General Magruder to take charge, but recalled that officer before he reached the scene of his duties and afterward sent him to Texas, assigning Major-general Holmes to the command of the trans-Mississippi. Hindman reported to General Holmes that he had 18,000 infantry, 6,000 mounted men, 54 pieces of artillery, and 7,000 or 8,000 unarmed men in instruction camps. The greater portion of this force General Hindman was directed to concentrate at Fort Smith and with it to organize an expedition into Missouri. General Schofield was in charge of the Union forces in Missouri, mostly State militia, and had had more than he could do to manage the Missourians and disperse the guerrilla bands that kept up the fight for the State on its own soil. Hearing that Hindman intended to invade Missouri with an army which rumor fixed at from 40,000 to 70,000 men, Schofield called for help, and Kansas was added to his department. Curtis was then

placed in command and gathered for Schofield a force of 11,000 men which he called the "Army of the Frontier." Hindman with from 9,000 to 10,000 men—3,000 of whom were Indians—advanced, but had hardly entered Missouri when he was recalled to Little Rock and left General James S. Rains in command, with orders not to provoke an engagement. Despite orders, Rains attacked General Frederick Salomon at Newtonia and drove him back in confusion. Schofield marched to Salomon's assistance; the Confederates fell back and Schofield followed, driving the whole army out of Missouri and into the mountains of Arkansas.

General Hindman had now returned to his command, but before he could take a strong position Schofield again advanced and forced Hindman to retreat. Schofield had then an army of 16,000 men. Believing the work of his expedition accomplished, and being sick, he turned over the command to General James G. Blunt and went to St. Louis. Hindman then determined to invade Missouri again, and was busy reorganizing his army when, by reason of the demands of the war east of the Mississippi, General Holmes was directed to abandon the expedition. Grant's way had now been opened by Van Dorn's defeat at Corinth, and the Federal forces were concentrating for a movement on Vicksburg. Pemberton had superseded Van Dorn, and he instructed Holmes to send 10,000 men to Vicksburg. Holmes thereupon ordered Hindman to return to Little Rock, but Hindman determined to attack General Blunt first. Blunt had driven General J. S. Marmaduke back and had taken position at Cane Hill, and hearing of Hindman's advance had ordered General F. J. Herron to come to his aid. Herron and Blunt were twelve miles apart, and Hindman determined to destroy Herron and then turn upon Blunt and defeat him. But Blunt knew that the upper road between himself and Herron was in Hindman's possession, so he marched to Ray's Mill, eight miles north, crossed Illinois River, a mountain stream, and thence went east four miles to Prairie Grove. This trip he made in a little

more than two hours without molestation. Instead of promptly attacking Herron, Hindman took a strong position and waited to be attacked. Herron, however, took his own time about attacking and so gave Blunt time to come to his assistance. The battle began with a furious artillery fire from the Federals, and no sooner did Blunt hear Herron's guns than he rushed to his support, thus forcing Hindman to fight the united army. The Federals swept up the hill through a young peach orchard, and right upon Blocker's battery which had been so masked as to be unperceivable to the advancing troops. The Confederates held their fire until the enemy were within fifty yards; then broke forth from their guns leaping flames that swept down the advance. The Federal line broke and struggled back in inextricable confusion, while Shelby's and Hawthorne's brigades followed the enemy almost to their own guns. All about the peach orchard, behind logs, stumps, and trees, the dead and wounded lay in great heaps. There was intense suffering among the wounded from the biting winds.

The first attack repulsed, Hindman commenced massing his troops on the right, which, under the command of General Marmaduke, he intended to hurl upon the enemy's left, turn it and gain their rear. At the beginning of these movements, Hindman's confidence was shaken by the conduct of Colonel C. W. Adams's regiment; after delivering a single fire most of Adams's men broke ranks, threw down their arms and shamefully fled, many of them even deserting to the enemy. A portion of the regiment was rallied about the colors, and these troops made desperate efforts to redeem the reputation of their regiment. With few exceptions the company officers exerted no influence. The desertion had occurred in the hottest part of the fight with Herron. Hindman then abandoned all other plans than holding the ground until nightfall and retiring below the mountains. Recovering from his first repulse, Herron organized his brigade and sent it back reinforced, but the issue was again disastrous to him. For four hours the tide of battle ebbed and flowed about the

hill. Blunt threw himself upon General Charles C. Parsons and for an hour and a half dealt heavy blows, but Parsons closed suddenly upon him and bore him back to the timber beyond a large orchard where thirty pieces of artillery were. In this orchard stood five great ricks of straw into which some 200 wounded Federals had crawled to escape the bitter cold. Their own army's shells fired the dry ricks and the 200, almost to a man, were burned to death. Darkness ended the battle, and in compliance with his previous orders Hindman decided to retreat during the night to Van Buren, which he did. His loss in killed, wounded, and missing had been 1,317; the Federal loss was 1,251, of which 918 belonged to Herron's two divisions, which had borne the weight of the contest.

In addition to the devastation of the regular troops, Missouri probably suffered more than any other State from guerrilla raids. The failure of the State to enter the Confederacy and to furnish 100,000 soldiers to the South was due to the weak and vacillating policy of the political leaders. Public sentiment needed but an impelling director to have enlisted numerous regiments for the Confederate army at the beginning of the war. Denied the opportunity of regular warfare, a large number of independent, or guerrilla, companies were formed; and many of these passed through the State, making war on those known to be Unionists. The most noted of the guerrilla leaders was William Clark Quantrell, who, in both Missouri and Kansas, warred against those sections which had no love for the South. The most notable of Quantrell's raids of 1862 were in August and November. On August 11th, after a four hours' fight, about 1,500 men under Quantrell and Hughes captured Independence, Missouri, a strong Federal town garrisoned by Lieutenant-colonel Buell with the Seventh Missouri Cavalry. On the 16th of the same month, about 3,200 men, under the same leaders, reinforced by M. S. Thompson, Alexander Hays, and F. M. Cockrell, attacked the Federals at Lone Jack, thirty-two miles from Lexington,

where a terrific contest was waged. Of the 36 men attached to the Federal battery, 24 were killed or wounded, and of the detachment supporting the battery, two-thirds were among the dead, wounded, and missing. The Federals retreated to Lexington, losing their battery. Quantrell also attacked Lamar, November 6th, burning the court house and a part of the town, and immediately thereafter, near Harrisonville, Missouri, captured a Federal supply train after a stubborn resistance. The fifteen wagons that made up the train were burned, and a dozen men, mostly teamsters, were killed. The entire cavalry escort of 22 men was captured. Quantrell then crossed into Kansas, and captured the town of Pottawatomie. Other companies of less note were busy throughout the State, including Anderson's, Hildebrand's, and other minor bands.

During the early months of 1862 came the culmination of an abortive invasion of New Mexico and Arizona. This invasion had been planned some months preceding the secession of Texas, the rumor coming to San Antonio early in December, 1860, that Captain John R. Baylor, well known throughout Texas, was organizing a body of 1,000 men for a buffalo hunt. Captain Baylor was an ardent secessionist, and in the beginning the plan was feared to be to surprise and seize the San Antonio arsenal in time to prevent resistance. The "buffalo hunt" assumed tangible shape in February, 1861. On the 18th of that month, General David E. Twiggs surrendered to a superior force of Texas Rangers and other forces under Colonel Ben McCulloch, the nineteen posts held by him as commander of the Department of Texas. For this surrender General Twiggs was dismissed from the United States army. On May 22d, he joined the Confederate army and was appointed to the command of the District of Louisiana, which position he resigned, however, before the close of the year. He died shortly after his resignation, in Georgia, his native State. The buffalo hunt culminated in Captain Baylor's reaching El Paso, Texas, early in July, 1861, with three hundred

men of his regiment, the Second Texas Mounted Rifles, and occupying Fort Bliss, across the river, which the regular troops had abandoned. On July 23d, Baylor and his force advanced up the Rio Grande to La Mesila, held by Major Isaac Lynde with a superior force. Lynde capitulated July 27th, after sustaining a desultory attack on the town and attempting a retreat. The troops at Fort Buchanan destroyed their stores and fled.

Captain Baylor issued a proclamation August 1st, organizing that part of New Mexico south of the thirty-fourth parallel as the Confederate Territory of Arizona, with Mesila as the capital. On the 18th of November General H. H. Sibley, who, by authority of the Confederate government, had organized a brigade of four regiments of mounted troops, including Baylor's, left San Antonio. He arrived at Fort Bliss and on December 14th assumed command of all forces in New Mexico and Arizona, which were designated as the "Army of New Mexico." On November 19, 1861, the United States had established their Department of New Mexico and placed it under the command of Colonel E. R. C. Canby. All the southern part of New Mexico was in possession of the Confederates. Colonel Canby at once began reorganizing the army and improving the defences of such posts as were still under control of the United States.

The first week of January, 1862, Sibley commenced the march with his command, numbering about 3,700 men, up the Rio Grande. Canby then had a force of 3,810 men. Undertaking to prevent the Confederates from crossing Valverde River, Canby was defeated with a loss of 68 killed and 160 wounded, the loss of the Confederates being almost equal. The result of this battle inspired the Confederates, so that instead of retreating to San Antonio, as had been the intention, they buried their dead, rested, and then advanced further up the river. Albuquerque was occupied, and then Santa Fé. In the battle of Apache Canon they met with the most serious loss of the campaign, including

sixty wagons and their contents. This left the Confederates in straitened circumstances.

Colonel Canby left Fort Craig April 1st with 1,210 men to join the troops at Fort Union. He made an attack on Albuquerque, but retired after a few volleys. General Sibley then decided to retreat from the territory, but his retreat was a desperate one. His men were on half rations for a great part of the time, and abandoned on the way almost everything except what they carried on their persons. It was May 1st when Sibley himself reached Fort Bliss, and his command was stretched out for fifty miles to the rear. Sibley returned to Fort Bliss with less than 2,000 men. The bones of nearly one-half of his original army were left scattered on the plains of Arizona and New Mexico.

Let us now turn to the coast. The blockade originally planned was now fully organized, and was constantly being strengthened by the increase in the number of squadrons, as well as by constant additions to the number of vessels engaged. The naval history of the year 1862 naturally comprises the history of several distinct squadrons. The North Atlantic Squadron, which confined its operations to the coast of Virginia and North Carolina, was in charge of Rear-admiral L. M. Goldsborough until September 5th, when he was relieved at his own request by Acting Rear-admiral S. P. Lee. The South Atlantic Squadron, maintaining the blockade on the coasts of South Carolina and Georgia and on the northeast coast of Florida, was commanded by Rear-admiral S. F. Dupont. The Gulf Squadron early in the year was divided into the Eastern and Western Gulf Squadrons, of which the former was successively commanded by Flag-officer William W. McKean and Acting Rear-admirals James L. Lardner and Theodorus Bailey, and extended its operations from Cape Canaveral on the east coast of Florida to Pensacola; the latter was under Rear-admiral Farragut. In addition to these four squadrons there were: the Western Flotilla, on Mississippi River, commanded at first by Rear-admiral A. H. Foote, who was

relieved on May 9th by Commodore C. H. Davis, he being succeeded about the middle of October by Acting Rear-admiral David D. Porter; the Potomac Flotilla, under Commodore A. A. Harwood; and the James River Flotilla, under Commodore Charles Wilkes.

The blockade was to be made as stringent as possible. For this purpose orders were issued by the United States Navy Department early in January, urging the importance of a rigorous blockade at every point, and in the instructions of Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, under date of January 23d, attention was called to the fact that "There is a manifest desire, if not determination, in certain quarters to break the blockade, and the apology therefor will be, if possible, a want of vigilance or efficiency on the part of our squadrons in guarding the coast in such a manner as to interdict communication." This reference was to the British contention in regard to the blockade, which was also adhered to in a less degree by other nations.

The Confederacy hoped and believed that cotton had power to lift the blockade, admit Confederate cruisers to the admiralty courts of foreign nations, and to win recognition of its independence and nationality; and until near the end that hope and belief never entirely departed from either the government or the people. The English admiral, Milne, in instructions to the commander of a frigate in his fleet, stated that "no port is to be considered efficiently blockaded if any vessel can enter or depart from it unknown to or in spite of the blockading squadron." By that test there was no blockade in 1862. The United States had all the markets of the world open to her; her navy yards were furnished with the best materials and machinery, and she could command an unlimited number of workmen; large workshops kept turning out arms and ammunition, and a contest on the water could have but one result. The South possessed no adequate navy and few facilities for building one. The armament for the Southern forts and such vessels as the South had were old-fashioned, weak, and defective. The disproportion

between men and materials on the two sides was almost incredible. And yet, the United States could not effectually blockade the ports of the Confederacy.

In one day at Charleston several sailing vessels and two Confederate steamers, one after the other, made good their escape from the harbor. At Wilmington, September 30, 1861, the steamer *Kate* and two schooners successfully ran the blockade. Beaufort carried on an active importation of provisions and export of naval stores. Nova Scotian vessels did "a good business in the South," and many were receiving a share of the profits realized from running the blockade.

Wilmington was resorted to by speculators from all over the South, who came to attend the regular weekly auctions of imported goods. Across the river from Wilmington were erected steam cotton presses, and there the blockade runners took in their cargoes. Captain John Wilkinson, of the Confederate States navy, had assigned him as one of his duties the detailing of pilots and signal officers to the blockade runners. Among the things required of blockade runners was that each should bring in a barrel of sperm oil for the lights along the approaches to Cape Fear River. Some of the blockade runners were constructed regardless of any good quality but speed, so that their scantling was light and their seagoing qualities were often inferior. Many came to grief; some swamped at sea and some had to come back after a few days without making a voyage.

Before a trip, the blockade runner was prepared by reducing her spars to a light pair of lower masts with one small crow's nest on the foremast to be used as a lookout. The hull was painted a dull gray to be as nearly invisible at night as possible. Anthracite coal was used and the "telescope" funnel was constructed so as to be lowered close to the deck. Steam was blown off under water to avoid noise. Among the fowls taken on board, no cocks were allowed, lest their crowing might reveal the vessel's whereabouts. Cargoes were landed quickly and replaced

by cotton, which was packed in hold and on deck to the last bale capacity. When loaded the vessel looked like a huge cotton bale with a pole upright at one end. The *Robert E. Lee*, Captain John Wilkinson, ran the blockade twenty-one times and carried abroad cotton worth two million dollars in gold. Another vessel, the *Kate*, made over forty trips. From April 18th to April 28th, ten blockade runners arrived at Havana with cotton from New Orleans and Mobile. From March 16th to April 10th, fourteen blockade runners with cotton from Atlantic ports arrived at Nassau, N. P., and six left Nassau for home with merchandise needed in the Confederacy. From July, 1862, to June, 1863, fifty-seven steamers and ninety-one sailing vessels left Nassau for Confederate ports and fifty-one steamers and fifty-five sailing vessels landed their cargoes. During the same period forty-four steamers and forty-five sailing vessels reached Nassau from the Confederacy, and on the 23d of April, 1863, there were seventy-three ships, chiefly British, loading with cotton at Matamoras. Freights were enormous, ranging from \$300 to \$1,000 a ton.

Charleston, Savannah, and Wilmington were the principal ports from which the blockaders operated on the Atlantic coast, as Bermuda, Havana, Nassau, and Matamoras were the principal foreign ports. Nassau, in particular, sprang into great prominence.

A remarkable feature of the year in the naval branch of the service was the development of the ironclad vessel. Desultory experiments in constructing armored ships or boats had been made, and as the penetrating power of the balls became greater the need was more keenly recognized.

The year 1862 witnessed the first battle ever fought between what might be called ironclad vessels, and its results changed the mode of naval warfare throughout the world. When the United States abandoned the Gosport Navy Yard they scuttled and sank a fine steam frigate, the *Merrimac*. The Confederates raised this ship from the water and remodelled it on a new plan devised by John

Mercer Brooke, the inventor of the deep-sea sounding apparatus. The decks were cut down and roofed over in a shape resembling a tortoise, and roof and sides were covered with thick iron plates impervious to shot. Ten heavy guns were put aboard, and a massive iron ram affixed to her bow. She was then christened the *Virginia*. On the 8th of March, 1862, accompanied by two small gunboats she steamed out of Norfolk Harbor into Hampton Roads, and went straight to the Federal fleet which was anchored there. The ships engaged her, but shot and shell glanced harmlessly from her iron sides. While her guns were firing she swept down upon the large wooden frigate the *Cumberland*, striking her with such force that the *Cumberland* sank within an hour with the loss of nearly half her crew. The *Virginia* then started for the *Congress*, which escaped by running into shallow water, where she was forced to surrender and was burned. The *Minnesota* and other Federal vessels also retreated into shallow water, but suffered seriously from the heavy guns of the three attacking boats.

The North was in consternation over this sudden onslaught and destruction, and the seaboard towns began to demand instant protection. But when the *Virginia* came again the following morning with the hope of destroying the *Minnesota* and other vessels, she was met by an enemy as strong as herself. During the night there had come to Hampton Roads the *Monitor*, an iron structure built by John Ericsson, resembling "a cheese box on a plank." Upon a flat deck was constructed a revolving iron turret containing her guns, which could be pointed in any direction. She was more easily managed than the *Virginia*. The heavy guns did some damage to the other ships, but neither could do serious harm to the other, and the *Virginia* returned to Norfolk. She had not done all that had been hoped for, but she kept James River free from the hostile vessels, while the success of the *Monitor* quieted the apprehensions of the Northern Coast cities. Orders were given

to build other monitors and ironclads as fast as possible, but want of safe harbors and materials prevented the Confederacy from constructing other rams like the *Virginia*. When it became impossible to hold Norfolk on the giving up of the peninsula, the troops went from Norfolk to Richmond and the war vessels moved up the James. The *Virginia* grounded at Craney Island and her commander, Commodore Josiah Tatnall, blew her up on May 11th, to prevent her falling into the enemy's hands.

The Confederacy had little or no navy, as has been stated, and small facilities for constructing one. The resort to privateers was without the hope of gain, foreign ports being closed and their own blockaded. Letters of marque were issued to those who desired them, and soon a small fleet was hovering on the coasts of the Northern States, capturing and destroying vessels. The Federals were filled with consternation and President Lincoln issued a proclamation, April 19, 1861, declaring that privateers would be punished under the laws for the prevention of piracy. Several prisoners taken from privateers were tried and condemned to death, whereupon President Davis declared, in a note to President Lincoln, dated July 6th, that for every one so executed one prisoner of the highest rank in the possession of the Confederacy would be executed in retaliation; that retaliation would be "extended so far as shall be requisite to secure the abandonment of a practice unknown to the warfare of civilized man, and so barbarous as to disgrace the nation which shall be guilty of inaugurating it." A reply to this letter was promised, but none ever came. President Lincoln's proclamation also provoked an animated discussion in the British House of Lords, in which the Earl of Derby said: "If one thing was clearer than another, it was that privateering was not piracy; and that no law could make that piracy as regarded the subjects of one nation which was not piracy by the laws of nations. The Lord Chancellor also spoke, saying that while an Englishman would violate the laws of his country by engaging in the

service of the Southern States, he could not be treated as a pirate, and those who did so treat him would be guilty of murder.

The United States government had previously declined to adhere to all the conditions of the Paris Congress of 1856, but now notified the British and French governments of a willingness to do so, providing the clause abolishing privateers might apply to the Confederate States. This offer, with such a provision attached, was declined by both France and Great Britain. The prisoners were not therefore executed. They were placed upon the same footing as other prisoners of war. One result of the publicity thus given to the fact that there was a large number of privateers was that, in order to be safe from them, the maritime nations all declared their neutrality and accordingly closed their ports to the prizes captured by both belligerents.

Another result was that a cartel was arranged for the formal exchange of prisoners, and it is worthy of note that this cartel was agreed to on the very basis that the Confederates had proposed in the beginning, but which the Federal authorities declined at that time. But the cartel was not rigidly observed. Had it been, the prison mortality and the horrors of prison life both North and South would have been largely averted. One of the most successful of the privateers was the *Jefferson Davis*, which on her first trip captured Federal vessels valued at two hundred and twenty-five thousand dollars. After she was wrecked, her captain, Coxetter, went into the blockade running service. Many others were destructive to the commerce of the United States, but any accurate estimate of the damage inflicted would be impossible. In June, 1861, there were fifty-seven vessels under seizure as prizes in the port of New Orleans alone; and in August of the same year, the *New York Herald* declared: "We are satisfied that already twenty million dollars' worth of property has been lost in various ways through the operations of these highwaymen of the seas, increasing daily in numbers, and becoming more and

more daring with impunity. The worst effect is not the loss of the vessels and their cargoes, but the destruction of our trade. Our commerce with the West Indies was immense before the pirates commenced their depredations. Now no Northern vessel will get a charter or can be insured for any reasonable premium. . . . Thus our shipping interest is literally ruined."

Not only did the privateers destroy the coast trade, but the Confederate cruisers in service by 1862 did immense damage to Federal commerce with all parts of the world. In many respects, the story of the building and operation of the vessels that drove the merchant flag of the United States from the oceans and almost extirpated its carrying trade is the most interesting chapter of the naval history of the Civil War.

The *Florida* was the first of the Confederate steam cruisers built in England. English officers took her out of Liverpool unarmed in March, 1862. She arrived at Nassau on April 28th, and between then and August 1st was twice seized by the British governor on complaint of the United States consul, but there was no proof that she was intended for the Confederate service and she was released. On August 10th she received her armament of two seven-inch and four six-inch Blakely rifled guns, but yellow fever broke out in her little crew of eighteen men, and in five days reduced it to one fireman and four deck hands. She ran into Cardenas, Cuba, in a desperate plight, and there Captain John N. Maffitt was stricken with the same disease. Before he recovered the *Florida* was summoned to Havana by the captain-general, and knowing the stringency of the Spanish regulations, he escaped to Mobile. He ran by the three blockading vessels, receiving their broadsides for two hours, but finally found shelter under the guns of Fort Morgan. There was no incident of the war in which bravery and energy were more conspicuous than in Captain Maffitt's coming from his sick berth to handle the ship on this trying passage.

The *Sumter*, which had had a brilliant career during 1861, anchored in the harbor at Cadiz, Spain, on January 4, 1862, but was forced to withdraw, though crippled and without coal. Captain Raphael Semmes captured two prizes between Cadiz and Gibraltar, reaching the latter port on January 19th. On February 3d, he received funds from Mr. Mason, Confederate envoy at London, but found the coal market closed against him, and was blockaded by the Federal steamers *Tuscarora*, *Kearsarge*, and *Chippewa*. He paid off all hands, discharged the sailors, went to London, and then sailed for home, but was overtaken at Nassau by orders to return to England and take command of the *Alabama*. The *Sumter* was sold by auction at Gibraltar in December, 1862, and was bought by a Liverpool merchant who changed her name to the *Gibraltar*.

The most notable of the Confederate cruisers was the *Alabama*, built in Liverpool as a merchantman under the supervision of Captain James D. Bulloch. Captain Semmes, late of the *Sumter*, was ordered to go to Liverpool and assume command of the *Alabama*. Here he gathered the officers of the old *Sumter*, and with the *Alabama* proceeded to Terceira, one of the Azores Islands, where her armament was put on board. She was a perfect steamer and an equally good sailing ship, of 900 tons burden, 230 feet long, 32 feet in beam, 20 feet in depth, and "sat upon the water with the lightness and grace of a swan," as Captain Semmes expressed it. As soon as her armament had all been placed she sailed out into the open sea, where she was formally named and Captain Semmes read his commission. The men were given an opportunity to enlist, and eighty of them joined the ship's crew. There was a full complement of officers, and with less than the authorized crew, Captain Semmes began his voyage. The ship carried six thirty-two-pounders in broadsides, a smoothbore eight-inch, and a hundred-pound rifled Blakely.

Captain Semmes knew where to cruise profitably and took many prizes. From captured New York papers he learned

of General Banks's movement against Galveston and resolved to intercept the coal fleet. On arriving, he found five Federal ships of war bombarding Galveston and knew that the Confederates held the city. Tempting one of the fleet to follow, Captain Semmes feigned retreat. The *Hatteras* followed, and twenty miles from Galveston the *Alabama* turned and opened battle. In thirteen minutes from the firing of the first gun the *Hatteras* surrendered, sinking just as the last of her crew were brought away. The *Hatteras* was larger than the *Alabama*, and had an equal number of guns. The *Alabama* then went to Jamaica, where her prisoners were released on parole.

A marked feature of the year was the series of land and naval expeditions sent by the United States against the Southern seacoast points. Following the success of the *Hatteras* expedition of the previous year a greater undertaking was projected. Port Royal in South Carolina was the finest harbor on the southern Atlantic coast, a wide estuary formed by the junction of Broad and Port Royal Rivers and Archer's Creek and their *débouchure* into the Atlantic. The harbor is about half way between Charleston and Savannah, having interior water communications with both cities. It was in the richest agricultural district in South Carolina, the most important seat of the production of the famous sea island cotton, the richest slaveholding parish in South Carolina, and the summer residence of many wealthy South Carolina planters. Fifty vessels, including transports, had sailed from Hampton Roads October 29, 1861, the naval command being assigned to Commodore S. F. Dupont and the army of 22,000 troops in transports being under the command of acting Major-general Thomas W. Sherman. The expedition was two months in preparation and sailed with sealed orders, but though every effort had been made to keep its destination secret, the information reached the Confederate secretary of war. He promptly telegraphed to the governor of South Carolina and the commander at Hilton Head where to expect it. Bull's Bay,

St. Helena, Port Royal, and Fernandina were considered as points for attack, but the choice fell on Port Royal. During the passage a storm scattered the fleet, wrecked a transport and drowned seven men, obliged one gunboat to throw her broadside battery overboard, sunk one storeship, and cost one transport her cargo. Forts Beauregard and Walker, guarding the eastern and western entrances to the harbor, were occupied in November, 1861, their small garrisons having retired before the combined attack of the entire fleet of gunboats, and thus the United States troops gained the first permanent foothold on the soil of South Carolina. On the first day of January, 1862, a combined attack of the land and naval forces was made on Port Royal. Every ferryboat and flat procurable was put in readiness, and 3,000 men with their horses were sent from the island to the Port Royal ferry, where it was thought the Confederates were trying to shut in the Federal troops by obstructing Coosaw River and Whale Branch.

The combined attack of the land and naval forces accomplished the purpose of the expedition, the Confederates retiring with little resistance. This success at Port Royal enabled the Federals to penetrate all the sounds, rivers, inlets, and bays between the sea islands and the mainland of South Carolina and Georgia, where the Confederates had established earthworks without having the men or the guns to arm them. Expeditions were sent through the sounds all the way down to Fernandina, and, without the means of effectually opposing them, the Confederates retired from their weak fortifications as the Federals approached. Soon the enemy were in possession of the whole coast southward from Port Royal, except Savannah.

Early in January, the waters of North Carolina were invaded by a joint naval and military expedition sailing from Hampton Roads under command of Flag-officer Goldsborough and General Burnside. The naval force, consisting of nineteen vessels with somewhat over fifty guns, being mostly of heavy calibre, were in waiting at Hatteras

Inlet by January 28, 1862, and were joined by the army branch February 5th. On the morning of the 7th, this fleet entered Croatan Sound and engaged in battle about noon. With the coming of darkness the battle ended. Troops were landed at Ashby's Harbor in the afternoon and night to the number of 10,000. On the morning of February 8th the Federal ships withheld their fire until the troops had attacked the fortifications. At the end of the engagement the Confederates retired. In a naval battle at Elizabeth City, February 10th, the Confederate fleet was destroyed or captured by fourteen Federal gunboats which dashed impetuously upon it. The Confederate vessels were all very small and poorly armed, the entire eight vessels destroyed being valued by the Board of Appraisement at a total of \$140,000. Newbern, at the junction of Trent and Neuse Rivers, was taken March 13th.

But the capture of Roanoke Island was a most serious loss to the Confederacy. It was the key to the rear defences of Norfolk; it permitted access to Albemarle and Currituck Sounds, to eight rivers and two railroads. It guarded more than four-fifths of Norfolk's supply of corn, pork, and forage. Its capture by the Federals cut off General Huger's command from all its most efficient transportation and endangered the very existence of the army, as well as the navy yard at Gosport, and threatened to cut off Norfolk from Richmond and both from railroad communication with the South Atlantic States. It lodged the enemy in a harbor safe from the storms of Hatteras, gave him a rendezvous and a large rich range of supplies, and the command of the seaboard from Oregon inlet to Cape Henry. Twenty thousand men should have defended it. That the enemy did not earlier realize its importance is as little to their credit as its loss was discreditable to the Confederates.

The Federals spent much of their time seeking a route into the Savannah from Port Royal with the idea of a rear attack, but found the way obstructed. They were removing these obstructions when discovered by a sentry at Fort



Pulaski, and Commodore Josiah Tatnall came down with three little gunboats and drove them away. Even after opening the inside passage, Fort Pulaski was not at once attacked. Under the belief that it was to be besieged, however, Commodore Tatnall conveyed to the fort a six months' supply of provisions, engaging in a hot battle of forty minutes with the Federal gunboats, but escaping back up the river. The commander of the fort, Colonel Charles H. Olmstead, refused the demand of General David Hunter to surrender, April 10th, and withstood a savage bombardment of two days before capitulation was agreed to. The surrender threw Savannah into consternation, but produced the good effect of stimulating the effort to provide a better naval squadron. But it was an effort that failed through the financial inability of the Confederacy to construct the vessels after they were designed.

A Federal expedition left Port Royal, February 28th, to reoccupy the principal points on the east coast of Florida. Commodore Dupont and Brigadier-general H. C. Wright were in charge. They took possession, with practically no resistance, of Fort Clinch, St. Mary's, and Fernandina, March 2d and 3d; Brunswick, Georgia, March 7th; Jacksonville and St. Augustine, Florida, March 12th.

Another expedition took possession of Stono Inlet on May 29th, and thus secured an important base for future siege operations against Charleston; but an attempt then to gain a foothold on James Island was frustrated by the Federals' defeat at the battle of Secessionville.

An unsuccessful raid by the Federal gunboats *Pocahontas* and *Treaty* was made up Black River on August 14th, with the view of capturing the Confederate steamer *Nina*, but they hurried out to sea again at the report of the approach of a large hostile force, and on their retreat were heavily shelled by batteries on the banks and subjected to the fire of the Confederate riflemen.

The close of the year 1862 found the boundaries of the Confederacy much contracted, and the Federals using their





Josiah (*Blood is thicker than Water*) Tatnall.
Commodore, C. S. N., in command of the *Merrimac*.

immense resources in every direction against the South. They had seized and held every Border State except Virginia, and retained the western portion of that State. The Federal forces held Missouri, where they had elected an overwhelmingly Union legislature, and occupied about half of Arkansas. They had captured New Orleans and Pensacola, subjugated much of Louisiana and the Gulf coast, and held Mississippi River except between Vicksburg and Grand Gulf. Nearly the entire Atlantic coast, except between Charleston and Savannah and one or two points in North Carolina, were lost to the Confederacy. West Tennessee had been subjugated and nearly all of Middle Tennessee was held by the enemy. Maryland had been forced into the ranks of the Unionists. Norfolk and Yorktown were in the enemy's hands. A powerful blockade operated seriously against the entrance of foreign recruits and supplies to the South, while Grant in Mississippi and Rosecrans in Tennessee threatened communications necessary for the support of the Confederate armies. The Northern forces had closed in their lines everywhere. And yet, in the field, the advantage had not been on the side of the Union. The victories of Lee and Jackson over the mighty armies of the Federals had excited universal wonder and inspired the Southern soldiers with the belief that their prowess would yet achieve Southern independence.

CHAPTER XII

CAMPAIGNS OF 1863—IN THE EAST

ABRAHAM LINCOLN, President of the United States, issued a proclamation on September 22, 1862, giving notice that he would on the first day of January, 1863, declare the freedom of all slaves within certain States, or designated parts of States. On December 1, 1862, President Lincoln sent to Congress his second annual message. In this, the ablest of his messages, he proposed three articles to be adopted by Congress as amendments to the Constitution and submitted to the States for ratification, and he discussed them at length. Those amendments provided for the gradual emancipation of slaves in the United States upon equitable terms. He issued the Emancipation Proclamation on January 1, 1863.

Looking backward at this proclamation, we may now view it calmly. At the time of its promulgation it aroused a tumult of excitement. It is the duty of the historian to record the sentiments with which it was received and the effects which it produced.

In the North it was hailed as an immortal document, a charter of liberty, humanity, and justice. It was heralded to the world as proof of the progressive spirit and humanitarian civilization of the northern section of the United States, which at length had triumphed over the bigotry and ignorance of the South and now signalized the victory by this great act of emancipation.

By the South it was received with an outburst of indignation, as a wanton act of usurpation and tyranny, hypocrisy and malevolence, overriding the Constitution, violating the rights of the States, and revealing the real purpose of the Northern leaders from the beginning. President Lincoln was charged with treachery and duplicity. His former declarations were compared with his present act, and they could not be reconciled. The Southern press teemed with denunciation, the Southern people were embittered, and the struggle deepened.

Passing from the further consideration of the sentiments of the participants in the struggle, let us examine the document itself as a State paper. The proclamation of January 1, 1863, declared all slaves free within ten of the eleven Confederate States, except in certain counties of Virginia and Louisiana. It omitted from the list the State of Tennessee, which State is nowhere mentioned in the proclamation. No reason is given for the exception of certain counties or the omission of one State. Four slave States which were not members of the Confederate States were not mentioned. It was not, therefore, a universal emancipation. On the contrary, the president says: "which excepted parts are for the present left precisely as if this proclamation were not issued." The president does not assign his reasons for making the proclamation partial instead of universal. We may conjecture them, but there seems to be no evidence on which the historian can base an authoritative statement.

A good reason may be found for the exception of Tennessee, based on the high moral ground of the obligation of contracts and public faith; but at this stage of the conflict such considerations had but little weight, and there is no evidence that they were thought of. The deed of North Carolina ceding to the United States in 1790 the territory which is now Tennessee contained the following provision: "Provided, always, that no regulations made or to be made by Congress shall tend to emancipate slaves." By the

acceptance of this deed of cession, the United States was bound to observe the conditions of the grant. It is probable, however, that very different considerations led to the exceptions and omissions of the proclamation.

It is known that Emerson Etheridge and other prominent citizens of Tennessee, in an interview with President Lincoln, demanded that the State should be exempted from the proclamation for the reason that a large element of the Union men of Tennessee were slaveholders, and claimed protection for their property. It was also urged that if their slaves were freed they would join the Confederate cause. It has also been claimed that Tennessee was omitted at the solicitation of Andrew Johnson, then military governor of the State, who ardently desired to be himself the instrument of abolishing slavery in Tennessee through constitutional means, and by State authority. In this effort other Tennesseans aided Governor Johnson's efforts, among them John M. Lea, a prominent Union man of Nashville who stood close to Johnson and joined in his pledges to the president that the legislature of the State would take the necessary action. There is no doubt that this was one factor in securing the omission of Tennessee, whatever other factors may have aided.

As a matter of fact, an effort was made later to abolish slavery in that State, before the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. A political convention of the Union men met at Nashville, and resolved itself into a Constitutional Convention. This convention adopted amendments to the Constitution of the State, abolishing slavery. These were submitted to a vote of the people at an election at which none but Union men were allowed to vote. This election, held February 22, 1865, resulted in a majority in favor of the amendments, but they were ignored when the people of the State came into power.

Whatever special influences may have been brought to bear to cause the exception of certain of the counties

of Virginia and Louisiana, and the omission of Tennessee and the slave States which had not seceded, it may be noted that all the excepted and omitted territory was within the military occupancy of the United States, and included a large amount of slave property owned by Union citizens. The proclamation, then, was not made for the purpose of conferring universal emancipation, but as a limited measure applying only as stated in the proclamation, to those States and parts of States "wherein the people thereof, respectively, are this day in rebellion against the United States."

Not only was the proclamation not universal, but it was based upon no legislative act, and upon no constitutional prerogative. President Lincoln does not even claim this. Constitutionally and legally, the proclamation was without authority and void. The president says: "Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, by virtue of the power vested in me as commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, in time of actual armed rebellion against authority and Government of the United States, and as a fit and necessary war measure for suppressing said rebellion, do . . . declare that all persons held as slaves within said designated States and parts of States are . . . free." The proclamation is thus placed by President Lincoln upon the footing of a "war measure," and the order of a military "commander-in-chief." If the Confederate States be viewed as merely a collection of States in rebellion, whose ordinances of secession were invalid, then surely neither the president nor the commander-in-chief had any power to abrogate their Constitutional rights. If viewed as a government *de facto*, surely neither a foreign government nor its representatives could legislate for it. In either case this proclamation had no effect as law, and could not be put into execution except by force of arms. It had no authority except the authority of the sword.

Nevertheless, the purpose of the proclamation was accomplished. The slaves were practically free at the close

of the war. The Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution was speedily adopted, and gave to the "war measure" legal decency, permanence, and the submission of the South.

As in our early history, in the formation of the Union, the Southern States were called on to make the sacrifice of their extensive western territory to appease jealousy, and to render possible the magical development of the West, so now again in the restoration of the Union the South was required to sacrifice her immense investment in slave property and to submit to the upheaval of her domestic economy. No other section has made such sacrifices, either voluntary or enforced.

The year 1863 was not only notable for the emancipation of the slaves: it was a year of battles. The great campaigns of the year opened in Virginia, where General Burnside, after the battle of Fredericksburg, had met the fate of his predecessors, and had been succeeded by General Joseph Hooker. Hooker's bravery in the field had earned him the sobriquet of "Fighting Joe." He had previously advised General Burnside to move against General Lee by the upper fords of the Rappahannock; and after succeeding Burnside, as soon as the weather and the condition of the roads permitted, he proceeded to make this move himself. He had utilized the past three months in increasing his army, and in April had under his command 120,000 infantry and artillery, 12,000 cavalry, and more than 400 cannon.

During the winter, in order to lessen the difficulty of feeding his men and horses, General Lee had retained only about 40,000 men on the south side of the Rappahannock, between Richmond and Fredericksburg, to protect that city and the railroads leading to it. Part of General Longstreet's corps had been sent into the country south of Petersburg. Many furloughs had been granted to soldiers, and from this and other causes, there were, at one time, scarcely 30,000 soldiers of the Army of Northern Virginia present for duty. This number had been increased by the end of April to about 53,000 of all arms.

The Federal army occupied the north side of the river, opposite Fredericksburg. General Stoneman had been instructed to cross the Rappahannock on the 13th of April and throw his whole force, except one brigade, between Lee's position on the Rappahannock and his base at Richmond. The purpose was to cut off the Confederate army from their supplies, to check their retreat, and to inflict general injury. Heavy rains delayed these movements, so that the plan was modified. General Hooker had decided to cross the Rappahannock and attack General Lee on the right flank; and in order to conceal his real intention, he sent Stoneman with 10,000 cavalry to pass around and destroy the railroads between the Confederate army and Richmond. This move was made by the upper fords. General W. W. Averell, with three brigades, was to advance on Culpepper Court House, while General Stoneman, with three brigades under General Gregg, was to take the short route by Stevensburg, seven miles west of Culpepper Court House. General W. H. F. Lee's small force of cavalry retired from Culpepper Court House on Averell's approach. During six days these forces operated, tearing up railroads and burning bridges, and then, hearing rumors of Hooker's defeat, they made their way back to the Army of the Potomac. While this raid had been in progress, General Sedgwick, on April 29th, with 37,000 men, appeared on the heights below Fredericksburg, presumably to create the expectation that another advance would be made there. Then, believing that by these measures he had deceived Lee as to his intentions, Hooker moved up the Rappahannock, crossing that river and the Rapidan, and on the evening of April 30th reached Chancellorsville, with four corps of his army. Two other corps, increasing the army to 90,000, came on the first day of May.

Chancellorsville was but a plantation settlement in the midst of a vast extent of young trees and undergrowth so dense that it had been named the "Wilderness." Making

his headquarters in Mr. Chancellor's house, General Hooker issued an order to his men assuring them that "the enemy must ingloriously fly or come out from behind his defenses and give us battle on our own ground where certain destruction awaits him."

These threatened alternatives were yet to be experienced by Lee's army; they had not as yet been their part. General Lee was not deceived by the triple movement of Hooker's troops, but fully understood the Federal commander's real intentions. He therefore proceeded to bring them to naught. General Early, with 9,000 infantry and an artillery force in charge of 45 guns, was left to hold Sedgwick in check while General Lee moved toward Chancellorsville on May 1st with about 43,000 men. On the evening of the 2d the advance troops of the two armies became engaged, and as one brigade after another of the Confederates came up to support the advance, the Federals were driven back to where their main army was strongly entrenched around Chancellorsville. General Lee had realized the loss of life that would be involved in a direct attack upon the breastworks in front, in view of the strong position and vastly superior numbers of the enemy, and determined again to divide his forces, trying a detour to the rear and flank of the Federals. He sent Jackson by a road leading to the southwest until he should strike another road through the Wilderness that would take him to the rear of Hooker's position. General Jackson marched on the morning of May 2d by this other road, his rear being covered by Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry under General Stuart in person. As the rear of the train was passing, a large force of the Federals advanced from Chancellorsville and attempted its capture, but a comparatively small force held them in check until the train had passed. Afterward, a large force surrounded the Twenty-third Georgia Regiment, which had been guarding General Jackson's flank, and captured nearly the entire body. General Richard H. Anderson sent General Canot Posey to resist the further progress of this column, and General Posey became engaged

with a superior force, but being reinforced by General Wright, the Federal advance was arrested.

Reaching the old turnpike about three miles in the rear of Chancellorsville about four o'clock, the divisions were formed as they arrived. The advance was ordered at six o'clock. The enemy had stacked their guns and were busy preparing supper. Surprised, they fled almost without resistance, and General Rodes's men pushed on with vigor and enthusiasm, followed by Trimble's division under Brigadier-general R. E. Colston and General A. P. Hill's division. The whole eleventh corps was in wild retreat, more like a rabble than an army. Position after position was taken, guns were captured, and every attempt of the Federals to rally was defeated by the impetuous rush of the Confederate troops. In the tangled woods the first two lines mingled and pressed forward as one. The Federals made a stand at breastworks which had been thrown across the road, but the Confederates dashed over the defences and flight and pursuit were resumed and continued until the advance was arrested by the abattis in front of the line of works near the central position at Chancellorsville. It was now dark and General A. P. Hill's division was sent to the front so that the troops of Rodes and Colston, now completely blended, could be re-formed. With another hour of daylight Hooker's stronghold might have been captured and his army destroyed.

General Jackson was rather inclined to a night attack, and while waiting the arrival of fresh troops from the rear he rode forward with his staff and escort to reconnoitre the Federal position. In returning to the Confederate lines he met his skirmishers advancing, and in the darkness of the night the skirmishers mistook them for the Federal cavalry and fired. Two of the party fell dead, and Jackson was severely wounded. He was placed on a litter and taken to the rear for treatment, one of his bearers being killed by a Federal cannon ball. General A. P. Hill being wounded by the same fire, General J. E. B. Stuart was sent for by

the brigadier-generals and came in from the cavalry outposts and assumed command of the corps. During the night much of the Confederate artillery arrived and was posted. While General Hill's division was coming up, the Federals opened a furious fire of artillery, under cover of which their infantry advanced to the attack. They were repulsed by the Fifty-fifth Virginia Regiment under Colonel Francis Mallory, who was killed while leading his men. The right of Hill's division being also attacked, the enemy was repulsed at this point by Lane's brigade. General Stuart decided that the darkness of the night and the difficulty of moving through the woods and undergrowth made it best to defer further operations until morning, and the troops rested on their arms and in line of battle. Positions for the Confederate batteries were selected during the night.

The situation of Jackson's corps on the morning of May 3d was a desperate one, the front and the right flank being in the presence of about 25,000 men, with the left exposed to attack by 30,000. But General Hooker was evidently despondent over having been outgeneraled by General Lee, and failed to realize his opportunity. General Stuart renewed the attack on the morning of May 3d; the Federals had strengthened their right during the night and had posted a large number of guns so as to sweep the woods through which the Confederate troops must advance. The earthworks where the assault had been suspended the preceding night were taken under a terrible fire of musketry and artillery; the Federals were then driven from a barricade in the rear of these works. The next line on the left of the plank road was broken and on the right the Confederates assailed the extensive earthworks behind which the Federal artillery was posted. Three times these works were carried, and as often abandoned; twice because the troops on their left were forced back after a gallant struggle with superior numbers, and once because of a movement of the enemy on their right, caused by the

advance of General R. H. Anderson. The left, reinforced, drove back the Federals; then the artillery was thrown forward into favorable position and began to fire with great precision and effect. General Anderson advanced directly upon Chancellorsville, while General McLaws made a strong demonstration to the right of the road. As the troops advancing upon the front and right of the Federal position converged upon his centre, General Anderson effected a junction with General Jackson's corps and the whole line pressed irresistibly on. The Federal army was driven from all its fortified positions with a heavy loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, and retreated toward the Rappahannock.

While General Lee was preparing, by resting and re-forming his troops, to renew the attack, further operations were arrested by the news from Fredericksburg. General Hooker had decided after the previous day's mishaps that the Confederates could not have so large a force in his front without having depleted the defences of Fredericksburg. General Sedgwick was therefore ordered to cross the river at Fredericksburg and march on Chancellorsville, and to be near the commanding general by daylight. Sedgwick, already across the river and three miles below Fredericksburg, received the order at 11 P. M., and had therefore twelve or fourteen miles to march to comply with the order. He was harassed by skirmishers so that it was daylight when he reached Fredericksburg. Misled by the error in an order sent him, General Early had started to Chancellorsville to join the main army, leaving General H. S. Hays's brigade and one regiment of General William Barksdale's brigade at Fredericksburg. Barksdale's brigade had to defend a line from the Rappahannock above Fredericksburg to Howison's house, a distance of two miles. His artillery was posted on the heights in the rear of the town. Sedgwick's first two assaults failed, despite his vastly superior numbers, but his third assault succeeded in taking the works, literally at the point of the bayonet, though at heavy loss. Then, at 11 A. M., the column

started for Chancellorsville, being annoyed by the Confederates all the way to Salem Heights. General Barksdale had reported to General Early the Federal occupation of Fredericksburg, and General Hays's brigade was sent to his support. They followed Sedgwick on his march to Chancellorsville, and were reinforced with three regiments of General J. B. Gordon's brigade. Sedgwick's column threatened the Confederate communications by the telegraph road, but being checked by the force just mentioned they tried to advance by the plank road. Here General C. M. Wilcox, who had come to General Barksdale's assistance, disputed the passage of the Federals, but fell back slowly until he reached Salem Heights.

Reports of these events having reached Chancellorsville, General McLaws, with his three brigades and one of General Anderson's, reinforced General Wilcox at Salem Heights, finding him in line of battle facing General Sedgwick's great army. The Federals advanced, but their assault was firmly met, and after a fierce struggle the first line was repulsed with great slaughter. Then came the second line, but it immediately broke under the close and deadly fire which it encountered, and fled in confusion to the rear. The brigades of Generals Wilcox and Paul J. Semmes pursued them nearly a mile, when they met the Federal reserve. It was now dark, and General Wilcox did not deem it prudent to attack with his small force. He retired to his original position, unmolested by the enemy. In pursuance of orders from General McLaws, Semmes's brigade bivouacked for the night after taking position in line of battle. On the next morning, General Early advanced along the telegraph road and recaptured the heights about Fredericksburg without trouble.

General Lee then resolved to reinforce the troops in front of General Sedgwick and drive him across the Rappahannock, if possible. Accordingly, on the 4th, General Anderson, with his three remaining brigades, joined General McLaws about noon, and was directed to gain the enemy's left flank

and effect a junction with General Early. General McLaws was to hold the enemy in front and push his right brigades forward as soon as the advance of Generals Anderson and Early should be perceived, connecting with them and making the Confederate line continuous. The attack was not made until 6 P. M., when the advance of Generals Anderson and Early drove General Sedgwick's troops rapidly before them across the Rappahannock. The darkness kept the victorious army from knowing the full success of their movement until they saw the Federals recrossing the river below Banks's Ford. The Confederate right advanced through the woods when the firing began, but the retreat was so speedy that they could only join in the pursuit. The dense fog that settled over the field prevented their following the enemy any great distance. The next morning they found that General Sedgwick had escaped, taking his pontoon bridges with him. Fredericksburg was evacuated and the Confederate rear was no longer threatened. General Early with his division and General Barksdale's brigade were detailed to hold the lines, as before, and Generals Anderson and McLaws were recalled to Chancellorsville. They reached there in the afternoon, in the midst of a violent storm, which continued throughout the night and most of the following day.

General Lee had perfected plans to attack the Federals again at daylight on May 6th, but, on advancing his skirmishers, it was found that under cover of the storm and the darkness of the night the entire Federal army had retreated across the river. Leaving a detachment to guard the battlefield while the wounded were being removed and the captured property collected, General Lee returned with the army to its former position. General Hooker had promised the certain destruction of his enemy, and at Washington and throughout the North the disappointment and the alarm were great at his utter discomfiture. He had lost 17,287 men, of whom 1,606 were killed, 9,762 wounded, and 5,919 captured or missing; besides 13 pieces of artillery, 19,500 stand of arms, 17 flags, and a large quantity

of ammunition. On the Confederate side, the killed numbered 1,649, the wounded 9,106, the captured or missing 1,708. Of the forces engaged, the most accurate estimates, based on official reports, give 60,000 men and 170 pieces of artillery as the effective force in General Lee's Army of the Rappahannock at the beginning of the battle on May 1st, and the effective strength of General Hooker's army, as about 130,000, with 404 pieces of artillery.

It was a victory for the Confederates, but a dearly bought victory. The greatest loss they sustained was the loss of General Jackson himself. The wound received on the night of May 2d necessitated the removal of his left arm. Fever and pneumonia followed, and on May 10th, one week after the victory made possible by the masterly flank movement he had executed, he died. His body was taken to Richmond, where it lay in state in the capitol to be visited by mourning thousands; then it was taken to his home in Lexington, where it was buried. The southern feeling was well expressed by General Lee himself, when he said: "Any victory is a dear one which deprives us of the services of Jackson, even for a short time."


Thomas Jonathan Jackson was born January 21, 1824, at Clarksburg, West Virginia, to which place his grandfather had gone from Maryland, shortly after coming from London in 1743. Jackson's father, a lawyer, died while Jackson was but a boy, and he was brought up by a bachelor uncle, Cummins Jackson. He was appointed a cadet at the United States Military Academy when eighteen, and graduated in 1846. Ordered to Mexico, he served as lieutenant in Magruder's battery and took part in General Scott's campaign from Vera Cruz to the City of Mexico. He was twice brevetted for meritorious conduct, at Cherubusco and at Chapultepec. He afterward served at Fort Hamilton, New York harbor, and Fort Meade, Florida, but resigned from the army in 1851 on his election as professor at Virginia Military Institute. A few days after the secession of Virginia he took charge of the troops collecting at Harper's

Ferry. When Virginia joined the Confederacy and Jackson was succeeded by General Joseph E. Johnston at Harper's Ferry, he became commander of a brigade in Johnston's army. It was at the battle of Bull Run, when the Confederate left had been turned and disaster impended, and Jackson's brigade was first to the rescue, that General Bernard E. Bee in rallying his men said: "See, there is Jackson standing like a stone wall." Bee fell a few moments later, but he had given Jackson a name by which he was affectionately known throughout the Confederacy. For his conduct at Bull Run Jackson was made a major-general and was assigned to the command of the district including the Shenandoah Valley and that part of Virginia northwest of it. During the winter he drove the Federal troops from his district, but returned to winter headquarters in Winchester. He fell back before General Banks's advance, in obedience to orders to detain the hostile army, but when General Banks began to send his troops away he attacked with great vigor. Though defeated at Kernstown, his fierce attack caused General Banks to return with all his troops to the valley. General Jackson retreated up the Shenandoah and took position at Swift Run Gap in the Blue Ridge.

In April, May, and June, 1862, he fought the great Shenandoah Valley campaign, took part in subsequent operations during McClellan's retreat, defeated Banks at Cedar Run in August, made the famous raid around Pope's right flank to seize his depot at Manassas and break his communications so that Pope had to abandon the Rappahannock; he held his opponent by stubborn fighting until General Lee with the rest of the Confederate army arrived and defeated Pope in the second battle of Bull Run. In the Maryland campaign he captured Harper's Ferry with 13,000 prisoners while Lee held McClellan back at South Mountain and Antietam; by a night march he reached Sharpsburg and with his thinned lines held the Confederate left against which McClellan in succession hurled Hooker's, Mansfield's and Sumner's corps. One of his divisions, A. P. Hill's,



Raphael Semmes, Rear-admiral, C. S. N.



which had been left at Harper's Ferry, arrived at Sharpsburg late in the day, but immediately engaged in battle and defeated Burnside's corps, which was making progress against the Confederate right. At Fredericksburg, Jackson, who had become a lieutenant-general, commanded the right wing which repelled the attacks of Franklin's division. His brave part in the battle of Chancellorsville has been briefly stated. While this great victory was causing joy throughout the Confederacy, Stonewall Jackson lay dying in a little farmhouse a few miles from where he had led his last and most famous attack. On the eighth day after his wound was received he died—Sunday, May 10, 1863. He had declared: "If I live it will be for the best—and if I die it will be for the best; God knows and directs all things for the best." His last utterance in the delusion that preceded death was: "Tell Major Hawks to send forward provisions to the men. Let us cross over the river and rest under the shade of the trees." His exploits rank among the most brilliant in the history of the world. Jackson was twice married, first to Miss Eleanor Junkin, and then to Miss Mary Ann Morrison, who, with one daughter, long survived him. A bronze monument to his memory was unveiled at Richmond in 1875.

For some weeks after the victory achieved at Chancellorsville the prospects of the Confederacy appeared at their best. Never did the promise of success seem so certain of fulfilment. No one believed but that Vicksburg was safe. General Bragg was holding General Rosecrans at bay at Chattanooga while two plans of campaign were presented to the Confederacy—to reinforce General Bragg from General Lee's army, which could be done in ten days, or to change from the defensive to the offensive in Virginia and again invade the North. These two plans were discussed in Richmond and the invasion was decided upon as best to clear Virginia of the Federal troops, to put the war back on the frontier, to relieve the Confederate commissariat and to counterbalance the continued retreat of the armies

of Tennessee and Mississippi. The statement made by some Northern writers that General Lee believed that such a movement would end the war is not correct.

On May 6th, Major-general A. P. Hill was assigned to command of the second corps of the Army of Northern Virginia, to which Major-general J. E. B. Stuart had been called at the time Jackson was wounded, and Stuart returned to the cavalry division. On the 30th of May, General Lee, who had marched his army back to the lines at Fredericksburg, reorganized it into three corps, Lieutenant-generals Richard S. Ewell and Ambrose P. Hill being assigned respectively to command of the second and third corps; Lieutenant-general James Longstreet, who had been recalled from North Carolina, retaining command of the first. Brigadier-general Alfred Pleasanton had been assigned to command of the Federal cavalry corps, Army of the Potomac, on the day that Major-general Winfield S. Hancock assumed command of the second army corps, United States army.

In this place mention should be made of the unusual religious interest prevailing in the Army of Northern Virginia. While it was more pronounced in Stonewall Jackson's corps, yet it was common throughout the army. Jackson's men built log chapels for regular services and their general aided religious work among them, taking pains to provide them with chaplains. General Lee did the same, and not only his chaplains but his chief of artillery, General William N. Pendleton, held services and preached every Sunday and during the week as well, whenever the army was not marching or fighting. Prayer meetings and revivals were common in the camps, and at these generals were as active and conspicuous as in battle. Itinerant preachers and "circuit riders" were guests always welcomed and better treated than any other visitors.

On the 3d of June, with an army which had grown to 68,000 men, and with 200 cannon, General Lee began to move, first westward across the mountains, and then north. His purpose was by the invasion of Maryland and

Pennsylvania to draw Federal troops from the southern points they then occupied. Some of the strategists of the time advocated an attempt to relieve Vicksburg, to which General Grant had laid siege, by sending a large force through East Tennessee to reinforce General Bragg and by directing General Johnston, then concentrating his forces at Jackson, also to unite with Bragg. The idea of this union of armies was to hold Tennessee, the "Shield of the South," by moving against Rosecrans and crushing his army, and following this up by a movement against Cincinnati. This would probably have drawn the Federal forces from Vicksburg, but General Lee placed his reliance on an invasion of the North. General Ewell moved by Culpepper directly to the valley; Longstreet and Stuart kept on the east of the mountains, and A. P. Hill remained at Fredericksburg confronting Hooker's army, then 118,000 strong. Learning of Lee's movements, but entirely misled as to their significance, as General Lee had intended they should be, the Federals left Fredericksburg, retaining a position between Lee and Washington City. When they had gone, A. P. Hill's division followed the other armies to the valley of the Shenandoah.

On June 14th, General Ewell drove General Milroy and his 10,000 men out of Winchester, and General Rodes marched from Berryville to Martinsburg; these two movements resulting in the capture of 4,000 prisoners, 29 good cannon, and 270 wagons and ambulances with 400 horses, besides a large quantity of food, clothing, and military stores. With these latter the needy Southern army was both fed and clothed. Martinsburg was occupied and the valley cleared of Federal soldiers. General Ewell crossed the Potomac June 15th, and moved to Hagerstown where he waited for the rest of the Confederate army.

General Longstreet had meantime marched on Culpepper, his right flank guarded by Stuart's cavalry, which watched the fords of the Rappahannock until after A. P. Hill's departure from Fredericksburg. On the 5th of June, and

again two days later, strong reconnoissances were sent across the river to General Lee's right by General Hooker. June 9th an expedition of Hooker's cavalry under General Pleasanton, which had crossed the Rappahannock at Beverly's and Kelly's fords, attacked General Stuart at Brandy Station. This force was routed by General Stuart and driven back across the river after losing 400 prisoners and three pieces of artillery. This later reconnoissance did to some extent discover the direction of General Lee's march, but General Hooker did not even then understand its importance, never dreaming of a movement into northern territory save for commissary purposes. He therefore disposed his forces to cover Washington, taking a strong position between the Confederate forces and that city.

The Federal commander thus entirely deceived, General Lee marched rapidly forward. Then General Hooker followed in a parallel line, but kept the Blue Ridge between him and General Lee; and, uncertain of the Confederate leader's intentions, failed to bring about an issue in Virginia. Hooker hastily crossed the Potomac and took position in Maryland. General Lee crossed the Potomac near Shepherdstown June 24th, and on June 27th was at Chambersburg, whither General Ewell's corps had preceded him. Stuart's cavalry was meantime making a raid between Washington and Frederick, cutting the Federal line of supplies, and capturing trains. A contemplated advance on Harrisburg was not made because of information received that the Federal army was moving northward and threatening the Confederate communications with the Potomac. The three divisions were therefore concentrated at Gettysburg to check the Federal advance.

In twenty days the great Confederate commander had brought his entire army from Fredericksburg entirely unobstructed, though confronted when he started by one of the largest and best appointed Federal armies ever gathered. Though Winchester, Martinsburg, Harper's Ferry, and Berryville were garrisoned by the enemy, and though the

Federal cavalry was in splendid condition, he had marched along the Rappahannock, through the passes of the Blue Ridge, up the Shenandoah, across the fords of the Potomac into Pennsylvania, and his march had not been arrested. In entering Pennsylvania there was no retribution exacted for the cruelties of the northern soldiers displayed in desolating the fields and homes of the South. General Lee ordered all private property respected; no house was entered without authority; no granary was pillaged, but vast fields of grain were picketed and protected by Confederate guards mounted on almost starved horses. These civilities were not appreciated by the people whose soldiers were despoiling the South, and some in the South criticized this feature of General Lee's campaign, believing this an opportunity of teaching the people of the North by example a lesson they had not learned.

The North was alarmed, and the governors of Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York, Maryland, and West Virginia called out their militia. The intelligent easily saw that this feverish excitement meant nothing; that the defence of the security of the North and of Washington was the great army and not a few handfuls of raw Northern militia. General Hooker had fallen into disfavor by reason of the disasters at Chancellorsville, and the Washington authorities determined not to let him fight another great battle. Knowing of this feeling against him, he had tendered his resignation, and, on June 28th, General George G. Meade, who had been a successful division and corps commander, was placed in command. General Meade had a splendid army of 150,000 men and he knew the necessity of rapid and decisive action. He disposed his army so as to cover Washington and Baltimore. General Reynolds was sent to Gettysburg and fortified it by a line of entrenchments one mile from the town. General Ewell's corps had reached Carlisle, Pennsylvania, and was preparing to advance to Harrisburg, and General Longstreet had halted with General A. P. Hill at Chambersburg, when these commanders

were informed that General Meade's position had influenced General Lee in concentrating at Gettysburg. General Stuart with the cavalry had been left behind to harass the Federals in Virginia and then to cross the river and join the army at Carlisle, but found the whole Union army between him and his position, and, after making a wide detour, reached Carlisle to find the army en route to Gettysburg. Thither he at once hastened, but was too late for the fighting of the first two days.

General Meade had resolved to concentrate his own columns, which were scattered from Gettysburg to a point thirty-five miles to the south. He determined to draw his advance back fifteen miles southeast of Gettysburg and there await attack. But he could not do so. On the morning of July 1st, General A. P. Hill on his advance to Gettysburg had learned, when six miles from the place, that it was occupied by the Federals, and sent back to urge General Longstreet forward. About two miles from Gettysburg they met a cavalry reconnoissance which had been sent out by General Reynolds, supported by infantry dispatched in its aid, and the fighting was on. General Reynolds was killed at the beginning of the fight. Not only did they outnumber the Confederates, but the Federal troops seemed also to have the best of the situation, nevertheless, as the Confederate reinforcements came up the tide of battle turned. The Federal force was driven back in confusion through Gettysburg, losing 5,000 prisoners and several pieces of artillery. Those who escaped retreated to Culp's Hill just south of the town and took a strong position. The entire Federal loss was fully 10,000 in this battle, half that number being killed or wounded. The Confederate loss was great in killed and wounded, but far less in the number of prisoners. General Meade knew nothing of Gettysburg and its vicinity, and as soon as he heard of the fighting he sent General W. S. Hancock to take command. General Hancock decided to fight there and asked all for the troops, which were hurried to him. The Confederates did not know the force in the

town and did not press their advantage, but exerted themselves to have the whole army sent up. The remainder of Hill's and Ewell's corps and two divisions of Longstreet's having arrived, preparations for renewing the battle were pushed, though the country was unfavorable for collecting supplies, in the presence of the main body of the enemy's troops, and it had not been intended to fight a general battle at such a distance from the Confederate base. The preparations for the battle lasted until the following afternoon. Meanwhile, General Meade, who had arrived from Taneytown at 1 P. M., had placed in line the second, third, twelfth, and fifth corps, which had arrived. The sixth corps, which arrived the next afternoon, was held as a reserve.

One mile south of Gettysburg is Cemetery Ridge, three miles in length, which curves first northward, then westward, and finally southward, the general shape being that of a fishhook. In places it rises into several craggy hills, each having its own name. On the extreme south is Round Top, and then Little Round Top, separated from it by a ravine. At the bend of the hook is Cemetery Hill, and at the barb is Culp's Hill. The Federal army occupied this whole line. Opposite Cemetery Ridge is Seminary Ridge, on which the main Confederate body was posted, though General Ewell's division lay at the foot of Culp's Hill, two miles away. Between the two ridges is a valley, and in this valley and on the slope of Cemetery Ridge were fought the battles of July 2d and 3d. From what followed, it has been inferred that the full strength of the enemy was not known to General Lee. He attacked the strongest Federal positions. General Longstreet was to assail Round Top, the Federal left, while General Ewell's simultaneous demonstration at Culp's Hill was to be turned into a real attack under favoring circumstances. General Daniel E. Sickles had been ordered to a position between Round Top and Cemetery Hill, but had passed this ridge, which is low, and had taken position on another wooded crest diagonal to the first and several hundred yards away. The Confederate

attack had been begun before the error could be corrected, and thus an unoccupied space was left between General Meade on Cemetery Hill and Round Top. General J. B. Hood's division of Longstreet's corps struck this opening in the attack, and perceived another terrible blunder of the enemy in the fact that Little Round Top had not been occupied. It was the key to the Federal position, and its capture would enable them to enfilade the whole Federal line with the guns they could place upon it. They swarmed up its rugged sides, and, as they reached the summit, met the Federal regiments coming up the other side. Pressed back by superior numbers, they assaulted the position again and again until nightfall ended their vain struggle for the hill.

While this terrific contest was in progress, the remainder of Longstreet's division had driven back Sickles's corps after a stubborn resistance, in which their commander was borne from the field with a leg shattered. The Federal corps retreated to the crest of the ridge and formed a new line, which the Confederates charged. The entire Fifth Corps by this time had come up to support the assailed division, and the fierce fire made the Confederate line recoil. General Hancock, commanding the centre, ordered a counter charge, by which the Confederates were pressed back to the ridge from which they had driven Sickles's corps; and there they stopped and held their position. Such was the distress of Sickles's corps that most of the Federal force left Culp's Hill to save it from annihilation. Upon this, General Ewell attacked Cemetery Hill in force, and, despite the strong fortifications, carried line after line and reached a position within the Federal entrenchments. He even reached the crest, so that for a time the dislodgment of the Federals seemed certain. But the latter vastly outnumbered him, though he did not know it then, and he held the position. While these struggles had been in progress, the Federal centre had been threatened and kept just sufficiently engaged to prevent its rendering aid to the wings. And so

the day had passed, and at dark the battle ceased. Not less than ten thousand was the Federal loss of the day, fully half of which was in Sickles's corps, which lost nearly one-half of its men. As one Northern historian writes: "The ground . . . was never meant to be held by Meade, and he would gladly have withdrawn from it without a fight."

The partial successes that had been gained by the Confederates determined General Lee to continue the assault the following day. Less than half his own force had been engaged, while he believed that they had encountered the entire Northern army. The general plan of attack decided on for the battle of July 3d was like that of the preceding day. While General Ewell followed up his advantage, the main attack was to be made on the centre. But the Federal army assumed the offensive against Ewell and forced him to give up the foothold he had gained. The Federals had spent the night improving their defences with earthworks, and on both sides all the morning was passed in preparation for the battle, which recommenced in the afternoon and raged with violence until sunset. In the morning, General George E. Pickett, with three of his divisions, had joined General Longstreet, and the Confederate batteries were moved forward to the positions gained on the preceding day. One division and two brigades of General Hill's corps were also ordered to support Longstreet. In the third day's battle both armies fought with the most desperate courage ever shown by men. The commanders on both sides were brave, skilful, and experienced, and handled their troops on the field with distinguished ability; but to superior numbers went the victory.

When General Ewell had been forced to withdraw from the position gained on the previous day, General Lee, for some reason, was not informed of it; and by this mischance one-third of the Confederate force was left out of the action, while General Meade was at liberty to gather his whole strength at any point assailed. On Seminary Ridge were

120 effective Confederate guns, directly in front of the Federal lines, while but 80 of the 200 Federal guns could be advantageously placed opposing them. Heavy artillery fire opened the battle at one o'clock, and the Federals replied. As fast as the Federal guns could be disabled, however, others were brought up to replace them. The Federal infantry was in the meantime sheltered behind the crest. After the cannonading had continued for a couple of hours, the Federals suspended to observe the Confederate procedure. Thinking that the batteries were silenced, General Lee now ordered the grand attack of the day, which proved to be one of the most famous in history. This attack was to be made by General Pickett's division of Virginians, who had not been engaged before in the day's battle, and they were to be aided by the brigades of Wilcox and J. S. Pettigrew. Wilcox did not fairly advance, but the attacking column numbered 18,000. At the last moment, General Lee had found that his ammunition was nearly exhausted, and there was no time to replenish it, so that he could not advance the artillery to support the infantry as he had intended.

Down the slope of the ridge and across the plain moved the swift advance, while every Federal battery from Round Top to Cemetery Hill blazed at them and sent torrents of shot and shell that plowed furrows through the serried ranks. As fast as these gaps were made and men fell, others moved into their places. The column was first headed to the left of the Federal centre, but swerved to avoid the breastworks of rails and stones, where 2,500 men stood in advance of the main Federal line. Despite the scathing flank fire from this position, the column moved on, until Pettigrew's brigade was within three hundred yards of Hancock's line, which had reserved its fire. Then there was a quick blaze of fire and a hail of bullets along the whole line—a continuous mowing torrent of lead that cut into the column like a scythe in ripe wheat. In a few minutes the brigade was broken and streaming back in disorder, but Pickett's division

moved on. Steadily on in the face of the fire they marched, until they had reached Colonel John Gibbon's front line, posted behind a stone wall. Straight over this they charged, in among the Federal batteries, and the contest was man to man. For a quarter of an hour there was a struggle with pistols and clubbed muskets. Then the Federal armies, rushing in thousands from every quarter, poured in to Gibbon's relief. The Confederates did not receive the support that had been ordered, and by sheer force of numbers they were pushed and rushed back down the slope, which was commanded by the raking fire of the Federal musketry and artillery. No one could advance, retreat, or stand still under that awful fire. Men threw themselves flat on the ground and raised a hand in token of surrender. Not one in four of all who made that grand charge escaped: they were dead or prisoners. Among the fallen of Pickett's division were Generals Armistead, Garnett, Barksdale, and Pender.

General Hood had been held in check upon the ridge he had won on the preceding day, but now, having routed the attacking columns in the centre, General Meade brought up his entire right wing and Hood was forced to withdraw, losing many men by capture. The losses of the day to the Confederates approximated 16,000, while the Federal loss was scarcely a fourth as many.

During the night the entire Confederate force was concentrated behind Seminary Ridge, in readiness for an expected attack, but General Meade's council of war advised against such a movement, and it was not made.

The next day a heavy storm set in, and under its cover General Lee began his retreat to the Potomac, the passes through the mountains being defended by a strong rearguard. He reached the river on July 7th, and found it swollen and unfordable, and the bridges he had thrown across it destroyed. General Meade followed him slowly, coming in sight on July 12th. Meade waited until the evening of the 13th, and issued an order of attack for the next morning. But when morning came, the Confederate army was

safe on the other side of the river. The invasion of the North had ended. While the final action at Gettysburg was in progress, the negotiations for the surrender of Vicksburg had been concluded—twin disasters that marked an epoch in the Confederacy.

The Federal loss at Gettysburg was 23,003, of which number there were 3,072 killed, 14,497 wounded, and 5,434 captured or missing. The Confederate loss, from reports of brigade and other commanders, was 20,451, of which 2,592 were killed, 12,709 wounded, and 5,150 captured or missing; some of the reports indicate that many of the “missing” were killed or wounded. Of the 12,227 wounded and unwounded Confederates captured by the Federals, the number of wounded prisoners is given by General Meade’s medical director as 6,802. The approximate strength of the forces engaged in the Gettysburg campaign was 101,679 on the Federal side, and 77,518 on the Confederate side.

General Lee gradually retired toward Winchester, and General Meade later in the month crossed the Potomac east of the Blue Ridge; then Lee moved once more in front of him, behind the Rapidan. The campaigns of the rest of the summer were uneventful. Weeks were devoted to resting and recruiting the armies. General Longstreet went with two divisions to reinforce General Bragg in Tennessee, while the third division went south of James River to check raiding and collect supplies. Cavalry fighting followed, with dozens of skirmishes, of which the Federals gained the greater part. The “campaign of strategy” followed, in which Generals Lee and Meade tried to outwit each other. On the 27th of November, Meade crossed the Rapidan below Lee’s position, and in order to get back between the Federal army and Richmond Lee retired to the hills above Mine Run. He waited three days for an attack, but the Federal general was content to use his cannon alone. General Lee decided that he would attack on the fourth morning, but when the time came the

Federals were gone. Believing the attack would be hopeless, the whole army had been withdrawn during the night. This ended active operations, and the armies went into winter quarters.

The counties of Virginia west of the Alleghany Mountains which had remained Union in sentiment had been treated by President Lincoln as if they were the whole of Virginia, as narrated elsewhere, and June 20, 1863, in violation of law, and in violation of the Constitutional provision that "no new State shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of another state without the consent of the Legislature concerned, as well as of Congress," West Virginia was admitted to the Union. The inauguration of the new State was accompanied by elaborate ceremonies at Wheeling.

West Virginia was not a sufferer by the war. Called on for 10,000 soldiers, the State had, when admitted, already furnished 20,000 to the Federal army. The conflicts on its soil were comparatively few, and were unimportant after the opening year of the war.

CHAPTER XIII

CAMPAIGNS OF 1863—IN THE WEST


AFTER the battle of Murfreesboro, General Rosecrans remained inactive for six months, but prepared for the forward movement he had planned. His right extended to Franklin on the Louisville and Nashville Railroad. General Bragg had established his line along Duck River, with his left extending to Columbia, thirty miles south of Franklin and also on the Louisville and Nashville Railroad. The only activity was on the line of the railroad where the Confederate left wing, under Van Dorn and Forrest, confronted the Federal right under Brigadier-general Gordon Granger. Forrest had been sent on an expedition to West Tennessee a short time before the battle of Murfreesboro. After brilliant exploits performed at Lexington, Jackson, Trenton, Union City, Parker's Cross Roads, and other places, and accompanying General Wheeler on two expeditions to Cumberland River, he returned to Middle Tennessee and took position at Columbia, on the left flank of the army. Soon afterward, General Van Dorn arrived with a force of 4,500 men, and assumed command with headquarters at Columbia, Tennessee.

Van Dorn and Forrest met on March 5th, at Thompson's Station, a Federal force under Colonel John Coburn, numbering about 3,000 men. After a spirited engagement, Colonel Coburn surrendered the infantry portion of his command, 2,200 men, including the wounded, while the cavalry escaped. The Confederate loss was 35 killed and

140 wounded. On March 25th, Forrest passed in the rear of Franklin and captured the garrison of Brentwood, taking 759 prisoners. Then he was ordered to Alabama.

On the 7th of April, Colonel Abel D. Streight received orders from General Rosecrans to fit out an expedition for important service in the rear of General Bragg's lines. In obedience to this order Colonel Streight repaired to Nashville, where he was furnished with mules and horses on which he mounted 2,000 men, consisting of the Fifty-first Indiana, the Seventy-third Indiana, the Third Ohio, and the Eightieth Illinois Regiments, and two companies of Union cavalry raised in Alabama. He had two mountain howitzers, with wagon trains and equipments. On the 10th, Colonel Streight received orders to embark his troops at Nashville and proceed to Eastport on Tennessee River. He reached Eastport April 19th, and formed a junction with an expedition under General Grenville M. Dodge.

The purposes of these two expeditions were not at the time understood by the Confederate authorities. They were revealed by subsequent events, and are now made clear to all investigators by the correspondence of the Federal officers, published in the *Official Records*. We learn from it that General Dodge moved with about 8,000 men from Corinth to Tuscumbia, crossing the Alabama portion of the valley of Tennessee River and threatening Decatur. This movement was intended to veil the more important movement of Colonel Streight. This latter officer was ordered to unite with Dodge, move as a part of Dodge's force as far as Tuscumbia, and thence to detach his command, march rapidly southeast, and cut the railroad connections between Atlanta and Chattanooga. In sending Colonel Streight on this expedition, General Rosecrans had in view the accomplishment of two purposes. One was the destruction of the valuable iron works at Rome, Georgia, which would inflict upon the Confederacy an irreparable loss. The other was the destruction of the lines of supply at Chattanooga, which Rosecrans hoped would render that



Battle of Lookout Mountain, Tennessee, November 24, 1863. Map of the line west of Chattanooga Creek,

place untenable and compel Bragg to retreat to Atlanta before the advance which he was then contemplating.

When General Dodge began his movement from Corinth toward Decatur, he found no opponent in the way except a small force of cavalry under Colonel P. D. Roddey, numbering in all about 1,100 men. On April 23d, General Forrest, then at Spring Hill, Tennessee, received orders to proceed at once to the relief of Colonel Roddey. He sent the Eleventh Tennessee, under Colonel J. H. Edmondson, who reached Tuscumbia the next day and reported to Colonel Roddey with about 500 men. Thus reinforced, Colonel Roddey contested the advance of Dodge and delayed his movement for three days, finally checking him at Town Creek.

In the meantime, General Forrest had arrived with his entire command. The purposes of General Dodge not being clearly understood, Forrest disposed his forces to meet any emergency. Colonel G. G. Dibrell, in command of the Eighth and Tenth Tennessee Regiments, remained on the north side of the river, to prevent any attempt of the enemy to cross the river, and, further, to keep up a cannonade and make feints of crossing in Dodge's rear. A rumor was industriously circulated that a large Confederate force was approaching from Tennessee in conjunction with General Van Dorn from the direction of Corinth to assail General Dodge in the rear.

With his two remaining regiments, the Fourth under Colonel W. S. McLemore, and the Ninth under Colonel J. B. Biddle, Forrest crossed to the south side of the river and took up a position on Town Creek, where he repulsed the attack made upon his lines on April 28th. Meanwhile, Colonel Dibrell had made such active and furious demonstrations of a purpose to cross the river, that General Dodge became alarmed and began his retreat. About the same time, Forrest received intelligence that a mounted Federal force of more than 2,000 men was moving to the southeast toward Moulton. Forrest's sagacious mind at once penetrated the

design of the movement, and he was the first man to comprehend it. He saw that Streight had gained a running start of nearly twenty miles and was bound for Rome, Georgia. There was no time to be lost in waiting for orders or in gathering forces. He acted with his habitual independence and moved with his habitual promptitude.

His rapid march from Spring Hill, Tennessee, and constant fighting since his arrival had left his men and horses broken down; but this did not deter him. He selected the best-mounted men from his three regiments at Town Creek, about 250 from each. These, with a detachment from Roddey's command, similarly selected, numbered about 1,200 men. One section of Morton's Battery—two guns—and Ferrell's Battery of four guns, with double teams of fresh and strong horses, completed the pursuing force. The remainder of the command was left to watch Dodge.

Early on the morning of April 29th he began the pursuit. Dividing his forces into two columns, he ordered Colonel Roddey, with the detachment from his own troops and the Eleventh Tennessee Regiment and the section of Morton's Battery to follow by the Ridge Road, while he himself, with the Fourth and Ninth Regiments and Ferrell's Battery, followed on the Valley Road to intercept any attempt of Streight to return. These two roads run nearly parallel, about eight miles apart.

A little after midnight of the 29th, Roddey's command arrived within four miles of the Federal camp, where a halt was ordered, and notice was sent to General Forrest. Before receiving this notice Forrest arrived in Roddey's camp, shortly before daylight. He made the dispositions for attack at daylight with the force at hand, about 600 men, and despatched orders to Colonel Biddle, commanding the detachment on the Valley Road, to coöperate with the attack by moving rapidly to Streight's rear and attacking from that direction.

What is locally named Sand Mountain is a long ridge, a spur of the Appalachian chain of mountains, running along

Tennessee River and thence southwest. As the best place to cross this mountain ridge, Colonel Streight selected Day's Gap, which is a mountain gorge with irregular, precipitous sides, averaging about three hundred yards in width, and ascending from the foot of the mountain to the summit of the Gap, a distance of about two miles.

In front of the Gap, a low range of foothills extends in a line nearly parallel with the mountain, and about a mile distant from it. A fertile and well watered valley lies between the foothills and the mountain. Colonel Streight had pitched his camp in this valley, at the foot of the gap, for the purpose of being convenient to water and of gathering provisions, and with the intention of crossing through the gap at daylight. He did not dream that the "Wizard of the Saddle" was close upon his trail.

While the general features of this remarkable series of running fights of five days have been frequently sketched, the battle of Day's Gap, the beginning of the series, has never been correctly described. General Forrest has left no report on record. Colonel Streight's report is found in the *Official Records*, and is, in the main, accurate and reliable, but his report of the battle of Day's Gap is incorrect. He treated it as an attack on his rear. It was in fact a surprise of his camp. Previous historians have followed Colonel Streight's account, and have thus failed to describe the most salient and important features of the battle.

General Forrest, as we have seen, rested with Colonel Roddey's detachment on the Ridge Road about four miles from Streight's camp. He sent forward a company of forty men under his brother, Captain W. H. Forrest, to gain a position unobserved on the foothills, from which he could watch the enemy and report by courier any movement. Forrest's formation of the troops was as follows: Forrest in person placed himself in front. Behind him came his famous escort in column of fours. Next came the section of Morton's Battery. Then the detachment of Edmondson's regiment. The line was completed by the detachment

of Roddey's command. Both these regiments were in column of fours. The column moved forward at a rapid pace. After travelling about three miles the advance came upon Streight's pickets, stationed on the foothills. The column at full speed charged the pickets, and followed them into the camp with wild yells. The artillery wheeling to right and left was unlimbered with lightning speed, opening the road for the cavalry. Thus the pickets, Forrest with his escort, the column of cavalry, and the cannon balls from the artillery plunged into the terror-stricken camp about the same time.

It so happened, however, that Colonel Streight had, contrary to Forrest's expectation, begun his movement before daylight. At the moment of attack, the head of his column with a portion of his baggage train was well on the way up the Gap. The rearguard and many loiterers were still in camp with a portion of the baggage train. Some were hitching up, some were at breakfast when Forrest's sudden interruption burst upon them like a thunderstroke. Those who could escape, rushed up the mountain. The Confederates took possession of the camp, capturing wagons, mules, provisions, ammunition, etc., and a few prisoners. The men scattered over the camp, some plundering, and many hungry men finishing the breakfasts which the Federals had left behind.

Forrest thundered through the camp to collect his men, and form them for pursuit. Captain W. H. Forrest of the Eleventh Tennessee Regiment was sent forward with his company to pursue the enemy up the Gap, and was speedily followed by the remainder of the regiment under Colonel Edmondson. At first, the pursuers rode forward in column. Soon they met resistance. Straggling parties of fugitives fired from rocks and overhanging precipices inaccessible to men on horseback. Then a skirmish line was encountered. Colonel Edmondson ordered the regiment to dismount and form into a skirmish line across the Gap. After allowing for horse holders and stragglers, and one company detached

on other duty, he had about one hundred and fifty men in line. This line advanced steadily forward, driving back all before it until it reached a point about one hundred yards from the summit of the Gap.

Here was encountered a peculiar obstacle. A ravine about thirty feet deep ran at right angles to the road from one side of the Gap to the other. The width of this ravine from the top of one bank to the top of the other was about forty feet, the upper bank being a few feet higher than the lower. This ravine had been cut in the course of time by a mountain stream that flowed close to the precipice which formed the left side of the Gap, and turning at right angles, flowed across the Gap to the right side. Here it emptied into another stream which flowed down the Gap close to the precipice which formed the right side.

When the Eleventh Tennessee crossed this ravine, and started to move forward ascending the gentle slope, it was discovered that Colonel Streight had formed his line of battle, 1,700 strong, on the summit of the Gap about one hundred yards distant. He was protected on each flank by the perpendicular mountain sides, and in front by defences made of logs and limbs of trees hastily thrown together. After drawing the fire of the enemy, the regiment fell back to the upper bank of the ravine, and lay down under its shelter. General Forrest now arrived upon the scene. He brought with him the two pieces of artillery belonging to Morton's Battery, under Lieutenant Gould, and Roddey's troops mounted. He placed the artillery in the line of Edmondson's regiment on the upper bank of the ravine, about one hundred yards from the enemy, and placed Roddey's regiment in line down in the ravine. He ordered the latter to ride up the bank of the ravine, pass through the intervals of Edmondson's regiment deployed as skirmishers, and charge on horseback right upon Streight's line.

Roddey's line rose from the ravine, as ordered, while the artillery opened fire, and charged gallantly upon Streight's silent line, whose men were lying down behind their defences.

Suddenly, when Roddey had approached within twenty-five yards, Streight's four lines arose and poured into the faces of the assailants one deadly volley after another. Roddey's line wavered, turned, and fled. More than one-fourth of their number were left upon the field. Horses without riders, many of them maddened with wounds, and men on horseback in wild flight plunged through Edmondson's regiment, while Streight charged forward. Forrest's entire line broke in utter rout and confusion. The whole mass rushed down the Gap. In crossing the ravine and the miry stream which flowed through its bottom, many of the mounted men were unhorsed, and many of those thus dismounted were trampled upon. It was not until the foot of the Gap was reached that order was restored. Here, the eyes of the discomfited soldiers were greeted with the sight of comrades to the rescue. The Fourth and Ninth Regiments had arrived. The gallant Colonel McLemore sat on his horse and looked calmly over his men in battle array. The veteran Biddle had placed his regiment in line as if on parade. Forrest rode along the front. Order was restored as if by magic, and the scene was changed. The lines were formed for immediate attack. Horse holders were reduced to the minimum. The horses were tied to trees and fences, and placed under a small guard. With the exception of a force of about fifty men, sent to make demonstrations on the flank and rear of the enemy, every available man was called in. A strong line of dismounted men in double rank, about one thousand in number, was formed across the Gap, and moved forward to attack Streight.

Every man now knew what was before him. Every man was a general, not in insubordination, but in intelligence, experience, and knowledge of war. Not a man doubted the result. They knew that the struggle would be fierce, they knew that their numbers were inferior; but they knew that they would be victorious. Never on any field did a more indomitable body of men move to battle.

On nearing Streight's position, it was found that he had retreated. He had charged as far as the brow of the ravine, and captured the two pieces of artillery. Here he was deceived by information which had been thrown in his way, and he had derived the impression that a large force was pursuing him, of which Forrest was only the advance guard, and that parallel columns were moving to intercept him. It was said that Captain Forrest, who was wounded and captured in the fight in the Gap, had helped to mislead him.

Thus, we see that Colonel Streight, after gaining a victory, did not dare to follow it up, but turned in precipitate flight under the belief that an overwhelming force was upon him, and moving to surround him. Immediately after Streight's retreat, Forrest followed in rapid pursuit, ordering his men to attack wherever they found the enemy, and "to keep up the scare." He left Roddey's command and Edmondson's regiment, which had suffered so severely, to guard the roads and intercept any attempt of Streight to return, and also to bury the dead and establish hospitals for the wounded. He took with him in the pursuit the remainder of his command, about 600 men. After an exciting chase of four days, interspersed with running fights, Colonel Streight surrendered, May 3d, near Rome, Georgia, his whole force of 1,466 men, which was increased a few hours later by the surrender of another detachment, making the total number of prisoners about 1,700. The entire force present with Forrest at the time of Streight's surrender was only 500 men.

It was in June, 1863, that General Rosecrans moved forward against the "Line of Duck River." The authorities at Washington, believing that large detachments were going from General Bragg's army to reinforce General Johnston in Mississippi, urged General Rosecrans to take advantage of Bragg's weakened condition to drive him back into Georgia and thus secure East Tennessee from the enemy's possession. General Rosecrans responded that

his division commanders and generals of cavalry did not think an advance advisable until the fate of Vicksburg was determined. In return, General Halleck reminded him that "Councils of war never fight," and said that if Rosecrans was not strong enough to fight Bragg with a part of his force absent, he certainly would not be after the absent soldiers had returned to Bragg; that the prolonged inactivity of so large an army was causing discontent in Washington and throughout the country.

General Rosecrans replied, showing the inadvisability of engaging all the forces in the west at the same time, leaving no reserve in case of possible disaster; but two days after writing the letter, or on June 23d, he commenced a series of movements for the purpose of bringing on a fight or causing Bragg to retire. After some fighting, which was merely a show of resistance, General Bragg evacuated Middle Tennessee, his withdrawal to Chattanooga being a series of skirmishes day after day. On the 23d there were skirmishes at Rover and Unionville, on the next day at Middleton, Bradyville, Christiana, and Big Spring Branch; from the 24th to the 26th at Hoover's Gap; from the 24th to the 27th at Liberty Gap; on the 25th at Beech Grove; on the 27th at Fosterville, Guy's Gap, and Fairfield, an action of some consequence at Shelbyville, and the occupation of Manchester by Union forces; on the 28th a skirmish at Rover; on the 29th those at Decherd and Hillsborough, and during the 29th and 30th that near Tullahoma. The Confederate forces evacuated Tullahoma on the 30th, and the following day the Union forces took possession. On July 1st there were skirmishes at Bethpage Bridge, Elk River, and Bobo's Cross Roads; on the next day at Morris Ford, Rock Creek Ford, Elk River, Estill Springs, Pelham, and Elk River Bridge; on the 3d at Boiling Fork, near Winchester, and on the 4th at University Depot.

So, falling back and fighting as he went, General Bragg on the 7th of July was able to concentrate the Confederate

army at Chattanooga, and there the Confederates rested from the laborious campaign of marching and fighting for nearly two months. General Buckner held Knoxville until September 2d. About August 20th, General Burnside had advanced from Kentucky, crossed, by using pack mules, the rugged mountains west of Cumberland Gap, and was approaching Knoxville on September 1st with a force of about 25,000 men, when General Buckner retired from Knoxville and took position at Loudon with 5,000 men of all arms. Cumberland Gap, the well-known pass by which Daniel Boone went into Kentucky, and the only pass in that region through which it was thought an army could march, was imperilled by General Buckner's withdrawal from Knoxville. It was then of little value to the Confederacy, but was in command of Brigadier-general I. W. Frazier, who had 2,300 men, but little ammunition. He was therefore forced to capitulate September 9th. As General Burnside advanced, General Buckner withdrew from East Tennessee and joined General Bragg near Chattanooga, where the main body of the Confederate army was then encamped. The cavalry force was meantime recruiting from fatigue and exhaustion near Rome, Georgia. General Lee had realized the importance of the pending movement and had consented to remain on the defensive while he sent General Longstreet and his corps to reinforce General Bragg. These troops were to come by rail from Atlanta.

General Rosecrans was at this time marching to attack the Confederate left and rear with an army of 70,000 men. On the last day of August he had crossed Tennessee River at Bridgeport with his main force and was advancing by way of Dalton and Rome, keeping Lookout Mountain between the two armies. Want of supplies and Burnside's force on the Confederate right made the situation perilous, and General Bragg realized that he could not hold Chattanooga. The Confederate army therefore evacuated Chattanooga September 7th and 8th and fell back to Lafayette,

Georgia, to form a junction with General Longstreet. The Federals at once took possession of Chattanooga, and without stopping to fortify it, General Crittenden began moving on the Confederate rear by the roads to Lafayette and Ringgold to cut off General Buckner, who, he heard, was moving to the support of General Bragg. He reached the point where General Buckner had crossed the Georgia Railroad, and, finding that he was too late, turned toward Lafayette to follow him. He moved up the Chickamauga on the east side and was confronted by a force of Confederate cavalry under Generals Pegram and Armstrong, when he fell back and crossed the Chickamauga at Gordon's Mills. General Rosecrans's entire force was then on the west side of the Chickamauga, within easy supporting distance.

General Bragg now moved his army by divisions, and crossed the Chickamauga at various fords and bridges north of Gordon's Mills. General Thomas had moved on until his left division, under General John M. Brannan, covered the Rossville Road. General Absalom Baird was on General Brannan's right, and then came the divisions of Generals R. W. Johnson, J. J. Reynolds, J. M. Palmer, and H. P. Van Cleve. General T. J. Hood covered Gordon's Mills Ford, and General J. S. Negley held Owen's Gap, four miles further south. Generals Davis and P. H. Sheridan were on the march, south of General Negley; and General John T. Wilder, with four regiments and a battery, was at the right, near Gordon's Mills. General Gordon Granger's forces were held in reserve some distance back of the Rossville Road. This was the position of the troops on the morning of September 19th. On that day and on September 20th was fought the greatest battle of the war in the West, mainly on Georgia soil near the Tennessee line,—the battle of Chickamauga. It was a battle for the possession of Tennessee, the main body of the attacking army being the flower of the Tennessee troops. They fought with a valor inspired by the hope of regaining their homes,

and made the contest a memorable one. By reports made on the morning of the battle, General Bragg's total effective force was 47,321, while the Federal army numbered 67,548, of which 64,392 actually took part in the engagement. While the Federal line was being extended toward the Confederate line some days before, it had been determined to turn upon the Third Corps, which was approaching from Chattanooga. Lieutenant-general Polk, in command of Major-general W. H. T. Walker's corps and his own, was ordered to attack the Federals, whose forces were known to be divided, and it was hoped to crush them in detail; but the division to be attacked withdrew during the night and formed a junction with the main body.

The great battle opened at ten o'clock on the morning of September 19th, the first attack being on General Rosecrans's left wing, which the Confederates wished to turn so that they might occupy the road to Chattanooga. This effort not succeeding, the centre was assailed with vigor and was driven back step by step, until reinforcements arrived and checked the retreat. Night came on and the battle ceased, both armies resting on their arms.

The Confederate forces were now divided into two corps or wings. The right was placed in command of Lieutenant-general Polk, and the left under Lieutenant-general Longstreet. The right was composed of Lieutenant-general D. H. Hill's corps of two divisions, under Major-generals Cleburne and Breckinridge, together with the divisions of Generals Cheatham and Walker. The left was composed of the divisions of Generals A. P. Stewart and William Preston; also that of General B. R. Johnson, of General Buckner's corps; General T. C. Hindman's division of Lieutenant-general Polk's corps; the brigades of Generals H. L. Benning, E. McIver Law, and J. B. Robertson, of Major-general Hood's division; and the brigades of J. B. Kershaw and B. G. Humphreys of Major-general McLaws's division. In the front line of the right wing were three divisions, Breckinridge's, Cleburne's, and Cheatham's, which were

posted from right to left in the order named. Major-general Walker was held in reserve. The line on the left wing was composed of Stewart's, Hood's, Hindman's, and Preston's divisions, from right to left in the order named.

During the night of September 19th, General Rosecrans, made cautious by the engagements of the day, withdrew his army toward the rear, and contracted his lines of the preceding day. The wounded were taken from the hospitals, which had been left exposed by the concentration of the forces, and all night trains were moving northward on every road in the rear of Chattanooga. General Thomas still held the left, with the divisions of General Palmer and Johnson attached to his corps and placed in the centre. General Brannan was retired slightly back of these, with his regiments arrayed in echelon. General Van Cleve was held in reserve on the west side of the first road in the rear of the line, and then Generals Wood, Davis, and Sheridan, the latter on the extreme left. General William H. Lytle occupied an isolated position at Gordon's Mills. Thus they awaited the attack of September 20th, which they knew was to come with renewed energy.

On the night of September 19th, General Bragg had also been preparing for the coming day. He gave his instructions orally to the general officers whom he had summoned to his camp fire, detailing their positions. The order of battle was that the attack should begin at daybreak on the right, and be taken up rapidly and successively to the left. There was much confusion from reorganizing the great army in the midst of a contest and owing to this confusion and to other mishaps the attack was not commenced until nine or ten o'clock in the morning, and when the battle did begin the troops from right to left did not engage as rapidly as was necessary for the full success of the plan of battle. The Federal army was attacked along the Chickamauga Creek, which that day might well be called after its Indian name, "River of Death." Before the fighting of the two days had ended more than twenty thousand dead and

wounded had fallen. But despite the failure of concerted action, deeds of valor gained many successes for the Confederates. In the first operations nearly all the assaults by the right wing were repulsed with loss. Successes gained could not be held, the Confederates being compelled to retire before the heavy reinforcements arriving. In parts of the field the battle was a succession of advances and retreats. Backward and forward the columns swayed, taking advantage of every protection from the hot fire of the enemy. Wherever a log or a boulder lay on the field, on each side of it was a heap of the slain, until the very piles of dead became bulwarks between the opposing survivors. There were deeds deserving of immortality, and quick movements on both sides. Such was the effectiveness, for instance, of a stroke by General Wheeler and his cavalry against the extreme right and centre of the Federal line, that the attack was mistaken for a flank movement by General Longstreet, and so appears in certain Federal reports of the battle.

The attack once becoming general was vigorously followed up. About four o'clock a general assault was made by the right, and this attack was pressed from right to left until the Federals rapidly gave way at one point after another, absolutely tired out from fighting. Finally, just as darkness fell, the enemy yielded along the whole line. The Confederates bivouacked on the ground they had taken by their prowess. Demoralized and beaten, the Federal army, saved from utter destruction solely by the heroic defence made by General Thomas, did not rest in its retreat, but fled in confusion during the night. On the following morning the main body of the Federal army was in position within its own lines at Chattanooga. The losses on both sides were very heavy, the official reports of the Federal loss being 16,170. There is no official report of the Confederate loss, but the best estimates place it at not far from the Federal loss, or nearly 16,000. The material results to the Confederates were 8,000 prisoners, many of them wounded, 51 pieces of artillery, 15,000 small arms, together with

large quantities of ammunition, wagons, and hospital stores. Three Confederate brigadier-generals had been killed, B. H. Helm, Preston Smith, and James Deshler, and Generals John B. Hood, D. W. Adams, John C. Brown, T. C. Hindman, and John Gregg badly wounded. Hood lost a leg and was afterward made lieutenant-general for his brave conduct in this battle.

General Rosecrans might have been kept out of Chattanooga, and the rout turned into an annihilation. When his army was in full retreat, General Forrest had been sent through Rossville Gap with a small force to assail the flank of the fleeing column. The Eleventh Tennessee Cavalry, under Colonel D. W. Holman, leading Forrest's advance, approached within less than a mile of Chattanooga, and held this position for more than five hours, awaiting the arrival of the Federals. General Forrest urged that the Federal line of retreat should be intercepted at this point, but General Bragg prohibited pursuit. Without interference, Rosecrans was therefore allowed to occupy Chattanooga, which he proceeded at once to fortify strongly. Had Thomas been again attacked on the morning of the 21st, Rosecrans's army could have been destroyed; and so disappointed were the Confederates because General Bragg did not follow up his victory that they lost confidence in him. General Bragg charged the failure upon his subordinate officers, and Generals D. H. Hill and Polk were relieved by him of their commands. Hill had not obeyed orders,—he said that they did not reach him,—Polk was exonerated and transferred to another important command. So the hard won victory at Chickamauga was barren of results to the Confederates, and in his comment on the battle in after years, General Hill said: "It seems to me that the *élan* of the Southern soldier was never seen after Chickamauga—that brilliant dash which had distinguished him was gone forever. That 'barren victory' sealed the fate of the Southern Confederacy."

Though he did not pursue and attack Rosecrans, General Bragg took position on the heights about Chattanooga and

established his line from the northern crest of Lookout Mountain across the valley and on Missionary Ridge. He held the roads south of the river and sent cavalry around Rosecrans's rear to capture his wagon trains and cut the railroads in the endeavor to starve him out. So well did these plans succeed for a time that the Federal situation grew critical. The troops were on half rations and suffering from lack of clothing; and their horses were dying of starvation. The authorities at Washington recognized the emergency. General Grant was ordered to take command at Chattanooga and arrived on the 24th of October. Sherman with his corps was called from Vicksburg, and Hooker from Virginia. Rosecrans was superseded by Thomas as commander of the Army of the Tennessee. The army was largely reinforced and with restored communications was soon ready to take the offensive again.

General Forrest, a few days after the battle of Chickamauga, was sent into East Tennessee to intercept an expected attempt on the part of Burnside to form a junction with Rosecrans. On this expedition he encountered and defeated Federal forces at Charleston, Athens, Sweetwater, Philadelphia, and Loudon. Soon afterward he was transferred to the Mississippi Department, where he arrived November 18th. Early in November General Longstreet was ordered to move against Burnside at Knoxville. He proceeded with his two infantry divisions, Hood's (under Jenkins) and McLaws's, about 10,000 infantry, and a cavalry force of 5,000 under General Wheeler. After some fighting on the way he reached and invested Knoxville November 17th.

General Grant had now accumulated an immense force at Chattanooga, and had fully established his lines of communication. Bragg, with his forces weakened by the detachment of Longstreet, clung tenaciously and fatally to the investment of Chattanooga. In the closing days of November, in a series of detached actions known as the battles of Chattanooga, Grant broke the Confederate line at Lookout Mountain, Orchard Knob, and Missionary Ridge.

The final disaster at Missionary Ridge, on November 25th, drove Bragg to retreat south in confusion. During this retreat to Ringgold, Georgia, General Cleburne covered the retreat of Hardee's corps, and on the night of November 26th bivouacked on the hills near the west bank of East Chickamauga River. Early on the following morning he was ordered to take a strong position in the gorge of the mountain and attempt to check the pursuit of the enemy until the trains and the rear of the army should be well advanced. He at once disposed his troops for that purpose; and within half an hour the Federal skirmishers were seen crossing the Chickamauga, in pursuit of the Confederate cavalry. The cavalry retreated through the gap at a trot, and the valley was clear of troops; but the immense trains of the Confederate army were in full view, still struggling through the fords of the creek and the deeply cut roads. The only barrier between the army's entire supplies and the flushed and eager advance of the Federal army was General Cleburne's division, posted in the gorge.

Five or six volleys from Cleburne's artillery stopped the oncoming Federals, and drove their first line to shelter. Major Taylor's Texas brigade held the further line in check, then charged down the hill and routed it, capturing the colors of the Twenty-ninth Missouri Regiment. Against another Federal line, Brigadier-general Lucius E. Polk sent the First Arkansas and the Seventh Texas Regiments, and drove the enemy back. Large bodies of the Federals had now crossed the Chickamauga and made the main attack at this point again. Still another advance was made, but, placing the Second Tennessee where it could command the enemy's flank, a double line was concentrated at the point of attack, and the Federals were again hurled back down the hill. The colors of the Sixty-sixth Ohio Regiment and a number of prisoners were taken. In this fight many of the Confederate officers fought with pistols and rocks, and so close were the opponents that some of the enemy were knocked down with stones and captured. On the extreme



Gibson Johnson PiHow,
Brigadier-general, C. S. A.



James Longstreet,
Major-general, C. S. A.



Stephen D. Lee,
Lieutenant-general, C. S. A.

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left, which the Federals attempted to turn with a brigade of three regiments, there was a terrific struggle, pending which General Cleburne was advised that the wagon trains were well advanced and that he might withdraw. He therefore retired to a new position one mile in the rear. The Confederate Congress formally tendered thanks to General Cleburne and his officers and men for the victory "obtained over superior forces of the enemy at Ringgold Gap, by which the advance of the enemy was impeded, our wagon train and most of our artillery saved."

The series of retreats which General Bragg had made since the battle of Murfreesboro, and the complaint of his men, operated to destroy the confidence reposed in him by the government, and, on December 2d, Lieutenant-general Hardee temporarily succeeded General Bragg. On December 27th, General Johnston assumed command of the Army of Tennessee, at Dalton, Georgia.

After the defeat of the Confederate army at Missionary Ridge, General Grant detached a force of 30,000 men, under command of General Sherman, and another force from Decherd, under General W. L. Elliott, to move toward Knoxville, and to coöperate with a third force, moving from Cumberland Gap, to the relief of Knoxville. General Longstreet, being informed of these movements, raised the siege on December 4th, and withdrew toward Virginia. He continued to hold a portion of upper East Tennessee, with headquarters at Morristown, until he was succeeded by General Buckner.

The campaign that followed was desultory, maintained mostly by the cavalry, and was one of the most remarkable in the history of the war. Two large bodies of hostile cavalry, unable, on account of the difficulty of transportation, to procure adequate supplies of forage, were compelled to live upon the country. They fought for possession of the fertile sections, but the scarcity of supplies forced them to separate into small detachments. Roving bands in pursuit of subsistence encountered each other and the hostile

commands became inextricably entangled. Then followed a period of innumerable skirmishes and individual adventures that accord more with the chronicles of knight errantry than with the annals of modern warfare. This condition of affairs subjected the citizens to great annoyance. The impressments of food, forage, and horses, made by both sides legitimately, under the pressure of military necessity, were bad enough, but the situation was utilized by lawless men to perpetrate outrages condemned by the soldiers of both armies.

During this time, however, a number of brilliant engagements occurred, among which were: Maynardsville, December 3d; Mossy Creek, December 24th and 29th; Dandridge, January 20th, 1864; Dibrell's Hill, January 28th; Shook's Gap, February 20th. Then the Confederate troops were withdrawn and the entire territory of Tennessee remained in possession of the Federal authorities.

General Forrest reached Okalona in the latter half of November and joined his little body of veterans there. Three small cavalry brigades at that time constituted the Confederate force in northern Mississippi. General Forrest wished to throw himself through the Federal line into West Tennessee, and by means of his personal influence on the scattered fighting elements there to bring together an effective offensive force. With barely 500 men and one section of Morton's Battery he pressed on to Bolivar, where he was warmly welcomed. A dozen detachments of from 25 to 200 men each, which had been formed, and all General Richardson's absentees were ordered to come together at once. While Forrest was collecting 1,600 or 1,700 men the Federals had posted 2,000 men on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad and columns were advancing from Corinth and Columbus. With a train of forty wagons and teams, and a large band of beef-cattle and hogs, Forrest fought his way through the lines that had been thrown about him, and reached Como, Mississippi, the last of the command arriving on the first day of the year 1864.

CHAPTER XIV

CAMPAIGNS OF 1863—OPERATIONS AGAINST MISSISSIPPI RIVER

GENERAL GRANT'S campaign against Vicksburg, which began early in November, 1862, after an interruption of some length, was resumed in 1863. After the fall of Holly Springs, General Grant had sent troops and wagons into the country for fifteen miles on each side of the railroad with orders to collect food and forage. The interruption in his communications with the north had cut him off from a great part of his command, and had so interfered with his plans as to disarrange them entirely. Orders had been issued for dividing the army into four corps, of which McClernand was to command one. McClernand was then in Springfield, and failed to arrive in time to have all the corps move together. General Grant returned to Holly Springs to remain until railroad connection with Memphis was reestablished, and then, on the 10th of January, returned to Memphis.

General Sherman had started down the Mississippi from Memphis with 20,000 men, and at Helena had received reinforcements of 12,000 more. McClernand had arrived on the 2d of January and had taken charge of these troops—a part of his own corps, the Thirteenth, and all Sherman's. Informed of General Grant's withdrawal to Holly Springs, Sherman and McClernand agreed that they could accomplish nothing then at Vicksburg, and returned

to Arkansas River, up which stream about fifty miles was Arkansas Post, defended by a few thousand Confederates. The gunboats and transports met with no opposition until the fort was reached; this, on the 11th of January, after three days' bombardment, was captured, together with 17 guns and 5,000 prisoners. The fall of Arkansas Post removed a very important element of the Confederate defence, as this fort with its garrison would have been able greatly to harass operations on Mississippi River, by operating in the rear of the invading army. McClellan then returned to Napoleon at the mouth of Arkansas River. Here, after a few days, prompted by the lack of confidence in McClellan's ability, General Grant assumed command in person, and ordered McClellan and the whole force to Young's Point and Milliken's Bend, while he returned to Memphis to take precautionary measures against another surprise. Returning a few days later to Young's Point, the actual campaign and siege of Vicksburg was begun.

General Grant's own idea of the best way to enter on this campaign then was that Memphis should be taken as a base, but he feared the effect of making so long a backward move and decided that nothing was left but to go forward. In the first month of 1863, therefore, the troops settled down opposite Vicksburg to await the final result. General McClellan was directed to widen and deepen the cut-off canal begun by General Williams in pursuance of Butler's orders in the previous year. Four thousand men were put to work on it and labored at the task incessantly until a sudden rise broke their protecting dam and stopped the work. The Confederates had not let the work go on without taking precautions. They were firmly of the opinion that the canal would be a failure, but had established a battery commanding its entire length, and soon drove out the two dredges that were doing the work of thousands of men. Even had the canal been completed, the Federals could have made no effective use of it, because of its running almost at right angles to the bluffs on the

east bank, where this battery had been established. Finding the canal a failure, General Grant then sent an expedition via Lake Providence and Bayou Macon, which did not meet with success. Then came the attempt to get an expedition through by Yazoo Pass and Hushpuccanaugh Bayou, removing obstructions to the navigation of the Yazoo Pass and Cold Water—little streams running from Mississippi River into the Tallahatchie. By this expedition, it was hoped to reduce Fort Pemberton and flank the Vicksburg defences. But the plan was frustrated by Fort Pemberton, a cotton-bale fort which had been made by Captain P. Robinson, of the Confederate States Engineers, on the overflowed bottom lands of Tallahatchie and Yallabusha Rivers, near their junction. Here, General Loring with three guns and 1,500 men turned back a large land and naval force.

This attempt proving as conspicuous a failure as had the canal, an effort was next made by General Sherman and Admiral Porter to pass around Vicksburg by way of Steele's Bayou and by the network of bayous and creeks north of the Yazoo to reach Sunflower and Yazoo Rivers and thus to gain a point above Haines's Bluff. This movement was thwarted by the effective work of the Confederate sharpshooters and by Colonel Ferguson with a section of field artillery and a few men. After this failure the expedition was ordered back to the west side of the river, above Vicksburg, where it arrived March 27, 1863. In the meantime, Admiral Porter had had a narrow escape from capture. He had gone some distance up Duck Creek with his fleet, and an adventurous party passed in after him to fell trees in the stream and prevent his return. He found the woods full of sharpshooters who sheltered themselves behind trees and stumps and shot every Federal who came within range. Things looked so critical at one time that Admiral Porter was on the verge of blowing up his gunboats and escaping to Mississippi River through the swamps. Land forces, however, were sent to his rescue and enabled him to escape.

Four attempts to get to the rear of Vicksburg had failed. When the winter had passed and the spring floods were over and the roads became passable, General Grant changed his plan of operations and strove to cut the Confederate communications between Vicksburg and the east while getting ready to attack the place from the southeast. He planned a movement by land to a point below Vicksburg which he desired to make his base of operations, and this plan included a concerted movement by the fleet and the land forces. On the night of April 16th, six gunboats and a number of transports from Admiral Porter's fleet ran past the Confederate batteries. Gunboats had performed this feat before, but never had it been accomplished by ordinary river steamboats. To protect them as far as possible, cotton bales were piled on deck and barges loaded with coal and supplies were lashed alongside. Confederate pickets had discovered the boats and crossed the river and fired several houses in De Soto so as to light up the river and enable the Confederate guns to play on them. Although this blaze exposed the daring Confederates to the enemy's fire on the now brightly lighted river, they did not hesitate to perform the perilous task. The Confederate shells set fire to one of the transports and it sank in front of the city. Two gunboats were disabled and several barges were destroyed. Eight boats succeeded in passing, however, in fair condition. Two nights later four other boats went by with their barges, joining the others at New Carthage, Louisiana, half way between Vicksburg and Grand Gulf. As Grant had now gathered at this point his gunboats and enough transports to convey an army across the Mississippi, the Confederates at Vicksburg had reason for apprehension.

Though still weak from his wounds, General Joseph E. Johnston, in charge of all the Confederate forces in Mississippi, had come to Jackson and was endeavoring to gather an army strong enough to aid Pemberton, then between Grant and Vicksburg. To cripple this effort, Grant sent General B. H. Grierson with three regiments of cavalry to

raid through the interior of the State and destroy railroads, bridges, cars, engines, and supplies of every kind. Grierson moved from the northern border of the State through the interior and joined General Banks at Baton Rouge in Louisiana. His raid stands out conspicuously among all predatory expeditions because of the outrages committed by Grierson's men, with their commander's knowledge and approval, against defenceless women and children.

To guard against Confederate interference from Vicksburg, Sherman menaced Haines's Bluff while Grierson was operating in the interior, and Federal troops were moving through northern Mississippi and threatening Port Hudson. General Pemberton strove to get back the troops he had sent to Bragg at Tullahoma, but his efforts failed. General Grant silenced the batteries at Grand Gulf, and on the 29th of April the Federal fleet passed that point. On the 30th, Grant crossed the river at Bruinsburg. On May 1st he defeated Bowen at Port Gibson; on the 12th he defeated General Gregg at Raymond, and on the 14th captured Jackson.

Pemberton had gone from Jackson to Vicksburg. These movements of the Federal army had puzzled him, as he at first believed Grant would turn north from Port Gibson and try to force a passage across Big Black River. Then he decided that Grant intended to strike the railroad near Edwards's Station and cut his communications with Jackson. In fact, Pemberton, who was in charge of the Department of the Mississippi, utterly failed to understand the purpose of Grant's movements. He took position at Edwards's Station, a strong position on high ground, and awaited a Federal attack. During the three days—May 13th to 15th—that he maintained this attitude, his position and intentions were further complicated by the receipt of telegrams from President Davis and General Johnston conflicting one with another. Neither agreed with his own plans, and he made the mistake of trying to reconcile both with his own wishes. Johnston had reached Jackson just after Pemberton's departure, but the effect of Grierson's destructive raid had

been to make it impossible for him to reinforce his army rapidly. There were but 6,000 Confederate troops in Jackson, while two corps of Federals were approaching. After a sufficient show of resistance to permit the removal of the government property, Johnston withdrew to Canton and the Federals marched into Jackson.

While Sherman continued to destroy railroads, factories, bridges, and everything of value to the Southern army, Grant sent McClernand and McPherson after Pemberton. Johnston had ordered Pemberton to concentrate his forces and to make every effort to keep open the communications between them; to strike Grant's rear while he was moving eastward. Physically unable to take command in person, Johnston desired Pemberton to join him finally at Clinton. Instead of obeying these orders, Pemberton moved south, and when he began retracing his steps he was so slow that Grant had had time to concentrate his forces. Moving to attack Grant in the rear, he met Grant's victorious army, fresh from the taking of Jackson, by which he was attacked on May 16th. This encounter resulted in the important battle of Baker's Creek, or Champion Hill, which was followed by the discreditable affair at Big Black River bridge, in which the Confederates were driven across Big Black River with great loss. In the battle of Champion Hill Brigadier-general Tilghman was killed. In pursuance of the wishes of President Davis, and against the orders of General Johnston, Pemberton now retreated to Vicksburg where the fortifications were sadly in need of repair. These repairs were made as speedily as possible, but the work of adequately fortifying the place had been neglected too long, and the most that could be done was not enough to make it defensible. The river batteries were almost the only part of the defences that remained in good condition. All the artillery on the river front and the field pieces brought in by the army were placed in position.

General Johnston wrote to Pemberton ordering him to evacuate Vicksburg, telling him that when the place should be

invested he would be obliged to surrender. This order was received May 18th, in time, perhaps, to have been obeyed. It was on this same day that Federal forces appeared outside the defence lines, and the Confederates withdrew inside their main lines. General Pemberton decided in his own mind that it was more important to hold Vicksburg in accordance with President Davis's wishes than to save his army to fight elsewhere—and so wrote General Johnston. He thereupon shut up 34,000 men with only two months' provisions, where the superior Federal forces must necessarily either capture or destroy them. Had Pemberton obeyed Johnston's orders, and thrown into Vicksburg a barely sufficient garrison, sending the remaining 20,000 troops to reinforce Johnston, the latter would have been so strengthened as to have been able to move upon the besieging force before Grant had entrenched himself, and Vicksburg might have been relieved. As it was, Johnston could not gather men enough to justify his advance.

McClermand and McPherson built floating bridges over Big Black River; Sherman crossed on a pontoon bridge, and the three advanced rapidly on Vicksburg. In the investment of the place, Sherman held the right of the lines, McPherson the centre, and McClermand the left. On the 19th of May, there was an attack by the division of General F. P. Blair, Jr. and one brigade of Sherman's division on what seemed to be a weak spot in the Confederate lines, but it was repulsed with serious loss. On the 20th and 21st, the Federals completed a line of fortifications about 800 yards from the Confederate works. On the 22d, a vigorous assault was made. The gunboats opened fire on the river front, while the whole Confederate line was bombarded by cannon. Under cover of the heavy fire of the guns, several columns of troops attacked the rear of the city. Three times they advanced, and each time were forced to retire with heavy loss. There were 3,500 dead and wounded left between the lines. Many of the dead remained until the 25th, when they were removed under a flag of truce. On

the 27th, the fleet attacked the river batteries, but these crippled and sank the *Cincinnati*, one of the attacking vessels, and inflicted much damage on her consorts.

The Federals now abandoned the attempt to capture the city by assault and began a siege. Parallels were constructed, and every day brought them nearer the Confederate entrenchments. Against every trench another trench was dug; opposite every fort another fort was erected. Amid the blazing fire of hostile musketry and under the burning summer sun, the enemy constructed corridors, passages, and pits. Confined to their trenches, their limbs swollen and cramped, the Confederates had no relief. Burning suns, drenching dews, rain, and fog weakened them. Federal fleets and mortar boats joined in the siege from the river front; from the batteries on every side a continuous storm of shot and shell poured into the city. The scanty supply of ammunition almost forced a continuous silence of the Confederate guns. The incessant bombardment drove the people within the beleaguered city from their houses to the hills, and there they dug caves to which they removed their furniture and there they lived in comparative safety. The Federal army now numbered about 75,000 men, and to oppose this force General Johnston had gathered about 25,000 men. To prevent attack from Johnston, General Grant threw up strong fortifications in the Federal rear.

During May and June the siege continued. The Federals had by June 4th brought their trenches to within 150 yards of the Confederate lines. So close did they approach that now and again one army mined beneath the other's positions. The only hope there was for the relief of the besieged garrison came through messengers who penetrated the swamps and thickets of the Yazoo and brought news from Johnston's army. They also brought badly needed caps for the muskets. The beleaguered people kept their courage up, and the women were as active as the men; they ministered to the sick and wounded. The besieging lines drew closer and closer, digging mines directly underneath the

fortifications that kept them out. One of these mines was exploded June 25th. On July 1st the Federal sappers blew up the Third Louisiana redan, virtually destroying it and making a breach nearly twenty feet wide. Vigorous assaults were made but failed to carry the Confederate works. The Confederates, though hard pressed, desperately and successfully resisted the storming parties. The breach made July 1st was closed with great difficulty and only through great strategy. On July 2d, the Confederates exploded one of their mines with considerable effect. Eleven others were in readiness, but on the 3d the flag of truce stopped all operations on both sides.

It was time. All the horrors of the siege, except actual death by starvation, had been experienced. By the end of May the soldiers were on half rations of bacon, and supplies of all things steadily diminished thereafter. Mule meat, and that in small quantities, took the place of bacon. Conditions grew worse and worse with both soldiers and citizens. An attempt to relieve them from Arkansas had failed. General Pemberton sent Johnston messages urging him to attack Grant and raise the siege, but Johnston replied that Vicksburg could not be saved. He suggested that by a simultaneous attack at a given point the garrison might be extricated. The division commanders thought their men too much exhausted to attempt to cut their way out, but declared their readiness to continue the defence. General Johnston notified them that he would be ready to attack Grant on the 7th of July; he urged the garrison to coöperate and to attempt to make their escape. But before the 7th it was all over. The end for Vicksburg had come. General Pemberton declared that he had not received Johnston's message, and said: "I would have lived upon an ounce a day, and have continued to meet the assaults of all Grant's army rather than have surrendered the city until General Johnston had realized or relinquished that hope."

It was the 3d of July when General Pemberton sent to General Grant, under a flag of truce, an offer to capitulate.

General Grant would accept only the unconditional surrender of the city and the garrison. The correspondence continued during the day and until the next morning at nine o'clock; besides which, General Pemberton had a personal interview with General Grant which lasted an hour and a half. Of the meeting a spectator said: "Grant was silent and smoking, while Pemberton, equally cool and careless in manner, was plucking straws and biting them as if in merest chitchat."

The capitulation was effected—one of the largest armies that the Confederacy had in the field surrendered. The result was decisive in the contest in the Mississippi valley; it was the final surrender of the great river and the complete severance of the two sections of the Confederacy. The number of men surrendered was 31,600, thousands of whom were disabled by wounds and illness, with 72 cannons and 60,000 muskets. The men were paroled and allowed to go to their homes, being provided with rations by the Federals during the necessary formalities. The kind treatment received from the captors was much appreciated; not a cheer or a shout greeted them as they marched out of the works they had so long and so bravely defended. Much of this was undoubtedly due to the order of General Grant pertaining to the removal of the prisoners. He directed the commands to be "orderly and quiet as these prisoners pass," and "to make no offensive remarks." The only cheering was one hearty cheer by a Federal division on the Confederate right "for the gallant defenders of Vicksburg."

Though more than a year later in point of time, the fall of Vicksburg was the immediate result of the fall of New Orleans, April 25, 1862. The attempts against it had been numerous, but unsuccessful for a time. Then came the fatal error of Pemberton in disobeying Johnston's orders and the inevitable success of Grant's combined movement against it. The causes necessitating its fall are well established. The bravest defence could not avail against a shortage of ammunition and practical starvation. Lamar Fontaine,

Captain Saunders, and Courier Walker had floated down the river on logs and brought in 18,000, 20,000, and 200,000 caps at different times, but these were immeasurably short of what was needed. For many days before the end of the siege the men had been on quarter rations; they had eaten mule meat, rats, and the young shoots of cane, for want of other food. The force defending was so insufficient that no man within the lines had ever been off duty more than a small part of each day. Every officer knew that his men were exhausted and had reported them unfit for any other duty than standing in the trenches and firing. The whole truth was brought out at a council of war on the night of July 2d. Having lost all hope of any possibility of relief from Johnston, it looked to be either a surrender or a hopeless effort to cut a way through the Federal lines. The voice of the council was almost unanimous for surrender; Brigadier-general Stephen D. Lee and Brigadier-general W. E. Baldwin voted against it, but they stood alone.

To General Pemberton's statement that he would offer to surrender on the 4th of July there was some objection, but he silenced it by the reasons he assigned for selecting that day. Of Northern birth himself, he said he knew the weaknesses and vanities of his people, and he could get better terms on that day than on any other. The full terms accorded might not have been so generous, however, had not obstacles existed which General Grant could not well displace. While the negotiations for surrender were going on General Grant and Admiral Porter were in communication by signal between a tall tower on land and a mast on Porter's ship. Grant wished to take his prisoners North to prison, but Admiral Porter said he did not have sufficient transportation and suggested the greater benefit of paroling the prisoners and using the fleet in carrying Federal troops to Port Hudson and other places where they would be needed. This signalling was seen inside the Confederate lines and interpreted to General Pemberton,

who was thereby emboldened to adhere to his original proposition as to the terms of surrender.

The first direct result of the surrender of Vicksburg was the fall of Port Hudson, and the resulting supremacy of the Union arms along the entire length of the Mississippi. General Banks had invested Port Hudson May 27th, and had made two assaults on it without success. General Frank Gardner held the place with about 5,000 men. No sooner had Vicksburg fallen than General Grant determined to send reinforcements to Banks, and wrote him a letter to that effect, saying that Vicksburg had fallen and that he could have all the troops needed to ensure the capture of the only foothold the Confederacy now had on Mississippi River. General Banks had this letter printed for easier circulation among his officers, and a copy fell into the hands of General Gardner. Gardner at once wrote General Banks that he had by this letter learned of the surrender of Vicksburg, and realized that it was useless for him to hold out longer. On July 9th, he surrendered Port Hudson unconditionally—6,000 prisoners, 51 guns, 5,000 small arms, and other stores. The river was from that time wholly in control of the Federals. The campaign for the possession of the Mississippi had ended in its entire accomplishment.

General Johnston, who had reoccupied Jackson when Grant left for Vicksburg, was marching toward Vicksburg, in accordance with his letter to Pemberton regarding an attack on July 7th, when he learned that Pemberton had surrendered. He at once fell back to Jackson, but the works defending this place were badly placed and of little worth. On the 8th of July, General Sherman, whom Grant had ordered to drive Johnston from the State, was within ten miles of Jackson, and on the 9th he drove in Johnston's pickets, and closed in on the city which he was bombarding with his heavy artillery. Another Federal force marched northward to turn Johnston's flank. The siege continued until July 17th when Sherman's scouts

reported to him that Johnston had evacuated Jackson during the night. On the 16th, Johnston had heard that a large train from Vicksburg, loaded with ammunition, was near the enemy's camp. This, together with the condition of the batteries, would make it possible for Sherman to concentrate on him the fire of about two hundred guns. The evacuation was therefore determined upon. Johnston removed most of the public stores and all his sick and wounded who could be moved, and left the city. The weather was hot, the roads dusty, and the water bad. Johnston destroyed the roads as he passed, and no pursuit was attempted. General Sherman occupied the town, which he proceeded to destroy, burning government buildings, railroad buildings, and nearly the whole town. In writing of his course at Jackson, Sherman said: "We have made fine progress to-day in the work of destruction. The city is a mass of charred ruins."

During the progress of the siege of Vicksburg, Grant had sent Blair's division along Yazoo River to burn and destroy everything his army could not use, and this work was continued by Sherman, who wrote of his army as "absolutely stripping the country of corn, cattle, hogs, sheep, poultry, everything," and throwing the growing corn "open as pasture fields." The destruction was frightful and extended for many miles in every direction about the devastated capital of Mississippi. General Johnston had withdrawn from his front, so that Sherman, having finished his work of devastation, left Jackson and returned to Vicksburg. The campaign in Mississippi seemed over. The reverses on the river and in the State were most damaging to the Confederacy. It brought about a strain that could not be long endured.

Eager to follow up the advantages he had gained, General Grant favored a campaign against Mobile and suggested it to the commander-in-chief, but Halleck wished first to acquire possession of the entire trans-Mississippi, and refused to allow the Mobile campaign. He also declined to

allow Grant leave of absence to visit New Orleans. General Grant therefore settled down to put himself on the defensive, and the army he had gathered was gradually dispersed. To General Banks he sent General Francis J. Herron's division of 4,000 men; the Ninth Corps under General John G. Parke returned to Kentucky, and a division of 5,000 was sent to General Schofield in Missouri, where Price was showing renewed activity. Another brigade under General T. E. G. Ransom was sent as a permanent garrison for Natchez. On the way to Natchez the Confederacy had nearly 5,000 beef cattle from Texas going to feed the eastern armies, as well as a large quantity of munitions of war on the way to General Lee. These fell into the hands of the enemy. The Thirteenth Corps was also sent to General Banks early in August, General Ord commanding, and General Grant was ordered to coöperate with Banks in movements west of the Mississippi. He went to New Orleans and conferred with Banks on the matter, but none of the movements amounted to anything. In September, while in bed from injuries received by his horse falling on him, General Grant received orders to send all available forces to the relief of Rosecrans at Chattanooga. Before the movement had been made the battle of Chickamauga had been fought and Rosecrans penned up in Chattanooga. The activity of the Federal troops about Vicksburg was devoted to hunting down independent companies which they denominated guerrillas and small bands of Confederate cavalry that were trying to guard Southern homes in the central part of the State; also in destroying mills, bridges, railroads, and railroad equipments.

In a few days more there was another, but inevitable, disaster to the Confederacy in the fall of Yazoo City, where much munition of war was stored and many steamers had taken refuge. The Federals advanced against the place both by land and water on July 13th. The heavy Confederate batteries repulsed the attack of the gunboats, under the able direction of Commander Isaac C. Brown of the navy,

and the *De Kalb*, the flagship of the attacking squadron, an ironclad mounting thirteen guns, was sunk by a torpedo. The small garrison of three hundred men made no resistance to the land attack and the place was surrendered. This entailed on the Confederacy a loss that was severely felt. Twenty vessels were destroyed.

During the remainder of the year Federal operations were confined to predatory expeditions, by mounted troops usually, that seemed to have no other purpose than burning towns and villages and causing as much suffering to the people as possible. The Confederates contented themselves with endeavoring to hold these raiders in check. In Mississippi, much of this warfare was along the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, where Brigadier-general D. Ruggles with Ferguson's brigade and ten or twelve field pieces, and Brigadier-general J. R. Chalmers with his brigade of cavalry and a field battery tried to hold the enemy in check. Another mounted brigade under Colonel J. A. Logan operated near Natchez and Port Hudson, Louisiana. After Sherman retired from Jackson to Vicksburg, General W. H. Jackson's division of cavalry watched the Federals beyond Big Black River and protected the reconstruction of the railroad from Jackson north and south where it had been destroyed by the Federals. Lieutenant-general Hardee was transferred from the Army of Tennessee to that of Mississippi, and after his arrival at Morton General Johnston went to Mobile to complete the examination of its defences, which he found very imperfect.

On August 15th, General Jackson sent Whitfield's Texas brigade in pursuit of a body of 800 or 900 Federal cavalry that moved from Yazoo City toward Grenada, but learning that the Federals had united with a similar expedition from Grand Junction, Tennessee, Whitfield turned back and destroyed in his retreat the railroad and all the rolling stock that was found on it. The two Federal detachments moved north after burning about one-fourth of the town of Grenada and the engines and cars at that

place. On the 6th of September, in response to a dispatch from General Bragg, Gregg's and E. McNair's brigades were started from Meridian and Enterprise to Atlanta, but when it became known that Atlanta was not then in danger these brigades joined General Bragg's army near Chattanooga, and assisted in the battle of Chickamauga. On October 6th, General Chalmers drove a detachment of 800 Federals from Coldwater, after a slight skirmish, and on the 8th routed 2,000 of the enemy in an engagement of three hours. Other successes were achieved by him at Collierville and Byhalia a few days later. Reports that the Fifteenth Corps had gone to relieve the Federal army in Chattanooga caused the dispatching of Generals W. A. Quarles's and W. E. Baldwin's brigades to the Army of Tennessee. A telegram from President Davis, on December 18th, directed General Johnston to transfer the command of the Department of Mississippi and Eastern Louisiana to Lieutenant-general Polk, and to repair to Dalton and assume command of the Army of Tennessee. The year witnessed no further events of importance in Mississippi or in eastern Louisiana.

The Federal losses during the Vicksburg campaign, including Port Gibson, Port Hudson, Raymond, Jackson, Champion Hill, Big Black River Bridge, the assaults of May 19th and 22d, siege operations and miscellaneous skirmishes, aggregated 1,514 killed, 7,395 wounded, 453 captured or missing—making a total of 9,362. On the Confederate side official returns, which are incomplete, give losses aggregating 9,059, of which 1,260 were killed, 3,572 wounded, and 4,227 captured or missing. Complete returns would undoubtedly swell the total to a little over 10,000.

CHAPTER XV

CAMPAIGNS OF 1863—THE TRANS-MISSISSIPPI AND THE COAST

FOLLOWING fast upon the fall of Vicksburg came other losses to the Confederacy on the west of the Mississippi, one especially grave disaster being the repulse of the Southern army at Helena, Arkansas.

In the Trans-Mississippi Department those portions of the Confederate army under Generals Hindman, Marmaduke and Sterling Price had from the beginning of the year maintained a restless activity. Early in January, 1863, General Marmaduke's command had marched rapidly down Arkansas River to a point near Clarksville, and then turned north with the purpose of capturing and destroying the large quantity of Federal stores and supplies accumulated at Springfield for the Army of the Frontier. He had gone by an indirect route to avoid trouble from the Federal forces under Generals J. G. Blunt and F. J. Herron, hoping to accomplish his purpose before they heard of his movements. Deprived of their supplies, those generals would of necessity have been compelled to flee from that part of the State or surrender to General Hindman. Springfield's defences were not completed, and the scheme was well planned and promising. The Federal troops were scattered through southwestern Missouri, two or three companies in a place. January 7th the Confederates burned Lawrence Mills, and were due in Springfield the following day. Brigadier-generals Egbert B. Brown and Colly B. Holland

sent most of their stores north, gathered all the available troops and successfully resisted the capture of Springfield. Marmaduke had divided his small force into two parties, one commanded by himself and the other by Colonel J. C. Porter. He thus not only failed to capture Springfield but encountered defeat for both divisions. His own division lost five hundred men or more killed, wounded, or captured, while the other division under Colonel Porter lost almost as many. Two months were spent after this in recruiting the army, and there was no important movement until April.

General W. L. Cabell with 2,000 men made an attack on Fayetteville, Arkansas, on the 17th of April, but was unsuccessful. Then, Generals Marmaduke and Price, having collected a large number of troops, mostly Texans, largely consisting of cavalry, determined, as a preliminary to a contemplated invasion of Missouri, to attempt the capture and destruction of Cape Girardeau, then the depot of supplies for a portion of Grant's army. Leaving Little Rock about the middle of April, they reached the State line on the 20th; Fredericktown, Missouri, the 22d, and came before Cape Girardeau on the 25th. General McNeil had reached Cape Girardeau on the 23d; he had been actively engaged in removing the government stores over into Illinois and had sent to St. Louis for reinforcements. Marmaduke's attack was unsuccessful and he retreated southward. Pursuit was made, but the Confederates crossed into Arkansas May 2d. On the 11th, Marmaduke's command, much divided, was met by a force of 1,000 cavalry which had left Helena under command of Colonel Powell Clayton on the 6th to destroy the Confederate stores accumulated between White and St. Francis Rivers. The Confederates lost heavily in this encounter. A Confederate detachment under Colonel John T. Coffee attacked a body of Federals on May 20th near Fort Gibson, Indian Territory, and capturing a lot of cattle escaped with slight loss. There were repeated skirmishes in the Indian Territory, but no severe fighting occurred until

July 15th, when the Confederates under General Douglas H. Cooper were defeated near Henry Springs by General Blunt, who had crossed the Arkansas. After several other skirmishes General Blunt went down Arkansas River and on September 1st occupied Fort Smith.

As early as May, General E. Kirby Smith, who had been in command of the trans-Mississippi department since March 7, 1863, had deemed it advisable to make a formidable demonstration on the west side of Mississippi River with the hope of relieving Vicksburg. General Holmes was therefore directed to move the troops then in Arkansas against Helena, situated on the west side of the river about eighty miles below Memphis and three hundred miles north of Vicksburg. Four thousand Federal troops held Helena, and were supported by one gunboat in the river. The troops began to move on the 31st of May through muddy country, every creek being full and the ground covered with water. The column consisted of 4,900 troops. M. Monroe Parsons's Missouri brigade of 1,000 and Dandridge McRae's Arkansas brigade of 400 constituted General Price's division; James F. Fagan's brigade of Arkansas and Missouri cavalry numbered 2,000. These various commands met at Jacksonport and on the 22d of June began one of the most extraordinary marches in the history of the war. The infantry marched the greater part of the distance through water up to their waists, heavy details of men dragging the wagons through the difficult places. The exhausted mules would be replaced by a hundred men with a long rope. After twelve days of terrible experiences the wornout men reached a point five miles from Helena on the 3d of July, and there General Holmes immediately assumed command. A council of war was held and the situation was discussed.

Helena, surrounded by wooded hills, was defended by three prominent forts—north, south, and in the rear of the centre of the city. General Price did not favor an attack, arguing that the Federals had undoubtedly prepared for it, and that if they had drawn troops from Vicksburg the object

of the expedition had been accomplished. He favored an investment of the place, cutting off supplies, and harassing the enemy by picket fighting; the city was untenable if taken, and if the enemy were driven out they would go to swell the army around Vicksburg. General Holmes warmly replied that he would attack at once, and if the attack failed he would assume the responsibility. Marmaduke's command was sent to the northern fort, Fagan's to the southern, while Price was ordered to assault the centre or "Grave Yard fort." The assaults were to be made simultaneously at daylight.

Price moved through the deep ravines and over the high hills in good order, though shelled by the enemy at every step, and reached the last ridge within two or three hundred yards of the centre fort. By the firing on the right and left he knew that Marmaduke and Fagan were at work. His men charged gallantly with fixed bayonets, over and through the fallen timber, up hills, into gullies, and were not checked till they were in possession of the fort. There the guns from the river began playing on them, but the men sheltered themselves as best they could and waited. Meanwhile, Fagan had advanced to within two hundred yards of the southern fort when the heavy fire of the artillery drove him back. Three times he charged and was repulsed. Marmaduke met with no better success. General Holmes then ordered two regiments of Parsons's brigade to attack the southern fort in the rear, and the movement was attempted, but under the heavy fire from the river and the other forts, it could not succeed. Fagan and Marmaduke were driven off and Price was, therefore, forced to abandon the position his troops had so gallantly won. The enemy concentrated their fire upon him and his retreat was accomplished with heavy loss. The battle was over and a thousand Confederates had been disabled or captured. News of the surrender of Vicksburg reached General Holmes, so he retreated to Little Rock.

In lower Louisiana there was a short-lived period of Confederate success which kindled renewed hope in the

South and even promised the recapture of New Orleans, but the insufficient number of men available could not accomplish this much desired object, and the expeditions came to naught after the surrender of Vicksburg and Port Hudson. Late in June, General Richard Taylor, who was in command in lower Louisiana, organized an expedition against Brashear City. He ordered Colonel J. P. Major, commanding a brigade of cavalry on the Atchafalaya, to open communication by way of the lakes with Generals Alfred Moulton and Thomas Green, who were to coöperate in front of the Federal position. After a successful campaign through the LaFourche country, Colonel Major effected the junction and a combined attack was made on Brashear City on June 22d, and the forts were taken at the point of the bayonet. The Confederates captured one thousand eight hundred prisoners, an enormous quantity of stores and a position that seemed to be the key of Louisiana and Texas. But the diversion was too late to draw the enemy from Vicksburg and Port Hudson, and when General Taylor learned that these places had fallen and Banks's forces had been released, he recognized the impossibility of holding the territory he had taken and abandoned it. This was the last serious effort on the line of the Mississippi.

After Vicksburg had fallen, General F. Steele was sent to Helena with a large force of Federals, and instructed to form a junction with General J. W. Davidson, who was moving south from Missouri, and with their combined forces drive the Confederates south of Arkansas River. The junction was accomplished, and on August 1st General Steele advanced against the Confederate army, which fell back to Little Rock. The Federals were opposed by inconsiderable bodies of Confederate troops, and, after a number of skirmishes, reached Arkansas River. Throwing part of his force to the south side of the river, Steele threatened the Confederate communications with Arkadelphia, their depot of supplies. General Marmaduke attempted to beat back the assailants, but was defeated by overwhelming numbers.

General Holmes then recognized the inevitable, destroyed what property he could, and, after slight resistance, retreated. The Federals entered Little Rock on September 10th, and at once pursued the Confederates southward. A small force of Confederates moved east and attacked Pine Bluff on the Arkansas, hoping to recapture it and break the Federal communications. This attack—October 28th—was not successful, and the retreat was continued toward Red River. The same day, the Federals entered Arkadelphia.

Arkansas was now wholly in possession of the Federals, except the extreme southwest and northwest, where the independent Confederate companies continued to hold possession. General Cabell, with a considerable force, crossed Arkansas River east of Fort Smith and went as far into Missouri as Booneville, but was compelled to retreat after a sharp engagement at Arrow Rock. Three hundred Confederates under Quantrell, early in October, almost captured General Blunt; they killed seventy-eight of the one hundred men in his escort, but he escaped. General Blunt was succeeded on October 20th by General McNeil as commander of the Army of the Frontier.

These events practically ended the struggle in Arkansas. On November 12th, at a meeting in Little Rock, steps were taken for the restoration of the State to the Union; other meetings followed, and in the spring of 1864 Arkansas was again one of the United States. But it was a small minority of its people that had taken any part in this movement. The majority had no vote and were never consulted.

Operations along the coast during 1863 had been numerous and important. The Confederates achieved a victory at Galveston. A Federal flotilla carrying a heavy armament had taken possession of Galveston in October, 1862, without a conflict. Less than three hundred men were left to garrison the place, the flotilla being disposed about the harbor. At daybreak on January 1, 1863, General Magruder, commanding the Confederate forces in Texas, made a vigorous attack on the city. There was but one bridge

by which he could enter, but the small Federal garrison was so much excited that it failed to destroy it, and even left it unguarded. During the night the Confederates planted batteries just outside the city, abreast of the warship *Harriet Lane*, lying in a narrow channel near the shore. Three other Federal vessels were further to the eastward. The Confederates had only two cotton-clad steamers, the *Bayou City* and the *Neptune*, the former carrying a rifled thirty-two-pounder, and the latter a couple of howitzers. Each had one hundred and fifty or two hundred sharpshooters aboard. The *Bayou City's* gun burst at the first fire, and the *Neptune* sank in an attempt to ram. The *Harriet Lane* was carried by boarding, Commander J. M. Wainwright being killed; and the *Westfield*, another gunboat, ran aground and was burned by orders of her commander, W. B. Renshaw, who was killed when she blew up prematurely. The other vessels steamed away, raising the blockade, and the Federals in Galveston surrendered. The blockade was renewed on January 8th by the *Brooklyn*, the *Hatteras*, and several other gunboats. On the 11th, the *Alabama*, posing as a blockade runner, enticed the *Hatteras* to pursue her, and destroyed her, as we have already noticed. On January 21st, the blockading fleet was attacked by two cotton-clad steamers, and surrendered. The next day the blockade was again resumed, with the *New London* and the *Cayuga*. After the fall of Port Hudson, General Banks sent four gunboats and a detachment of troops to land at Sabine Pass and strike the railroad, and on September 8th they attacked the Confederate fort at that point. Two vessels surrendered after a heavy loss, and the others retreated. General Banks then decided to operate near the Rio Grande, and troops landed at Brazos on November 2d. Brownsville, Corpus Christi, Aransas, and Fort Esperandieu fell into the hands of the enemy, but no further conquest was attempted.

The interesting and encouraging event of midsummer on the Atlantic coast was the defence of Charleston against an energetic attack by the combined land and sea forces of the

enemy. The Federals had made preparations in the early spring to attack Charleston from the sea. To undertake this, a fleet with seven ironclads of the *Monitor* type gathered about the 1st of April at Port Royal under the command of Admiral Dupont. Besides the monitors there were the *Keokuk* and the *Ironsides*—the latter armor-plated and equipped with eighteen ten, eleven, and fifteen-inch guns. This formidable fleet entered the channel on the afternoon of April 7th and passed the outer batteries without a shot being fired. As they came within range, simultaneously from Fort Sumter and from the hills on Morris Island and Sullivan's Island every battery opened fire. Five of the monitors replied, hurling their fifteen-inch shells and shot against Fort Moultrie, and particularly against Fort Sumter. The whole harbor was enveloped in smoke through which the constant flashes of cannon shone. The ironclads changed from place to place, but continued to pour from every position a storm of iron against the walls of Sumter. The *Keokuk* went within half a mile of the fort, but was disabled by the fire of the heavy guns and slowly withdrew from her advanced position. The rest of the fleet soon retreated, more or less injured, the entire engagement lasting but half an hour. The stranded and riddled wreck of the *Keokuk* remained as evidence of the Confederate victory.

The Federals at once began making plans for another attempt on Charleston; in this, land and naval forces were to unite. Folly Island, occupied by the Federals since April 7th, was taken as a base of operations, and under cover of the night forty-seven pieces of artillery were placed in battery. On July 6th, preparations had been completed. Under the belief that Charleston was entirely safe, the forces at that point had been steadily reduced until General Beauregard had not the men or the labor to defend Morris Island against attack or to construct the proper defences. On July 10th the batteries were unmasked and the assaulting column landed to attack Fort Wagner on Morris Island. Operations ceased as night came on.

The main attack was made early on the morning of the 11th, and the Seventh Connecticut Regiment, in the lead, pressed on despite the heavy fire, until they were inside the outer works of the fort. There they discovered that the Ninth Maine and Seventy-sixth Pennsylvania Regiments, which were to support them, had been held back by the fire. They were forced to retreat with the loss of half their men; the Confederate loss was almost as large. The southeast part of Morris Island was now evacuated by the Confederates, who retained only one mile of the north end embracing Fort Wagner and Fort Gregg.

The next assault on Fort Wagner was made on July 18th. For forty-eight hours four monitors, four gunboats, the *Ironsides*, and a frigate kept up a continuous fire, but Fort Wagner did not surrender. In addition to the bombardment from the vessels, fifty-four guns of the land batteries had played against the fort. The flag was shot down, but in a few minutes it was flying again. But, except when a little cluster of soldiers jumped upon the parapet and waved their hats as the flag was replaced, no sign of life was seen by the enemy. The Confederates were waiting. The Federal storming party moved to attack at twilight. The cessation of the guns had warned the Confederates of what they might expect, and every man was ordered to the parapet. Eleven regiments advanced as the guns of Fort Sumter, Fort Gregg, and Fort Wagner opened upon them. The column struggled on. When eighty yards from the fort, and the defenders could look into the very eyes of their assailants, a compact and destructive musketry fire was poured upon them. Each missile seemed to find its mark, and in five minutes every man in the first line of the enemy had been shot, bayoneted, or was in retreat. The first brigade failed; the second drew back, and the few who reached the parapet found it difficult to flee to safety. The night was dark. Men rolled into the ditch or crawled through the sand hills. At midnight the battle was over; the beach was filled with the dead, the dying, and the

wounded. The loss of the enemy was stated as 1,550; the Confederate loss was trifling.

The Federals then began the construction of siege works and the mounting of heavy siege guns preparatory to reducing Fort Sumter over the heads of the other forts. On August 21st, General J. A. Gilmore sent to General Beauregard a demand for the evacuation of Morris Island and Fort Sumter, stating that unless he complied within four hours fire would be opened on the city of Charleston from batteries within easy and effective reach of the city. It would have been impossible to respond within the time limit fixed, but Gilmore did not wait. During the night twelve eight-inch shells fell within the city, but fortunately no one was injured. General Beauregard replied to the letter on the following day, and referred in scathing terms to Gilmore's turning his guns against the old men, the women, the children, and the hospitals of a sleeping city, despite the impossibility of receiving a reply within the designated time. On the same day that he dispatched the letter, Gilmore discharged nine hundred and forty-three shots against Fort Sumter's eastern wall, disabling two guns. The next day he had six hundred and four shots fired, and on the 23d kept up a continuous fire, disabling guns and doing great damage to the fort. But its usefulness was not destroyed.

From the night of September 4th, for three days and nights, the fire of land and water batteries was concentrated on Forts Wagner and Gregg. They were badly damaged, and as they had now been under fire for fifty-seven days, many guns were disabled, and the Confederates decided to evacuate. The evacuation was completed at midnight September 6th. General Gilmore, who had been experimenting with "liquid fire" which he had promised to throw into Charleston, to the expressed delight of the more radical northern papers, declared that he now had Charleston completely covered with his guns.

On September 8th, Admiral Dahlgren demanded the surrender of Fort Sumter. General Beauregard telegraphed

Major Stephen Elliott, Jr., to reply that they could have Fort Sumter when they took and held it. At midnight an expedition of twenty boats containing thirty-four officers and one thousand four hundred and thirteen men, under Commander T. H. Stevens, went silently across the water to surprise the fort. But an effective watch had been kept and suddenly the bay was lighted with signals. The assailants who landed were met with a fire of musketry, and Fort Moultrie and a gunboat in the harbor poured shot and shell into them. Those still in the boats escaped in the darkness, but the assaulting parties were forced to surrender. Among the captured colors was the same flag which Major Anderson had taken down in April, 1861, and which the Federals brought with the intention of hoisting when they captured the fort. The repulse of this attack closed the efforts to capture Fort Sumter during 1863. The works at Fort Wagner and Fort Gregg were enlarged and new batteries erected which commanded Fort Sumter and could aid in any naval attack on Charleston, but the vessels remained out of the harbor. Desultory bombardment of Charleston was kept up almost daily, until the people became accustomed to the falling shells and gave them little attention. The Confederates were not entirely idle. An almost successful attempt was made to blow up the *Ironsides* by a torpedo on the night of October 5th.

Other naval operations of the Federals for 1863 were less important. The North Atlantic squadron maintained the blockade of the Virginia and North Carolina coasts, and coöperated with the land forces in their operations. They found it impossible, however, to maintain an effective blockade at Wilmington, North Carolina. They aided in the attack on Suffolk, Virginia, in April; participated in the investment of Washington, North Carolina; took part in the attack on Newbern; and coöperated in expeditions up Pamunkey, York, and Mattaponi Rivers, undertaken for the purpose of occupying West Point and threatening Richmond. The South Atlantic squadron was kept busy at Charleston,


caused the Federals to destroy three to keep them from falling into the Confederates' hands.

The year 1863 had been one of disaster to the Southern cause. West of Mississippi River, the State of Missouri had been placed beyond the reach of Confederate operations. The power of the Southern army in Arkansas was broken, the State was really in the hands of the Federals, and the movement to force restoration to the Union was already under way. Louisiana was practically held by the Federal troops. Western Texas was lost to the Confederacy, the occupation of the mouth of the Rio Grande closing one more important outlet from the South to foreign commerce. The Confederacy had been cut into two parts by the undisputed Federal possession of Mississippi River, and that portion west of the river was no longer in fact a part of the Confederate States. The capture of Vicksburg and Port Hudson removed from the banks of the Mississippi every Confederate military station that could interfere with free navigation of the river. The capture of East Tennessee gave the Federals entire control of that State, while northern Mississippi as well as that section of the State along the river was occupied by them. North Alabama and Georgia were subject to Federal raids and devastation. Virginia north of the Rappahannock was desolate and downtrodden, but in Virginia and North Carolina there had been no operations of magnitude affecting the limits of the Confederacy except the subjugation of the Valley of Virginia. Everywhere else the limits had been contracted. The Southern soldiers, discouraged by their own lack of success and by the desperate condition of their families, were refusing to serve longer. These losses and the impossibility of enforcing the conscription law, combined with the defeats of the year, left on the rolls of the Confederate armies at the end of 1863 little more than four hundred thousand men, and of these fully one-third were absent from the ranks. At the same time there were in the field against them largely over one million Federal soldiers, well equipped.

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
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Map of the United States of America, showing the boundaries
June 30, 1861. From an original

George Barris & Sons.



the Union and Confederate geographical divisions and departments,
the Map Department, Library of Congress.

The South was still undismayed, even hopeful of final victory. The North was exultant and defiant. In December, in his annual report, the Federal secretary of war wrote: "The success of our arms during the last year has enabled the department to make a reduction of over two hundred millions of dollars in the war estimates for the ensuing fiscal year."

CHAPTER XVI

CAMPAIGNS OF 1864—IN THE EAST

THE confidence of the Southern people in their ultimate success did not seem, during the early months of 1864, to be a mistaken one. The year opened with a series of successes which surprised the Northern people and showed them that the spirit of the Southern armies had not grown less as their numbers diminished. These successes were a decisive victory in Florida, the defeat of Sherman's expedition in the southwest, and a triumphal ending of the most important campaign that had yet taken place west of Mississippi River. It is a remarkable fact that while there was a strong confidence at Washington that the operations and events of the year would certainly end the war, there was just as strong a feeling in Richmond that the coming campaigns would accomplish the independence of the Southern Confederacy. This impression was very strong in Richmond after the successes mentioned.

Before treating of these events, however, we will once more take up the thread of the story where it was dropped at the close of the campaigns of 1863 in Virginia. The bloody drama was to recommence on the banks of the stream where the Army of Northern Virginia had been spending the winter. The army had lain along its entrenchments on the Rapidan from Barnett's Ford to Norton's Ford, a distance of eighteen or twenty miles. The lower part of the defences was held by General Ewell, the upper by General A. P. Hill. While a few brigades guarded

the river, the main body of troops was in the rear ready to advance to the river or to either flank as might be required. The cavalry lay along the Rappahannock below Fredericksburg, where forage was abundant. The situation of the army did not require cavalry in front or on the right, except small parties to watch the main roads and the crossings of the river. General Longstreet returned to the Army of Northern Virginia in April, and his troops were held in the vicinity of Gordonsville.

The Army of the Potomac lay between the Rapidan and the Rappahannock, the infantry chiefly in the vicinity of Culpepper Court House covering the roads from Lee's position. The Ninth Corps under General Burnside began to relieve the Fifth Corps, April 25th, and in the opening days of May encamped along the railroad from Manassas Junction to Rappahannock Station. The main part of the cavalry was about two miles from Culpepper Court House and the rest near Stevensburg. A chain of infantry pickets encircled the whole army, with cavalry pickets outside of these to give notice of any movement of the other army. The Rapidan was closely watched at the fords and at the bridge. The strength of the Army of the Potomac on the 30th of April was 99,438, to which was added, on May 24th, the Ninth Corps with a strength of 22,618, giving a total of 122,056 men. They had 316 guns. The Army of Northern Virginia had, on May 1, 1864, according to the best obtainable reports, 61,953 men and officers with 224 guns.

In March a new and important actor came upon the scene in the person of General Grant, whose success in the west had caused him to be summoned to Washington early that month and to be made lieutenant-general and placed in command of all the forces of the United States; he thus stood second only to the president. Sherman was at the same time placed over all the forces between the Alleghany Mountains and the Mississippi, while McPherson was appointed to Sherman's position as commander of the

Army of the Tennessee. General Grant at once arranged the plans by which he would operate to bring the war to a close. There were then but two Southern armies of any strength left in the field,—Lee's force on the Rapidan and Johnston's at Dalton, Georgia. Grant's plan was to strike these two armies at the same time, and with such overwhelming numbers that effectual resistance would be impossible. Sherman was sent against Johnston to break up his army, destroying as he went all property that could in any manner assist in carrying on the war. At the same time, Banks was ordered to move against Mobile, so as to prevent any reinforcements being sent to Johnston, and to destroy the railroads in Alabama. Deeming the Virginia campaign the most important, General Grant placed himself with General Meade's army, then assembled on the Rapidan. It will be remembered from the figures given above that the Northern army outnumbered the Southern by almost two to one.

General Sigel was sent up the Valley of Virginia to cut off Lee's supplies from that quarter. General Butler, who was at Fortress Monroe with 30,000 men, was ordered to move toward Richmond to coöperate with Meade's army. Preparations were hurried for an immediate advance.

Previous to General Grant's arrival there had been but one movement of note in Virginia, and that was General Judson Kilpatrick's raid upon Richmond. General Meade did not favor this raid, which was arranged in Washington, but carried out the order when it was given him. It was supposed to have been arranged with great secrecy, but when Colonel Ulric Dahlgren arrived from Washington and asked to accompany Kilpatrick, Meade knew it was a subject of more or less general discussion. Kilpatrick was to pass around Lee's right and go as directly as possible to Richmond. He left Meade's headquarters on the Rapidan on February 28th with 4,000 men and a battery of horse artillery and marched rapidly by Spottsylvania Court House to Richmond. His purpose was to enter the city and release

all the prisoners. In order to keep back pursuit several apparent movements were made in which Custer's cavalry were the principal participants. By ten o'clock, March 1st, the column was five miles from Richmond on the Brook pike, where they were met by 500 men and four guns. Driving these back, Kilpatrick awaited the arrival of Dahlgren, who had left him below Spottsylvania and gone southwest. Leaving the Virginia Central Railroad, Dahlgren captured a few prisoners, but missed the ford where he was to cross the river, and after a roundabout journey arrived within hearing of Kilpatrick's guns. Kilpatrick had been attacked by a small force, but in the darkness did not know how small, and despairing of Dahlgren's arrival, abandoned the attempt to enter the city and fell back to Atlee's Station. Dahlgren also withdrew. Kilpatrick, after some skirmishing, escaped back to the lines occupied by General Butler's troops. Dahlgren's small force became scattered, and his own party fell into an ambush on the night of March 2d, near Walkerton. Dahlgren was killed and nearly all his command captured. On Dahlgren's person were found some papers which aroused much indignation among the Southern people. One, signed Ulric Dahlgren, was apparently an address to his men containing this passage: "We hope to release the prisoners from Belle Isle first, and having seen them fairly started, we will cross the James River into Richmond, destroying the bridge after us, and exhorting the released prisoners to destroy and burn the hateful city; and do not allow the rebel leader, Davis, and his traitorous crew to escape." Another paper contained instructions, though unsigned, setting forth that "once in the city it must be destroyed and Jeff Davis and cabinet killed. Pioneers will go along with combustible material." Inquiry into the authenticity of these documents by General Meade showed that no address had been published to the troops or instructions given, but General Kilpatrick stated that he had approved an address which conformed to the one published in the Richmond papers except that he denied

it had contained the injunction to burn the city and kill President Davis and the Cabinet. But that Dahlgren intended to issue both address and instructions before entering the city cannot be doubted; nor can it be doubted that they would have been issued according to the copies in his possession.

While General Grant was on a visit to Fortress Monroe, General Butler, on the 2d of April, suggested the idea of participating in the campaign against Richmond by landing at Bermuda Hundred and operating from the rear of the Confederate capital. The suggestion was adopted and May 5th forty thousand men were afloat on the James and nearing Bermuda Hundred. The next day they were in position between Richmond and Petersburg. Four miles away was Drewry's Bluff, the works of which covered Richmond, and which was in peril from Butler. Butler's forces had been baffled on May 6th and 7th in their attack on the Richmond railroad above Petersburg, in which a thousand men had been lost. Beauregard reached Petersburg on May 10th, but learning that Drewry's Bluff was in imminent peril went to that point and assumed command. The exterior lines were attacked by Butler and partly carried on the evening of the 13th and on the morning of the 14th. Beauregard planned to attack and defeat Butler and then to turn his force against Grant, and the plan was approved by all except President Davis, who objected because it involved a backward movement by Lee's army. On the 15th, General Robert Ransom's five thousand men from the vicinity of Richmond joined Beauregard, who organized an attack. Ransom carried the Federal breastworks in his front on the 16th and checked the Federal advance, which was driving in the Confederate left. The fight of the 16th resulted in Butler's defeat and in his retirement to his fortified lines. He had lost one thousand four hundred of his men by capture, and five guns. The victory was not complete but it thwarted and annulled the principal object of Butler's expedition. Had Beauregard's plans been carried out fully

by all the division commanders Butler's entire army would have been captured, but the failure of General W. H. C. Whiting to bring up his forces as ordered prevented the attainment of that result.

The general advance against Lee was begun on the 4th of May, when Meade's army moved across the Rapidan by the fords below Lee's position with the intention of turning the Confederate right. But General Lee was not surprised, for he knew so well of Grant's contemplated movements that he talked them over with his officers two days beforehand, telling them the fords where the enemy would cross. Nor had he been idle in adopting precautionary measures. He had strengthened his entrenchments, dug rifle pits at the fords of the Rapidan, and had destroyed bridges and railroads by way of Fredericksburg so as to prevent, or at least to embarrass, the advance in that direction. No sooner did General Lee ascertain that Grant had certainly cut loose from his base at Culpepper Court House, and was moving rapidly past his right, than Longstreet was ordered to march from Gordonsville to the right of Ewell, who was sent down the turnpike to strike the head of the Federal column. A. P. Hill's corps marched by the plank road. On the morning of May 4th, Ewell and Longstreet were in front of Grant and on the 5th the enemy was discovered.

The whole country was covered with a thick undergrowth of pines, cedars, and scrub oaks, making it unfit for use by cavalry or artillery and almost impassable by any large body of troops. But in such order as was practicable the Fifth Corps with two pieces of artillery assailed the Confederate right, forcing back the brigade of General J. M. Jones. Jones, while endeavoring to rally his men, was shot from his horse and killed instantly. As the Federals poured through this break in the lines, Stewart moved up to close the gap, his men coming forward so impetuously as to force the Federal masses back. Simultaneously, Generals Julius Daniel's and Gordon's brigades of Rodes's division charged

under Gordon's command. They struck the Federal front and scattered it in flight that lasted till they were a mile and a half off the field. The enemy lost 3,000 men in this attack. The Sixth Corps of the Federal army moved upon the Confederate left soon after the assault on the front began, and here the attack was repulsed by Generals John Pegram's and H. T. Hays's brigades. The furious attack of Hays's men forced back the Federals in confusion, and they left nearly one-third of their number on the field. Everywhere in the woods and thickets fighting was in progress, and continuous skirmishing went on outside the lines. Late in the evening, a column of the Federal army, three lines deep, attacked Pegram's brigade, driving in his skirmishers and sharpshooters, but the Virginians stood their ground, and, protected by their works to some extent, sent volley after volley into the attacking ranks. The Federals retired, but at nightfall the attack was renewed by a column in five lines. The assault was again repulsed with great loss, but Pegram fell severely wounded. The day closed with the Confederates still in possession of their improved position, and both sides, in expectation of hard fighting the following day, slept on their arms. Manœuvring was impossible, and the fight had been in most parts of the field brigade against brigade, regiment against regiment, company against company, and man to man almost in single-handed combat.

Grant ordered an advance along his whole front on the morning of the 6th. It was also Lee's intention to attack, but he had to await the coming of Longstreet and of Hill's third division; and before they arrived, General Hancock with nearly 40,000 men attacked, carried the front of that end of the line, and put the right to flight. Longstreet had arrived on the preceding evening, but had failed to hear the guns and was unaware of the first day's fighting until informed at midnight by a messenger from General Lee, and ordered to march by the plank road to Hill's aid. It was therefore at two o'clock in the morning that he aroused his men and marched to the field. Hill's men had been

expecting to be relieved, and at Longstreet's approach prepared to retire. At that moment, Grant renewed the attack, threw Hill's corps into confusion, and pushed them back on Longstreet's men, who had not even formed in line. The disordered lines wavered; alternately they fell back and again advanced, sometimes pressed back within one hundred and fifty yards of General Lee's position, but three regiments of Kershaw's division swung into line and held the enemy in check until Longstreet's entire corps was brought up. A terrible combat ensued all along Longstreet's front. His corps had during the year past fought in every part of the Confederacy, but never had they fought better than then, or more successfully. Grant's attempt to turn the Confederate right and put his army between Lee and Richmond was defeated, but it was defeated by Longstreet's timely arrival. During the battle an illustration was given of the love of the Confederate soldiers for their chieftain. In the time of confusion and retreat, when a portion of Longstreet's force came on at a double-quick, General Lee rode up and found they were from Texas. Exclaiming: "Hurrah for Texas!" he placed himself at their head and ordered: "Charge!" The soldiers cried out: "Lee to the rear!" and a gray-headed sergeant seized his bridle. "General Lee, if you do not go back, we will not go forward," he said. To this appeal the commander yielded, and the Texans swept on to victory. The well-planned movement, however, could not be executed as Longstreet had designed, he having been temporarily disabled in consequence of being accidentally shot by some of his own men, concealed in the brush and looking for fleeing Federals. By the same fire General Micah Jenkins was killed. The delay gave the Federals the opportunity to re-form their lines before a new commander could be brought to the field; and when an attack on Hancock's line was made late in the afternoon, it was successfully resisted. The glory of the day belonged to the Confederate army, since they had repulsed Hancock's attack on the right and Burnside's assault upon the centre,

while General G. K. Warren, on the left, had been driven back with heavy loss in killed and wounded.

Besides the general engagements, there were other important events. Brigadier-general W. T. Wofford, of Anderson's corps, was by his own request permitted during the afternoon to attack the rear of the Federal left wing. He seized their camps, destroyed and captured a great deal of provisions and supplies, and created great consternation. Another brave act was that of Brigadier-general Gordon, of Ewell's division, who attacked the enemy's left about twilight, capturing General Alexander Shaler, General Truman Seymour and a large part of his brigade, and causing a panic that put the army on the verge of a rout. As one brigade after another fled, the next tried in turn to wheel into line and check the advance, but it too was swept irresistibly back. For two miles, Gordon swept them before him, until darkness in the impenetrable woods warned him to return. Night closed the battle of the Wilderness. The Confederates were nearer the Federal line of march than when the battle began, and had inflicted losses double their own. Both sides were well entrenched, and each waited for the other to attack. The 7th was spent in skirmishing and waiting. At night they began the race for Spottsylvania.

The two days' fighting in the Wilderness had cost the Federal army 2,246 killed, 12,037 wounded, 3,383 captured or missing, making a total of 17,666. The losses of the Confederates are only partially reported, but from the reports, so far as they are official, the total must have been very nearly 9,000, a more serious loss to Lee than was the greater loss to the Federal commander.

As indicated above, the Federals had started south in the afternoon of May 7th, and Stuart's cavalry had at once given Lee the information. After dark, the noise of moving columns was plainly heard and Lee made a similar movement. The armies moved in parallel columns. Stuart's cavalry arrived at Spottsylvania early on the morning of the 8th and was thrown across the Brock road to check

the enemy's advance. Major-general Warren's corps had marched to dislodge the cavalry when Longstreet's corps under General R. H. Anderson arrived. Warren fell back and began entrenching, while the Federal cavalry and artillery at Spottsylvania Court House retired. The Confederates had won the race, but now troops of both armies were fast coming, Hill's corps, under General Early, arriving May 9th. There was no fighting on the 9th, both armies spending the day in preparing. On the 10th, Hancock's corps had crossed the Po and was threatening the Confederate rear and the trains. General Early attacked and drove the enemy through the burning woods to the river with great loss. General Grant assailed General C. W. Field's division of Longstreet's corps, and was driven back with severe loss. In the afternoon he attacked again, and was repulsed anew with heavier loss than before. In anticipation of another attack the muskets of the dead and wounded were gathered up and distributed along the Confederate line. There were no reserves and the guns were needed. After some hours of quiet came the culmination of the day's events. The third attack was made near sunset, and by an impetuous rush the assailants gained the works held by the Texas troops. Then Anderson's brigade turned their flank and drove them out, many of their dead and wounded being left inside the defences. Another determined attack was made in front of Rodes's division of Ewell's corps, but the attacking force was struck on three sides at once, forced back out of the works which they had entered through a gap in General George Dole's brigade, and broke in disorderly retreat to their own lines.

There was no serious fighting on the next day, which was rainy and disagreeable, but movements indicated a withdrawal from Longstreet's front. Believing General Grant had begun another flanking movement, General Lee ordered all artillery difficult of access withdrawn and everything put in readiness to move. After the withdrawal of his artillery, General Edward Johnson, who held an elevated point known

as the "Bloody Angle," discovered that Hancock's troops were concentrating in his front. He requested the return of the guns, but they came just in time to be captured with General Johnson and 2,800 men, almost his entire command. The Federals had advanced quietly to the very breastworks, knowing that the guns had been removed, and without firing a shot flanked the defenders, rushed over the breastworks and captured the position. A brigade or two of General Stewart's troops were also captured in this assault, which was so quickly executed that there was little chance for defence. Hancock re-formed his men and resumed the advance when General James H. Lane's brigade of Hill's corps, which had been on the right of the captured works, poured such a galling fire into Hancock's left that it checked the advance. Then General Hill moved down and joined Ewell, while Anderson with Longstreet's men came in from the extreme left, and the whole army moved against the Federal line. Column after column was cut down until the whole Federal line was halted. But it was a contest of endurance. All day and into the night the fighting continued. Every attempt of either side to advance was met by the other and repelled. From the same works often waved the battle flags of both armies, and hand-to-hand fighting for their possession was a feature of the day. Both armies had tried to relieve the awful pressure on the centre by diversions elsewhere. The Sixth Corps attacked Anderson's (Longstreet's) corps but was repulsed, while Early, who was moving with a part of Hill's corps to strike the flank of the Federal force at that point, met and defeated Burnside's corps which was advancing to attack him.

While the fighting had been in progress, Gordon's division had been constructing a new line of entrenchments in the rear of the old ones, and to these Ewell's corps retired before daylight on the 13th. The fighting had been practically continuous since the 4th, and the five days of comparative rest that followed was most welcome to the tired men. During these days, however, the changes in the

position of the Federal army were met by the gradual movement of the Confederate army eastward. On the 18th of May the last Federal attempt to force the Confederate lines at Spottsylvania was made and proved a signal failure. The attacking force met the fire of thirty guns, which swept all the approaches to Ewell's lines, and fell back. On the 19th, Ewell's corps was thrown around the Federal left to ascertain the meaning of certain movements of the enemy, and in the severe battle which followed Ewell lost 900 men and withdrew. Grant's movement was delayed for twenty-four hours.

On the 14th, Grant had moved near the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad, and now he undertook to pass from the line of the Po down the valley of the Rappahannock. General Lee was thereby forced to leave his strong position on the line of the Po, and he took a new position between the North and South Anna, again defeating Grant's purpose to get between him and Richmond. On the 21st, when Grant occupied Milford Station and Bowling Green, and was moving on the well known highroads to Richmond, Lee placed himself between Grant and Richmond near Hanover Junction. On the afternoon of the 23d there was a severe but indecisive engagement between Warren's corps and Wilcox's division of Hill's corps. The two wings of Grant's army crossed at Chesterfield Bridge and Jericho Mill, but Lee held the river between the wings, and he handled Grant's centre severely when Grant tried to force it across the bridge between the two positions he already occupied. Two days were spent vainly trying to find a vulnerable point, and on the morning of the 27th Grant's army was on its march for Hanover town where the leading corps crossed the Pamunkey. This was Grant's fourth turning movement since the opening of the campaign, and it brought him eight miles nearer Richmond than was Lee's army. Lee moved at once to head him off, and on the 28th, after one of the hardest fought cavalry battles of the war between Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee and Sheridan, the two

armies again confronted each other along the Totopotomoy. Grant's manœuvring had brought him to a point which he might have reached in one day by water from Washington.

On the 8th of May, General Grant gave verbal orders to Sheridan to go on a raid toward Richmond, the main object being to draw Stuart's cavalry after him and attack it at whatever disadvantage might offer. Sheridan left on the following day with 10,000 men. At Beaver Dam Station he captured two train loads of Federal wounded and prisoners about to start for Richmond, burned 1,500,000 rations, and destroyed the Confederate medical stores. There were skirmishes on the 10th, and a severe engagement at five o'clock on the morning of the 11th, when Stuart's skirmishers were encountered at Glen Allen Station and forced back within two miles of Yellow Tavern. The Confederates were worsted, and in the moment of defeat their leader, Stuart, received his death wound. But Richmond, though only six miles away, was not taken. The rain fell for three days, and, in that swampy region, made roads and meadows alike difficult to travel. A guide decoyed the advance directly under the fire of the outworks of the city, and as day broke part of the attacking column found itself inside the outer line of defence and threatened from all sides. Sheridan did not dare attack, but withdrew and made his way back to the main army by a circuitous route that occupied two weeks' time. On the 31st, Sheridan was sent to hold Cold Harbor "at all hazards." At eight o'clock on the following morning his command had a short, sharp fight with 1,500 of Kershaw's division. This was the preliminary engagement in the bloody battle of Cold Harbor.

James Ewell Brown Stuart, who was mortally wounded at the battle of Yellow Tavern, May 11, 1864, and died at Richmond the following day, was one of the wonderful leaders that the war brought forward to fight the battles of the Confederacy. His grandparents, Archibald Stuart and Giles Letcher, both came from Ireland before the

Revolutionary War, the former in 1726. Born in Patrick County, Virginia, February 6, 1833, Stuart attended school at Wytheville, Virginia, and at Emory and Henry College, and was graduated from the United States Military Academy and brevetted second lieutenant of Mounted Riflemen on July 1, 1854. He served on the western frontier, 1854-1859; was promoted second lieutenant, October 31, 1854; transferred to the First Cavalry, March 3, 1855; married Flora Cooke, daughter of Colonel Philip St. George Cooke, November 14, 1855; promoted first lieutenant, December 20, 1855; was volunteer aide de camp to Colonel Robert E. Lee on the Harper's Ferry expedition to suppress John Brown's raid in 1859; was on frontier duty in Kansas, 1859-1860, taking part in the Keowa and Comanche expedition of 1860, and was promoted captain, April 22, 1861. On the secession of Virginia he resigned his commission and was made lieutenant-colonel of Virginia Infantry, May 10, 1861, reporting to Colonel Thomas J. Jackson at Harper's Ferry; was promoted colonel of cavalry, July 16, 1861, and assigned to the First Virginia Cavalry, which he commanded at the first battle of Bull Run, July 21, 1861, driving back the Union attack. He was promoted brigadier-general, September 24, 1861; major-general, July 25, 1862. His last words on the battlefield in rallying his men were: "Go back! I had rather die than be whipped!"

On the first day of June, Grant secured at a heavy cost in men a position which was important because it was at the point of convergence of all roads to his base of supplies at White House. He had apparently resolved to make Cold Harbor the decisive battle of the campaign and to force the passage of the Chickahominy. He found the Southern army confronting him behind strong fortifications. General Lee had selected positions that he knew from his experience in 1862 to be good ones. When the Sixth Corps arrived to relieve Sheridan in the battle of June 1st, the Confederates observed the arrival, and the various divisions of Longstreet's corps closed in to the right. A part

AN ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF THE FREE STATES

BY THE

PRESIDENT OF THE SOUTHERN CONFEDERACY.

RICHMOND, January 5, 1863.

As of old, I have been called during States of America, swayed by peaceable motives. I have used all my influence, often at the expense of my position as the President of the Southern Confederacy, to have the unhappy conflict now existing between the two great Republics, governed by those well established international rules, which heretofore have softened the fiercest passions, and have resulted in a state of harmony, but all my efforts in the premises have heretofore been in vain. Now, therefore, I am compelled to resort to a measure, which most willingly I would have avoided, and I do so, not, Sir Citizens, as the very organism of politically associated society.

It is a measure which my people have by a binding their inherent rights - their political, social and religious rights - to the maintenance of New England and their allies in the South, heretofore regarded as conservative. The people of the South, however, have been making sacrifices even as the modern world has never witnessed - patiently, but determinedly, to achieve their rights, and the world has well seen, well felt and well paid mercenaries of the Abolitionists, and I need not say that I have already anticipated the good - even American citizens. Heretofore, the warfare has been conducted by white men, the victims of the same stock; but the present warfare has been changed, and your rulers, desirous of a triumph by the employment of white men, have degraded you and themselves, by inviting the cooperation of the black race. Thus, while they deprecate the intervention of white men - the French and the English - in behalf of the Southern Confederacy, they, these Abolitionists, do not hesitate to invoke the intervention of the African race in favor of the North.

The time has, therefore, come when a becoming respect for the good opinion of the civilized world impels me to set forth the following facts:

First - A declaration on the President of the Non-Slaveryholding States, has issued a proclamation, declaring the slaves

On and after February 22, 1862, all free negroes within the limits of the Southern Confederacy shall be placed on the slave status, and be deemed to be such, to, they and their heirs forever.

All negroes who shall be taken in any of the States in which slavery was not now exist, in the progress of our arms, shall be adjudged, immediately after such capture, to occupy the slave status, and in all States which shall be vanquished by our arms, and free negroes shall, *ex facto*, be reduced to the condition of helots, so that the respective normal conditions of the white and black races may be ultimately placed on a permanent basis, so as to prevent the future peace from being thereafter endangered.

Therefore, while I would not ignore the conservative policy of the Slave States, namely, that a Federal Government cannot, without violating the fundamental principles of a Constitution, interfere with the internal policy of several States, since, however, Abraham Lincoln has seen fit to ignore the Constitution in his solemnly sworn to support, it ought not to be considered polemically or politically improper in me to vindicate the position which has been, at an early day of this Southern republic, assumed by the Confederacy, namely, that slavery is the cornerstone of a Western Republic. It is not necessary for me to elaborate this proposition. I may merely refer, in passing, to the prominent fact, that the South is emphatically a producing section of North America, this is equally true of the West and Northwest. The other States, in which have been mainly dependent on the South for the consumption of their products. The States of New England, from which all complicated difficulties have arisen, owe their greatness and power to the free suffrages of all other sections of North America; and yet, as is now evident, they have, from the adoption of the Federal Constitution, waged a persistent warfare against the interests of all the other States of the old Union. The great centre of their opposition has been slavery, while the annual statistics of their respective State Governments abundantly prove that they entertain within all their boundaries fewer negroes than any single State which does not tolerate slavery.

In view of these facts, and conscientiously believing that the proper condition of the negro is slavery, or a complete subjection to the white man,—and entertaining the belief that the day is not distant when the old Union will be restored with slavery nationally declared to be the proper condition of all of African descent,—and in view of the future harmony and progress of all the States of America, I have been induced to issue this address, so that there may be no misunderstanding in the future.

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

Richard Rogers Pratt

Address to the people of the free States. From an original in the Library of Congress.

of Anderson's corps was sent forward early on the morning of the 1st of June with orders to occupy the eminences around Gaines's Mill and Cold Harbor. These had been taken by a small force of Federal cavalry, but the Confederates succeeded in gaining them. When Grant saw Anderson's troops moving along Warren's front, he ordered Warren to attack vigorously in flank, and H. G. Wright to take position on Anderson's front. Warren took so much time preparing to execute his orders that Anderson reached the desired heights and was soon strongly entrenched. These entrenchments covered the approaches to the Chickahominy and included the ground on which the battle of Gaines's Mill had been fought two years before. Both the Sixth and the Eighteenth Corps were ready for an assault by six o'clock in the afternoon. Their charge was across the cleared space into the wood, and resulted in the capture of that portion of the Confederate rifle pits in front of the junction of the two corps. Several hundred prisoners were taken. The Federal losses on the left, under the fire from front and flank, were heavy. Further progress was checked and the line partially restored during the night, although the Confederates ineffectually tried to regain the position that had been taken by the Federals.

By morning the lines confronted each other. Three corps of Grant's army were opposed to the Confederate right wing at Cold Harbor while the other two were watching Early's (Ewell's) corps near Bethesda Church. General Early interpreted certain movements during the afternoon of the 2d of June as an attempt of the Federals to leave his front. He thereupon attacked Burnside's corps and the flank of Warren's corps, and with small loss captured several hundred prisoners. While the attacks were repulsed by the Federals, any advantage gained was not followed up, much to the annoyance of General Grant when he learned the facts, as he imagined his troops could have achieved victory. But Early had accomplished a great deal, for his attacks effectually prevented the two corps with which he

had been engaged from participating in the battle of Cold Harbor the following day.

During the night of June 2d, Lee moved his left up to make his lines face those of Grant. The Confederate lines extended from the Totopotomoy to New Cold Harbor, and the Federal lines from Bethesda Church by Old Cold Harbor to the Chickahominy, the right guarded by cavalry. The concentration of the Federal forces in the woods seemed to threaten an early attack. Lee placed artillery at each end of his new line abreast of the infantry, and when morning dawned his troops were under arms and waiting. The divisions of Hancock, Wright, and Smith attacked, rushing forward and cheering. The Confederate artillery and musketry played on them with deadly effect. The havoc made in the ranks of the assaulting column was terrible. In front of General E. M. Law's position alone there were over a thousand killed or too badly wounded to leave the field. Many who were living and unhurt had also fallen flat to the ground and lay there preferring capture to retreat under that merciless fire. The Confederate artillery was handled superbly. The outer rifle pits in front had been taken by Wright's and Smith's corps, but these could do no more. Early's corps below Bethesda was attacked without success. The Confederate right was broken once, but quickly restored by Finnegan's brigade, with frightful loss to Hancock's attacking troops. The grand advance of the Federal army along the whole line brought on a desperate struggle and resulted in a disastrous and bloody repulse. When the battle of Cold Harbor ended at eight o'clock on the morning of June 3d the overland campaign against Richmond had ended with it. The failure of General Grant to win by force of vastly superior numbers forced him to change the whole plan of campaign. Grant himself admitted that the assault of June 3d cost heavily, was without compensating benefit, and says in his *Memoirs*: "I have always regretted that the last assault of Cold Harbor was ever made." The advantages, inclusive of relative losses, were

with the Confederates. During this campaign the courage and endurance of the Confederate army, despite their inferior numbers, had been grandly shown.

On the Federal side in the various engagements of the battle of Cold Harbor, there were about 111,375 men. During the first twelve days of June alone this number was reduced by 1,844 killed, 9,077 wounded, 1,816 captured or missing, making 12,737, or nearly eleven and one-half per cent of the total force engaged. The useless month's campaign had cost Grant fully 60,000 men, the report of Medical Director Thomas A. McParlin showing to the evening of June 4th, a total of 35,048 wounded who had come under his care since May 5th. On the Confederate side there were probably 78,000 men engaged during the campaign. The losses at Cold Harbor were much less than one-sixth of the total losses of the Federal army, aggregating about 1,700, though full official returns are not extant. During the month, the Confederate losses aggregated probably 20,000.

Hancock and others of Grant's commanders believed that Lee was too strongly entrenched to be again attacked, and Grant thereupon suspended offensive operations. The month had brought him no closer to Richmond than McClellan had been two years before.

General Sigel had been sent up the Valley of Virginia some weeks before this to cut Lee's communications, his orders being thereafter to cross the mountains and come upon Lee's rear. At the same time, Butler was to coöperate south of Richmond, to destroy Lee's army and capture Richmond. At New Market, General Breckinridge with a smaller force had on May 15th defeated Sigel with 6,500 men in a battle where a battalion of boys from the Virginia Military Institute fought with rare courage. General Beauregard, who had come from South Carolina, attacked Butler and shut up his 30,000 men between the James and the Rappahannock. Prompt movement would have given Butler Petersburg and changed the whole nature of the

contest; but Butler allowed Beauregard, with less than half his number of men, to shut him in, so that the best he could do was to ferry 12,500 of his force across the James to join Grant. After Sigel's defeat, General David Hunter was put in his place. Hunter was one of the few Virginians who took up arms against the Confederacy. He marched up the Valley of Virginia with 10,000 men, plundering and destroying. He defeated a force of 3,000 Confederates near Staunton; then Colonel George Crook and Colonel John T. Averell, coming from the Kanawha valley, joined him, and they marched first to Lexington and then to Lynchburg. Fire and desolation marked their track. Sheridan was sent to cut the Virginia Central Railroad between Richmond and Charlottesville. He intended to cut the main line of the road at Trevilian Station, and the Lynchburg branch at Charlottesville, but met General M. C. Butler's brigade of Hampton's cavalry and had a sharp engagement. Sheridan then concluded that it was impracticable to carry out his orders with Hampton so near, and returned to rejoin Grant. Hunter visited the Military Institute at Lexington, where he burned the barracks and professors' houses and the residence of Governor Letcher. He crossed the mountains to Lynchburg, but was brought to a halt by a detachment of 10,000 men under Breckinridge and Early. He was forced to make a precipitate retreat. His ammunition was low, and his communications were in danger. He went west across the mountains to the Kanawha valley, and, after much hardship and suffering, at last effected his escape.

When he had driven Hunter away, Early decided to utilize his opportunity. He went down the valley to Winchester, crossing the Potomac at Hagerstown, and marched toward Washington, which was at that time defended by a few militia. The Federal forces from Hagerstown fell back toward Chambersburg, and there was considerable skirmishing. General Lew Wallace sent out a reconnoitring force from Monocacy, which the Confederates promptly drove back. On the evening of July 8th, Wallace withdrew from

Frederick to Monocacy Junction, where he was attacked on the morning of the 9th and put to flight after he had lost 1,200 men and six cannons. This disaster to Wallace created great excitement in the North. Washington appeared to be in imminent peril. Even Grant was alarmed. He sent the Nineteenth Corps, just from New Orleans, and two divisions of the Sixth Corps from his army about Petersburg. They met Early's army almost in the suburbs of Washington and Early retired; he was in no condition to hold Washington, though he might have taken the outer defences. Early at first withdrew to Leesburg, beyond the Potomac, on the 13th of July, and rested there a few days. Returning to the valley, he defeated Crook and Averell at Snicker's Ferry and on the old Kernstown field, and then retired to Winchester. He had sent the cavalry under Johnston and McCausland to Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, to collect \$500,000 in United States currency, or \$100,000 in gold, to repay the citizens of the Valley of Virginia for damage done by General Hunter. The people refused to pay, and Chambersburg was burned. The North, which had complacently enjoyed the pictures of scores of burning Southern cities, denounced as an outrage the burning of this one Northern town.

Convinced of the value of the Valley of Virginia as a base of supplies for the Confederates, and as a convenient and direct road for the invasion of Union territory, Grant appointed General Sheridan to command in the valley. Sheridan at once resolved on attacking Early at Winchester. He did so on September 19th, and defeated him, inflicting a loss of 5,500 men, with a loss of 4,873 of his own men. Sheridan pursued the defeated Confederate army to Cedar Creek, where Early reorganized his forces and faced Sheridan on the 19th of October. During the absence of Sheridan the Federals were almost defeated, but his inopportune and hurried arrival changed the fortune of the day, and Early was so badly beaten that he lost nearly all his artillery and retired from the valley. Sheridan lost 5,995 men and Early

4,200, but the victory was with the Federals. The value of the Valley of Virginia to the Confederacy was completely destroyed. Sheridan left sufficient men to guard the valley, and returned to Grant at Petersburg.

Colonel S. S. Mosby, a Partisan Ranger, with about fifty men, crossed the Potomac at Cheat Ferry on the 30th of July, and went to Adamsville, cut the telegraph wires, captured a force of Federal cavalry larger than his own band, and retired. The excited people declared that Early was invading Pennsylvania with 40,000 men, and wild excitement prevailed. On his return Mosby met a superior force of Federals at Conrad's Ferry, which caused General D. N. Couch to telegraph to Pittsburg: "It is believed Breckinridge is marching west." Business was suspended, an extra session of the legislature was called, and the Sixth Corps started for the scene. The Federal movements merged into the defence of Washington and Mosby was for the time forgotten. He for a long period, however, harassed the Federals and made many raids, though few created the excitement of the two here mentioned.

When Grant moved against Petersburg, Lee sent reinforcements to Beauregard, and that general drew in his forces from Bermuda Hundred and Drewry's Bluff and started to Petersburg. He reached that place on June 16th, hurriedly took position behind the second line of works and was attacked the same evening by Meade and Hancock. Tremendous assaults were made for the purpose of capturing Petersburg before Lee's army could prevent it, but these assaults of the 16th, 17th, and 18th, failed to dislodge the defenders. At the final assault on the 18th both Lee and Grant were present. In the three days the Federal loss had been 10,000, fully as many men as Beauregard had in his army. The lines at Bermuda Hundred were regained by the Confederates.

Both armies then spent several days in strengthening their defences. Lee's entrenchments were thirty-five miles long, and he was compelled to defend both Richmond and

Petersburg against an army numbering more than twice his own. Food for men and horses grew scarcer, clothing more thin and worn, and men in the Confederate service and their families at home suffered intensely. In an attack on June 22d, General William Mahone struck the Federal left by surprise, carried the entrenchments and returned with 2,000 prisoners, four cannons, four flags, and a number of small guns. The same day, General J. H. Wilson and General A. V. Kautz went with 6,000 cavalry to destroy Confederate railroad communications. General Lee's son, General W. H. F. Lee, harassed them with a small band of cavalry, the local militia kept them back, and Hampton's cavalry chased them an entire day. Wilson, bewildered, tried to make his way back but was met by Mahone with Confederate infantry and Pegram's artillery; he was also attacked in the rear by Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry and routed, losing 1,000 men, twelve guns, and many wagons. In recognition of these defeats, President Lincoln named July 7th as a day of prayer and humiliation.

The entrenchments of the two armies were very close together at Petersburg, but despite their constant bombardment of the city the Federals made no break in the Confederate defence. An immense mine was dug under the Confederate lines where the Federals believed it would make a breach. The location of the mine was known to General Lee, who kept a strong defence line in its rear, and covered the position with his heavy artillery. Its explosion occurred on July 30th, when timber, stones, gun carriages, and corpses were scattered in horrible confusion. In the ruins were buried 278 Confederate soldiers, mostly South Carolinians. The break in the lines was 135 feet long, 90 feet wide, and 30 feet deep, and toward this breach swarmed Burnside's corps, who paused on the edge. The guns and mortars opened upon them, and for safety they plunged into the yawning hole. It was impossible to climb up the farther side under the hot fire. The crater was packed with soldiers and the Confederate

fire grew hotter every minute. After two hours of this, Burnside sent the negro troops forward. They passed around the crater, but under the deadly fire broke in disorder and fled. Then the white troops advanced once, twice, thrice more, and a few got into possession of parts of the Confederate lines. By this time Lee's men were ready; they charged, driving the Federal troops back from the entrenchments they had seized, while shot and shell poured into the masses packed into the crater. Then from the crater came up a white flag. The few still living had surrendered. The Federals lost 4,000 men, the Confederates about 400. The scene in the crater, piled with the dead and mangled, was horrible beyond description. But 13,000 Confederates had turned the assault of 50,000 into disaster.

Grant then continued to extend his lines north and south of the James, to capture new positions, to destroy railroads. In his encounters with the Confederates his losses were double, even treble, those of Lee's army, but he filled the ranks and kept on.

CHAPTER XVII

CAMPAIGNS OF 1864—IN THE SOUTH AND WEST

IN obedience to his orders received from President Davis December 18, 1863, General Joseph E. Johnston transferred to Lieutenant-general Polk command of the Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana and proceeded to Dalton, Georgia. He arrived on the evening of the 26th, assumed command of the Army of Tennessee on the 27th and at once gave attention to improving that army in efficiency and morale. The active campaign of six months, the latter half in the rugged section of northern Georgia, had so reduced the condition of men and horses that even the rest at Dalton had not materially bettered it. The improvement of the railroad facilities in January brought about some change for the better, but conditions were far from satisfactory. Food and forage were very scarce, clothing and blankets deficient, and sufficient guns were not on hand to arm the troops. It was many weeks before the horses were fed regularly and brought into condition to draw the guns up even a trifling hill. The cavalry horses were in poor condition and totally insufficient in number. The winter months were given to remedying these conditions as far as they could be remedied, and before the end of April over 5,000 men who had been absent on furlough returned to the army. Military operations were limited to skirmishes between scouting parties and pickets. The outposts were driven in on the 28th of January by a strong

body of Federal infantry from Ringgold, which returned after finding that Tunnel Hill was still occupied. After trying to retain all the troops in his command, Johnston was obliged to send Lieutenant-general Hardee and three divisions of his corps to General Polk in Mississippi, but before they had arrived, Sherman's column against which they were to operate had returned to Vicksburg. The troops then returned to Johnston's army.

Under orders to gain possession of Dalton and the country as far south of that as possible, Major-general Thomas had sent three heavy columns against Johnston. The advance was begun on the 24th of April. During the 25th there was desultory fighting and one sharp attack against Hindman's division, which was repulsed. Another body of Federals was driven back from Mill Creek Gap in confusion. A regiment of Federals drove in the guard in Dug Gap, but the position was recovered the following morning before sunrise. Thomas then withdrew his troops. The Richmond authorities desired a junction of the forces of Longstreet with those of Johnston near Kingston; cavalry diversions to West Tennessee and thence to Middle Tennessee, and the precipitation of the main force on Nashville, all as a means of regaining to the Confederacy the States of Kentucky and Tennessee, from which supplies were obtainable in abundance by those holding them, and of recruiting his army. General Johnston opposed this programme, but before any decision was reached daily arrivals of Federal troops on Johnston's front indicated an early resumption of offensive operations. General Johnston urged that his army be strengthened and better provided for, and was afterward charged with disobeying orders in not assuming the offensive. The full correspondence does not indicate that this was true. Reports of the 1st, 2d, and 4th days of May indicated the beginning of an active campaign. General Grant had determined on simultaneous movements against Lee and Johnston and the time was at hand. Both Grant and Sherman advanced on May 4th. The Federal army

under Sherman was composed of troops that fought at Missionary Ridge with Grant, the Sixteenth and Twenty-third Corps and Hovey's division and other troops were moving toward Chattanooga from every direction.

General Sherman reports that he advanced with an army of 98,797 men and 254 guns; by June 1st the army had grown to 112,819. This great army was splendidly equipped for the work before it. The instructions were to destroy Johnston's army and go on to Atlanta, and this did not seem an impossible thing to do. Johnston had an effective force on April 30, 1864, of 42,856, according to his official reports. Additions to this swelled the total, as reported on the 10th of June, to 70,878. The maximum number in Johnston's army on the New Hope Church line the latter part of May was probably about 75,000. Under such circumstances it was impossible to advance; he could not even retain his position.

Sherman's campaign was planned with consummate skill. Though not familiar with the country, he knew its rugged mountainous character, and that it afforded innumerable positions for effective defence. He therefore determined to attack as rarely as possible, and to advance by a series of flank movements that must compel retreat if the Confederate general wished to save his army from being cut off from every base. While one large force threatened the front, another was to be sent to attempt to get in Johnston's rear. Johnston had to retreat from Dalton to Resaca, where General Polk joined him with 19,000 men. Here, after severe fighting from May 13th to 16th, in which Johnston lost 2,800 men, and the enemy 2,747, Sherman moved around the left and Johnston fell back. Day by day, the Southern army was thus forced from place to place—from Calhoun, Adairville, Cassville, as one position after another was flanked by the army of invasion. The Confederates were forced across the Oostanaula, and then the Etowah, and every movement was accompanied by skirmishing and fighting. While this main line of advance and retreat was

followed, Federal expeditions were sent out which captured Rome and other Georgia towns, and seized bridges and ferries. Johnston, however, determined to stand his ground and stopped near New Hope Church on May 24th. His position at Alatoona had been so well fortified that Sherman made no demonstration, but moved his whole army to Dallas to rest, with the intention of making another flank movement later. But when the Confederates stopped on the 24th, they were attacked, and fighting and skirmishing occurred daily until the 4th of June. Every attack was repulsed, Johnston losing 3,000 men and Sherman 2,400; but while this was in progress Sherman was constantly pushing forward. Alatoona was given up and Johnston moved on to where he could protect Marietta.

One of the most remarkable leaders in the Confederate army was Leonidas Polk, an Episcopal Church bishop, who had throughout the war neglected none of his church duties, holding services in a devout manner for all who would attend. Among those he had baptized were Generals Johnston and Hood. At Pine Mountain, Georgia, while watching from the top of a hill the Federal advance on the 14th of June he was struck in the breast by a cannon ball and killed. He was known throughout the South as "the fighting bishop" and was a remarkable man. When the war broke out he was Bishop of Louisiana, the first in that State and the thirty-third in the American succession. Born April 10, 1806, at Raleigh, North Carolina, the son of General William and Sarah (Hawkins) Polk, he was educated in the University of North Carolina and at the United States Military Academy, where he was graduated and brevetted second lieutenant of artillery in 1827. He resigned his commission in December of the same year to study for the Protestant Episcopal ministry, was ordained deacon in 1830, and priest in 1831. He was assistant rector at Monumental Church, Richmond, Virginia, 1831-1832; was rector of St. Peter's Church, Columbia, Tennessee, 1833-1838, and filled many offices of honor in the church

councils. He was consecrated the first missionary bishop of Arkansas, December 7, 1838, by Bishops Meade, of Virginia, Smith, of Kentucky, McIlvaine, of Ohio, and Otey, of Tennessee; his charge comprising Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, with the episcopal missions in Texas. In 1841 he became Bishop of Louisiana. He was one of the founders of the University of the South at Sewanee, Tennessee, in 1860. In 1861 he was offered a commission in the Confederate army by President Davis, who had great confidence in his knowledge of military construction. Polk hesitated; he referred the matter to Bishop Meade, of Virginia, but Bishop Meade declined to advise him, suggesting that he ask the advice of Robert E. Lee. General Lee unhesitatingly advised the acceptance of the commission, and Bishop Polk thereupon joined the Confederate army as major-general, with headquarters at Memphis, and commanding the territory from the mouth of Red River to Cairo along the Mississippi. He constructed the fortifications at New Madrid, Fort Pillow, Island Number Ten, at Memphis, and at other points. He commanded the Confederate troops at the battle of Belmont, Missouri, November 7, 1861; joined Johnston and Beauregard at Corinth, and commanded the First Army Corps at the battle of Shiloh, April 6th, and at Corinth in April and May, 1862. In the invasion of Kentucky he commanded the Army of the Mississippi; was in the battle of Perryville, Kentucky, October 8th, and had charge of the armies of Kentucky and Mississippi in the retreat from Kentucky. He was commissioned lieutenant-general in October, 1862; commanded the right wing of the Army of Tennessee at the battle of Stone's River, December 31, 1862. In the Chickamauga campaign, for alleged disobedience of orders, he was relieved from command and ordered to Atlanta, declining the reinstatement which was offered him after full investigation. He then commanded the paroled Confederate prisoners at Vicksburg and Fort Hudson, and in September, 1863, succeeded Joseph E. Johnston in command of the Department

of Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana, from which the name of Alabama was afterward dropped. His army combined with Johnston's in opposing Sherman's march to Atlanta, his last service. He was buried in St. Paul's churchyard at Augusta, Georgia, and in 1892 a monument to his memory was erected on the spot where he fell. General Polk had both the LL.D. and D.D., degrees conferred on him, the latter by Columbia College in 1838.

Sherman had forced Johnston out of Marietta, June 19th, and to a position including the crest of Kenesaw. On the 20th, the most important cavalry affair of the campaign took place, General Joseph Wheeler repulsing General Kenner Garrard's command, capturing a hundred of the Federal cavalymen with their horses and killing and wounding many more. Hindman's and Stevenson's divisions, on June 21st, repulsed a Federal attack, inflicting a loss of about 1,000 men. On the 24th, a vigorous attack on Hardee's corps was unsuccessful, as was a double assault on different parts of the lines on the 27th. But these were simple incidents in the great campaign. The Southern army could not keep Sherman's immense army back, and his advance went on. Discouraged by the continual retreat the Confederate soldiers deserted in large numbers. At last Johnston had to withdraw across the Chattahoochee; on July 10th, he took a position on Peachtree Creek, there to fight or to withdraw into Atlanta. Sherman followed. Then the Richmond authorities, incensed at Johnston's continual retreat, and not understanding its necessity, displaced him from command and appointed Hood in his place. The change was not a fortunate one, but no change could have been. The Army of Tennessee, however, wanted to fight, and General Hood was willing to gratify this wish.

Hood attacked on July 20th, the Confederates breaking through the Federal line and sweeping everything before them for a time. But in one half-hour's battle they lost 4,796 men, while inflicting a loss of but 1,710, and were driven back to their entrenchments, leaving the dead and

wounded on the field. Hood then swung his army around to meet McPherson, who moved from Decatur, and in a battle on the 22d gained a temporary success, killing General J. B. McPherson and inflicting a loss of 3,641 men. Then the tide turned, Hood was beaten back with a loss of 8,499 of his men and withdrew into the defences around Atlanta. This was the beginning of the siege. Sherman entrenched himself, but did not attack. He still pursued his flanking tactics, moving toward Hood's left. Hood attacked gallantly on the 27th, but his repeated assaults failed. He lost 4,632 men, while the Federals lost but 700. A number of cavalry expeditions, sent out by Sherman despite desperate resistance, cut off Hood's communications. General Stoneman commanded one of these, going with 5,000 men to free the Northern prisoners at Macon and turn them loose on the country. Surrounded by the Confederates, Stoneman and 1,000 of his men surrendered. But Hood had now realized the wisdom of remaining on the defensive. Late in August, Sherman moved nearly his whole army to the south of Atlanta, and on August 31st entered Jonesboro, an unfortified point, twenty-six miles from that city. Hood evacuated Atlanta on the night of September 1st, after destroying such stores and supplies as could not be moved.

Sherman occupied Atlanta on September 2d, but considered this success only a partial victory, since Hood and his army had escaped. The country about Atlanta was laid waste; people old and young, sick and feeble, well and strong were driven out of the city to live as they could. Every important building was burned. The loss of Atlanta narrowed the limits of the Confederacy greatly and cut off much needed supplies that had been coming from the Gulf States over roads centring there. Hood retired to Lovejoy Station, thirty miles southeast of Atlanta, and remained there until the 21st of September, when he shifted his position to Palmetto Station, twenty-five miles southwest of Atlanta. The losses of the opposing armies in the

Atlanta campaign had been about equal, and approximated 40,000 for each side. From this loss on the Confederate side, to arrive at the exact loss in battle, should be deducted thousands who deserted. To the Federal loss might properly be added the decrease from sickness, which would swell the Union loss to over 47,000.

From Palmetto Station on the 24th of September, Hood began a movement with the intention of passing Sherman's rear and marching to occupy Tennessee. He transferred his army by a flank movement from Lovejoy Station on the Macon Railroad to near Newman on the West Point road, and General Sherman, surmising that this was but preliminary to a greater movement, was instantly on the alert. He sent his spare forces, wagons, and guns to the rear under General Thomas, and at the same time sent Generals John M. Schofield, John Newton, and John M. Corse to different points in the rear of Atlanta. Hood moved toward the Chattahoochee on the 27th, crossing on the 29th and 30th of September. Sherman discovered this movement on October 1st and immediately followed him. Hood attacked Alatoona on the 5th of October, but Sherman from Kenesaw Mountain signaled the garrison to hold out, and it did. Hood then moved westward, threatening Resaca, capturing Dalton on the 12th, with its garrison, and taking possession of Tilton and Mill Creek. Passing through the gap of Pigeon Mountain he entered Lafayette on the 15th, marched to Tuscumbia, rejoining his trains at Gadsden, and prepared for the march to Nashville. He crossed Tennessee River on November 20th.

General Sherman had followed him only as far as Gaylesville, Alabama, where he became convinced of the direction Hood intended to take; then he abruptly abandoned the pursuit, appointing General Thomas to oppose Hood's march, and returned to Atlanta to put his army in motion for the march from that city to the sea. Reports of December 10th show that the total effective force of the Confederate army was 33,393, while the Federal army

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Richard Taylor.
Major-general, C. S. A.



Joseph Eggleston Johnston.
General, C. S. A.



Albert Sidney Johnston.
General, C. S. A.

had an aggregate equipped of 75,153. It was November 15th when Sherman began his march, and when Hood crossed the Tennessee, Sherman was far on his way to Savannah.

General Schofield had been sent by Thomas to oppose Hood's advance as soon as he should cross Tennessee River, while Thomas gave his own attention to collecting at Nashville a force largely superior to Hood's. On November 21st Hood moved from North Alabama into Tennessee, and pushed forward as if to cut off Schofield's retreat from Pulaski, where the Federal commander had taken position with two army corps. Fearing that his position would be flanked, Schofield abandoned Pulaski and reached Columbia by forced marches. At Hood's approach Columbia was abandoned, the Federals retiring to a strong position on the opposite side of the river, a mile and a half distant. Late in the evening of November 28th, General Forrest crossed Duck River a few miles above Columbia, Hood following early next morning with Stewart's and Cheatham's corps, and Johnston's division of S. D. Lee's corps, leaving the other troops in the enemy's front at Columbia. They moved in light marching order, the intention being to turn the enemy's flank by marching rapidly on roads parallel to the Columbia and Franklin pike, at or near Spring Hill, and to cut off that portion of the enemy at or near Columbia.

Schofield, however, surmised the intentions of the enemy and began retreating. Late in the afternoon Hood's infantry forces, Cheatham in the advance, came in contact with the enemy two miles from Spring Hill and there was some skirmishing. General Hood wished to possess himself of the road to Franklin and cut off the retreat of the Federals, but owing to a series of misunderstandings Schofield was allowed to pass and succeeded in reaching Franklin. There was now nothing left but pursuit and attack. Pursuit was begun at daylight, and the Federals were so closely pressed that they had to burn a number of their

wagons. From captured despatches Hood had learned that it was all important to attack Schofield before he should have time to strengthen himself, and that if he should escape at Franklin he would gain his works about Nashville. He therefore determined to attack without delay. Schofield was strongly entrenched and Hood was repulsed with fearful slaughter. The engagement was of the fiercest possible character. The desperate attack of the Confederates showed that bravery and disregard of death which had been notable on other battlefields of the war. More heroic valor was never shown by troops. They were mowed down by grape and canister, many being killed inside the enemy's works. The struggle continued until late at night. Then the Federals abandoned the works and crossed the river, leaving their dead and wounded on the field, and retreated to Nashville. Official reports of the day's losses were 2,326 for the Federals and 4,500 for the Confederates. Victory was achieved at the price of a terrible slaughter.

This was the most pathetic of the battles fought on Tennessee soil. Surrounded by their homes and friends, with scarce time for a kiss of welcome after the protracted absence, the flower of the youth of Tennessee went into battle full of ardor and resolution—many of them never to come out. The battle brought grief to nearly every household in Middle Tennessee. Among the slain were Major-general Patrick Cleburne, Brigadier-generals S. R. Gist, John Adams, Otho F. Strahl, and H. B. Granbury. In the list of officers of high rank severely wounded were Major-general John C. Brown, Brigadier-generals J. C. Carter, A. M. Manigault, William A. Quarles, F. M. Cockrell, and T. M. Scott.

General Hood pursued Schofield to the vicinity of Nashville and established his lines about two miles from the city on December 2d. Here he entrenched his position and sent Forrest with a force of cavalry and infantry to invest Murfreesboro, held by General L. H. Rousseau with a force of 8,000 men. Meantime, General Thomas was accumulating

an immense force at Nashville, and on December 15th he assaulted the Confederate lines. Although repulsed, he renewed his assault on the following day and broke the Confederate line. Hood at once retreated by way of the Franklin road, losing fifty pieces of artillery and nearly all his ordnance wagons. The rearguard, commanded by Lieutenant-general Stephen D. Lee, held the enemy in check until Columbia was reached. Forrest arrived at Columbia December 18th, and upon him the command devolved when General Lee was severely wounded. The army marched south with the conviction that Tennessee was permanently abandoned, but the soldiers were true to their colors, and less than three hundred desertions were reported. On Christmas day they began to recross the Tennessee at Bainbridge, and in two days Tennessee was a battleground no longer. Forrest was promoted to be lieutenant-general and reorganized his command. All the Tennessee cavalry was organized into a division and placed under command of Brigadier-general William H. Jackson, who had been a valuable officer under Forrest and had taken an important part in all his operations.

General Beauregard assumed command of the Department of the West on the 17th of October. Since the battle of Drewry's Bluff, May 16th, he had been in command of but two divisions, numbering less than 10,000 men, and had determined in September to ask for a change of command. At that time, however, he was sent to Charleston by the president, and made numerous suggestions for bettering conditions in the Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, most of which were adopted. Finding Beauregard in sympathy with his own ideas, President Davis appointed him to the command of the Department of the West, embracing the two departments under Generals Hood and Taylor. Hood's department had been known as the Department of Tennessee and Georgia, and Lieutenant-general Richard Taylor's as the Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana. Beauregard was

active, though he failed in securing the coöperation of Hood in the plans he formed for offensive movements. The operations in his new field and the management of affairs in South Carolina—that State and Florida having been added to his department—occupied Hood during the remainder of the year. In January of the following year, Hood was relieved at his own request, and was succeeded by General Taylor.

One of the brilliant features of the year's campaigns in the West in 1864 was the series of raids made by General Forrest. After the battle of Chickamauga, Forrest had been transferred to Mississippi, taking with him 310 men of his old command. He invaded West Tennessee in the hope of raising a force of cavalry and of annoying the enemy. The expedition was regarded as a forlorn hope, but it led to the most brilliant epoch of Forrest's military career, drew on his exploits the eyes of the world and won his title "The Wizard of the Saddle." Entering West Tennessee with 500 men he remained there thirty days, recruited a force of 3,000 men within the enemy's lines, evaded General Hurlbut, who attempted to surround him with a force of 20,000 men, fought five battles,—Jack's Creek, Estenaula, Somerville, Lafayette, and Collierville,—threatened Memphis, crossed Wolf River on the bridge built by his pursuers on their way to capture him, and finally passed the fortified line of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, and reached the Confederate lines with a long train of wagons laden with supplies, besides a great number of horses, mules, and cattle. On his return, he learned that he had been made major-general on December 4, 1863.

General Forrest made Mississippi the base of his operations, from which he made frequent irruptions into Tennessee. In Mississippi he became famous for his operations against the forces of Generals Smith and Grierson, over whom he gained numerous victories. The brilliant victories of Tishomingo Creek and Brice's Cross Roads came later. Four expeditions into West Tennessee were successfully made, the first having been described above. The

second was more extensive. Starting on the 15th of March, 1864, he extended his operations into Kentucky, capturing Union City on the way. He attacked Paducah, made demonstrations against Columbus and other points, and then came back to Tennessee. After engagements at Somerville, Bolivar, and other places, and numerous captures and skirmishes, he captured Fort Pillow. This was the capture that made the expedition famous, and which has been the occasion of his being unjustly charged with the slaughter of the negro troops after their surrender. Very soon after this, Forrest made his third expedition into West Tennessee. This time he surprised Memphis, passed into the heart of the city and almost captured Generals C. C. Washburne and S. A. Hurlbut, the Federal commanders.

Forrest's Middle Tennessee expedition was another brilliant achievement. He passed first through northern Alabama, crossing Tennessee River on September 21, 1864. He captured many small garrisons, as well as those at Athens, Alabama, and at Sulphur Spring Trestle. He made demonstrations at Pulaski and then marched rapidly to strike the communications of Sherman on the railway between Nashville and Chattanooga. Receiving information that 50,000 Federal troops were moving to surround him, and realizing his great danger, he sent his wagons and captured stores under a strong guard, in command of General A. Buford, to recross Tennessee River and retreat south. To secure the safety of these supplies he misled the enemy by a fast movement toward Nashville. The entire Federal force followed him. At Columbia he made such demonstrations as strengthened the belief that Nashville was his objective point, then he suddenly gave the enemy the slip and retreated south. He was pursued by a large force and was in great danger, Tennessee River being swollen by recent rains and unfordable. Here Forrest's genius saved him, though a portion of the command was forced to escape by swimming the river. A part of the enemy pursued him across it, but was driven back at

Eastport by Colonel D. C. Kelley. In 23 days, with the loss of about 300 men, Forrest had caused the Federals a loss of 3,500 men in killed, wounded, and captured, had taken 8 pieces of artillery, 3,000 stand of arms, 900 horses, and a large amount of stores; had destroyed nearly 100 miles of railroad track, 2 locomotives and 50 cars, and had gained over 1,000 recruits.

Forrest did not rest long. On October 7th he again entered West Tennessee, moved to Tennessee River and placed batteries in ambush between Paris Landing and the old Fort Heiman and lay in wait for boats. He captured a number of these, the *Undine* and the *Venus* among them, the former a formidable river ironclad with a fine battery of eight twenty-four-pounders. He placed on the *Venus* two twenty-pound Parrott guns which he had used in capturing her, and for this "navy" he detailed crews. Captain John W. Morton, a boy who had handled artillery as well as Forrest had handled cavalry, was assigned to command the "navy." At his request, General Forrest placed him on the *Undine*, commanded by Captain Frank P. Gracey, of Tennessee, assigning Lieutenant-colonel W. A. Dawson to the *Venus*. After a trial trip between Paris Landing and Fort Heiman, the "navy" decided to move against Johnsonville, where a vast quantity of military stores had been collected. It encountered a Federal fleet of gunboats, and after a severe fight both the *Undine* and the *Venus* were destroyed. The crews escaped to the shore by swimming.

Forrest then moved his artillery to points opposite Johnsonville, where he destroyed the Federal gunboats, barges, and transports and by hot shot set on fire the large warehouses and the huge piles of army stores along the shore, which were covered with tarpaulins. The Confederates withdrew during the night, November 4th, marching six miles by the light of the burning stores. In this expedition General Forrest reports a loss inflicted on the enemy of 500 men, 4 gunboats, 14 transports, 20 barges, 26 pieces

of artillery, and \$6,700,000 worth of property. The assistant inspector-general of the United States army reports the value of the property destroyed at Johnsonville as \$2,200,000. The following day General Forrest started on his march to join General Hood for the campaign in Middle Tennessee.

More than that of any other leader who participated in the great conflict, the fame of Nathan Bedford Forrest has grown since the war. He was a man of the common people, without education or military training, yet his genius in the art of war has never been surpassed. He was born in Bedford County, Tennessee, July 13, 1821. His father went to Mississippi in 1834 and died there in 1837, leaving to the boy the care of a large household. He did not go to school; he went to work. He became a merchant at Hernando in 1842, moved to Memphis in 1852 and became a real estate broker and merchant. In 1859 he went to Coahoma County, Mississippi, became a planter and amassed a fortune. He went into the Confederate army as a private in the Tennessee Mounted Rifles in June, 1861, but at the request of Governor Harris, of Tennessee, he recruited a regiment of cavalry which he equipped at his own expense, and of which he was made lieutenant-colonel. In the war, Forrest first attracted attention by his reconnoissance to Green River, Kentucky, at the outset of the conflict, by the affair at Sacramento, and by his masterly escape from Fort Donelson after his advice to hold the fort was not acted on. In this move his entire regiment passed between Tennessee River and the Federal right wing. At Shiloh his coolness and daring on the night of April 7th and on April 8th brought him conspicuously to the attention of General Beauregard, who assigned him to command a brigade of cavalry already in service, to assist General E. Kirby Smith in an offensive movement into Middle Tennessee from Chattanooga. Forrest at first hesitated to assume this responsibility, but yielded, and thus began in earnest his wonderful military career. While at Murfreesboro,

July 21, 1862, he was made brigadier-general, and when in Mississippi, in 1863, was made major-general. His command then became known as Forrest's Cavalry Department among the troops, but such was the pride and devotion of all the men who served under him that they would never abandon the name of Forrest's cavalry, his first regiment retaining during the war the name of "Forrest's old regiment." For his activity he was made lieutenant-general in February, 1865. Forrest met with but one marked defeat—and that was at the hands of 15,000 cavalry under General James Wilson in northern Alabama, April 3, 1865. He surrendered his force at Gainesville on May 9, 1865. Throughout the war he wore a pair of silver spurs made of thimbles that had been worn and were presented by the ladies of Mississippi. After the war he engaged in railroad building. He died at Memphis, October 29, 1877. A magnificent monument to his memory was erected at Memphis in 1905, and a life-size portrait has been placed in the State Capitol at Nashville. After the war, in answer to an inquirer, who wanted to know the secret of his successes, Forrest answered by saying: "Well, I got there first with the most men." A reply that does scant justice to his own masterly campaigning. General Grenville M. Dodge said: "Forrest was one of the best cavalry commanders in history," and quotes General Sherman as saying that if he could match Forrest with a man of equal enterprise many of his difficulties would fade. For the last two years of the war he was the sentinel and safeguard of northern Mississippi and Alabama until the very last battle, defeating every army organized to capture or destroy his forces.

With 60,000 infantry and 5,500 cavalry Sherman left Atlanta on November 15th to march across the country to Savannah, giving his men orders to live on the country through which they passed. Before leaving Atlanta he applied the torch to that city and practically destroyed it; over two hundred acres of buildings were at one time in flames. Of five thousand buildings, but a few hundred

remained as a melancholy reminder of the prosperous city. In the march, one company of each brigade was detailed to rob the people of the invaded territory of sufficient food to supply the vast army. Every morsel of food was in many cases carried away from houses where there were only women and children living. What one raiding party spared the next would appropriate. Not only was everything eatable taken; whatever pleased a raider's fancy was borne away, whether it was a pet poodle, a family portrait or a piece of silver. General O. O. Howard, in command of the right wing, followed the Georgia Central Railroad through Macon and Milledgeville, while the left wing under General H. W. Slocum marched directly east on the railroad from Atlanta to Augusta, destroying the road as they went. Madison and Milledgeville were burned, the governor, State officers, and members of the legislature fleeing from the capital without securing the State archives. Leaving Milledgeville on November 24th, the two wings of the army met next at Millen, where it had been hoped to free the Union prisoners, but these had been carried away by the Confederates. Here there was a severe engagement between the Federal cavalry and a force under General Joseph Wheeler, but Wheeler had not men enough to withstand Sherman. Sherman reached Millen on December 2d, and left next day for Savannah, his objective point. He met with no further resistance until within a few miles of Savannah, which was found to be entrenched and garrisoned by General Hardee. The siege of Savannah commenced on the 10th. Fort McAllister at the mouth of the Ogeechee, a few miles south of Savannah was captured by assault, being held by a mere handful of men, and communication was thus established with the coast. Sherman hoped to capture Hardee's army, but was outwitted. On the night of the 20th, Hardee ordered a vigorous artillery fire upon the Federals, and while this was in progress conveyed his men across the river to South Carolina by rafts and steamboats. Supplies that he could not move were

destroyed. On the 21st Sherman found to his surprise that the city was undefended and took possession. Sherman's own estimate of the damage he had inflicted on the people of Georgia was one hundred million dollars; "at least twenty millions of which has inured to our advantage, and the remainder is simple waste and destruction."

CHAPTER XVIII

CAMPAIGNS OF 1864—THE TRANS-MISSISSIPPI AND THE COAST

WHEN Vicksburg surrendered and Port Hudson followed, leaving the Federal forces in entire control of Mississippi River, all that part of the Confederacy known as the trans-Mississippi had been completely isolated, and though rich in all the resources so badly needed in the other parts of the South, had been unable to contribute of its wealth to the needy sections. Communication was cut off, but the struggle beyond the river continued, in the vain hope that European interference might yet occur. The mistaken idea prevailed to the very end of the war that Great Britain hesitated only by reason of confidence in the ability of the South to achieve her own independence. Great Britain had already foreseen to which side would be the victory, and the cause of the Confederacy was lost, so far as any hope of British aid was concerned. But this feeling continued strong west of the Mississippi. General Kirby Smith had been placed in command of the Trans-Mississippi Department and vested with absolute powers after the communication between that department and the rest of the Confederacy had been destroyed, in order that he might act without having to await orders which could not reach him promptly, and in all probability would not reach him at all. Major-general Taylor was at this time commanding the Confederate forces operating along the west bank of Mississippi River.

General Smith's headquarters were at Shreveport. General Price was temporarily commanding the district of Arkansas, with headquarters in the field, in the neighborhood of Camden, at the head of navigation on Washita River. Camden was an important centre, in the midst of plentiful forage and supplies; but deceived by the supposed intention of the Federals under General John Steele to attack Shreveport, Price withdrew from Camden to a better point from which to impede the advance. Steele then moved between him and Camden, and took possession of the place, thus cutting Price off from a section rich in forage and subsistence. When the Red River expedition failed, the Confederate forces pressed their advantage, and moved against General Steele, who was forced to retreat. His supplies were cut off, and a foraging party of 150 wagons escorted by nearly 1,000 men was driven back on April 21, 1864, by the Confederates, who captured 300 of the men, four guns and the wagons. Four days later, a larger train of 250 wagons, escorted by 200 cavalry and 1,200 infantry, with four pieces of artillery, was sent by Steele to Pine Bluff for supplies, and was attacked by the cavalry under Major-general J. F. Fagan. Two hundred and fifty of the Federals were killed or wounded, and nearly every remaining officer and man was captured, together with the guns and the wagons. Steele then determined to retire from Camden. The Confederates followed, harassing and delaying the rear until General Smith arrived. His forces came up and General Steele was attacked at the Saline. After a bloody battle of seven hours, partly fought in the downpouring rain, the Confederates retired with hundreds of prisoners and many captured supplies. Steele continued his retreat to Little Rock, where he arrived on May 2d.

Early in the year, General Banks had announced his intention to open up the region of western Louisiana to trade, and to occupy the Red River section permanently. Forces were concentrated in New Orleans, and the most formidable fleet ever gathered on the western waters assembled at the

mouth of Red River under Rear-admiral Porter. Ten thousand Federal troops under General A. J. Smith left Vicksburg on twenty transports and joined the fleet, with orders to unite with General Banks's forces, subsequently to be sent to reinforce General Steele's force from Arkansas. The main body of the Confederates was then at Shreveport under General Taylor, who was to be joined there by the troops under Generals Price and Walker. On the 12th of March, the Federal fleet and transports moved up the old Red River into the Atchafalaya, burning and destroying everything along both banks of the river. A column was sent overland toward Fort De Russy, thirty miles distant. This column was attacked in the rear by the Confederates and harassed during the entire march. Fort De Russy, in which only two guns were in position, was captured and destroyed. The Federal infantry reached Alexandria on March 16th, and were joined by the cavalry on the 20th. Natchitoches was taken on the 21st, and on the 26th General A. J. Smith left for Shreveport, the real destination of the expedition. He was followed by Banks, who reached Natchitoches on April 4th, where he rested two days, and with the whole army left for Shreveport on the 6th. After some skirmishing on the 7th, a general engagement followed on the 8th about two miles from Mansfield, Louisiana.

General Taylor had selected a position favorably situated for defence and expected Banks to attack as soon as he came up. When Banks discovered, however, that the Confederates had halted he halted also, and for several hours each army waited for the other to attack. Then General Taylor became impatient and determined to drive back the Federal advance guard. He sent forward a battalion of skirmishers, and the Federals dispatched a regiment of cavalry to cut them off. Taylor sent another regiment to the relief of the skirmishers; the enemy forwarded an entire brigade and in a few minutes a general battle was on. Against the heavy fire of the Federal artillery the Louisiana troops moved forward, broke the enemy's

first line and captured nearly the whole of the brigade. Then the second line of the enemy shared the same fate. The battle ceased, just before nightfall. The Federals had been driven back. Eight hundred of them had been killed or wounded; thousands were prisoners, and eighteen pieces of artillery and over five thousand stand of small arms were in the possession of the Confederates. At two o'clock the next morning Churchill's corps moved forward and found the enemy in full retreat. Its line to Pleasant Hill was marked by burning wagons, abandoned supplies and heaps of Federal dead.

On the following day, at Pleasant Hill, Banks disposed his entire army for battle. When the Confederates came within three miles of Pleasant Hill, General Taylor learned that the Federals had made a stand and called a council of war, believing that Banks would again retreat. As he did not do so, Churchill's corps was sent to make a detour and strike him on the flank, but by a misunderstanding of orders Churchill marched by the wrong road and came full upon the Federal front strongly entrenched in the tangled underbrush. By a vigorous attack he broke the first and second Federal lines, drove the enemy back to the gullies in the field and beyond the villages, but pursued too far. The Federal reserves attacked his flank and rear and threw them into a disorder that soon became a rout. Two miles from the village the Confederates were halted and re-formed. The Federals then retired leaving the dead and wounded on the field, and night intervened. On the following morning Banks retreated to Grand Ecore, thirty-five miles distant, to rest and obtain rations.

Meantime the fleet had continued to ascend the river until April 7th, when its way was blocked by a large steamer sunk in the stream. Before the obstruction had been removed, Porter heard of Banks's defeat and received orders to turn back.

The whole expedition having rested, it started on April 21st to retreat to Alexandria. The Confederates pursued

with a small force and continued to harass the Federal rear until Alexandria was reached. Before leaving Alexandria, on May 13th, the Federals set fire to it in numerous places, and though Banks instructed his men to fight the flames, the order was given in such a manner that little attention was paid to it. Despite the protection to save their property promised to those who had taken the oath, the houses were destroyed, and the women and children, almost the sole inhabitants of Alexandria, as the men were in the army, were driven shelterless, without food, or change of clothing, into the blackened streets. Banks's army retreated to New Orleans, laying the country waste as it went, burning and robbing everywhere. The troops were described as marching with their weapons fastened to their backs, a torch in their right hand and plunder in their left. The expedition had failed in its purpose, and revenge was taken on the helpless. The Federal loss was admitted by Banks to be 1,830 killed and wounded and 2,150 "missing," a large portion of the latter being captured, besides 815 killed and wounded and 450 captured on the return march from Alexandria.

Later in the year, General Price's invasion of Missouri attracted general attention. About September 21st, Price crossed the Arkansas with two divisions of cavalry and three batteries of artillery, joined General Shelby near Batesville, and was ready with 15,000 or 20,000 mounted veterans to advance. Confident in the possession of the State, the Federals had allowed their force in this department, then under command of General Rosecrans, to be depleted to 6,500 mounted men for field duty, with some partially organized infantry regiments, the latter being employed to guard the great depots of supplies at St. Louis, Jefferson City, St. Joseph, Macon, Springfield, Rolla, and Pilot Knob, and to guard bridges and other means of communication. Six Illinois regiments and eight regiments of Missouri militia were added to the three cavalry regiments and General Smith's infantry guarding St. Louis; all the Federal troops in the central part of the State, and all

available forces from the north of Missouri River were quickly massed at Jefferson City. General Price's army rested a day or two at Richwoods, threatening St. Louis, and then started for the State capital. The concentration of overwhelming forces of Federals at Jefferson City caused Price to withdraw. His march was a series of skirmishes with the pursuing cavalry—at Independence on October 22d, at the Big Blue on the 23d, at Marais des Cygnes at midnight of the 24th and on the 25th. At Little Osage Crossing several hundred Confederates, among them Generals Marmaduke and Cabell were taken prisoners. The Confederates made their final stand at Newtonia, and were driving back General Blunt's men, when the Kansas troops and Colonel Frederick W. Benteen's cavalry regiment, the Tenth Missouri, came up and turned the tide of battle. General Price added several thousand Missourians to his force, but the plans of his invasion were all defeated. He lost a number of his guns, 1,958 prisoners, and several hundred of his men were killed and wounded. He was forced to retreat into Arkansas, his army badly cut up and greatly demoralized.

The important naval events of the year may be briefly summarized as the battle in Mobile Bay, the destruction of the *Alabama*, and the capture of her ally, the *Florida*. Mobile Bay had long been greatly desired by the Federals. Two imposing forts guarded the entrance; it was a difficult place to blockade; and here the Confederacy was constructing a number of powerful vessels. On the 5th of August, the Federal fleet under Admiral Farragut, consisting of fourteen steamers and four monitors, carrying more than two hundred guns, sailed up the main ship channel and into Mobile Bay, where the Confederates had in commission but one ironclad—the ram *Tennessee*—and three wooden vessels. The guns of Fort Morgan, unable to stand against the broadsides of the heavy guns, were almost silenced. The little Confederate fleet had taken position across the entrance to the harbor and raked the advance vessels fore



Benjamin Franklin Chentham
Major-general, C. S. A.



Joseph Wheelot
Lieutenant-general, C. S. A.



Edmund Kirby Smith
General, C. S. A.

[illegible]

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and aft and for a time the invading fleet could not effectively reply. Then the fleet closed in and the cannonading became terrific. The *Brooklyn* had been detailed to lead the advance, but as she hesitated, Farragut sent his flagship, the *Hartford*, forward in the lead. As the fleet suffered terribly from the raking fire of the Confederate vessel, the *Selma*, the *Metacomet*, which greatly outclassed her and was the fastest vessel in the Federal fleet, was sent after the *Selma*. The *Selma* tried to retreat, but was captured after being disabled. The *Gaines*, the second Confederate vessel, was crippled, ran aground under the guns of the fort, and was set on fire by her crew. The *Morgan*, the third wooden vessel, escaped to Mobile. An attempt to ram the *Tennessee* failed, though the blow the *Monongahela* gave her would have sunk any vessel in the Federal fleet. Admiral Franklin Buchanan, commanding the *Tennessee*, made an attempt to ram the *Hartford*, but realizing that the sinking of the *Hartford* might carry down her assailant, suddenly changed his ship's course and glanced along the *Hartford's* side, avoiding a direct blow. The *Tennessee* then became the target for the whole fleet, every vessel of which was pounding her with shot and trying to run her down. The concentration of solid shot began to tell. Flagstaff and smokestack were shot away and the rudder chain was cut by a shot from the *Chickasaw*. Admiral Buchanan was wounded by a piece of shell and hoisted the white flag; then the cannonading ceased, and the *Tennessee* was taken. The Confederate loss was 12 killed and 20 wounded, besides 280 taken prisoners. The Federal loss, including the crew of the *Tecumseh*, which sank with all on board, was 145 killed, 170 wounded, and 4 captured. Fort Powell was evacuated the same night. Fort Gaines surrendered on August 7th. Fort Morgan, after a whole day's bombardment by the coöperating land forces, capitulated on the 23d. With Fort Morgan were captured 500 prisoners and about 50 guns.

An important movement on the part of the Confederates on the Atlantic coast was the capture of Plymouth, North

Carolina, a town on the south bank of Roanoke River, about eight miles from its mouth. Plymouth had been burned by the Federals in 1862, and the position was considered the key to the river. It was strongly fortified, and held by 2,400 men under General H. W. Wessells, and two gunboats in the river. On April 17th, in the afternoon, the Confederates suddenly appeared in the rear of the town, driving in the pickets. Next morning at daylight, the main engagement was begun, and the Confederate ironclad *Albemarle* came down the river to assist. The *Albemarle* sunk one of the two gunboats, put the other to flight, and prevented the coming of any reinforcements. Plymouth surrendered on April 20th, with 1,600 men, 25 guns, and large military stores. On May 5th, the *Albemarle* descended the Roanoke and attacked the Federal fleet gathered near the mouth of the river, and a vigorous naval battle followed, but without definite results. An unsuccessful attempt was made to destroy the *Albemarle* on May 25th by a torpedo, while she was lying at the wharf in Plymouth. All the summer the Federals plotted her destruction. On the night of October 27th, Lieutenant W. B. Cushing and a crew of thirteen in a steam launch, equipped as a torpedo boat, started up the Roanoke to destroy the *Albemarle*. The effort succeeded in sinking her, but only one member of the party besides Lieutenant Cushing escaped killing, drowning, or capture. The *Albemarle* removed, the Federal forces pushed up the river and recaptured Plymouth on the 31st of October.

An army of 6,500 men and a formidable fleet under Admiral Porter moved October 12th and 13th against the forts at the mouth of Cape Fear River. The Confederates relied principally on Fort Fisher and a connecting series of batteries running along the coast, all forming a single work of two fronts—the land front 480 yards in length, the sea front about 1,300 yards. By December 19th the fleet was off New Inlet, but the weather prevented immediate attack. General B. F. Butler conceived the idea of running a

powder laden vessel ashore and exploding it under the fort. This was done, but it failed to damage the thick walls. The entire squadron of thirty-three war vessels attacked on the 24th. The guns of the fort were silenced, two of its magazines were blown up, the buildings fired in several places and a torrent of missiles which no human being could endure was sent inside its walls. The bursting of their own guns disabled six of the attacking fleet. The transports arrived in the afternoon and on the following day troops were landed, but an attack was not made, Generals Weitzel and Butler agreeing that it would be "butchery to order an assault." General Butler withdrew his troops to Fortress Monroe and Admiral Porter withdrew to Beaufort, confident that another attack would be ordered. This second and successful attack was made early the following year, General Butler having been removed meantime from command.

No serious demonstration was made against Charleston in 1864, as operations were much restricted by the withdrawal of nearly all the troops from that department for the Army of the James, thus leaving the Federal fleet little to do except to try to enforce the blockade. A detachment of vessels coöperated in St. John's River with the army movements in Florida, and later in demonstrations against James's Island, Bull's Bay, and other places off the South Carolina coast. The Federal gunboat *Housatonic* was destroyed by a torpedo off Charleston on February 17th. During the year, the Confederates also captured two small armed steamers, the *Columbine* and the *Water Witch*.

The enormous prices obtainable for all sorts of goods made blockade running during 1864 more lucrative than ever, despite the danger of capture; and, notwithstanding the most stringent regulations announced early in 1864, there were more blockade runners at the end of the year than when it opened. A remarkable fact is that vessels under command of officers of the Confederate States navy succeeded on every trip in evading the blockaders, and that

down to August 16, 1864, and perhaps later, only a single blockade running vessel was lost while under their command. It was impossible for the United States to stop blockade running in any other way than by capturing the ports with which the blockade runners did business. Wilmington was never effectually blockaded until Fort Fisher was captured and the port closed. Then the blockade runners turned in larger force than ever to Charleston, where, despite the impending fall of the city, cargoes could be safely landed and transported along the interior line to the famishing armies of the Confederacy. One blockade runner, the *Chicora*, ran into Charleston, found the city in Federal hands, and ran out again, despite the "effective" blockade. In the trans-Mississippi, blockade running continued to be successfully conducted as long as the war lasted.

The activity of the Confederate cruiser *Alabama*, heretofore recorded, continued during the early part of 1864. Leaving Sumatra on the last day of 1863, Admiral Semmes doubled the island of Ceylon; burned the *Emma Jane* on January 14th on the coast of Malabar; crossed the Arabian Sea, rested at the Gomoro Islands until February 15th, and after an uneventful passage entered the harbor at Cape Town, March 20th. Here Admiral Semmes took up with the British Government the seizure of the *Tuscaloosa*, a prize captured and made a tender to the *Alabama*, which had been detained by the British authorities. As a result of this correspondence the *Tuscaloosa* was ordered to be restored to Admiral Semmes, but the order came after he had left Cape Town, and, the war ending shortly after, she fell into the hands of the Federals along with other Confederate property. Leaving Table Bay on March 25th for the last time with the fears gathered from the late newspapers that the Confederacy was drawing to a close, the *Alabama*, on the 23d of April, captured and burned the *Rockingham*, a guano ship, in the track of homeward bound Pacific ships, and four days later captured and burned the *Tycoon*, the last

of her long list of captures. On May 2d she crossed the equator into the northern hemisphere, badly worn and in need of repairs, and on the 11th of June dropped anchor in the port of Cherbourg. It was the *Alabama's* last port. Landing his prisoners, Semmes tried to get permission to dock and repair his vessel, but while waiting for an answer the Federal ironclad war vessel *Kearsarge* steamed into the harbor on the 14th. Semmes protested against the released prisoners being turned over to Captain John A. Winslow of the *Kearsarge*, because it would augment his crew, and his protest prevailed.

Completing the coaling of the ship and other preparations for battle, the *Alabama* went out to meet her enemy on Sunday morning, June 19th, the ironclad frigate *Couronne* going with her part of the way to see that the neutrality of French waters was not violated. On the heights above the town immense numbers of people gathered to see the battle. The *Kearsarge* was waiting a short distance outside the harbor. Semmes made an address to his men, and when distant a mile from the *Kearsarge* opened the battle with solid shot. The *Kearsarge* replied, and the battle was on. The two vessels fought in a circle, preserving a distance from half to three-quarters of a mile. When within suitable range shell took the place of solid shot, but as shells were harmless to the *Kearsarge*, their use, by the *Alabama*, was discontinued. After a battle of an hour and ten minutes, the *Alabama* was found to be sinking and an effort was made to reach the French coast. This being impossible, the Confederate colors were hauled down to prevent further loss of life, and the enemy informed of the *Alabama's* condition. But until the latter went down the *Kearsarge* sent no boats. Ten men were drowned; nine had been killed and twenty-one wounded. But for the aid extended by the *Deerhound*, an English steam yacht, and the pilot boats, many more would have met death by drowning. Even after the Confederate flag had been lowered the *Kearsarge* fired five times at her sinking opponent,

and endeavored afterward to claim as prisoners those rescued from drowning by the *Deerhound* and other vessels.

The *Florida*, commanded by Captain Charles M. Morris, after six months spent in recruiting and refitting at Brest, France, sailed for the West Indies on February 12, 1864. Finding nothing valuable there, she visited the coast of the United States, and captured the United States mail steamer *Electric Spark* on July 10th, just off the capes of the Delaware. Shortly afterwards, the *Harriet Stevens*, *Golconda*, *Margaret Y. Davis*, and *Mondanum* were captured. Crossing the ocean to Teneriffe, she cruised back leisurely toward Brazil, capturing ten vessels en route, and anchored at Bahia, October 4th. Relying on the protection of a neutral power little precaution was observed. At three o'clock on the morning of October 7th, while Captain Morris and most of his crew were ashore, the United States steam corvette *Wachusett*, under command of Captain Napoleon Collins, rammed the *Florida*, poured a volley into her and demanded her surrender. After a vain effort at resistance, the defenceless vessel was surrendered and was towed seaward without an opportunity being given to communicate with Captain Morris, and she was sent to Hampton Roads as a prize. Nine of the *Florida's* crew who attempted to swim to the shore were either drowned or killed by being fired upon from the *Wachusett*. Brazil demanded the return of the vessel. This was conceded, but the *Florida* was "accidentally" struck by an army transport, and shortly afterward sank at her moorings, by the connivance, if not by the orders, of the Federal naval authorities. Her captured officers were kept in prison at Point Lookout, Washington, and Fort Warren until February, 1865, when they were released under a signed agreement to leave the United States in ten days, and were then turned loose in the streets of Boston without a dollar. They finally managed to secure passage to Europe.

The *Shenandoah* was the last of the Confederate cruisers, and she inflicted more damage than any other except the

Alabama. The *Shenandoah* was originally a British merchant steamer, the *Sea King*, and was bought by Captain J. D. Bulloch to replace the *Alabama* after that vessel's destruction by the *Kearsarge*. Almost all the ocean commerce that the United States had left was its whaling fleets, and the *Shenandoah* was intended to prey upon them. Her guns and stores were taken aboard at the uninhabited island of Las Desertas, near Madeira, to which place they had been conveyed by the blockade runner *Laurel*, and Captain James I. Waddell was placed in command. Captain Waddell steered for Australia, whither he arrived January 25, 1865. To that year the operations of the *Shenandoah* belong.

The close of the year 1864 found the Confederacy in desperate straits, and at the end of her resources. Her territory was overrun by the hostile armies, her currency was almost absolutely worthless, her men in the field were almost naked and poorly fed, and the people at home were in little better condition. Her railroads had been destroyed, so that communication between the sections was broken off. Trade was impossible, for there was neither money with which to purchase nor produce to sell. Every factory was wrecked, the fields had been laid waste, and every horse, mule, cow, pig, sheep, and chicken carried away by the enemy. There seemed little to hope for, but the South hoped on. In territory she had also suffered loss. Tennessee and Missouri were hers no longer; the larger part of Alabama and Mississippi had been seized; the valley of Virginia and the State of Georgia were laid waste; the armies of Hood, Early, and Price had been beaten and broken up. The end seemed near. The only army of any strength lay in the fortifications about Petersburg, and Grant was gathering a force of over 200,000 men with the purpose of crushing this. Hardly a vessel except the *Shenandoah* was left upon the ocean, and but few small and unimportant ones upon the gulf or on the inland waters. Almost every seaport of the South was held by the Federal armies, and no thoughtful man could believe that there would be another year of war.

The presidential contest in the North had given the South new hope in 1864, but the result of the election shattered the last hopes of the Confederacy that there would be a change in the Northern policy. The Confederate authorities believed that if they could hold military matters in a negative condition until after the election, when the Democratic party could appeal to the popular impatience of the North, a distinct advance could be gained toward terms acceptable to the great mass of Southern people. Parties in the North were distinctly divided on two questions—the supremacy of the Constitution to military necessity and the relative powers of the Union and the States. The party in power believed in force, while the opposition contended for a strict construction of the Constitution. But the Northern Democrats as a body opposed the ultimate right of secession for which the South contended, believing the Union inviolable and perpetual, and that all grievances must be redressed within the Union and with due regard to its integrity. The South believed secession sanctioned by precedent and by the precepts of the framers of the Constitution. In the North only a small minority held this belief.

Nor was the Republican party united. Assertive as Lincoln was of the power and ability of the North, he was not altogether to the liking of the most radical members of his party, and they emphasized the bitterness of their feeling against him by early scheming for the election of a successor who would carry out their wishes. A full year before the time of election the opposition to Lincoln began planning for his defeat. Aside from the uncompromising and expected antagonism of the Democratic party, there were internal differences which threatened the disruption of the Republican party. While the radical members of the party were not numerically strong, for a time it looked as if they would accomplish the defeat of the president, though, as a matter of fact, the show of hostility among the leaders was out of all proportion to the feeling among the people. Outside of the city of Washington the bitterness existed mostly in

Missouri, where the displacement of General Frémont had never been forgiven or forgotten. Yet the presidential ambition of Secretary Chase, the anger of Senator Pomeroy, of Kansas, at the president's refusal to support him in local matters, and the bitter and sweeping denunciations of the administration from Wendell Phillips inspired the South for a time with the hope that these divisions would enable the Democracy of the North to elect their candidate. But the nomination of Frémont for the presidency by the so-called Republican mass convention at Cleveland aroused no show of enthusiasm in this party. The clamorous approval of the Democratic party was manifestly partisan, and finally Frémont withdrew. He characterized the administration as "politically, militarily, and financially a failure," and charged that Lincoln's belief in the protection of slavery had strengthened the South, but the country refused to take alarm. An effort to nominate General Grant was dismissed by Grant himself, and as a last resort an incipient effort to induce Lincoln to withdraw was made by his antagonists, but it met with no support. All this opposition had no effect, even opponents of Lincoln's policy rallying to his support, hoping to end the war. Lincoln was aware of all these efforts, but failed to express himself, save when he accepted Chase's resignation with the words: "You and I have reached a point of mutual embarrassment in our official relation which it seems cannot be overcome or longer sustained consistently with the public service."

Another effort toward defeating the nomination of Lincoln was the scheme to postpone the convention from June 7, 1864, until September in the same year. This failed and the convention met at Baltimore on the appointed day and nominated Lincoln on the first ballot. Andrew Johnson received a plurality on the first ballot, and his nomination for vice-president was made unanimous. The excessive strain of the campaign that followed has never been equalled. The Democrats worked as men expecting a certain triumph. They argued the failure of the war

policy, and when they nominated General George B. McClellan in August it seemed as if that nomination meant election. Even the president believed that the only hope of Republican victory lay in military successes great enough to vindicate the policy until then adopted. The determined opposition of Horace Greeley and other peace Republicans proved formidable. Greeley worked earnestly for peace, and by Lincoln's consent met some prominent southerners at Niagara Falls to discuss the matter; but the meeting failed to accomplish its purpose. Greeley failed to get from Lincoln any categorical reply as to what his course would be if peace were possible on the basis of reunion with the institution of slavery undisturbed.

At this time, when every indication pointed to Democratic success, the Democratic party inserted in their platform a peace plank, which McClellan repudiated, but which C. L. Vallandigham reiterated as the true policy of the party, and which opened a chasm that divided the party more hopelessly than their opponents were divided.

The proclaimed purpose of the radical element of the Republican party had from the first been the abolition of slavery and the securing of equal rights before the law to the African race. Their journals and their leaders had declared this repeatedly and with emphasis. They had courted dissolution of the Union, and had invited war with this purpose in view, though their moderate declaration at the outset of the war had allayed the suspicions of the conservative class at the North and disarmed much of the opposition. But their pacific expressions came purposely too late to reclaim the South. The North believed them, but the South did not. After the reduction of Fort Sumter the peace party at the North was a peace party no longer; it believed in the inviolability of the Union, and the duty of suppressing disruption, but much of the unanimity in favor of the war resulted from the peculiar dread of public opinion entertained by the people of the North. Party issues in 1864 turned largely upon the conditions of reconstruction,

the Constitutional party holding to the doctrine that the sole rightful object of the war was the suppression of the rebellion, and that the seceding States had never been rightfully separated from the Union. General McClellan, the Democratic candidate, stated this in these words: "The Union is the sole condition of peace—we ask no more." But the administration urged coercion, proposing to bring in the States divested of slavery. A bill passed Congress July 3, 1864, which the president did not sign, prescribing as conditions necessary to the restoration of a seceded State to the Union the disfranchisement of the guilty leaders of the rebellion as to State offices; the abolition of slavery and the repudiation of the rebel debt by the returning States themselves. In the platform of June 7, 1864, the condition of making the abolition of slavery a condition precedent had not been inserted, and in his formal acceptance of the nomination Lincoln took pains to exclude the idea, taking the ground that slavery could only be abolished by an amendment to the Constitution. This amendment he justified by the fact that the South had refused to accept his offer to receive them within a hundred days without the overthrow of their institutions.

In the summer of 1864, the Confederate government had authorized Clement C. Clay, James P. Holcombe, and Jacob Thompson to confer with the government at Washington relative to peace, and Lincoln sent these commissioners a safe conduct to Washington. Because, however, these commissioners had no power in themselves to arrange and decide finally upon the terms of peace, whereas Lincoln's passport in terms implied that they must be so empowered, they could not accept or use the paper. Then came another paper from Washington, declaring that any person or persons having the authority to control the armies then at war with the United States and bearing a proposition to treat, which should "embrace the restoration of peace, the integrity of the whole Union and the abandonment of slavery," should have conduct both ways, and their proposition would

be received and considered by the executive government of the United States. This proved as useless as the other, as Lincoln, of course, knew it must.

The national convention of the Democratic party at Chicago, August 29th, adopted a platform declaring its unswerving fidelity to the Union; calling for a convention of all the States looking to the restoration of peace on the basis of a Federal Union of all the States; denouncing the military interference in recent elections in the Border States; declaring that the aim and object of the Democratic party were to preserve the Federal Union and the rights of the States unimpaired; reprobating the system of usurpation, tyranny, and despotism which the administration had wantonly and systematically pursued throughout the war; and tendering their sympathy and pledging their future protection to the soldiers and sailors of the army and navy of the United States.

General McClellan's letter of acceptance of the nomination for president was pacific and conciliatory in tone. He declared for the preservation of the Union, and that its preservation "was the sole avowed object for which the war was commenced;" that "it should have been conducted for that object only," on the principles of conciliation and compromise; that the reestablishment of the Union must be the indispensable condition in any settlement; and that "they should exhaust all the resources of statesmanship to secure such a peace, to reestablish the Union, and to secure for the future the Constitutional rights of every State."

The canvass need not be detailed. In rapid succession came the military successes that drew more adherents to the administration—the overwhelming of Lee's army by Grant in Virginia, the failure of Early's attempt to capture Washington, Sherman's capture of Atlanta, Farragut's possession of Mobile Bay, Sheridan's victories in the valley of the Shenandoah, and Hood's series of reverses. The necessity for victories in the field had been met, and Lincoln was

reëlected. He received the vote of every Northern State except Delaware, Kentucky, and New Jersey. The election came at a time when the idea prevailed that a vote for the war party would complete the exhaustion of the prostrate Confederacy, and that a vote for McClellan would inspire the South to renewed exertions in the hope of favorable terms of peace. Expediency was triumphant. The South fought on, but with the knowledge that the end was near.

CHAPTER XIX

THE END OF THE WAR

NEVER in the history of the world had there been such immense destruction of life and property as had been inflicted upon the South during the year 1864, and its effect was speedily seen in the exhausted condition of the country at the beginning of 1865. The diminution of food supplies, already rapid, was hastened incalculably by the conquests of the army of invasion during the year just passed, and much more by the wilful destruction of food and every other form of property whose removal was considered a means of crushing the ability of the Southern people to resist. There was a general distress for want of food, and even without another battle the South must have submitted during the year, starved into submission. At one time in the spring of 1864 there had been in Richmond but two days' rations for Lee's army. Crops that year in Virginia were short, and these were in large part destroyed by the Federal army. In November, 1864, there were in Richmond requisitions for 30,000,000 rations which could not be supplied, and the commissary-general reported to President Davis that the situation was growing worse. Every State was exhausted and without food. In the entire Confederacy there were meat rations barely sufficient for the army for a period of twenty-five days, and the winter had just begun. On December 5th Lee's army had but nine days' rations in sight, and on the 14th they were without meat.

The Confederate Congress in secret session gave its earnest consideration to the situation, and the condition of the Confederacy with respect to food was found to be alarming. It was acknowledged that there was not meat enough in the Confederacy for the armies in the field; there was not in Virginia either meat or bread enough for the armies in the State; that the bread supply from other places depended absolutely on keeping open the railroad connections of the South; that meat must be obtained from abroad by a seaport; that bread must be paid for at market rates in cash and in a better medium than was then circulating; that transportation was inadequate to the service; that the meat supply for Lee's army was precarious and would probably cease altogether if he fell back from Richmond.

An attempt to raise \$3,000,000 in specie failed, barely one-tenth of that sum resulting from the effort, and that mostly from Virginia. It was the last effort of 1864, and by the 1st of January, 1865, the end was already in sight. The campaigns of 1865 were the last despairing efforts for independence, fought against almost inconceivable odds and against even the hope of success. The soldiers in the field were naked and starving, and the people at home were little or no better off. The only strong army in the field was that in the trenches at Petersburg, and to crush this last army Grant and Sherman were, as we have seen, gathering 200,000 men.

Efforts to bring about negotiations for peace were made again early in 1865, the first being by Francis P. Blair, who visited Richmond under a passport from President Lincoln. He disclaimed any official instructions, but urged upon President Davis to send commissioners to Washington authorized to treat for peace. He secured written assurances from President Davis of his willingness to enter into negotiations and to receive a commissioner whenever one should be sent, as well as to appoint such a commissioner or other agent on the part of the Confederacy to "renew the effort to enter into a conference with a view to secure

peace between the two countries" whenever Mr. Blair could promise that such an appointee would be received. Mr. Lincoln's reply was to the effect that he was "ready to receive any agent whom Mr. Davis or any other influential person now resisting the national authority, may formally send me, with a view of securing peace to the people of our common country." Nothing more came of this endeavor.

Meantime, however, leading Congressmen and other politicians of the Confederacy had been trying to bring President Davis and Vice-president Alexander H. Stephens together, that Mr. Stephens might conduct peace negotiations with Washington. These two gentlemen had not for some time sustained friendly relations with each other, but they now had an interview on the subject. Mr. Stephens was allowed to name his associate commissioners, and named R. M. T. Hunter, of Virginia, and Joseph A. Campbell, of Alabama. Mr. Davis gave Mr. Stephens full authority to treat with the United States. He said: "I give you *carte blanche*, only writing on it the one word 'Independence.'"

This conference was held February 3, 1865. General Grant had telegraphed his belief in the sincerity of the desire for peace, and upon his request President Lincoln and Secretary Seward attended the conference as the Federal representatives. The conference, which was informal, was held on a steamer in Hampton Roads, but there was no basis of negotiations between the parties and nothing could be accomplished. Mr. Lincoln's demand that the South should submit to the rule of the Union unconditionally; that the new position of the Federal executive on the subject of slavery should be acknowledged, including the abolition of slavery by constitutional amendment and accompanying measures, could not be entertained. The report of the commissioners was submitted to the Confederate Congress on the 5th of February, and an effort was made to rouse the people anew by an imposing expression of public opinion. Many places of meeting were appointed,

and at noon processions marched to each appointed place. In churches, theatres, and elsewhere the throngs were great and the speeches were eloquent; but the spirit was broken, and was too weak to respond with effect. Despite the expressed confidence of President Davis in the result, the people of the Confederacy felt that the end was approaching. Just one month before the Confederacy was doomed to disappear forever from the midst of human affairs, the Confederate Congress sent out its last joint declaration, an impassioned appeal to the people of the South, reciting the failure of the Peace Congress, urging continued resistance and closing with the prophecy that has proved only too true that "failure will compel us to drink the cup of humiliation even to the bitter dregs of having the history of our struggle written by New England historians."

General Butler's attempt to capture Fort Fisher in December had failed, and January 6, 1865, General Alfred H. Terry was sent thither with 20,000 men, backed up by Porter's fleet of fifty-nine vessels. After a bombardment lasting three days, Fort Fisher was simultaneously attacked by land and naval forces, the vessels, ranged in a semicircle, opening up with their 413 guns. Notwithstanding this furious cannonading, which drove the men from their guns, the garrison of 2,500 men repelled the first attack with severe loss and kept up a hand-to-hand battle until midnight when the 1,800 who still lived surrendered. General W. H. C. Whiting was mortally wounded, and Colonel John Lamb, who was in command, was disabled. The Federal loss was about 700. Then the lesser defences of Wilmington were abandoned and the Federals marched into the town. When General Bragg was sent to command the defences at Wilmington, one of the Virginia newspapers announced the fact in one sentence and followed it with the words: "Good-bye Wilmington." Against such odds, however, no military skill could have held the place. General Bragg's command retired from Wilmington to the centre of hostility in South Carolina.

On the 1st of February, Sherman left Savannah with 60,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry and marched into South Carolina, opposed only by an inconsiderable remnant of the army to the command of which General Joseph E. Johnston had been assigned. This consisted of a part of Hood's force from Mississippi, a part of the men with whom Hardee had left Savannah, and a few of the State militia. Wheeler's cavalry destroyed bridges, but the Confederates were not able to stop the invaders. In South Carolina there was no effort by the Federal commanders or authorities to restrain outrages upon the people or their property. All that had been done before in other States seemed but little when compared with the destruction wrought in South Carolina. Houses were first looted and then fired. Not even negro cabins escaped. Six out of every seven houses which Sherman passed in South Carolina were burned. More than three-fifths of all the personal property in the counties through which he marched was stolen by his army. One of the features of its triumphal parade in Washington after the war ended was his "bummers" with stolen mules laden with household goods purloined in the South. Among the towns he burned were Blackville, Graham, Ramberg, Buford's Bridge, Lexington, Allston, Pomaria, Winnsboro, Black Stock, Society Hill, Camden, and Cheraw.

On the 16th of March, Hardee was attacked in his entrenched position at Averysboro by an overwhelming force, and, being flanked, retreated, leaving 108 dead and 68 wounded on the field, and losing 217 by capture. The loss to the Federals was 77 killed and 477 wounded. On the 19th, at Bentonville, General Slocum came upon the Confederates under direct command of General Johnston and was in a fair way to be annihilated when reinforced from the main army. In the battle of the first day, the Confederates had all the best of it, and drove back Carlin's division. The 20th was spent by the Federals in strengthening their position, and, on the 21st, Sherman's army had gathered on three sides of Johnston's army, while on the

other side was Mill Creek. The Confederates thereupon retreated on the night of the 21st toward Raleigh. The Federal loss at Bentonville was 191 killed, 1,178 wounded, 287 missing, a total of 1,656. The Confederates lost 267 killed and 1,625 captured. Johnston's plan was to attack and defeat in detail, which was all he had men for. The plan was well formed and well executed, but circumstances prevented its success. With 16,000 men he could not fight Sherman's united army of 81,000. The resistance was therefore ineffectual, and Sherman marched into Columbia February 17th. He promised protection. The pillage began with the entrance of the army, and the scenes were beyond description and beyond belief. Stores were broken open, houses entered, and the contents that were not carried away were thrown into the streets. Men, women, and children were robbed; not a house, hardly a person escaped. Women were insulted, and even sick women plundered of the jewelry on their persons. At night the entire city was burned, schools, churches, and convents sharing the general fate. Eighty-four squares of buildings were wiped out of existence.

On the day that Sherman reached Columbia, Hardee evacuated Charleston, destroying much property, but leaving 200 heavy cannon behind. With Beauregard he retired to Charlotte, where Cheatham was coming from Augusta to join them. Charleston was but a ruin when the enemy marched in. Four years' defence with daily bombardment for the greater part of the time had left a scar on almost every house.

A Federal cavalry expedition into Alabama was organized at Nashville and put under command of General J. H. Wilson, who left Chickasaw on March 22d with 15,000 men. After some skirmishing en route, Selma was occupied on the 3d of April, and the arsenal and other property, including ironworks and vast stores of cotton, burned. Cahawba was taken on the 4th, and then Montgomery, from which place he went to Georgia, capturing in rapid

succession West Point, Griffin, Lagrange, Columbus, and Macon. Wilson's victorious career through a country where no one was left to oppose him seriously was stopped by General Johnston's surrender.

General Forrest, at the end of the year 1864, had furloughed all his men whose homes were not too remote, to go thither for fresh horses and clothing. Sending scouts into Tennessee to ascertain the exact whereabouts of the enemy, and information of his movements, he established headquarters at Verona and recruited his worn ranks until March 1st. On February 24th he assumed command of the cavalry of the Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana. He grouped his men into State divisions, placing the Mississippians under General J. R. Chalmers, the Alabamians under General Abe Buford, and the Tennesseans under General W. H. Jackson. Colonel McCulloch's famous second Missouri Cavalry Regiment was constituted a special scouting force. It harassed Wilson's flanks, engaging detachments of the enemy wherever possible, and kept its cavalry busy until the end came.

General Lee held Richmond and Petersburg early in 1865 with little more than 33,000 men, while General Grant was opposing him with five times that number. The Confederate lines were nearly forty miles in length, and almost as thin as a skirmish line. There were no reserves, and men withdrawn to assist at a threatened point left their former position proportionately weakened. Sensible of his peril though he was, General Lee countenanced no negotiations for surrender, urged levies of negro troops and held out what hope he could. Despite the general despondency, few knew the terrible decrease of General Lee's army, nearly every detail of the military situation being suppressed. No one knew what was to come next.

General Lee's last offensive move was made in March, but it ended in failure and plainly showed the condition of his troops. He determined to try Grant's lines south of the Appomattox, and sent General Gordon to attack the

enemy at Hare's Hill. Bold as the effort was, it seemed to promise the capture of the neighboring works and the separation of Grant's right from its base at City Point, as well as from the army north of the James. General Gordon, early on the morning of March 25th, made a dash at the Federal works, taking them entirely by surprise. He captured Fort Steadman, which was the principal defence, together with about five hundred prisoners, and occupied nearly a quarter of a mile of the enemy's breastworks. Instead of pressing the advantage and attacking the crest in the rear of the line they occupied, the Confederates remained in possession until the enemy recovered from the effects of their surprise. The artillery from the forts to the right and the left opened fire with terrible effect, and, under cover of this, fresh Federal troops were brought up. The fort was recaptured and the Confederates retired. Two thousand of them were taken prisoners in the breastworks they had captured. The loss was one that could be ill afforded, and was most disheartening in its effect.

General Grant's purpose to await a junction with Sherman before making the final attack upon Richmond was changed for fear that when Sherman crossed the Roanoke, Johnston would move to Lee's position and join forces with him. With the view of cutting off all communication with the city north of James River, General Grant sent Sheridan with two divisions of cavalry to execute the preliminary movement of his operations against Richmond. Sheridan moved from the Shenandoah Valley with about ten thousand men on the 27th of February, and on the first day of March secured the bridge across the middle fork of the Shenandoah, entered Staunton on the 2d, and pushed on toward Waynesboro. General Early with less than twelve hundred men opposed him, but Sheridan's ten thousand cavalry captured nine hundred of Early's men with little trouble; General Early and two of his staff officers escaped by taking refuge in the neighboring woods. On the 3d, Charlottesville was taken, and here Sheridan

awaited the arrival of his trains while destroying the railroads toward Richmond and Lynchburg. After gaining the latter place, Sheridan's instructions were to break up Lee's communications by the Lynchburg Railroad and James River Canal, and then by passing southward west of Danville to join Sherman. Moving toward James River between Richmond and Lynchburg he found himself confronted by a swollen and impassable stream, and fell back. He rounded the left wing of Lee's army, crossed the Pamunkey at White House, and on the 25th joined General Grant before Petersburg. Though he had not carried out the orders given him he had been very destructive in the thirteen counties he had traversed, and had almost irreparably damaged the canal. Every lock on the canal for twenty miles from Lynchburg, and every bridge, every culvert and many miles of the railroad itself had been completely destroyed. The return of the cavalry proved a timely accession to Grant's strength in the final encounter, which was near at hand.

General Grant planned an attempt upon Lee's right by a turning column which theoretically embraced his whole army. Three divisions of the Army of the James were transferred from Longstreet's front to a position near Hatcher's Run. The Second and Fifth Corps had been holding this part of the entrenched lines, but these were thus freed to coöperate with Sheridan's cavalry, about 25,000 in all, and these moved, March 29th, to the right of Lee's entrenched line to threaten his communication by the Southside Railroad. General Lee's troops depended on this line for their daily food, and its defence was of paramount importance. Stripping his entrenchments for the purpose, General Lee sent Pickett's and Bushrod Johnson's divisions, Wise's and Ransom's brigades, Huger's battalion of infantry, and Fitzhugh Lee's division, in all about 17,000 men, to encounter the enemy. The right of the Confederate entrenched line crossed Hatcher's Run at the Boydton plank road, extending along the White Oak road. Four

miles beyond the termination of the line several roads from north and south converged on the White Oak road and formed what is known as Five Forks. It was the strategic key to the region General Lee was trying to cover, though an isolated position.

Sheridan occupied Dinwiddie Court House on the evening of March 29th, six miles southwest of the two coöperating corps of infantry and eight miles from Five Forks. Heavy rain prevented operations on the 30th, but on March 31st Sheridan pushed on to Five Forks and there encountered two divisions of infantry under Pickett and Johnson. In the afternoon, this force attacked the whole cavalry line, forcing it back to a point within two miles of Dinwiddie Court House. During the night the Confederates retired, leaving a mask of force in Sheridan's front. On the morning of April 1st, reinforced by the Fifth Corps Sheridan advanced again, flanking Pickett and Johnson within the works at Five Forks. Pressed on their front, flank and rear, the Confederates believed they were trapped, and nearly all threw down their arms. Five thousand surrendered as prisoners, and the rest of the divisions of Pickett and Johnson fled westward, demoralized and past control. When General Lee found that his right, wrenched violently from his centre, had been thus turned almost without a battle, making what he had counted as the bulk of his army of little use, he was bitterly grieved and for the only time recorded spoke in terms of reproof.

But whatever might have been the result, the fate of Richmond and Petersburg had been decided. The force defending Petersburg had been reduced to two depleted corps, strung out for nine miles. General Grant, discovering this weakness, determined to break the lines, and on the night of April 1st opened a fierce and continuous bombardment, in which every piece of artillery in forts, batteries, and mortar beds joined. At dawn he was prepared to attack. He began by a determined assault on Gordon's lines between Appomattox and Hatcher's Run. While the struggle

was on for the minor cordon of the Confederate works, Hill's batteries were carried by a heavy attack on the weakest point in the line. Forts Alexander and Gregg, two or three hundred yards in the rear of the captured position, were all that now prevented the Federals from cutting the Confederate lines in two to the Appomattox. They moved on the batteries with a rush, taking Fort Alexander; the gunners stood to their guns to the last, and fired their last shot while the Federals were on the ramparts. Confidently the victorious Federals moved from Fort Alexander on to Fort Gregg, in which the defending force had been increased by the Mississippians and North Carolinians driven back from the picket lines. The first assault was repulsed by the simultaneous fire from the infantry and artillery, and the assailants broke and retreated. Reinforcements came up, and the attack was renewed. The Federals swarmed up the sides of the works, the foremost reeling and falling upon those below. Three times they reached the top and were driven back, but they kept on. Not until the defending force of two hundred and fifty had been reduced to thirty was the fort taken. The Confederate line had been cut in two. Heavy bodies of cavalry poured over the captured works, and galloped toward the Appomattox, while the infantry formed, fronting the Confederate right flank, and appeared as if they intended to march on Petersburg.

General Lee disposed the remnant of his forces as best he could to protect Petersburg. In making this disposition General A. P. Hill lost his life. With a single orderly he rode out to obtain a near view of the Federal line and came upon six Federal soldiers in a ravine. General Hill wore only an officer's stars on a citizen's coat. He commanded the surrender of the Federals and they surrendered, but he failed to disarm them. Finding that the captors had no troops near, the prisoners fired and shot Hill through the heart. His first service had been as colonel of the Thirteenth Virginia Regiment in General Johnston's army at the famous field of Manassas, after which he had rapidly

risen through all the intermediate gradations of rank to be lieutenant-general. He had taken constant and distinguished part in the defence of Richmond for four years.

Shortly after the fall of Fort Gregg, columns of smoke were seen rising from numberless depots and warehouses in Petersburg. At eleven o'clock, a hasty telegram was sent to the war department advising that the authorities be ready to evacuate Richmond and Petersburg at eight o'clock that evening. This information was handed to President Davis as he sat in his pew at St. Paul's Church, and in an incredibly short space of time it became known throughout the city. It is a remarkable fact that the people of Richmond did not know of the past three days' fighting; that not a rumor of it was afloat, and not a newspaper in the city had printed it. There had been only reassuring reports. The day before Grant began his movement, the morning train brought the news from Petersburg that General Lee had crushed the enemy in a night attack. John M. Daniel, editor of the *Richmond Examiner*, died that day believing it true. John Mitchel, who wrote his obituary, expressed regret that Daniel had died just as a decisive victory was likely to give a turning point to success in the struggle that had been waged by the Southern Confederacy. This shows how utterly unprepared were the people on that bright Sunday morning for the news that they received.

Preparations for evacuation were hurried. The streets were soon thronged with people and with vehicles leaving the city. President Davis and some of the Cabinet left on the afternoon train. The City Council met to consult on the emergency. It was proposed to maintain order by the use of the militia and to destroy every drop of liquor in the stores and warehouses. These plans failed, and mad confusion and horrors indescribable prevailed throughout the city. There was little sleep—only disorder, pillage, wild cries of distress, the yells of drunken men. The rams in the river were blown up, the bridges were destroyed as soon as the troops had passed over them, and warehouses

were burned, the flames from the latter spreading to adjoining structures and resulting in a conflagration beyond control. In the evening of the following day, after burning the business section of the city, the flames were subdued by the efforts of the Federal troops. Those who had not fled from the city accepted the changed condition quietly, without violence or outbreak.

Meantime, General Lee had abandoned Petersburg and pushed forward with all the expedition possible to gain the southwestern route, on which all the remaining hope of the Confederacy depended. There were few obstacles to rapid travelling, for his soldiers had little to carry with them. Grant began the pursuit on the morning of April 3d. He believed that Lee would move for the Danville road and arranged the pursuit so as to obviate any chance of escape. Reaching Amelia Court House on the 4th, General Lee found that supplies ordered to be sent to that point had not arrived, and there was not a ration for his army. The country was scant of subsistence and half his men had to be detailed to forage. The delay gave Sheridan and his cavalry time to strike the Confederates upon the line of retreat, and on the afternoon of the 4th he was but seven miles away. As a last desperate chance of escape, General Lee determined to penetrate the hill section in the direction of Farmville, and on the 5th took up this line of retreat. The next day in a battle against overwhelming odds, General Ewell and the greater part of his command were captured and Pickett's small force was broken up never to re-form again. The retreat continued until the army crossed the Appomattox and reached Farmville, where the men replenished their haversacks for the first time since leaving Petersburg. The Federals attacked at early dawn on the 7th of April, but the Confederates endeavored to protect the wagons as they took up their line of retreat. Even then, in an assault by General Bryan Grimes's division on the attacking party, some two hundred Federal prisoners were taken and the attack was held off. During the rest of the day the

retreat continued with the rear unmolested. Not a gun was fired during the 8th, and when the head of the column at dark reached Appomattox Court House, only twenty-four miles from Lynchburg, the troops retired to rest with a strange feeling of relief and contentment.

General Lee realized that he had come near to the end. The sound of distant cannon in the front showed that the outlet to Lynchburg was closed by Sheridan, while Meade was in the rear and Ord south of the Court House. The only way out was by a battle which his army could not fight. He had but 8,000 men with muskets in their hands. On the morning of the 9th, a last desperate task was attempted of cutting a way through Sheridan's lines, but before the battle had fairly begun a flag of truce appeared and hostilities ceased. A correspondence begun at Farmville on the 7th of April had led to an interview between General Grant and General Lee. The proposition had come from General Grant, who said:

“GENERAL: The result of last week must convince you of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia in this struggle. I feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood, by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the C. S. Army known as the Army of Northern Virginia.”

General Lee's reply was a question as to the terms to be offered on condition of such surrender, though not conceding the hopelessness of further resistance. The correspondence was continued on the 8th and 9th, on the latter date resulting in an interview when the most generous terms were conceded by General Grant in the following letter:

“APPOMATTOX COURT HOUSE, VA., April 9, 1865.

“GENERAL R. E. LEE:

“GENERAL: In accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the 8th inst., I propose to receive the

surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia on the following terms, to-wit:

“Rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate, one copy to be given to an officer to be designated by me, the other to be retained by such officers as you may designate.

“The officers to give their individual parole not to take arms against the Government of the United States until properly exchanged; and each company or regimental commander to sign a like parole for the men of their commands.

“The arms, artillery, and public property to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officers appointed by me to receive them.

“This will not embrace the side arms of the officers, nor their private horses or baggage.

“This done, each officer and man will be allowed to return to their homes, not to be disturbed by United States authority so long as they observe their parole and the laws in force where they may reside.

“Very Respectfully,
“U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant-general.*”

The acceptance read as follows:

“HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
“April 9, 1865.

“GENERAL: I received your letter of this date, containing the terms of surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, as proposed by you. As they are substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the 8th inst., they are accepted. I will proceed to designate the proper officers to carry the stipulations into effect.

“R. E. LEE, *General.*

“LIEUT-GEN. U. S. GRANT.”

The interview had been simple and businesslike. Little was said, and nothing done beyond the agreement given in the correspondence. The rumor of surrender had started

as soon as General Lee had been seen riding to the rear attended by Colonel Charles Marshall, one of his aides, and when General Lee rode thoughtfully back to his headquarters about half-past three o'clock it was known that the surrender had been accomplished. The terms given were satisfactory to officers and men; and when they were announced they crowded around their commander, shaking hands, thanking him, and expressing regret at parting. The battle lines which had been awaiting a possible renewal of the conflict were broken for the last time. The rugged veterans bade him good-bye, with tears streaming from their eyes. All he could say to them was: "Men, we have fought through the war together; and I have done the best I could for you."

The following day, General Lee issued his last order to the army, in plain and manly words. It was as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
"April 10th, 1865.

"After four years of arduous service, marked by unsurpassed courage and fortitude, the Army of Northern Virginia has been compelled to yield to overwhelming numbers and resources.

"I need not tell the survivors of so many hard-fought battles, who have remained steadfast to the last, that I have consented to this result from no distrust of them; but, feeling that valor and devotion could accomplish nothing that could compensate for the loss that would have attended the continuation of the contest, I have determined to avoid the useless sacrifice of those whose past services have endeared them to their countrymen.

"By the terms of agreement, officers and men can return to their homes, and remain there until exchanged.

"You will take with you the satisfaction that proceeds from the consciousness of duty faithfully performed; and I earnestly pray that a merciful God will extend to you His blessing and protection.

“With an unceasing admiration of your constancy and devotion to your country, and a grateful remembrance of your kind and generous consideration of myself, I bid you an affectionate farewell.

“R. E. LEE, *General.*”

The last parade was on April 12th, when the troops marched by divisions to the designated place and stacked arms and deposited their accoutrements. General Grant was not present.


The war practically ended with the surrender of General Lee, and it was so considered in Washington. Remnants of the army remained; but before they had laid down their arms, the assassin had dealt the South a serious blow by the murder of President Lincoln. This happened on April 14th, two days after the formal disbanding of Lee's army. Not only was the act one of atrocity and barbarity, but it was the most unfortunate crime against the South that could have been committed, and was so regarded by the leaders of Southern opinion. His death was recognized as a misfortune at the time, and proved costly to the Southern people in the days following the war.


On April 26th, General Joseph E. Johnston, who had been nominally holding North and South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, with an effective force of less than twenty thousand men, surrendered to General W. T. Sherman, near Durham Station, North Carolina. General Richard Taylor surrendered the Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana on May 11th; and on May 26th General E. Kirby Smith surrendered the trans-Mississippi Department.

The Confederate flag had practically, almost absolutely, disappeared from the ocean before the opening of the year. Of the vessels that remained, the *Olustee*, the name of which had been changed to the *Chameleon*, was seized at Bermuda, but was released and returned to find blockaders too thick along the coast. She went to Liverpool where

she was seized and was finally surrendered to the United States by Great Britain a year later, in 1866. The *Chickamauga* participated in the defence of Fort Fisher, and after its fall was taken up the river and burned and sunk. The last of the Confederate cruisers was the *Shenandoah*. Sailing from London October 8, 1864, she took her armament on board from another vessel on the 18th, and sailed for Australia under Captain James I. Waddell. On her way she made prizes of the barks *Aline*, *Godfrey*, *Edward*, and *Delphine*; the schooners *Charter Oak* and *Lizzie M. Stacey*, and the brig *Susan*, all of which were burned. The steamer *Kate Prince* was ransomed to take the prisoners home, and the bark *Adelaide* was bonded. Leaving Melbourne February 8, 1865, the *Shenandoah* went to Okhotsk Sea, Behring Sea, and the Arctic Ocean, where from June 22d to June 28th she captured twenty-four ships, which were either ransomed or destroyed. It took four of them to convey the prisoners home. The burning of eight prizes near the mouth of Behring Strait, June 28, 1865, was the *Shenandoah's* last act of war. She had captured thirty-eight ships, whose value was stated by the masters as \$1,361,983. On August 2d, the *Shenandoah*, while running toward the California coast, learned from a British bark of the capitulation of the Confederacy. Her guns were dismounted, ports closed, and the ship made to resemble a merchantman. She entered Liverpool on November 6th without having spoken a vessel, and was surrendered. A charge of piracy was brought, but never pressed, as the evidence was clear that the last seizures were made before the collapse of the Confederacy was known to Waddell. The United States sold the *Shenandoah* to the Sultan of Zanzibar, and she was lost in the Indian Ocean in 1879.

February 18, 1865, Rear-admiral Semmes took charge of the James River squadron, comprising eight vessels lightly manned, but could do nothing except to prevent the Federal fleet ascending the James. When Richmond was evacuated the three ironclads of the Confederate squadron were blown





Jefferson Davis.

From photographs made during and after the War.

up and the wooden vessels burned. Semmes formed his men into a brigade of artillery, and on April 6th helped to fight the last great battle of the war at Saylor's Creek. In this battle the naval colors were the last to come down.

When Richmond was evacuated President Davis went to Danville to await General Lee, while his family went to Charlotte, North Carolina. Lee failed to reach Danville, and Davis went to Greensboro, North Carolina, where Johnston surrendered his army, and thence to Charlotte. On his way further south with the intention of escaping from the country, Davis was captured at Irwinsville, in Wilkinson County, Georgia. He was taken to Fortress Monroe and placed in close confinement in a dark, damp, and unhealthy stone cell; armed sentinels paced in front of his door night and day; a bright light was kept shining into his face; his food was served in unclean dishes, and he was allowed neither knife nor fork. His property was seized as "mementoes" and he was stared at by visitors as if he were a wild animal; at first, neither books nor papers were allowed him, except his Bible, to which his prayer book was added later, and finally Macaulay's and Bancroft's histories. He might not even have a pencil. He was placed in shackles under the most outrageous circumstances, and as efforts have been made to evade the blame for this crowning outrage, the facts are here set forth from the *Official Records*. On the 22d day of May, Assistant Secretary of War C. A. Dana made a visit to Fort Monroe, and from that point sent the following communication to Secretary of War Stanton at Washington; dating it 2 P. M.:

"The arrangements for the security of the prisoners seem to me as complete as could be desired," and then he proceeds to describe these arrangements: "Each one (Jefferson Davis and Clement C. Clay) occupies the inner room of a casemate. The window is heavily barred. A sentry stands within before each of the doors leading into the outer room. These doors are to be grated, but are now secured by bars fastened on the outside. Two other sentries stand

outside of these doors. An officer is also constantly on duty in the outer room, whose duty is to see his prisoners every fifteen minutes. The outer door of all is locked on the outside and the key is kept exclusively by the general officer of the guard. Two sentries are also stationed without that door. A strong line of sentries cuts off all access to the vicinity of the casemates. Another line is stationed on top of the parapet overhead, and a third line is posted across the moats on the counterscarp opposite the places of confinement. The casemates on each side and between those occupied by the prisoners are used as guard rooms and soldiers are always there. . . . I have not given orders to have them placed in irons, as General Halleck seemed opposed to it, but General Miles is instructed to have fetters ready, if he thinks them necessary." This document is printed in full in *Official Records*, series II, volume viii, page 564. The instruction referred to is of the same date as above, and is found in the same volume, page 565, and leaves the matter entirely in Miles's hand:

"FORT MONROE, May 22, 1865.

"Brevet Major-general Miles is hereby authorized and directed to place manacles and fetters upon the hands and feet of Jefferson Davis and Clement C. Clay whenever he thinks it advisable in order to render their imprisonment more secure.

"C. A. DANA, *Assistant Secretary of War.*"

How could the imprisonment be rendered more secure than Mr. Dana had described it to be? It was on May 22d that Mr. Davis was brought to the fort. Early on the following morning the shackles were placed on his ankles, and on May 24th the assistant secretary of war was advised of the action taken, and the statement made that the prisoner had violently resisted. The attempt made to transfer the blame falls to the ground in view of these facts and in view of the following telegram sent General Miles by Secretary Stanton

on May 28th, evidently the first information of the act having just reached the secretary of war. It is found on page 577 of the volume mentioned above.

“Please report whether irons have or have not been placed on Jefferson Davis. If they have been, when was it done and for what reason and remove them.”

Miles had removed the irons before daylight of the 28th, Sunday morning though it was, and in reply to this telegram claimed that they had been used because of the wooden door having no lock, and grated doors having been placed in their stead, the “anklets” had been removed. The world has recognized the act as an outrage, an attempt to degrade the prisoner, a studied indignity to Mr. Davis and to the Southern people.

One charge against Mr. Davis was that he had been implicated in the assassination of President Lincoln. This absurd charge was not pressed against him in the courts, and finally on the 4th of May, 1867, he was released on the bond of Horace Greeley and others. The indictment for complicity in the assassination was quashed early in December, 1867.

On May 29th, 1865, President Johnson issued his proclamation stating the terms on which the people of the Southern States could be restored to their civil rights. This declaration, commonly known as the Amnesty Proclamation, was much more stringent than Lincoln's had been. In it Johnson barred from the right to take the amnesty oath fourteen classes of prominent Confederates. Provisional governors were appointed for the subjugated States, with authority to assemble delegates elected by those who had taken the amnesty oath, first to amend the State constitutions, and then to secure the election of State officers, legislatures, and members of Congress under the constitutions so amended.

CHAPTER XX

CIVIL GOVERNMENT OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES

THE most remarkable inauguration of a new government, with all its complicated machinery in working order, that the world has ever known was the formation of the Confederate States of America. The government sprang into existence full fledged and equipped for battle. There was no confusion, little debate. The framers of the constitutions, both provisional and permanent, were skilled in the art of government, learned in the history and meaning of the constitution of the country of which they and their ancestors had so long been a part, and knew the theory of a government by the people, of the people, and for the people; they believed in that theory as a practical and simple government.

Secession from one governmental compact logically included the formation of another for the common defence, and to its formation the best minds of the South were brought. The history of the Constitution of the United States and of its meaning as it was understood by its framers, as it was understood by the statesmen of the Southern States, was traced in the opening chapter of this history. The existence of slavery at the time of the Declaration of Independence, its gradual disappearance from the Northern States "by the operation of social, economic, and natural laws," and the final decision of the North to destroy it because "its continuance threatened not only their industrial independence, but their political importance," needs

no further reference here. When the years of gradually increasing estrangement led to angry strife, and the crisis came, secession and the new government followed speedily. South Carolina first made official declaration of the cause which it believed justified secession. Georgia recited the attachment of its people to the Union from "habit, national tradition and aversion to change," and stated the willingness of its people to abide by the original compact. These, and all the other Southern States withdrew from the Union to save the principles of the Constitution, not to destroy them. From the beginning of the government the Southern States had tried to keep all legislation within the orbit prescribed by the Constitution, and had failed. For selfish and sectional purposes the Constitution had been so abrogated that the numerically weaker section of the country could have no peace or liberty except through independence. Throughout the war, no less than after it, the seceded States were treated in a contradictory manner—sometimes as being in the Union, sometimes as being out of the Union; now as States and again as conquered territory. They were forced to ratify amendments, and then refused the exercise of their rights as States. Sometimes representation was accorded them, sometimes refused. All this was in line with the treatment of many years leading up to the war, intended to force upon them radical changes in matters over which only the States had rightful control.

South Carolina's secession of the 20th of December, 1860, was followed by the secession of Florida, Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana, and Georgia in January, 1861. In the South Carolina convention a resolution was adopted December 27th, by which the people of the Southern States were invited to select delegates to a convention to be held in Montgomery on February 4, 1861, to consult "as to the most effectual mode of securing concerted and harmonious action in whatever measures may be deemed most desirable for the common peace and security." The Alabama Convention emphasized the invitation and to further the cause

of Southern independence, the Alabama legislature appropriated the sum of \$500,000.

In the State Capitol at Montgomery then, on February 4, 1861, met the delegates from six States as a Convention of Deputies. It was a quiet, orderly, dignified assembly, with a deep sense of responsibility, come together as the representatives of sovereign States. The first work was to prepare a provisional constitution. Their action was prompt though deliberate and conservative, and the new government was established in accordance with what had been claimed as the meaning of the Constitution of the United States since the formation of the Federal Union. The discussions were able, patriotic, and unselfish. The provisional government was established and came into being almost as by magic. The delegates were of the same mind. In seceding, their States had prescribed conditions and restrictions as to general conformity with the Constitution of the United States, with which all were familiar. The agreement with that document was marked, and was purposed, it being the intention to adopt every part of it which the Southern people approved, and to depart from it only where the meaning of its language had been disputed. The Provisional Constitution was adopted February 8th, to continue in force for one year unless earlier superseded by a permanent organization. Such changes were also incorporated in the Provisional Constitution as were made necessary by giving the legislative power into the hands of a single body.

On the day following the adoption of the Provisional Constitution, Jefferson Davis was elected president and Alexander H. Stephens vice-president, and within a few days after their inauguration, February 18th, the six Cabinet officers were appointed, viz: Robert Toombs, of Georgia, secretary of state; Stephen R. Mallory, of Florida, secretary of the navy; Judah P. Benjamin, of Louisiana, attorney-general; John H. Reagan, of Texas, postmaster-general; C. G. Memminger, of South Carolina, secretary of the treasury, and L. P. Walker, of Alabama, secretary of

war. The departments organized, they proceeded with the work of preparing for war as smoothly and as systematically as if the government had been long established. There was no halting, no hesitation. The Cabinet was made up of men who had studied statecraft and knew it. While the majority of them believed that the South would be allowed to depart without coercion, Mr. Davis had never so believed, and he deemed it an imperative duty to prepare for the coming conflict.

There were few new laws enacted by the Provisional Confederate Congress. All the early legislation, and much of it was necessary, had in view the adaptation of the newly formed government to its environments, the prevention of friction and inconvenience arising from the suspension of existent relations with the United States, and the supply of such equipments as should be necessary. Agents were sent abroad and to the North, to prepare as far as preparation could be made, for the contingency of armed resistance. And while all this business was being expedited, preparations were also under way for the installation of a permanent government to take the place of the transient government primarily formed. All the time that could be spared was devoted to the consideration of a permanent Constitution to be submitted to the States for ratification or rejection. The committee to form a permanent Constitution had been appointed on the day when the president and vice-president had been elected, and this committee was composed of two members from each of the States represented. The committee remained in continuous session, and on the 26th of February submitted its report. The Constitution prepared by them was unanimously adopted March 11, 1861.

Again the model had been taken from the Constitution under which they had heretofore lived, on which they had relied, and in which they made only such changes as would indubitably explain its intent and remedy the evils by which secession had been provoked. The object in view was the reformation and rejuvenation of the Union that

they had loved. The document itself refutes all charges of personal ambition, treason or conspiracy. The derivative character of the Confederacy was emphasized, the quality and sovereignty of the States declared, and such limitations and restrictions placed upon the powers of the general government as would make future aggressions and usurpations altogether impossible. The South had never found fault with the Constitution of the United States; they had but objected to its misinterpretation and improper administration, and their purpose was to adopt an organic law that secured faithful observance in the future. They framed it, however, strictly on the States Rights theory, taking the possibility of unlimited control from any majority in Congress, and the result vindicated their wisdom and conservatism. In every change made they had simply endeavored to incorporate in unmistakable language those constructions of the Constitution of the United States for which they had always contended. It was the strongest possible proof of the attachment of the people of the South to the institutions of their fathers that in framing a new bond of union they found so little to alter.

The term of the president's office was fixed at six years, and he was made ineligible for a second term—a provision that ever since the war the statesmen of the North have advocated engrafting upon the Constitution of the United States. Except for its own expenses, and certain judicially determined claims, Congress could make no appropriation except by a two-thirds vote of both houses, unless asked and estimated for by some one of the heads of the departments through the president. The president was empowered to approve of some and disapprove of other appropriations in the same bill. No law could relate to more than one subject, and that subject must be clearly stated in the title of the bill. Receipts and disbursements, item by item, were required to be published at stated intervals. Believing in the economical administration of government, the South vigilantly guarded the treasury. Executive power was

restricted so that the president could remove no one except for cause, save the members of his Cabinet and those engaged in the diplomatic service. No person nominated for civil office and rejected by the Senate could be reappointed during intervals between the sessions of Congress. Congress was forbidden to levy and collect taxes, duties, imports, or excises except for paying debts and conducting the government, and its power over the adjudication of claims was rigidly limited, such adjudication being placed in the hands of the courts. The Confederate Congress could make no appropriation for internal improvements, except to furnish lights, beacons, buoys, and other aids to navigation along the coast, the improvement of harbors, and the removal of obstructions in river navigation; and the cost of these must be paid by duties levied on the beneficiaries of the work. Under certain conditions a State was allowed to make internal improvements within its own borders by levying a tax on seagoing tonnage benefited thereby, and two or more States might agree with one another for improving rivers flowing between them. The expenses of the post office department after March 1, 1863, were required to be paid out of its own revenues. The provisions affecting slave property are not of interest now.

Among the other changes made were those referring to Constitutional amendments, a two-thirds vote of each State for the admission of new States, bankruptcy laws, citizenship, and the prevention of alien suffrage. It has been said that every possible infringement upon popular liberty, or upon State rights, every oppressive or sectional use of the taxing power, was carefully guarded against, and civil service reform was made easy and practicable. Stubborn and corrupting controversies about tariffs, the post office, the improvement of rivers and harbors, subsidies, extra pay, were avoided. The taxing power was placed under salutary restrictions. Responsibility was more clearly fixed. Money in the treasury was protected against purchasable majorities and wicked combinations. Adequate powers for a frugal

and just administration were granted to the general government; and thus the States maintained their autonomy and were not reduced to petty corporations, or counties, or dependencies.

Not only did this new Constitution meet with the universal approval of the Southern people, but the intelligent criticism of hostile elements in the North felt bound to admit that it possessed strong features. A few days after its adoption, or on March 16, 1861, the *New York Herald* editorially conceded that the "New Constitution is the Constitution of the United States, with various modifications and some very important and most desirable improvements. We are free to say that the invaluable reforms enumerated should be adopted by the United States, with or without a reunion with the seceded States, and as soon as possible. But why not accept them with the propositions of the Confederate States on slavery as a basis of reunion?" As prejudice dies away, this document will more and more be recognized as a worthy contribution to the science of government.

There were comparatively few changes in the Confederate Cabinet, and in the executive proper there was none, both Mr. Davis and Mr. Stephens being reëlected at the expiration of the provisional period. Robert Toombs, secretary of state, resigned and was succeeded by Robert M. T. Hunter, July 25, 1861, Hunter giving way to Judah P. Benjamin, who was appointed March 18, 1862, and served until the end of the war. As secretary of the treasury, Christopher G. Memminger was succeeded, July 18, 1864, by George A. Trenholm. Stephen R. Mallory, secretary of the navy, and John H. Reagan, postmaster-general, served till the close of the war. As secretary of war, several held office before James A. Seddon, who was appointed November 21, 1862, and served until February 6, 1865.

A measure enacted by the Confederate Congress which excited much comment at the time was the conscription law. It had been easy during the first year of the war to

secure volunteers for the army in sufficient numbers to accomplish all that could then be undertaken, and an army even larger than could be fitted out was mustered. When the contest continued, and it became evident that the end was yet far away, enlistments fell off. An unfortunate law passed by the Provisional Congress just before the end of its existence allowed a sixty days' furlough to every man who would reënlist for the term of the war. The effect of this was to cause a considerable temporary depletion of the army then in the field, and the streets of Richmond were filled with furloughed soldiers homeward bound. Despite the appeals of Generals Beauregard and Johnston, and of other commanders, the lines became thinner and thinner, and the condition was beginning to be one of danger, when the Provisional Confederacy passed out of existence and the regular Congress met.

One of the first acts of this Congress was to pass a law to secure better measures of preparation, and this was the "Conscript Law." This law authorized President Davis to call out and place in military service for three years or until the end of the war all white male residents of the Confederate States between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five, and to continue those already in the army for three years from the date of their enlistment. All under the age of eighteen or over thirty-five might be forced to serve for ninety days. This was the first step taken toward placing the army in a permanent and efficient condition. Previous to this, the military system of the Confederacy was not a strong one, reliance having been placed solely on popular enthusiasm for the conduct of the war. In his inaugural address to the regular Congress in February, 1862, President Davis had stated the necessity of enlisting troops for long terms instead of short ones; and this law, finally passed on the 16th of April, 1862, was the response. By it there were saved to the army one hundred and forty-eight regiments, whose terms otherwise would have expired in the next thirty days. Their terms were prolonged for two years. The

existing companies, regiments, etc., were brought up to their full quota of men; camps of instruction were established in the various States; a commandant of conscripts was appointed for each State, and charged with the enrollment and instruction of the new recruits. The efficiency of the law was aided by the appointment of lieutenant-generals, either commanding separate departments or heading army corps under a general in the field. Brigades continued to be organized with troops and generals from the several States, as occasion offered, and with no detriment to the service.

The constitutionality of this law was vigorously attacked in certain quarters, but it met with almost unanimous approval from most of the leading men of the various States, and the method of its administration left little room for complaint. It was recognized as a military necessity, and, being made as little harsh as possible under the circumstances, it undoubtedly prolonged the existence of the Confederacy. Its operation was suspended in the States of Tennessee, Missouri, and Kentucky, because those States were held by the Federal armies. A second conscript law was passed on September 27, 1862, by which all white men between the ages of thirty-five and forty-five were placed in the army for three years, and the power given to enroll all subject to duty wherever they might be found. Provision was made for the reception of volunteers from States where the operation of the law was suspended. On February 11, 1864, a third act was passed, enlisting all white men between the ages of seventeen and fifty for the full term of the war, and also retaining in the service until the end of the war all in the army whose ages were between eighteen and forty-five. An enrollment was ordered of all between seventeen and eighteen and between forty-five and fifty as a reserve, whose work should be detail duty and the States' defence.

The feeling of the South regarding the conscript law was thus stated by some of the Southern leaders: "If it be absolutely necessary to save us from a conquest by the

North, we are willing to submit to it, but we fear the public mind must prepare itself for a great change in our government."

But the conscription laws did not bring into active service as many men as it was expected to add. Had they done so the Confederacy would have been unable to provide arms and equipments for them, and, in fact, many regiments were raised that never were armed and sent to the field. And although the conscription laws seemed framed to bring into the army every man above the age of eighteen years, it must be remembered that the greater part of the Confederacy was under the domination of the Union and its laws could be enforced in only a portion of the territory. This condition was generally recognized during the war and immediately thereafter,—recognized on both sides,—but the time came when the great number of unarmed troops began to be counted by the States as their contribution to the cause, and companies formed solely for the protection of their own neighborhoods were added to the number of regular troops. Since the records are destroyed in large part, exact results are hard to obtain, but the closest possible estimates of the total number enlisted in the Confederate army cannot make it exceed 700,000, if, indeed, it much exceeded 600,000. The number of regiments is an unsafe guide. The Federal authorities were astonished at the small numbers on regimental rolls when they surrendered, many so-called regiments having but handfuls of men. Appleton's *Annual Cyclopædia* for 1862 states that even in that year many companies had more officers than men. At the end of the war the number surrendered in all the armies of the South is officially stated to be 174,223. In addition to these there were in Federal prisons 98,802. The aggregate of the Federal armies, May 1, 1865, was 1,000,516, of which number 602,598 were the "available force present for duty." The Army of the Potomac alone at the end of the war numbered 162,851, or 94 per cent of the aggregate in all the Confederate armies at the time of surrender. Sherman's

army numbered 116,183, or almost exactly two-thirds of the entire Southern force. The *Official Records* show the enlistments in the Federal army to have numbered 2,877,641.

Another estimate of the numbers in each army may be reached by means of the census of 1860. This shows that in 1860 the entire white male population of the United States numbered 13,685,834, and that of the eleven seceding States but 2,799,818, leaving in the Northern and Border States 10,886,016—considerably in excess of three times the Southern white population. Of this population in the Southern States the same census shows but 1,055,793 white males between the ages of eighteen and forty-five years, and from this the number residing in western Virginia is to be deducted, leaving a little less than 1,000,000 all told. In the States adhering to the Union, counting 57,000 for western Virginia, there were 4,626,065 between those ages, or 4.62 times as many as lived in the South. These are the figures of the census. If it be urged that the conscription age embraced all between the ages of seventeen and fifty, the following table will show a similar result. The figures are compiled from the census:

The number between the ages of fifteen and seventeen is estimated as forty per cent of the number given as between the ages of fifteen and twenty in the census reports, which is approximately correct.

	Under Fifteen.	Fifteen to Seventeen.	Over Fifty.	Total.
Alabama	121,712	11,955	21,828	145,495
Arkansas	79,674	6,124	10,371	96,169
Florida	17,785	1,639	3,182	22,606
Georgia	135,203	13,341	25,034	183,578
Louisiana	71,854	6,518	12,393	90,765
Mississippi	80,855	7,848	14,452	103,155
North Carolina	79,871	7,374	14,046	101,291
South Carolina	62,012	6,397	14,117	82,526
Tennessee	186,582	18,690	35,609	240,881
Texas	97,309	8,660	14,873	120,842
Virginia	226,225	22,640	52,479	301,344
Total	1,159,082	109,186	218,384	1,486,652

From the total white male population deduct those exempt as above and we have a remainder of 1,313,166 as the total white male population between the ages of seventeen and fifty years. From this is still to be deducted those residing in western Virginia and in those large portions of the Confederacy which were subjugated by the armies of invasion and cut off from service in the Confederate armies previous to 1864, when the age limit was extended so as to embrace those under eighteen and over forty-five. From it is still to be deducted those incapable of service by reason of physical disability or mental incapacity and other causes and those who did no service beyond guarding their own homes. This would leave practically the same result as the other figures show, and demonstrate the truth that even had every sound man between the ages named in the conscription laws been enrolled, there would have been between 600,000 and 700,000. Even these figures show a much larger proportion of enlistments than is shown by the Northern States. Those who entered the Southern armies from the Border States were more than offset by those from Southern States like Tennessee, North Carolina, Virginia, and Arkansas, who joined the armies of the North.

In addition to the overwhelming power of home numbers in the North, there was a steady stream of foreign immigrants to the Union armies, drawn from abroad by the bounty offered for volunteers. The South fought without foreign aid to swell her armies. The immigration statistics of the decade between 1860 and 1870 tell a part of the story and the enormous increase in population of the northern and Northwestern States tells the rest. The foreign soldiery who settled in this country had their share in adding to the population of Missouri during those ten years 540,000; to Pennsylvania, 600,000; to New York, 500,000; to Michigan, 431,000; to Illinois, 807,000; to Iowa, 413,000; to Kansas, 230,000; to Indiana, 300,000; to Minnesota, 260,000; to Ohio, 300,000, and to Wisconsin, 230,000. Of the Southern States, only Texas,



Battle flags in the Memorial Hall of the Louisiana Historical Society.

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with the highest percentage of gain, 34 per cent, could show as many gained as 144,000. One Southern State, Alabama, showed a loss of population as compared with 1860, and five others showed increases ranging from .56 of one per cent to 8.19 per cent.

Taking this diversity of numbers into consideration, the success which marked the early history of the Confederate arms must find its explanation in the army leaders. The North appointed in turn Generals McClellan, Pope, Burnside, and Hooker, and all met defeat by the army whose movements were directed by General Lee. It was Grant who determined upon the crushing of the Southern armies by superior numbers, and even this plan of campaign involved the loss of greater numbers of Northern men.

And it was not alone those who directed operations upon the field to whom must be ascribed the efficiency of the Southern army. The military movements were directed from Richmond by President Davis, a man educated in the school of war and an able commander. And as adjutant and inspector-general, and consequently ranking officer of the Confederate army, President Davis appointed Samuel Cooper, a man who vindicated the confidence reposed in him.

Cooper was born at Hackensack, New Jersey, June 12, 1798, his father being a soldier who had fought at Lexington, Bunker Hill, Monmouth, and Germantown in the Revolutionary War, gaining by his service the rank of major. The son was graduated at the United States Military Academy in 1815, and served in the artillery and on garrison duty at Washington for several years. He married, in 1827, the granddaughter of George Mason, United States Senator from Virginia; was promoted to first lieutenant in 1828; served as aide to General Alexander Macomb and was then made captain on staff duty and served as assistant adjutant-general until 1841; served as chief of staff to Colonel W. J. Worth in the Seminole War, in Florida, 1836-1837; was in Washington on special duty 1842-1852,

being brevetted colonel for meritorious services in the prosecution of his duties in the conduct of the war with Mexico; served as adjutant-general 1852-1861, with the rank of colonel of staff, and for a time was secretary of war *ad interim*. On the outbreak of the Civil War, Cooper resigned his commission in the United States army, in March, 1861, and President Davis, knowing his ability, appointed him to high position in the army of the new nation, which place he held until the end of the war. After the war he lived quietly in his country home near Alexandria, Virginia, and died December 3, 1876.

General Cooper wrote in 1836 *A Concise System of Instruction and Regulations for the Militia and Volunteers of the United States*. His thorough knowledge of military matters and his careful regard of detail are to be seen in the voluminous correspondence of his office as printed in the *Official Records*. Much of the success of the Southern arms until the latter days of the war is to be attributed to the thorough understanding at Richmond, and the accord existing between the authorities there and General Lee.

The Partisan Ranger Law was passed in the spring of 1862, and authorized the president to commission officers to form bands of "Partisan Rangers," either of infantry or cavalry, but subsequently confined to cavalry alone. Under this law numerous commissions were issued by which independent companies were formed, and these independent companies did valuable service in many sections. The partisan rangers received the same pay as other soldiers, and for all arms and munitions of war captured from the enemy were paid the full value of such captures.

Owing to the disposition of the Federals to treat these partisan rangers as guerrillas rather than as regular soldiers, a direct inquiry was addressed to the secretary of war by Senator John B. Clark, of Missouri, asking whether the partisan rangers were to be regarded as a part of the army of the Confederacy and protected by the government as such; and whether, in the event of capture, the Confederate

government would claim for them the same treatment as prisoners of war which was then exacted for prisoners belonging to the regular army. In response to this inquiry, Secretary Randolph wrote that "partisan rangers are a part of the provisional army of the Confederate States, subject to all the regulations adopted for its government, and entitled to the same protection as prisoners of war. Partisan rangers are in no respect different from troops of the line, except that they are not brigaded and are employed oftener on detached service."

That the question of sufficient food supplies might easily become an important one was early foreseen. The first session of the Provisional Congress at Montgomery passed a law exempting from import duty bacon, pork, hams, lard, beef, fish, wheat, flour of all grains, corn meal, barley, rye, oats, and all munitions of war. Later, at the second session of the Provisional Congress, all imports from Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas were exempted from payment of duties, and the tariff bill, enacted May 21, 1861, put on the free list all foods and all agricultural products, including those of orchard and garden.

A law passed February 17, 1864, authorized the employment of slaves to perform duties with the army in constructing military defences, preparing materials of war, or working in military hospitals. The secretary of war was authorized to employ 20,000 negroes for these purposes, but this law produced less result than had been expected. It did lead up, however, to the suggestion of employing slaves as soldiers in the army, a proposition vigorously opposed by President Davis, though as strongly favored by General R. E. Lee. President Davis made it the subject of a special message to Congress on November 7, 1864, and urged the propriety of a radical modification of the theory of the law. He argued the question strenuously, but subsequently a bill passed the House authorizing him to ask for and accept from their owners such a number of able-bodied negro men as he might deem expedient. The Senate,

however, opposed the passage of the bill by one vote. The Virginia senators, under instructions of the legislature, then changed their votes, and the bill finally passed, with an amendment that not more than twenty-five per cent of the slaves between the ages of eighteen and forty-five might be called out. But the delay in passing the measure left insufficient time for securing any of the anticipated benefit from it, so that the wisdom of its enactment was never apparent.

The department of justice, established by an Act passed on February 21, 1861, was efficiently maintained. The State courts were simply continued as before, with little or no change, and the administration of justice in all the courts was marked for its high character as well as for the ability of those placed in positions of responsibility. In all the courts, from the highest to the lowest, was shown the ability of the Southern people to direct all the affairs of government and to administer the laws.

President Davis was empowered by Congress to declare the suspension of the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* in cities threatened with invasion, and by virtue of this authority did in numerous cases declare martial law in cities so threatened. The first instances to be noted were Richmond and Norfolk during 1862. In the case of Richmond, the proclamation of territory in which civil jurisdiction was suspended included all the country adjacent to and about Richmond within a distance of ten miles. The mayor of the city was the only official whose jurisdiction was not taken away. Threatened territory was thus better protected and order more effectually maintained. At a later period of the war, martial law was proclaimed throughout the South, the *habeas corpus* being suspended and a passport system established that, though onerous, was made necessary by the exigencies of the times.

The foreign relations of the Confederate government were anomalous at all times, and such relations as existed were of little actual advantage save in the case of Great Britain. Robert W. Barnwell had been President Davis's

choice for secretary of state, that he might conduct the foreign relations of the new government. Mr. Barnwell, distrustful of his own ability, declined the portfolio, and Mr. Davis named for his secretary of state Robert Toombs, of Georgia, whom he had originally intended for the treasury department. The provisional constitution directed that steps be at once taken to settle all matters at issue between the States forming the Confederacy and those forming the United States, and to negotiate friendly relations; but the attempt, though made in good faith, proved an utter failure, as heretofore narrated in this history. The Confederacy also adopted the Paris Agreement of 1856, touching the international law of blockade, and sent commissioners to Europe, especially to Great Britain and France, to present this subject, as well as to secure for the Confederacy a favorable position in relation to the rights of neutrals and belligerents. These commissioners were James M. Mason, of Virginia, and John Slidell, of Louisiana. While they, together with their secretaries, were on board the British mail steamer *Trent*, between Havana and St. Thomas, they were seized by Captain Wilkes, of the United States navy, commanding the *San Jacinto*, on November 8, 1861, and taken to Fort Warren, in Boston Harbor, and confined as prisoners. The captain of the *Trent* reported this insult to the British flag, and the most intense excitement prevailed in England. The war feeling sprung up, and troops were sent to Canada. Formal demand was made upon the Washington authorities for an apology and for the surrender of the prisoners, and both demands were promptly complied with. Though so promising at the time, the affair soon passed off without material results. Although the commissioners proceeded to Europe, their labors were fruitless; so, also, were the labors of John I. Pickett, the secretary for the commissioners, who visited Washington, and who was sent to Mexico as the diplomatic agent of the Confederate government. He conducted an able and interesting correspondence, but accomplished nothing.

Previous to this time, William L. Yancey, of Alabama, A. P. Rost, of Louisiana, and A. D. Mann, of Virginia, had been sent abroad with general authority to watch the interests of the Confederacy, and with some supervision over the cotton loan. Through their efforts Great Britain and France recognized the Confederate States as belligerents but deferred recognition of independence. The demand was, however, made by the foreign powers that the blockade of the Southern ports must be effective and not merely a proclaimed blockade.

Hon. L. Q. C. Lamar was appointed envoy to Russia, spending the first half of 1863 in London and Paris, where he did much toward correcting wrong ideas of the nature of the Confederacy, what it had done, and what it proposed to do. But finding conditions in Russia unfavorable, the mission was discontinued and Lamar returned home.

Another special commissioner to Europe, but particularly to Great Britain, was appointed early in 1865, in the person of Hon. Duncan F. Kenner, of Louisiana. He was able, discreet, well informed, and had large and unusual discretionary powers, but long delays, numerous detentions, and the accumulating disasters to the Confederacy prevented his achieving success in any of the objects of his mission, or even, for that matter, of attempting them. It is unfortunate that he left no narrative of this interesting chapter of his life and of the life of the Confederacy.

Judah P. Benjamin, one of the president's advisers during the existence of the Confederacy, was secretary of state while these active agents of the Confederacy were trying to secure foreign intervention. After the collapse of the Confederacy he went to London, became Queen's Counsel and the acknowledged head of the English bar. Tireless, cheerful and hopeful, of immense resources and strong convictions, he managed affairs with rare ability and good judgment.

The foreign-built cruisers of the Confederacy have had due notice in the account of their careers. While constructed abroad under direction of Captain James D. Bulloch,

the official representative of the Confederacy, they were neither armed nor equipped in British waters. All that the South secured from Great Britain was the unarmed vessels. On the other hand, vast shipments of arms and implements of war were being sent by foreign merchants to the North with scarce an effort at concealment. That Great Britain paid for the damage done to Northern shipping by the Confederate cruisers was merely a concession to the victor, and in the interest of commercial peace.

The relation of the State governments to the Confederacy was well defined and not unlike their relation to the government of the United States, save in the more rigidly defined rights retained by them. Yet under the pressing necessities of military law and in view of the paramount duty of the new government to defend itself, these rights were not always conceded. Martial law at the end was supreme. And yet, as compared with the coercion that accompanied the Federal invasion of the South, the Confederate States government was lenient indeed. The Federal policy was marked by invasion and martial law which repressed or suppressed the State government in every invaded State. Missouri and Kentucky were refused the right to remain neutral. A revolutionary State government organized in Missouri was backed by the Federal army, while in Kentucky a reign of terror was instituted to defeat neutrality, and the government of the people overthrown. Martial law prevailed in Maryland and that State was subjugated before its people had an opportunity to speak. In subjugated States military governors were appointed, like Andrew Johnson in Tennessee, who ruled without mercy and with unprecedented severity; their avowed purpose was to punish those who had been independent enough to think for themselves, who had seceded not from the Union that they had originally joined, but from a Union where the Constitution no longer ruled.

One of the darkest chapters in the history of the war is the record of the treatment of prisoners. The crews

of small vessels operating under letters of marque issued by the Confederacy were captured by the North, tried and convicted as pirates. Their execution was stayed by the assurance of President Davis that he would execute for each man a Federal officer of rank then a prisoner. The exchange of prisoners was hampered and finally suspended by the Federals until popular indignation in the North forced its resumption. The cartel arranged for the exchange of prisoners was often violated, officers and men being confined, sometimes in irons or cells, even when the Federal authorities announced that all Confederate officers had been exchanged. The ground of opposition to the exchange of prisoners was stated by General Grant in a letter to General B. F. Butler under date of August 18, 1864. He says: "It is hard on our men held in Southern prisons not to exchange them, but it is humanity to those left in the ranks to fight our battles. Every man released on parole, or otherwise, becomes an active soldier against us at once, either directly or indirectly. If we commence a system of exchange which liberates all prisoners taken we will have to fight on until the whole South is exterminated. If we hold those caught they amount to no more than dead men. At this particular time, to release all rebel prisoners North would insure Sherman's defeat, and would compromise our safety here." The inference naturally is that Northern prisoners released had enough of fighting and went no more into the army.

The Confederacy was not able to care for its multitude of prisoners—the authorities had not even food and medicines for their armies; but the prisoners received the same rations as the men in the Southern army. Recognizing the fact that the sick among their prisoners were in need of supplies which could not be furnished, Judge Robert C. Ould, the Confederate commissioner for the exchange of prisoners, on January 24, 1863, wrote to General E. A. Hitchcock, United States Commissioner of Exchange, proposing that prisoners on each side should be attended by a

proper number of their own surgeons, who should take charge under rules to be agreed upon; that these surgeons should have power to receive and distribute medicine, money, food, and clothing sent the prisoners; that these surgeons should be selected by their own governments with power to report upon their own acts and matters concerning the welfare of the prisoners. The letter was ignored.

The South then offered to release to the United States government their sick and wounded without any equivalent, and did deliver between ten and fifteen thousand at the mouth of Savannah River, of whom five thousand were well men. The United States thereupon delivered to the Confederacy about three thousand sick and wounded, five hundred having died after starting from their northern prisons. The South had offered to surrender the Federal sick and wounded in the summer; they were not sent for until November.

But despite the vast differences between the resources and wealth of the North and of the South, and despite the hard conditions which lay upon the South, the northern prisons were more fatal than those of the South. During the war 22,576 out of a total of 270,000 prisoners died in the hands of the Confederates; in the northern prisons 26,246 Southern soldiers died, out of a total of 220,000 held prisoners. The report of the secretary of war, E. M. Stanton, July 19, 1866, shows the number that died; the official report of Surgeon-general Barnes of the United States army shows the number of prisoners on both sides. By their figures the death rate was more than twelve per cent in the northern prisons and less than nine per cent in the prisons of the South.

The war between the States was a great object lesson to the world, for it revealed the great power and resources of the United States, both North and South. It paved the way to make the United States a world power. It was characteristic of the people of the South that they accepted the result of the contest in good faith. The surrender was

followed by no insurrections, by no guerrilla warfare, but when the South laid down its arms, the Southern people turned from war to the arts of peace once more—a proof as strong as could be given of the innate confidence of Southern men in American institutions. Utterly exhausted and without resources, the remnants of the defeated army returned to their ruined homes and took up the stupendous task of creating them anew. The whole industrial system was deranged by the abolition of slavery, and immense properties had been swept away without compensation. Yet, unflinchingly, turning their eyes to the time to come, those who had fought as Confederate soldiers took up the labor of carving from their defeat a success grander than any other country has yet achieved from victory.

APPENDIX I

CONSTITUTION OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA

WE, the people of the Confederate States, each State acting in its sovereign and independent character, in order to form a permanent federal government, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity—invoking the favor and guidance of Almighty God—do ordain and establish this Constitution for the Confederate States of America.

ARTICLE I.

SEC. 1.—All legislative powers herein delegated shall be vested in a Congress of the Confederate States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.

SEC. 2.—(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several States; and the electors in each State shall be citizens of the Confederate States, and have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislature; but no person of foreign birth, not a citizen of the Confederate States, shall be allowed to vote for any officer, civil or political, State or Federal.

(2) No person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained the age of twenty-five years, and be a citizen of the Confederate States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.

(3) Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Confederacy, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all slaves. The actual enumeration shall be made within three years after the first meeting of the Congress of the Confederate States, and within every subsequent term of ten years, in such manner as they shall by law direct. The number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every fifty thousand, but each State shall have at least one Representative; and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of South Carolina shall be entitled to choose six; the State of Georgia, ten; the State of Alabama, nine; the State of Florida, two; the State of Mississippi, seven; the State of Louisiana, six; and the State of Texas, six.

(4) When vacancies happen in the representation from any State, the executive authority thereof shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies.

(5) The House of Representatives shall choose their Speaker and other officers; and shall have the sole power of impeachment; except that any judicial or other federal officer resident and acting solely within the limits of any State, may be impeached by a vote of two-thirds of both branches of the legislature thereof.

SEC. 3.—(1) The Senate of the Confederate States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen for six years by the legislature thereof, at the regular session next immediately preceding the commencement of the term of service; and each Senator shall have one vote.

(2) Immediately after they shall be assembled, in consequence of the first election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three classes. The seats of the Senators of the first class shall be vacated at the expiration of the second year; of the second class at the expiration of the fourth year; and of the third class at the expiration of the sixth year; so

that one-third may be chosen every second year; and if vacancies happen by resignation or otherwise during the recess of the legislature of any State, the executive thereof may make temporary appointments until the next meeting of the legislature, which shall then fill such vacancies.

(3) No person shall be a Senator, who shall not have attained the age of thirty years, and be a citizen of the Confederate States; and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of the State for which he shall be chosen.

(4) The Vice President of the Confederate States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no vote, unless they be equally divided.

(5) The Senate shall choose their other officers, and also a President *pro tempore*, in the absence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the office of President of the Confederate States.

(6) The Senate shall have sole power to try all impeachments. When sitting for that purpose they shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Confederate States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside; and no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of the members present.

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit, under the Confederate States; but the party convicted shall, nevertheless, be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment according to law.

SEC. 4.—(1) The times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof, subject to the provisions of this Constitution; but the Congress may, at any time, by law, make or alter such regulations, except as to the times and places of choosing Senators.

(2) The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year; and such meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall, by law, appoint a different day.

SEC. 5.—(1) Each House shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members, and a majority of each shall constitute a quorum to do business; but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the attendance of absent members, in such manner and under such penalties as each House may provide.

(2) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of the whole number, expel a member.

(3) Each House shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may in their judgment require secrecy, and the ayes and noes of the members of either House, on any question, shall, at the desire of one-fifth of those present, be entered on the journal.

(4) Neither House, during the session of Congress, shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.

SEC. 6.—(1) The Senators and Representatives shall receive a compensation for their services, to be ascertained by law, and paid out of the Treasury of the Confederate States. They shall, in all cases except treason and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other place.

(2) No Senator or Representative shall, during the time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under the authority of the Confederate States, which shall have been created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased during such time; and no person holding any office under the Confederate States shall be a member of either House during his continuance in office. But Congress may, by law, grant to the principal officer in each

of the executive departments a seat upon the floor of either House, with the privilege of discussing any measure appertaining to his department.

SEC. 7.—(1) All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills.

(2) Every bill which shall have passed both Houses shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President of the Confederate States; if he approve he shall sign it; but if not, he shall return it with his objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of that House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of that House, it shall become a law. But in all such cases, the votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the persons voting for and against the bill shall be entered on the journal of each House respectively. If any bill shall not be returned by the President within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress, by their adjournment, prevent its return; in which case it shall not be a law. The President may approve any appropriation and disapprove any other appropriation in the same bill. In such case he shall, in signing the bill, designate the appropriations disapproved; and shall return a copy of such appropriations, with his objections, to the House in which the bill shall have originated; and the same proceedings shall then be had as in case of other bills disapproved by the President.

(3) Every order, resolution, or vote, to which the concurrence of both Houses may be necessary, (except on a question of adjournment,) shall be presented to the President of the Confederate States; and before the same shall

take effect, shall be approved by him; or being disapproved by him, shall be re-passed by two-thirds of both Houses, according to the rules and limitations prescribed in case of a bill.

SEC. 8.—The Congress shall have power—

(1) To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, for revenue necessary to pay the debts, provide for the common defence, and carry on the Government of the Confederate States; but no bounties shall be granted from the treasury; nor shall any duties or taxes on importations from foreign nations be laid to promote or foster any branch of industry; and all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the Confederate States.

(2) To borrow money on the credit of the Confederate States.

(3) To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes; but neither this, nor any other clause contained in the Constitution, shall ever be construed to delegate the power to Congress to appropriate money for any internal improvement intended to facilitate commerce; except for the purpose of furnishing lights, beacons, and buoys, and other aids to navigation upon the coast, and the improvement of harbors, and the removing of obstructions in river navigation; in all which cases, such duties shall be laid on the navigation facilitated thereby, as may be necessary to pay the costs and expenses thereof.

(4) To establish uniform laws of naturalization, and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the Confederate States, but no law of Congress shall discharge any debt contracted before the passage of the same.

(5) To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, and fix the standard of weights and measures.

(6) To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the Confederate States.

(7) To establish post-offices and post-routes; but the expenses of the Post-office Department, after the first day

of March, in the year of our Lord eighteen hundred and sixty-three, shall be paid out of its own revenues.

(8) To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.

(9) To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court.

(10) To define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offences against the law of nations.

(11) To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and on water.

(12) To raise and support armies; but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years.

(13) To provide and maintain a navy.

(14) To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces.

(15) To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Confederate States; suppress insurrections, and repel invasions.

(16) To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the Confederate States; reserving to the States, respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.

(17) To exercise exclusive legislation, in all cases whatsoever, over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of one or more States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the government of the Confederate States; and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings, and

(18) To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers,

and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the Confederate States, or in any department or officer thereof.

SEC. 9.—(1) The importation of negroes of the African race, from any foreign country, other than the slaveholding States or Territories of the United States of America, is hereby forbidden; and Congress is required to pass such laws as shall effectually prevent the same.

(2) Congress shall also have power to prohibit the introduction of slaves from any State not a member of, or Territory not belonging to, this Confederacy.

(3) The privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.

(4) No bill of attainder, or *ex post facto* law, or law denying or impairing the right of property in negro slaves, shall be passed.

(5) No capitation or other direct tax shall be laid unless in proportion to the census or enumeration hereinbefore directed to be taken.

(6) No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State, except by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses.

(7) No preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one State over those of another.

(8) No money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law; and a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time.

(9) Congress shall appropriate no money from the treasury except by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses, taken by yeas and nays, unless it be asked and estimated for by some one of the heads of departments, and submitted to Congress by the President; or for the purpose of paying its own expenses and contingencies; or for the payment of claims against the Confederate States, the justice of which shall have been judicially declared by a tribunal for the

investigation of claims against the government, which it is hereby made the duty of Congress to establish.

(10) All bills appropriating money shall specify in federal currency the exact amount of each appropriation and the purposes for which it is made; and Congress shall grant no extra compensation to any public contractor, officer, agent, or servant, after such contract shall have been made or such service rendered.

(11) No title of nobility shall be granted by the Confederate States; and no person holding any office of profit or trust under them shall, without the consent of the Congress, accept of any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign state.

(12) Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for a redress of grievances.

(13) A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.

(14) No soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner; nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.

(15) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

(16) No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service, in time of war, or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor be compelled in any criminal case to be

a witness against himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.

(17) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted by the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; and to have the assistance of counsel for his defence.

(18) In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved; and no fact so tried by a jury shall be otherwise reëxamined in any court of the Confederacy, than according to the rules of the common law.

(19) Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.

(20) Every law, or resolution having the force of law, shall relate to but one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title.

SEC. 10.—(1) No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal; coin money; make any thing but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder; or *ex post facto* law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts; or grant any title of nobility.

(2) No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws; and the net produce of all duties and imposts, laid by any State on imports or exports, shall be for the use of the treasury of the Confederate States; and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of Congress.

(3) No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty on tonnage, except on sea-going vessels, for the

improvement of its rivers and harbors navigated by the said vessels; but such duties shall not conflict with any treaties of the Confederate States with foreign nations; and any surplus of revenue, thus derived, shall, after making such improvement, be paid into the common treasury; nor shall any State keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another State, or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay. But when any river divides or flows through two or more States, they may enter into compacts with each other to improve the navigation thereof.

ARTICLE II.

SEC. I.—(1) The executive power shall be vested in a President of the Confederate States of America. He and the Vice President shall hold their offices for the term of six years; but the President shall not be reëligible. The President and Vice President shall be elected as follows:

(2) Each State shall appoint, in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in Congress; but no Senator or Representative, or person holding an office of trust or profit under the Confederate States, shall be appointed an elector.

(3) The electors shall meet in their respective States and vote by ballot for President and Vice President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice President, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice President, and of the number of votes for each; which list they shall sign, and certify, and transmit, sealed, to the government of the Confederate States, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate

shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates, and the vote shall then be counted; the person having the greatest number of votes for President shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed; and if no person shall have such a majority, then, from the persons having the highest numbers, not exceeding three, on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But, in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by States, the representation from each State having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the States, and a majority of all the States shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President, whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the Vice President shall act as President, as in case of the death, or other constitutional disability of the President.

(4) The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice President shall be the Vice President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed; and if no person have a majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice President; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice.

(5) But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice President of the Confederate States.

(6) The Congress may determine the time of choosing the electors, and the day on which they shall give their votes; which day shall be the same throughout the Confederate States.

(7) No person except a natural born citizen of the Confederate States, or a citizen thereof at the time of the

adoption of this Constitution, or a citizen thereof born in the United States prior to the 20th December, 1860, shall be eligible to the office of President; neither shall any person be eligible to that office who shall not have attained the age of thirty-five years, and been fourteen years a resident within the limits of the Confederate States, as they may exist at the time of his election.

(8) In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice President; and the Congress may, by law, provide for the case of the removal, death, resignation, or inability both of the President and Vice President, declaring what officer shall then act as President, and such officer shall act accordingly until the disability be removed or a President shall be elected.

(9) The President shall, at stated times, receive for his services a compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the period for which he shall have been elected; and he shall not receive within that period any other emolument from the Confederate States, or any of them.

(10) Before he enters on the execution of the duties of his office, he shall take the following oath or affirmation:

“I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the Confederate States of America, and will, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution thereof.”

Sec. 2.—(1) The President shall be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the Confederate States, and of the militia of the several States, when called into the actual service of the Confederate States; he may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices; and he shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offences against the Confederate States, except in cases of impeachment.

(2) He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the Confederate States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments.

(3) The principal officer in each of the executive departments, and all persons connected with the diplomatic service, may be removed from office at the pleasure of the President. All other civil officers of the executive departments may be removed at any time by the President, or other appointing power, when their services are unnecessary, or for dishonesty, incapacity, inefficiency, misconduct, or neglect of duty; and when so removed, the removal shall be reported to the Senate, together with the reasons therefor.

(4) The President shall have power to fill all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of their next session; but no person rejected by the Senate shall be reappointed to the same office during the ensuing recess.

SEC. 3.—The President shall, from time to time, give to the Congress information of the state of the Confederacy, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them; and, in case of disagreement between them, with respect to the time of adjournment, he may adjourn them to such time as he may think proper; he shall receive ambassadors and other public ministers; he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and shall commission all the officers of the Confederate States.

SEC. 4.—The President and Vice President, and all civil officers of the Confederate States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for, or conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.

ARTICLE III.

SEC. 1.—The judicial power of the Confederate States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The judges, both of the Supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.

SEC. 2.—(1) The judicial power shall extend to all cases arising under this Constitution, the laws of the Confederate States, or treaties made or which shall be made under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the Confederate States shall be a party; to controversies between two or more States; between a State and citizens of another State, where the State is plaintiff; between citizens claiming lands under grants of different States, and between a State, or the citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens, or subjects; but no State shall be sued by a citizen or subject of any foreign State.

(2) In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make.

(3) The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury, and such trial shall be held in the State where the said crimes shall have been committed; but

when not committed within any State, the trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may by law have directed.

SEC. 3.—(1) Treason against the Confederate States shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court.

(2) The Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason, but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted.

ARTICLE IV.

SEC. 1.—Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may, by general laws, prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof.

SEC. 2.—(1) The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States, and shall have the right of transit and sojourn in any State of this Confederacy, with their slaves and other property; and the right of property in said slaves shall not be thereby impaired.

(2) A person charged in any State with treason, felony, or other crime against the laws of such State, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another State, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime.

(3) No slave or other person held to service or labor in any State or Territory of the Confederate States, under the laws thereof, escaping or lawfully carried into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor; but shall be delivered

up on claim of the party to whom such slave belongs, or to whom such service or labor may be due.

SEC. 3.—(1) Other States may be admitted into this Confederacy by a vote of two-thirds of the whole House of Representatives, and two-thirds of the Senate, the Senate voting by States; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the junction of two or more States, or parts of States, without the consent of the legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.

(2) The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations concerning the property of the Confederate States, including the lands thereof.

(3) The Confederate States may acquire new territory; and Congress shall have power to legislate and provide governments for the inhabitants of all territory belonging to the Confederate States, lying without the limits of the several States, and may permit them, at such times, and in such manner as it may by law provide, to form States to be admitted into the Confederacy. In all such territory, the institution of negro slavery, as it now exists in the Confederate States, shall be recognized and protected by Congress and by the territorial government; and the inhabitants of the several Confederate States and Territories shall have the right to take to such territory any slaves lawfully held by them in any of the States or Territories of the Confederate States.

(4) The Confederate States shall guarantee to every State that now is or hereafter may become a member of this Confederacy, a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on application of the legislature, (or of the executive when the legislature is not in session,) against domestic violence.

ARTICLE V.

SEC. 1.—Upon the demand of any three States, legally assembled in their several conventions, the Congress shall

summon a convention of all the States, to take into consideration such amendments to the Constitution as the said States shall concur in suggesting at the time when the said demand is made; and should any of the proposed amendments to the Constitution be agreed on by the said convention—voting by States—and the same be ratified by the legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, or by conventions in two-thirds thereof—as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the general convention—they shall thenceforward form a part of this Constitution. But no State shall, without its consent, be deprived of its equal representation in the Senate.

ARTICLE VI.

SEC. I.—(1) The government established by this Constitution is the successor of the Provisional Government of the Confederate States of America, and all the laws passed by the latter shall continue in force until the same shall be repealed or modified; and all the officers appointed by the same shall remain in office until their successors are appointed and qualified, or the offices abolished.

(2) All debts contracted and engagements entered into before the adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the Confederate States under this Constitution as under the Provisional Government.

(3) This Constitution, and the laws of the Confederate States made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the Confederate States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.

(4) The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the members of the several State legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of the Confederate States and of the several States, shall be bound, by oath or affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious

test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the Confederate States.

(5) The enumeration, in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people of the several States.

(6) The powers not delegated to the Confederate States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people thereof.

ARTICLE VII.

SEC. I.—(1) The ratification of the convention of five States shall be sufficient for the establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the same.

(2) When five States shall have ratified this Constitution in the manner before specified, the Congress, under the Provisional Constitution, shall prescribe the time for holding the election of President and Vice President, and for the meeting of the electoral college, and for counting the votes and inaugurating the President. They shall also prescribe the time for holding the first election of members of Congress under this Constitution, and the time for assembling the same. Until the assembling of such Congress, the Congress under the Provisional Constitution shall continue to exercise the legislative powers granted them; not extending beyond the time limited by the Constitution of the Provisional Government.

APPENDIX II

INAUGURAL ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT JEFFERSON DAVIS

*Gentlemen of the Congress of the Confederate States of America,
Friends, and Fellow-Citizens:*

CALLED to the difficult and responsible station of Chief Executive of the Provisional Government which you have instituted, I approach the discharge of the duties assigned me with an humble distrust of my abilities, but with a sustaining confidence in the wisdom of those who are to guide and aid me in the administration of public affairs, and an abiding faith in the virtue and patriotism of the people. Looking forward to the speedy establishment of a permanent government to take the place of this, and which by its greater moral and physical power will be better able to combat with the many difficulties which arise from the conflicting interests of separate nations, I enter upon the duties of the office to which I have been chosen, with the hope that the beginning of our career as a Confederacy may not be obstructed by hostile opposition to our enjoyment of the separate existence and independence which we have asserted, and which, with the blessing of Providence, we intend to maintain.

Our present condition, achieved in a manner unprecedented in the history of nations, illustrates the American idea that governments rest upon the consent of the governed, and that it is the right of the people to alter and abolish governments whenever they become destructive to the ends

for which they were established. The declared compact of the Union from which we have withdrawn was to establish justice, ensure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity; and when in the judgment of the sovereign States now composing this Confederacy, it has been perverted from the purposes for which it was ordained, and ceased to answer the ends for which it was established, a peaceful appeal to the ballot-box declared that, so far as they were concerned, the government created by that compact should cease to exist. In this they merely asserted the right which the Declaration of Independence of 1776 defined to be inalienable. Of the time and occasion of its exercise they as sovereigns were the final judges, each for itself. The impartial, enlightened verdict of mankind will vindicate the rectitude of our conduct; and He who knows the hearts of men will judge of the sincerity with which we labored to preserve the government of our fathers in its spirit.

The right solemnly proclaimed at the birth of the States, and which has been affirmed and reaffirmed in the bills of rights of the States subsequently admitted into the Union of 1789, undeniably recognizes in the people the power to resume the authority delegated for the purposes of government. Thus the sovereign States here represented proceeded to form this Confederacy; and it is by the abuse of language that their act has been denominated revolution. They formed a new alliance, but within each State its government has remained. The rights of person and property have not been disturbed. The agent through whom they communicated with foreign nations is changed, but this does not necessarily interrupt their international relations. Sustained by the consciousness that the transition from the former Union to the present Confederacy has not proceeded from a disregard on our part of our just obligations or any failure to perform every constitutional duty, moved by no interest or passion to invade the rights of others, anxious to

cultivate peace and commerce with all nations, if we may not hope to avoid war, we may at least expect that posterity will acquit us of having needlessly engaged in it. Doubly justified by the absence of wrong on our part, and by wanton aggression on the part of others, there can be no cause to doubt that the courage and patriotism of the people of the Confederate States will be found equal to any measures of defence which soon their security may require.

An agricultural people, whose chief interest is the export of a commodity required in every manufacturing country, our true policy is peace, and the freest trade which our necessities will permit. It is alike our interest and that of all those to whom we would sell and from whom we would buy, that there should be the fewest practicable restrictions upon the interchange of commodities. There can be but little rivalry between ours and any manufacturing or navigating community, such as the northeastern States of the American Union. It must follow, therefore, that mutual interest would invite good will and kind offices. If, however, passion or lust of dominion should cloud the judgment or inflame the ambition of those States, we must prepare to meet the emergency and maintain by the final arbitrament of the sword the position which we have assumed among the nations of the earth.

We have entered upon a career of independence, and it must be inflexibly pursued through many years of controversy with our late associates of the Northern States. We have vainly endeavored to secure tranquillity and obtain respect for the rights to which we were entitled. As a necessity, not a choice, we have resorted to the remedy of separation, and henceforth our energies must be directed to the conduct of our own affairs, and the perpetuity of the Confederacy which we have formed. If a just perception of mutual interest shall permit us peaceably to pursue our separate political career, my most earnest desire will have been fulfilled. But if this be denied us, and the integrity of our territory and jurisdiction be assailed, it will but

remain for us with firm resolve to appeal to arms and invoke the blessing of Providence on a just cause.

As a consequence of our new condition, and with a view to meet anticipated wants, it will be necessary to provide a speedy and efficient organization of the branches of the executive department having special charge of foreign intercourse, finance, military affairs, and postal service. For purposes of defence the Confederate States may, under ordinary circumstances, rely mainly upon their militia; but it is deemed advisable in the present condition of affairs, that there should be a well-instructed, disciplined army, more numerous than would usually be required on a peace establishment. I also suggest that, for the protection of our harbors and commerce on the high seas, a navy adapted to those objects will be required. These necessities have, doubtless, engaged the attention of Congress.

With a Constitution differing only from that of our fathers in so far as it is explanatory of their well-known intent, freed from sectional conflicts, which have interfered with the pursuit of the general welfare, it is not unreasonable to expect that the States from which we have recently parted may seek to unite their fortunes to ours, under the government which we have instituted. For this your Constitution makes adequate provision, but beyond this, if I mistake not, the judgment and will of the people are, that union with the States from which they have separated is neither practicable nor desirable. To increase the power, develop the resources, and promote the happiness of the Confederacy, it is requisite there should be so much homogeneity that the welfare of every portion would be the aim of the whole. Where this does not exist antagonisms are engendered which must and should result in separation.

Actuated solely by a desire to preserve our own rights, and to promote our own welfare, the separation of the Confederate States has been marked by no aggression upon others, and followed by no domestic convulsion. Our industrial pursuits have received no check, the cultivation

of our fields progresses as heretofore, and even should we be involved in war, there would be no considerable diminution in the production of the staples which have constituted our exports, in which the commercial world has an interest scarcely less than our own. This common interest of producer and consumer can only be intercepted by an exterior force which should obstruct its transmission to foreign markets, a course of conduct which would be detrimental to manufacturing and commercial interests abroad.

Should reason guide the action of the government from which we have separated, a policy so detrimental to the civilized world, the Northern States included, could not be dictated by even a stronger desire to inflict injury upon us; but if it be otherwise, a terrible responsibility will rest upon it, and the suffering of millions will bear testimony to the folly and wickedness of our aggressors. In the mean time there will remain to us, besides the ordinary remedies before suggested, the well-known resources for retaliation upon the commerce of an enemy.

Experience in public stations of a subordinate grade to this which your kindness has conferred, has taught me that care and toil and disappointments are the price of official elevation. You will see many errors to forgive, many deficiencies to tolerate; but you shall not find in me either want of zeal or fidelity to the cause that is to me the highest in hope and of most enduring affection. Your generosity has bestowed upon me an undeserved distinction, one which I neither sought nor desired. Upon the continuance of that sentiment, and upon your wisdom and patriotism, I rely to direct and support me in the performance of the duties required at my hands.

We have changed the constituent parts but not the system of our government. The Constitution formed by our fathers is that of these Confederate States. In their exposition of it, and in the judicial construction it has received, we have a light which reveals its true meaning. Thus instructed as to the just interpretation of that instrument,

and ever remembering that all offices are but trusts held for the people, and that delegated powers are to be strictly construed, I will hope by due diligence in the performance of my duties, though I may disappoint your expectation, yet to retain, when retiring, something of the good will and confidence which will welcome my entrance into office.

It is joyous in the midst of perilous times to look around upon a people united in heart, when one purpose of high resolve animates and actuates the whole, where the sacrifices to be made are not weighed in the balance against honor, right, liberty, and equality. Obstacles may retard, but they cannot long prevent the progress of a movement sanctioned by its justice and sustained by a virtuous people. Reverently let us invoke the God of our fathers to guide and protect us in our efforts to perpetuate the principles which by His blessing they were able to vindicate, establish, and transmit to their posterity; and with a continuance of His favor, ever gratefully acknowledged, we may hopefully look forward to success, to peace, to prosperity.

APPENDIX III

EXECUTIVE OFFICERS OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES—1861-1865

President, Jefferson Davis, February 18, 1861.

Vice-president, Alexander H. Stephens, February 18, 1861.

Secretary of State, Robert Toombs, February 21, 1861; Robert M. T. Hunter, July 25, 1861; William M. Browne, *ad interim*, February 17, 1862; Judah P. Benjamin, March 18, 1862.


Attorney-general, Judah P. Benjamin, February 25, 1861; Thomas Bragg, November 21, 1861; Thomas H. Watts, March 18, 1862 (no definite information as to the end of Mr. Watts's period of service; he became Governor of Alabama on December 21, 1863); Wade Keyes, *ad interim*; George Davis, January 2, 1864.

Secretary of the Treasury, Christopher G. Memminger, February 21, 1861; George A. Trenholm, July 18, 1864.

Secretary of the Navy, Stephen R. Mallory, March 4, 1861.

Postmaster-general, Henry T. Ellet, February 25, 1861 (declined the appointment); John H. Reagan, March 6, 1861.

Secretary of War, Leroy P. Walker, February 21 to September 16, 1861; Judah P. Benjamin, November 21, 1861 (was also acting from September 17 to November 21, 1861, and from March 18 to March 23, 1862); Brigadier-general George W. Randolph, March 18, 1862; Major-general Gustavus W. Smith (assigned temporarily), November 17, 1862; James A. Seddon, November 21, 1862; Major-general John C. Breckinridge, February 6, 1865.



APPENDIX IV

MEETINGS OF THE CONFEDERATE CONGRESS

PROVISIONAL CONGRESS

First Session.—Assembled at Montgomery, Alabama, February 4, 1861. Adjourned March 16, 1861, to meet on the second Monday in May.

Second Session (called).—Met at Montgomery, Alabama, April 29, 1861. Adjourned May 21, 1861.

Third Session.—Met at Richmond, Virginia, July 20, 1861. Adjourned August 31, 1861.

Fourth Session (called).—Met at Richmond, Virginia, September 3, 1861. Adjourned the same day.

Fifth Session.—Met at Richmond, Virginia, November 18, 1861. Adjourned February 17, 1862.

FIRST CONGRESS

First Session.—Met at Richmond, Virginia, February 18, 1862. Adjourned April 21, 1862.

Second Session.—Met at Richmond, Virginia, August 18, 1862. Adjourned October 13, 1862.

Third Session.—Met at Richmond, Virginia, January 12, 1863. Adjourned May 1, 1863.

Fourth Session.—Met at Richmond, Virginia, December 7, 1863. Adjourned February 17, 1864.

SECOND CONGRESS

First Session.—Met at Richmond, Virginia, May 2, 1864. Adjourned June 14, 1864.

Second Session.—Met at Richmond, Virginia, November 7, 1864. Adjourned March 18, 1865.

Scrubland

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